00028020

NOT TO BE ISSUED
OUT OF THE LIBRARY.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
TOWN HALL, BOMBAY.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 02 April, 2016

REMARKS

ON THE

NATIVE TROOPS

OF THE

INDIAN ARMY.

By MAJOR JOHN JACOB.

RR-27

LONDON:
1854.

00028020

On the contrary, self-government is essential to the Anglo-Saxon race.

These principles are felt as much, and are of as much force in our Indian army, as in respect to the Indian people generally. But they do not appear to be fully understood by either our generals or our statesmen.

The Native soldiers, to be in a really efficient state, must look on their immediate commander, the head of the regiment, as their absolute prince, as the paramount authority, as far as they are concerned.

Concentrating all real power at head-quarters of the army, and leaving none to the commanding officers of regiments, has been attended with ruinous results.

In many instances the Sepoy has been allowed and encouraged to look on his regimental commander as his natural enemy; and in the Bengal army, at least, to forward secret complaints against him to army head-quarters. While courts-martial, articles of war, rules and regulations bewilder the native soldier, and fill his mind with the idea that his officers are wishing to keep him out of his rights, he knows not what, but certainly important ones, or such a fuss would not be made about them.

The only principle of military discipline which a native Indian soldier thoroughly understands is obedience to his commanding officer. He cannot, without great injury to efficiency, be taught to look beyond him.

On the regimental commander he should, and must, to be in a healthy state, wholly depend. Enlistment, discharge, promotion to all ranks, and everything else, should rest with the regimental commander alone. There should be no articles of war (at least none of the nature of those at present in force, to the ruin of our

Native army); but the commanding officer should have full powers in his own right over his men.

The want of power intrusted to regimental commanders is one enormous evil now existing in our Native army. It is perhaps a necessary consequence of another very great error.

The seniority rise among the officers of a Native regiment, originally appointed at hazard, renders it impossible at present to ensure their being at the head of each Native regiment a man capable of wielding the powers necessary to govern it efficiently and well.

This is the great difficulty experienced at head-quarters; this is the stumbling block of all honest reformers, and must be overcome and removed before anything can be done towards effectually remedying existing difficulties.

The posting of officers to Native regiments, without regard to qualification, is a proceeding attended with ruinous consequences.

The presence of unselected Europeans, in such numbers as are at present borne on the strength of Native corps of the line, is not less ruinous.

Qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of native Indian soldiers. One active, energetic, right-feeling, and right-thinking English gentleman can even, when alone, infuse an excellent spirit into thousands of these Eastern soldiers, till they will follow him anywhere, obey him in all things, and feel the greatest pride in acting in his absence as they know he would wish them to do if present.

The feelings thus engendered are most powerful and most honourable.

The Native officers and men feel the deepest gratitude

towards him who has raised their moral, intellectual, and worldly position, and are actuated by the strongest wish and energetic zeal to show that they are worthy of the respectable position in which they find themselves.

With thirty Europeans, on the contrary, instead of one, the Native officer finds himself of no importance, and the Sepoy becomes a lifeless automaton.

The Englishman becomes too common to be held in proper and wholesome respect. He is seen holding no important position, but in the performance of trifling duties which any Native officer or non-commissioned officer would do equally well. He is often seen idling away his time in frivolous, or wasting his energies in vicious, pursuits. The prestige of the superior race is thus destroyed, while it too often happens that the European officer, having nothing important to occupy him, loses somewhat of his own self-respect.

The young boy is placed in command of the old soobadar, from whom, when anything is to be done, he has to crave instruction; and the men see that, so far from taking a pride in them and in the service, their European officers are generally longing to be removed from them, craving intensely for staff appointments, &c.

The example of the idle, the evil-minded, and the indifferent, does more harm than the good can remedy. To be in a healthy state the Native soldier should never see his European officer living an idle, useless life, or holding a degraded or unimportant position. While the European officer should be proud of his men, and as Sir J. Malcolm most justly observed (Government of India, Appendix E, paragraph 25), it should be arranged that the command of Native corps should be the most sought after of all existing appointments.

A most unwise adoption of every useless form of office, paper-work, style of dress, and accoutrements, has accompanied the excess of indifferent European officers with the Native Indian army. Real efficiency has been in all things sacrificed to appearance. Voluminous "returns," &c., on paper, pervert the attention of commanding officers and adjutants from their really important duties, while knapsacks, basket-hats, stocks, tight clothing, pipe-clayed belts, and other unspeakable absurdities, introduced in imitation of European follies, are quite sufficient to crush and cripple the soldiers without much effort on the part of an enemy.

But it is not my intention at present to enter into minute details. My wish is now only to set forth the true principles on which the efficiency of our Native Indian army depends.

I will, therefore, now briefly endeavour to show how, in my opinion, all the defects now existing in our Native Indian army may be remedied.

It is first, perhaps, necessary that I should state my own opportunities of forming sound opinions on these matters. Wherefore I may mention that my first seven years of service were passed at the head-quarters of an European battalion of artillery, in those days exactly similar to an European regiment of infantry. I then for nearly three years commanded a detached company of Native artillery with a field battery. I then held a civil appointment in Guzzerat, and next served with the horse and foot artillery in Affghaunistan, Beloochistan, &c., and since 1841 I have commanded the Sinde Irregular Horse. This corps consists of two regiments, each 800 strong; with each of these regiments I have only two European officers under me. During the last seven

years the Sinde Irregular Horse has been posted, and actively employed on the Sinde frontier, and during the whole period of its existence, the corps has been constantly on actual service of some kind or other.

The men composing the corps are not Sindees or Beloochees, of whom there is not a single man in its ranks, but the whole 1600 men are Hindustanees and Deccanees. The raw material is exactly like that of the Sepoys of the Bengal and Bombay armies, chiefly resembling the former. Three-fourths of the men are Mussulmans, the remainder Hindoos. The Sepoys, then, of the Sinde Irregular Horse, are fair average specimens of the Indian soldiers.

I have been allowed to manage, discipline, and govern the corps in every way pretty much according to my own ideas, without interference from any one, wherefore, during the twelve years past, the principles acted on must have been well tested in practice, and have resulted unmistakably in good or evil. There can remain no room for doubt as to whether three European officers suffice for a Native Indian regiment, or otherwise.

The conduct of the corps when on service has appeared in various public despatches, Parliamentary proceedings, &c., wherefore it is not necessary here to enter into detail regarding it. Other particulars less known are not less significant as to its state, with its two and a half Europeans to a regiment. There are ten permanent outposts on the Sinde frontier held by detachments of the Sinde Irregular Horse, of various strengths, from 40 to 120 men each; these outposts are all commanded by Native officers. A high degree of intelligence and vigilance is required to conduct their duties properly, yet no

European officers could perform these duties better than they are performed at present.

The Native officers command their troops and squadrons everywhere, and occasionally a regiment on parade, with as much readiness and facility as European officers of average ability and acquirement. While both officers and men are ready, willing, and able to do effective service against any enemy in any part of the world.

Another fact is very significant, and is, I think, unique. On referring to the defaulters' books of the two regiments, I find that during full five years past but 53 men of the 1st regiment, and 52 of the 2nd, have been brought before me, and punished for various offences, great and small. Of these offences, many were committed by the same individual on different occasions, and the total number of offenders of every kind during five years amounts to 80 out of 1600 men, or 1 in 100 per annum.

This corps, then, with five European officers to two regiments, is not inferior to its neighbours in conduct in quarters, or efficiency in the field.

The principles contended for have, therefore, to this extent proved true in practice.

It is necessary to bring forward these instances, because our highest authority, Sir John Malcolm, asserts (Minute on the State of the Bombay Army, 25th March, 1828, Para 6) that with few officers, though answering admirably for local purposes, Native regiments would not be fit for general duties.

This opinion of Sir John's, events have since proved, as shown above, to be erroneous. The presence of a

great number of European officers, and the assimilation of everything to an European model, however absurd that model may be, has enabled the Native army to accord in all outward appearances, ceremonies, and forms, to the European armies, but its real efficiency has been thereby destroyed. A Sepoy of the line, dressed in a tight coat, trousers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot stoop at all, bound to an immense and totally useless knapsack, so that he can hardly breathe, strapped, belted, and pipe-clayed within a hair's breadth of his life, with a rigid basket chako on his head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance there, and which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour, and with a leather stock round his neck, to complete his absurd costume, when compared with the same Sepoy clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with regard to his comfort and efficiency, forms the most perfect example of what is madly called the "Regular" system with many European officers, contrasted with the system of common sense now recommended for adoption.

Let the common-sense system be adopted, and nearly one-half of the cost of the Native army of India might be saved to the State by reduction in the number of European officers, while the real strength and military power of the army would be more than doubled.

It is quite as absurd to force all our European forms of courts-martial, &c., &c., on our Native soldiers as it is to force them to cripple themselves with our ridiculous chakos, &c., instead of their own most soldier-like, easy, and neat puggrees. Let the foolish system which crushes the Native soldier, and requires so many Europeans to render him useless, all go together. Abolish it

in toto, and have recourse to common sense, reason, and experience.

It will not be difficult, if prejudice be lost sight of for a while, to show how principles similar to those proved to lead to good results, can be applied with overpowering advantage to the Native army of India generally.

Few European officers only, and those carefully selected and intrusted with full powers, must be appointed to Native Regiments.

Three officers to a regiment would suffice. That four be appointed—a Commandant, a Second in Command, an Adjutant, and a Quarter-Master.

No army rank solely to be regarded, but individuals to be selected on the professed principle, at least, of being best qualified.

Sir John Malcolm proposed that the regiments of officers should be retained as they now stand in the "Army List," but not have regiments of men attached to them. All officers of the Native Indian army to be, in fact, unattached, and that from the whole body properly qualified individuals should be selected for staff appointments, &c., &c. The plan appears a good one, and practicable enough, but it appears to me that we have a better. Let all the officers of the Indian army be borne on the strength of the European portion of it. We know that any amount of excess of English officers with English regiments can do no harm, and the numbers of officers of artillery and engineers are totally irrespective of the numbers of the men of those corps.

Suppose, then, in round numbers, the Bombay Army to be composed as follows:—

Let each regiment or battalion of officers consist of—

2 Colonels.
4 Lieutenant-Colonels.
4 Majors.
16 Captains.
16 Lieutenants.
16 Ensigns.

58 Total

Say that there be six battalions of artillery, 58 each 348
Three battalions of engineers . . . 174
Four European regiments of infantry . 232
One „ „ cavalry . . 58

Total European officers for the whole army 812

Of these there would be appointed to—say
30 Native infantry regiments at 4 each . 120
6 Native cavalry regiments . . . 24
Staff appointments—say 180
Sick and on furlough 80

Total 404

Balance for duty with 14 European battalions 408

(I would have no native artillery). Numbers and details might be altered and re-arranged to any extent, but the above will show the principle on which a sufficient fund of European energy and talent might be placed at the disposal of the Indian Government for the performance of public duties of all kinds. The highest appointments being the prizes for the most worthy. While the

principle of posting a few selected officers to native regiments, instead of a crowd taken at hazard, might be fully carried out, and for all manner of duty the individual most fitted, might easily be selected without incurring the enormous cost of more Europeans, or having to face the apparently insurmountable difficulties of an Indian Staff-appointment Corps (it is nonsense calling it a staff corps, which means quite a different thing). The appointments to native regiments, both of horse and foot, should be considered as the highest prizes of all in their various grades, and should be made so both in station and emolument. The allowances should be such as to cause the commands of Native corps to be sought after by lieut.-colonels, and to have commandants of that rank in the army would be an advantage, but rank *alone* should never be considered in such appointments. The principle of giving them to those best qualified for them should always be acted upon and strictly followed out.

All pipe-clay, metaphorical and actual, should be at once abolished; black leather accoutrements should be adopted, and no difficulties should be made or allowed to exist with regard to the introduction of improvements generally, in respect to arms, clothing, accoutrements, and all else.

The disgraceful system of paying colonels, by "tailors' cabbage," called off-reckoning, should be abolished.

The pay of both men and officers should be somewhat increased, and every man should be compelled (as in good Silidar Corps) at all times and in all places to be provided with sufficient carriage for his kit, &c.

Under such arrangements and so organized, the Native army of India would be fully capable of going anywhere

and doing anything. It would be equal to the encounter with equal numbers of any troops in continental Europe, and of course far superior to any Asiatic enemy.

It is a grave mistake to suppose, as we are often told, that it is necessary to enlist men of the Northern tribes, Patans, Belooche, Goorkas, &c., to enable our Indian army to encounter successfully the warlike tribes now on our Indian frontier.

The Mussulmans of *Hindustan*, are the very best men for our army. The Patans, &c., are faithless and treacherous. *These* are very bold, brave, strong, well-made, active men, fully equal in these respects, to the Affghauns (though the latter be the stouter looking of the two). They are generally most excellent horsemen, and many enlist in our Cavalry regiments, but under the present system no great numbers are found in the Infantry corps of the line.

There cannot be better Eastern soldiers than these men make when properly treated. They have scarcely more prejudices of religion, &c. than Englishmen; they have most liberal ideas as compared with those of the Hindoo Sepoys, to whom they are in every way superior beings. With all this they are the most faithful and trustworthy of any men in India; they are, in fact, more like gentlemen than any other class of Indians.

With such men in our ranks, and a fixed head-quarters for each regiment, where their families could remain in safety and comfort while the corps might be absent on service, the Native troops of the Indian army might be employed on foreign service for any length of time, and at any distance from their homes; and the time may possibly not be far distant when their services may be of the greatest value.

There is one erroneous opinion, with regard to our Native Indian troops, which would appear unworthy of notice, were it not that it has lately proceeded from those considered to be high authorities on these matters, but who in truth were totally ignorant of the feelings and springs of action of our Indian soldiery.

I allude to the often-expressed opinion, that if we were to make too much of our Native officers, they would take the command from us. Nothing can possibly be more unfounded, more contrary to truth than such an idea. We hold India by being in reality as in reputation a superior race to the Asiatic. If this natural superiority did not exist, we should not and could not retain the country for one week.

Whatever tends to make European gentlemen "cheap," to lessen their evident value, to hold up their vices rather than their virtues, to the view of the Natives, to show them to the Indians only in inferior positions where their powers are not called forth, and where they have little influence for good, must tend to destroy in no slight degree the hold which we have on the people.

Whatever raises the European character in the eyes of the natives of India and in reality, must greatly add to our security and power.

The Native officers feel the greatest devotion and gratitude towards their European commanders who most succeed in raising their character and position. *The more the European is able to improve them, the greater does he appear in their estimation.* They cannot govern themselves, they are too proud to submit to an equal, but they will all with the greatest delight and pride submit to the English gentleman, whom they all acknowledge and feel to be their superior.

If we really are a morally superior race, governed by higher motives and possessing higher attributes than the Asiatics, the more the Natives of India are able to understand us, the more they will know and feel this, and the firmer will be our power.

If we are not superior to the Indians, the attempt to retain our sovereignty will be as hopeless and vain as it would be vicious.

England neither can be nor wishes to be powerful in evil. Let us strive to do what good we can, and we shall prosper; no other principles will succeed. To attempt to keep the nations of India or the Native soldiers of the Indian army in darkness and ignorance, in the hope of increasing our power over them, will be as contemptible and base as it would be unwise and useless.

The better example we set them, the more we make them feel the value of truth and honesty, the more we can raise their moral and intellectual powers, the firmer must we stand as their rulers.

JOHN JACOB.

I have just received and read a posthumous work of Sir C. J. Napier's, edited by Sir W. Napier, and entitled "Defects, Civil and Military, of the Indian Government," and in continuation of the subject of a paper lately sent to you by me on the Native troops of the Indian army, I think it right to offer some remarks on a passage in the work above mentioned, relating to promotion of Native officers by seniority (pages 235 to 240).

In page 235, line 20, the substitution of "and" by the author for "or" in the original, which he pretends to quote, completely alters the sense.

But without any reference to anonymous pamphleteers or unknown "Bombay Officers," I, John Jacob, Commandant of the Sinde Irregular Horse, plainly and deliberately assert that any one who, wishing well to the Native army of India, advocates promoting the Native officers and non-commissioned officers of that army by seniority only, must undoubtedly be deplorably ignorant of the real merits of the matter.

My means of forming correct opinions on these matters have been stated in my paper on the Native Indian army above alluded to, and need not be here repeated.

The assertion of Sir C. or Sir W. Napier, page 237, of the book above mentioned, that, "according to the Bombay Officer," it is right to place the brave old "Sepoy at the caprice of prejudiced and ignorant commanding officers," is simply a falsehood. The "Bombay Officer" never asserted any such thing, but he strongly advocated the having as commanding officers men *not* governed by caprice, ignorance, &c., and leaving the promotions to *them*, and I now assert that such is the only wise course of proceeding. A better instance need not be adduced as an example than that mentioned (at page 237) of the drill-corporal.

Men are often very good soldiers, having three or four medals on their breasts, &c., who are as unfit to be drill-masters as any old woman taken at haphazard out of any village; yet such men are, according to our author, to be promoted, if senior, rather than one really efficient.

It is difficult enough to find half-a-dozen really good drill-masters in any regiment; but if they are to be chosen not by qualification but by seniority, it would be far better to have none at all.

The seniority system, so far from being just, is the

greatest possible injustice to the really deserving men, while it holds out the greatest possible encouragement to the lazy, the idle, and the good-for-nothing. Throw everything open to fair competition, and let the best man win. This is the style of justice which Sepoys and all other men really like best in their hearts. Let their be no favoritism, but let the European officers honestly and continually endeavour to choose the *best* men for promotion, and the best possible feeling will assuredly be created and maintained between them and their Native soldiers.

I and all my officers have acted on these principles for twelve years with one regiment, and for eight years past with two regiments, and with what effect! though I have but two European officers under me for each regiment. The whole corps of the Sinde Irregular Horse is as if it had but one heart and mind; any difference of feeling on common interest between the officers and men would be as unnatural, as quarrel between a man's hand and limbs.

The evidence of hostile witnesses is the strongest proof in our favour.

Sir W. Napier has assailed me personally with all manner of coarse and vulgar scurrility, and gross and infamous falsehoods. He cannot be supposed capable of *partiality* towards me or mine; but even he, with all the peculiar and characteristic disregard of truth displayed in his writings, dare not write otherwise than in terms of high praise of our discipline, &c.

At page 191 of the "Administration of Sinde," he says, after describing our proceedings at Shahpoor in 1845, "It was a fine example of generous discipline." Again, at page 262, "The Sinde horsemen (the Moguel-

aces) whose matchless ability for irregular warfare did not keep them from being the foremost in the field, and charge when solid hosts were to be broken."

It is true that this passage is mingled with numerous false assertions, such as that Sir C. Napier "in a measure created the Sinde Irregular Horse," and placed Major Jacob in command, &c.

The truth being that the Sinde Horse, raised in 1839, had done a great deal of excellent work, and seen a very great deal of the hardest service, under Curties, Clarke, and Malcolm, during the three years previous to Sir Charles Napier's arrival in Sinde; while I, their present commander, selected not by Sir C. Napier but by Colonel Outram, received the command in December, 1841, and have held it ever since. The corps has been increased since I joined it from 500 to 1600 men, and was 600 strong when Sir C. Napier arrived in Sinde. The discipline of the corps then being allowed on all hands to be perfect, the principles on which it has been so long formed and led cannot be bad.

Those principles have been constantly and perseveringly applied, in spite of all prejudice and opposition, from men esteemed of authority in these matters, during a period of twelve years with the happiest effect. A new generation of soldiers has sprung up under them. I have now in my ranks hundreds of fine young men, some of them Native officers, the sons of my old soldiers, who were little boys when I received the command: these indeed form our best men, they are born and bred soldiers. In several instances the sons have superseded their old fathers in rank; one even obtained his commission while his father, a most respectable and efficient soldier, but totally unfit for further promotion, as he

himself well knew, was still a naique (corporal). Every man has been chosen to the utmost of my ability by merit, fitness, and qualifications alone, and every member of the corps is pleased, contented, and happy thereat. A soldier-like pride is, under such a system, created in every man's breast; he scorns to owe his promotion to favour or seniority. The highest Native officers, gentlemen of birth and property as well as rank in the army (be it remembered), place their sons in our ranks as private soldiers, asking for them no favour whatever, but letting them take their chance with the rest. Men are required to pass an examination in drill, &c., before they are considered eligible for promotion, and no length of service nor any brave deeds are allowed to supersede the necessity of this. The system works admirably; and while others have been writing and theorizing, we have reduced these things to the *test of actual experience*. Similar principles adopted in the whole Native army of India would necessarily produce similar effects.

At page 240 Sir Charles, or his editor Sir W. Napier, again pretends to quote the words of the "Bombay officer," thus—"The Bombay Officer says those who study Hindustanee books cannot study Hindustanee men, and that those who study the language necessarily know less of it than he who don't study it."

This quotation is wholly and wilfully false! The pamphlet from which it is pretended to have been extracted is now before me: nothing of the kind appears in it; but at page 27 of the pamphlet appears the following passage: "I have had abundant opportunity of judging of this matter, and I solemnly assure my honourable masters that it is notorious that their officers, who have passed in the language, are not only

not the most able of their servants, but that they have, as a body (there are brilliant exceptions of course), *less knowledge of that language* for practical purposes than the unpassed. That is if language be intended to facilitate the communication of ideas between man and man, and not for concealing thoughts. This may appear paradoxical, but a little consideration soon shows that it must be so.

"While the young man *has been studying Hindustanee books, the other has been studying Hindustanee men.* I have on hundreds of occasions seen a youthful genius *who had passed* in the language, entirely at a loss to understand the expressions used by the common peasant, and quite incapable of maintaining a conversation with him; while one of the unpassed, who could not read a word in a Hindustanee *book*, but had been accustomed to associate with the *people*, would talk with the man with perfect fluency. A knowledge of the people of India, of their thoughts, habits, feelings, beliefs, desires, wants, &c., is learnt not from Hindustanee books, but from intercourse with the people themselves; and my honourable masters may well believe me when I tell them that such knowledge is of far more importance to their service and to India than the most intimate acquaintance with all the Hindustanee books ever written."

In this passage the author of the pamphlet asserts, that which I also here state to be a fact, that the "passed" men, as a body, have not (or at least had not) studied the language or the habits, &c., of the people so well as the "unpassed," and that the latter are, or at least were, practically the better informed of the two classes in these respects.

Undoubtedly officers should speak the language of their men; it is folly to suppose otherwise; but the examination before a committee, as at present conducted, is often no criterion of proficiency in this respect. The best practical linguists, and those best acquainted with the ideas of the Sepoys, are often rejected, while many a man so perfectly master of the grammar and phraseology of the Moonshees, and the elegancies of the language on paper, as to be wholly unintelligible to the Sepoy, passes with éclat.

The best security for fitness is the opinion and approval of the commanding officers, who, if treated with proper consideration, and allowed sufficient power, would take very good care that their subalterns were well qualified.

Again, if passing an examination in the Hindustanee language (*not* knowledge of the language be it remembered, which is a different affair) be a necessary qualification for officers serving with Native troops, it seems strange that, by the orders now in force, the only situations in the Indian service for which such passing is *not* required are those of officers doing regimental duty. "Officers who do not pass are to remain with their regiments."

JOHN JACOB.

RIFLE PRACTICE:

BY

MAJOR JOHN JACOB, C.B.,

OF THE BOMBAY ARTILLERY.

Nº 1.



Nº 2.



Nº 4.



Nº 5.



Improved Minié Balls used without Cups

Nº 3.



Original Minié Ball with iron Cup.

Nº 6.



Nº 6 Perfect shape for Rifle Balls

A.B. 2 Diameters
C.D. 2 " "
A.C. 2½ " "
B.D. ½ " "

From E, to E, the ball is cylindrical, from A, to E it is defined by arcs of circles described from the centres C, with the radius C.A.

Nº 7.



Rifle Shell formed exactly as Ball Nº 6. but cast with a deep hole at the smaller end in which is fixed a Copper Tube filled with detonating powder.

RIFLE PRACTICE:

BY

MAJOR JOHN JACOB, C.B.,

OF THE BOMBAY ARTILLERY,

COMMANDANT OF THE SINDE IRREGULAR HORSE, AND ON THE FRONTIER OF UPPER SINDE;

HONORARY A.D.C. TO THE MOST NOBLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, ETC., ETC.

WITH TWO PLATES.

LONDON:

SMITH, ELDER, AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.

BOMBAY: SMITH, TAYLOR, AND CO.

1855.

RIFLE PRACTICE.

Man has been called a tool-making animal; and it is certain that the perfection of tools and machinery is a clear and certain mark of advancing civilization, of the progress of the rule of mind over matter, of the development and operation of those laws by which the working of the human brain makes the force of one civilized man equal that of the stalwart limbs of thousands, or even millions, of untaught and ignorant barbarians.

In no country on earth has this been more apparent than in England; to no people on earth have the tools and machinery of the arts been of more importance than to the English.

It was said, and truly said, by one of the greatest of modern statesmen, that it was the spinning machinery of Arkwright which enabled England so long to stand alone, and to stand successfully, against the world in arms.

If such be the value of the tools employed in the arts of peace, those used in war must be even of greater importance. On success in war often depends

the power to follow peaceful pursuits; on the high state of the art of war, the practice of all other arts may depend.

The military art, like all others, can only approach towards perfection by the use of the most perfect tools and machinery attainable.

Yet, notwithstanding this certain truth, it is notorious that the inferiority of the arms used by modern English soldiers, was, for long, a disgrace to the intelligence of the age, and an outrage on common sense, when compared with the high state of perfection to which the manufacture of arms, as of all other tools and machinery, has been brought to in England.

Impressed with the importance of the subject to the policy of nations, and having been a diligent amateur mechanic since childhood, I have, for twenty-five years past, paid much attention to the improvement of rifled fire-arms, with which I have, during the last ten years, been carrying on a great variety of experiments, on a scale probably almost unequalled, even by public bodies, elsewhere.

The result of these experiments I have, from time to time, freely communicated to Government; in doing so I had no thought whatever of honour or reward of any kind, and in truth I have received but little encouragement from authority. In placing at the disposal of Government the knowledge which I have acquired with great labour and expense, I have been actuated solely by the wish of being useful to my country, and thought that I was doing my duty to the public in making known what might prove of the

highest importance to the success of our arms in war. Still under the influence of these sentiments, and at the urgent solicitation of friends, I now give to the public a succinct account of the results of the experiments mentioned above, and of the means by which these were arrived at.

I have prepared a pattern rifle for the Army, (specimens of which have been given to Government,) lighter, far more handy and convenient in every way than the rifles hitherto in use, of 24-guage bore only, (that is, the spherical ball of which weighs twenty-four to the pound), with which a tolerably good shot can certainly strike an object the size of a man once out of three times, at a thousand yards distance, and of which the full effective range is near 2000 yards; the ball, at that range, still flying with deadly velocity. These rifles, proposed for the Army, I have only sighted up to 1200 yards, but higher sights could easily be added if necessary.*

The charge of powder used has been small, two drachms only, for a ball weighing one and three quarter ounces; but, if another half pound of weight in the rifle were not objected to, the barrel might be made sufficiently stout at the breech to admit of a three drachm charge, when the sights now on the rifles would serve for ranges up to about eighteen hundred yards, and

* My pattern rifles for the Army have been made by Messrs. Swinburne and Son, Birmingham. Specimens have been given by me, at the request of the Government of India, to the Honorable the Court of Directors, and others have been forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army.

the balls would range a thousand yards further, with force and effect.

These performances seem astonishing, and no such effect can be produced by the use of balls of lead only, as will be explained hereafter.

The description of my proposed pattern rifle for the Army is as follows: Single barrel, thirty inches long, 24-guage, four-grooved; grooves to take one complete turn in twenty-four inches of length; good locks, mainspring connected with tumbler by link, half-cock little above nipple, trap in butt; full-stocked barrel attached to stock by bands; steel ram-rod with hollow head exactly fitting the small end of the balls; sword bayonet twenty-four inches long, (of peculiar form not easy to describe in words), of the best cast steel; case-hardened iron mountings, and no brass or bright metal anywhere about the piece; long folding sight with slide, both the sight itself and its slide to be made with springs to prevent their working loose. Weight of the whole, with sword included, nine and three quarter pounds.

In my opinion, a piece of similar construction, but half a pound heavier, so as to admit of making the barrel very stout near the breech, would be best; but the above makes a very beautiful and wonderfully-effective weapon.

I have other pieces of the same calibre (24-guage), but made a little heavier, which make excellent practice at a range of 2000 yards; the balls at that distance penetrating about four inches into very hard dry sunburnt brick: that is, having sufficient

force to go through two or more men. Regular practice at a further range than 2000 yards I have not yet tried; but from what I have seen of the effect at that distance, I am convinced that with these balls which I am now using, a moderately light and perfectly handy rifle may be made to possess as much effectual power at a distance of 3000 yards as the old two grooved rifle with the round ball at 300.

A double 24-guage rifle of mine, by Manton, twenty-four inches long, with the zinc pointed balls two and half diameters long, and with three drachms of powder, requires a sight two and three quarter inches high for 2000 yards; the distance of sight from muzzle being nineteen inches. The other elevations may be judged of from this.

The experiments by which these results have been arrived at extend over a long series of years, but they may be shortly summed up; and only during the last ten years have I had the means and opportunity of carrying them on upon a scale sufficiently large.

I have up to this time had some dozens of rifles made, of all sorts and descriptions, a large proportion of them made for me by the celebrated makers John Manton and Son; while the cost of target walls alone, used in the course of these experiments, amounts to several hundred pounds, and powder and lead have been expended by the ton.

Our rifle practice-ground at Jacobabad is the best possible, being the perfectly-smooth dead level plain of the desert; and the line of targets, stretching away

in front of the lines of the Sinde Irregular Horse, has a singular and somewhat formidable appearance, when their use is known.

These targets are walls of "Cutcha" (sun-dried) brick, which here attains nearly to the hardness of stone.

There is a small building open to the front for the accommodation of the shooters, and at accurately-measured distances from this, the walls are erected at 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600, 1800, and 2000 yards. The 2,000 yard wall is forty feet high, fifty feet long, and three feet thick, with supporting wing walls and counterforts, plastered and whitewashed on the face; the others are of similar construction, and of size proportionate to their distances; all are marked with circular black bulls' eyes, of one inch radius for each hundred yards, and raised one foot from the ground for each hundred yards of range.

The shooting-shed contains various heavy carriages, or rests, with horizontal and vertical screw adjustments, in which rifles can be fixed for trial and fired, instead of from the shoulder. These carriages do not however improve the practice: as will be shown hereafter.

The rifles which have been here used are of all calibres, from the single 8-guage of fifteen pounds weight, throwing a ball of near four ounces, to a double 32-guage weighing six pounds.

Such are the apparatus employed. Our proceedings therewith, up to the commencement of the year 1854, are set forth in the following memoranda.

Memoranda on Rifle Muskets for the Army.

JACOBABAD, 4th March, 1854.

For many years past, the writer of this paper has been engaged in making experiments with rifled Guns, with a view to determining the best weapon for a soldier. Every species of Arm has been tried by him thousands of times, and more than twenty rifles of different sorts have been made for him in the course of these experiments. The result is now communicated, in the hope of its being useful to the public.

It was very early in these trials discovered that the two-grooved rifle has defects which render it quite unfit for the Army.

If its ball be made to fit loosely, it is at liberty to roll in the direction of its two grooves, and thus the advantage of rifling the piece is, in some measure, thrown away.

If the ball be made to fit tightly, the difficulty of loading becomes a most serious evil. The two-grooved rifle was therefore, after trial, rejected.

The four-grooved rifle with the ball with two bands round it, (No. 1 of Plate 1), was then tried, and found to be wholly free from the defects of the two-grooved and poly-grooved rifles. Other shaped balls were also tried; but, as their use has been superseded by others of a better shape, it is not thought necessary to describe them.

The two bands gave such a firm hold on the grooves of the barrel that, though the ball was made so loose as to drop into the barrel and the twist of the rifle's grooves was more than usual, the ball always followed the sweep of the grooves exactly; the gun was more easy to load than even a common smooth bored musket, while in accuracy of performance the piece was surpassed by none. The balls provided for the two-grooved rifle, or the common musket ball cartridge, could be used for it on emergency, if necessary; and the piece seemed to have such important advantages for military purposes over the rifles in use in the Army, that the results of the experiments, &c., were, in the year 1846, placed freely at the disposal of the Indian Government.

But the proposed four-grooved rifle was rejected by authority, for the reason that the two-grooved rifle, which was thought good enough for the royal Army, was good enough for the soldiers in India.

The best nature of *gun* being now established, experiments were continued to determine the best-shaped ball.

All manner of forms were tried, until, after a series of experiments carried on diligently for many years, the conical ball, (No. 2 of Plate 1), proved *very greatly* superior to all other shapes thought of up to that time. The round ball was found of little use after 300 yards. This conical ball, though heavier than the round ball of the same calibre in the proportion of three to two, required a charge of powder in the inverse proportion of these weights; that is to say,

the charge of the round ball being three drachms, that for the conical ball, with the same range and elevation, was but two drachms.

All manner of rifles were tried, both breech and muzzle loading, of every length, weight, &c., of various twists to the grooves, and of various calibres from 32 to 8-guage.

The conical ball (No. 2) for a long time held its ground against all others; its advantages were overpowering, and excellent practice was made with it at 600 and even 800 yards.

The experiments had reached this point long before the Minié ball appeared; but immediately that invention was known, great things were expected of it, and it was tried in the fairest manner, and on a large scale.

The original Minié ball with iron cup is shewn in figure No. 3.

After long and patient trials, for months together, it was found to *fail completely.*

Under the most favourable circumstances, it never equalled, or even approached to, the excellence of the conical ball, (No. 2); and it was liable to the enormous defect of having the iron cup blown through the ball, the resulting tube of lead not unfrequently remaining firmly and almost immoveably fixed in the barrel.

The ball had another great defect: it was cast from the foremost end, so that the roughness left by the ingate of the mould, defects of air-holes, &c., must occur *where the form of the ball was required to be most perfect.*

The Minié ball, to our great disappointment, was then condemned; but others, with modification of the expansion principle, were then largely tried, of all manner of shapes. That shown by figure No. 4 was the most promising; it was made with projections to fit the grooves, so that its hold on the rifles was not dependent on the expansion only; it was cast at the hinder end; the conical forepart gave it great advantages in getting through the air; while the hole in the hinder part was reduced in depth, so as to avoid, as it was hoped, the chance of its been blown into a tube.

Still this "improved" Minié ball proved on trial no way superior to the ball No. 2; while, though no iron cups were used, still the balls occasionally were blown into tubes, and thus often rendered the gun unserviceable for the time.

Figure No. 5 was then tried; and this succeeded well, having apparently some small advantage over the conical ball, No. 2.

It will be observed, that a perfect and very firm hold on the screw formed by the rifle grooves, is given by the projections on the ball, quite independently of the action of the expansion principle; while the conical hollow at the back part of the ball gives sufficient expansion to close all windage when the piece is fired, however loose the ball may be when inserted in loading.

The hold on the grooves of the gun being so great, even with the ball quite loose, it was found that the *twist of the rifles could be increased to any extent* re-

quired, without the least danger of what is technically termed "stripping;" that is, of the ball being driven through the barrel without following the sweep of the grooves. The rifles were therefore made with the grooves taking one whole turn in twenty-four inches of length; and this twist was found to answer admirably.

The shape of the ball being found to have such great influence on the resistance of the air to its flight, and the twist of the rifles being found of full power to keep the point of the ball foremost with unerring certainty, even in the longest ranges, the form of the ball was still further studied, till that of figure No. 6 was finally adopted; and this shape, after hundreds of thousands of experiments, proves to be quite perfect. Some of the results obtained are most curious.

For instance; the weights of the balls, Nos. 1, 2, and 6, are very nearly in the proportion of each other of the Nos. 2, 3, and 4; but the charges of powder required for them, with the same elevation, are in the *inverse ratio* of their weights: so much is the resistance of the air reduced by the shape of the ball, that No. 6, being double the weight of No. 1, requires only one-half of its charge of powder!

The ball, No. 6, is perfectly and accurately effective up to 1200 yards, and probably to much greater distances. The effect of its shape in overcoming the resistance of the air is so great, that its progressive velocity, after a flight of 1200 yards, is but very little reduced; and even at 1400 yards distance, or further, the percussion shells of this shape burst well.

These Percussion Rifle Shells constitute the *most formidable missile ever invented by man.* They are perfectly simple, and safe in use; and when properly made, cannot be injured by time, weather, &c.; while they range to the longest distance, with accuracy quite equal to that of the solid balls.

The great reduction of the resistance of the air to projectiles of this shape, enables us, with the usual initial velocity, to reduce the elevation required for long ranges so much, that the ground between the rifleman and his mark becomes no longer so safe by reason of the high curve of the flight of the projectile; and errors in judging of distance become, in proportion, of less serious importance.

Judging from our practice at Jacobabad, it seems certain, that two good riflemen so armed, could, in in ten minutes, annihilate the best Field Battery of Artillery now existing.

The shells are formed as shown in figure 1, Plate 2; a copper tube of proper size and shape, filled with percussion powder in the usual way, is thrust into a deep opening cast in the fore-end of the ball. The tube is first dipped in melted resin, "kitt," or such like cement, so that it cannot ever become loose; the ramrod-end is hollow, so as to press wholly on the lead in loading; all other particulars will be apparent from the figure.

The peculiar form of the hinder end gives the shells also the advantage of the expansion principle.

It seems evident that if the arms above described be supplied to our soldiers, their power would be

SHOT OR SHELL FOR RIFLE CANNON.

Note. The weight of these Shot will be more than double that of the common Round Shot of the same Calibre, the weight of the Gun must be proportioned to that of the Shot, not to its diameter

Fig. 1.

From E, to F, the Shot is Cylindrical From A, to E, it is defined by circular arcs described from the centres C, C, with the radius C. A.

A. B. 2 Diameters.
D. B. ½ ___.___
C. D. 2 ___.___
C. A. 2½ ___.___



The dotted interior line shews the shape of the inside of a Shrapnel Shell of this construction

* Square iron tenon, cast in one with the Shot or Shell, side of the square equal to ¼th of the Diameter.

Hard wood bottom with Square Mortice in the Centre to fit on to the tail Tenon of the Shot, to which it is to be wedged fast

Fig. 2.



An iron ring is driven on to each end of the bottom to secure it from splitting.
Thickness of bottom exclusive of iron rings equal to half the Diameter.

Ford & Hunt lith.

increased at least fourfold. The Army which should first adopt these weapons, would thereby obtain an advantage equal to that of the exclusive possession of fire-arms a century ago. One effect of these would be that the whole of our Field Artillery must become *totally useless.*

The guns must be rifled also! In which case Shrapnell shells, of the shape of figure No. 6, would be fully effective at distances of 5000* yards, or more.

For Cannon Shot the hold on the rifle grooves could be given by a wooden bottom (Fig. 2, Plate 2), formed with proper projections to fit the grooves, and fixed to the shot by a square tenon cast on the latter, and a mortice through the wood. The twist of the grooves might be one whole turn in forty-five diameters.

This plan is, it is understood, being tried at Woolwich, on the suggestion of the Author of this paper. The thing was freely offered to the Indian Service; but no notice has as yet been taken of it.

The subject, however, appears to be one of vast importance; and, with regard to it, wonderful ignorance appears generally to exist.

The exact description of rifle recommended for use throughout the Army is the same as has been already given above.

The charge of powder mentioned is the quantity of good sporting powder, which is found most convenient.

---

* From subsequent experiments with Minié pointed balls, it seems that three times this range may be accomplished.

If the musket powder be of less strength, the charge should, of course, be slightly increased in proportion; and probably two and a half drachms may be found to be best.

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, *Major*,
&c. &c. &c.

The annexed Table of times of flight, &c., is curious. The initial velocity appears to be but little reduced in the long ranges. The numbers in the Table are the mean of hundreds of experiments.

Particulars of Shell Practice with 8-Guage Rifles.

JACOBABAD, 1853-54.

GUN.					Range.	Weight of Shell.	Charge of Powder.	Angle of Elevation.	Time of Flight.	Remarks.
Nature of Gun.	Length of Barrel.	Distances of Sight from Muzzle.	Height of Sight.	Weight.	Yards.		Drachm		Seconds.	
	Inches.	Inches.	Inches.	lbs. oz.		Oz. Drs.				
Double 8-Guage Charge	20	16	·75 ·92 1·1 1·3 1·5 1·7 1·9 2·1 2·3	13 8	400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200	3 12	2¼	2° 42′ 3 19 3 57 4 40 5 24 6 7 6 50 7 33 8 16	1·89 2·3 2·8 3·25 3·75 4·38 4·71 5·2 5·68	Two guns of this size used, both made by John Manton. The grooves take one whole turn in 24 inches.
Single 8-Guage, four Grooved	24	19½	·85 1·03 1·22 1·42 1·63 1·8 2·1 2·4 2·7	14 8	400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200	3 12	2¼	2° 33′ 3 5 3 39 4 15 4 53 5 24 6 18 7 12 8 6	1·82 2·23 2·47 3·1 3·56 3·96 4·52 5·05 5·61	Two guns of this size used, both made by John Manton. The grooves take one complete turn in 24 inches. NOTE.—With a charge of 3 drachms these guns make excellent practice at 1600 yards, and shells never fail to burst at that range.

This paper was forwarded to the Military authorities, and a Committee of Artillery Officers was assembled to report on its subject.

This Committee conducted its proceedings, no doubt, with the greatest fairness; but, owing possibly in some measure to imperfect explanation on my part, and to other causes not necessary to detail, fell into several mistakes, which rendered the enquiry totally useless for the object in view.

The pattern rifle proposed by me for the Army was described in the above Memoranda; but at that time I had no rifles of proper pattern for the Army ready, and the four-grooved rifle forwarded by me with the paper on the subject, was of construction altogether different.

The rifle forwarded was made for me purposely, exactly resembling the two-grooved rifles in use with the Army, with all their defects; with the sole exception of its having four grooves instead of two. This piece was made for me many years ago, with the sole object of obviating the difficulty in loading the two-grooved rifle.

All this is set forth in the first part of the above Memorandum, and was explained to the Military authorities, &c., in 1846, as therein mentioned.

The only trial, then, between this piece and the common two-grooved rifle which could have been of any practical use, should have been made with round balls with the one, and two bands respectively. It would then have been found that, with the usual tight fitting balls of the two-grooved rifle, the number

of shots capable of being fired with accuracy in a given time, would have been about ten to one in favor of the four-grooved piece.

The circumstance of easy or difficult loading is of the greatest practical importance; the Committee however, did not even allude to it.

Yet with a view to easy loading alone, was the piece forwarded by me made. In making it exactly like the rifles in use, I had this object in view: namely, to show how the great defect of the two-grooved rifles, —difficult loading—could be at once obviated, by adding two more grooves to the pieces then in use, and using the two-banded ball.

Two additional grooves could easily have been made in the two-grooved rifles by any ordinary armourer, or even by the soldiers themselves: thus. Take a cylindrical piece of hard wood about two inches long, of size to fit the bore of the piece; through this drive a peg, to be left projecting a little at each end to fit into the two grooves of the barrel; at right angles to this, in the wooden cylinder insert a steel cutter, with its edge of the breadth of the required grooves; screw the ramrod into the wooden cylinder, and thrust it up and down inside the barrel; the pegs give the lead for the twist of the new groove, which must thus be exactly parallel to the old ones. To make the cut of the proper depth, insert pieces of paper, card, or spills of wood, between the cylinder, on the side opposite the cutter, and the barrel. When one groove has been cut thus, take the tool out of the barrel, turn it half round, and cut the other in like

manner. I have found this simple method perfectly effective.

Thus the improvement proposed could at once have been adopted into the service, without additional expense.

Easy loading alone was what this piece was intended to effect; in other respects it was neither better nor worse than the rifles then in use in the Army. All other improvements referred to the shape of the *ball* only, and of course equally affected both rifles; save that the conical ball No. 2 of the Memorandum, or of other such like shapes, cannot be used with effect from the two-grooved barrel, by reason of their being at liberty to lean over to one side in the direction of the grooves, so that the axis of the ball may not coincide with the axis of the gun.

The Committee, however, apparently not knowing the object with which the piece was made, nor that it was of old date, seemed to imagine that the four-grooved rifle before them was of the pattern recommended by me, and proceeded to try it against one of the two-grooved rifles, using *the same balls for each;* when of course it was found that the differences between the pieces were merely accidental, such as might have occurred between two individual muskets of similar pattern.

The result, therefore, of the enquiry was of no practical use whatever; but, on the contrary, with the best possible intention, the proceedings tended only to mislead.

The rifles used were of the old musket bore, and

much too light in proportion to the diameter of their bore, to enable a proper shaped ball to be used with a proper charge of powder; so that no great accuracy nor penetration at long ranges could be expected; and their practice at 800 yards seems to have been inferior to contemporary practice at Jacobabad (with leaden balls only) at 1200.

Little practical advantage indeed was to be expected from the proceedings of a Committee, however ably and honestly composed, unless the members had some previous practical acquaintance with the particular matter in hand, and the proposer of the improved weapons, &c., had been present to explain matters personally.

As an example, the Committee fired the rifles "fixed almost immoveably" in a species of carriage; naturally thinking thereby to ensure accuracy of practice.

Experience shews, however, that by far better practice can be made by firing from the shoulder, than by fixing the barrel in any vice or carriage.

It was not long before this was discovered, and numerous trials placed the fact beyond doubt, and led to the discovery of the cause.

I had made several apparently excellent carriages for rifles, very strong and heavy, with screw adjustments both for altitude and azimuth; yet, to my amazement, no practice nearly equal to that from the shoulder could be made with them.

The reason I discovered by grasping the barrel while being fired. The metal appeared in a state of strong vibration, like the ringing of a bell; and the

whole matter was at once accounted for. The vibration was not perceptible to the eye, and the barrel, when examined after firing, appeared to be in the same position as before; but the velocity of its vibration when fired probably bore considerable ratio to that of fired gun-powder, and necessarily threw the ball quitting its muzzle upwards, downwards, right or left, in an irregular and quite uncertain manner. Take a stiff steel spring, hold it in the hand, and it can be made to vibrate only with great difficulty, or not at all. Screw it fast in a vice, and the least touch makes it vibrate rapidly. In like manner the gun fired from the shoulder gives way, moves, and alters its position much, probably; but this motion is slow, and does not affect the flight of the ball in a degree approaching to the effect of the rapid *vibrations of the metal itself;* which do not take place when the gun is not fixed immoveably.

This at first seems curious; but however it be, there is no doubt of the fact as stated above. In these experiments by the Committee, also, the rifles were laid with a gunner's quadrant; which does not seem to be a workmanlike or effective method for small arms. A long folding sight with slide, is by far the best method of elevating the piece, whether in actual use in war or for experimental practice.

These sights should be made with springs, both to the sight itself and to the slide, to prevent their working loose and falling down of themselves.

Since the date of these proceedings, the experiments at Jacobabad have been continued with a great many

new rifles, and with curious and important results; such, that the progress made throws all former proposals for improved balls for rifles for the Army, in the back ground.

The ball No. 6 of the foregoing Memorandum, there described as of perfect shape, is indeed so, so long as it retains that shape in front. With a charge of powder equal to one-fifteenth of the weight of the ball, or less, these balls, of lead only, performed admirably; so that a good shot could, with them, at a distance of 1000 yards, put nearly every ball into a circle of four feet radius.

Nothing could have been better as far as it went; but rifles were now procured of heavier metal, in proportion to the bore of 16 and 24 and 32 guage, and the balls were tried with larger charges; it being supposed that they could be used with advantage with an initial velocity at least equal to that used with the ordinary round ball.

It proved, however, on trial, that such was not the case, and a new law was at once developed. A very slight increase of charge caused the lead to change its shape under the pressure of the gunpowder; so that the balls of the shape of the ball No. 6 when inserted into the barrel, came out in a form resembling the annexed sketch.



SHAPE AFTER FIRING.

It was in vain attempted to remedy this by lengthening the ball, which was increased to two-and-a-half and three diameters; and, by making holes in the afterpart, as in the Minié ball. Wads also of all manner of kinds, loose, and attached to the balls in various ways, were employed; but without avail.

The lead was found totally incapable of preserving any resemblance to its original form, under the pressure of a charge of powder equal to one-eighth of the weight of the ball. The balls of three diameters in length, from the 24-guage guns, whose fore-part was shaped as that of the ball No. 6, came out of the rifle in the form here shown.



SHAPE AFTER FIRING.



SHAPE OF THE FORE PART OF THESE BALLS BEFORE FIRING.

These proved the best of all the lead balls, and ranged, with deadly force and considerable accuracy, up to 1600 yards, or further; but of course all advantage of the peculiar form adapted to overcome the resistance of the air was lost. Manton's steel points were tried with these balls; but these were worse than the others; the lead was squeezed forward by one side of the point in an irregular manner; the ball assumed this shape, and would not fly truly.



The limit of the powers of leaden balls had thus been attained; and to proceed further, it became necessary to find a method of constructing rifle balls so that the fore-part should be capable of sustaining the pressure of large charges of fired gunpowder without change of form, and thereby retain that shape best adapted for overcoming the resistance of the air, on which all accurate distance practice depends; and at the same time having the part of the ball next the powder sufficiently soft and yielding to spread out under its pressure, so as to fill the barrel and grooves perfectly air tight. This problem was speedily solved; the fore part of the ball was cast of zinc, in a separate mould, of the shape of the annexed sketch:—



RIFLE BALL COMPLETE, WITH THE FORE PART OF ZINC OR IRON.



ZINC OR IRON POINT.

A D = 1½ diameters.
D B = ditto.
D C = 2 diameters.
A C = 2½ ditto.
From E to F the Ball is cylindrical.
From E to A its sides are defined by arcs of circles described from the centres C with the radius C A.

These points were placed in the full sized mould, and the lead cast on to them, the complete ball being formed as shown in the diagram.

I was, at first, doubtful whether the small specific gravity of the zinc would not prove of disadvantage so great as to overcome the benefit of its hardness; but, on trial, nothing could have proved more perfectly effective.

The 24-guage balls of the increased length of two-and-half and three diameters—especially the latter —proved admirably effective at ranges up to 2000 yards, which had never before been attained.

No change whatever took place in the form of the zinc fore-part of the balls with the largest charges, while their penetration was found enormous, being not less than four inches at 2000, and nearly three times that depth at 1000 yards, into very hard dry Cutcha brick. At the same time the accuracy of the flight of these balls was truly wonderful.

It may be here remarked that in the published reports of the Enfield rifle practice, it is stated that the twist of the rifle grooves throws the ball to the right or left, according as a right or left handed screw may be employed.

This seems to be wholly erroneous; no such effect is observed in my practice. There may be some such *tendency* to deviation from such cause, but it must be of small amount, and is not perceptible.

The real facts of the matter seem to be these: considering the person of the rifleman as a cylindrical column, the recoil of a gun fired from the right

shoulder is a force acting at a distance from the axis of that column, and therefore tending not only to drive it back, but to run it round on its axis. The muzzle of the gun, therefore, must receive a certain degree of motion to the right hand when fired.

It was found here, in many thousands of trials, that on a calm day the balls of the guns which recoiled with the greatest force, fired from the right shoulder, always deviated to the right hand; this deviation amounting to about twenty feet at 800 yards.

That the cause of this is correctly assigned above is thus proved. The same gun fired from the *left* shoulder *threw* the ball to the *left*. With the guns recoiling most, such as the 8-guage rifles, used with a four-ounce ball and three-drachm charge, the deviation was very great; with the 32-guage rifles, of which the recoil was slight, this regular deviation did not occur at all. These effects were observed *always* to occur, without any respect whatever to the amount of twist given to the grooves of the rifle. In practice a perfect remedy was found for this deviation, or for any other similar errors caused by the action of wind or any thing else. When taking aim, leaning the gun over a little to the left perfectly counteracted the deviation to the right; and by practice the habit is formed of instinctively adjusting the amount of the lateral indication thus given to the sight, so as correctly to compensate the error.

Thus the matter stands at present. The limit of the powers of these missiles has, I am certain, not yet even been approached.

The points for such balls could probably be made wholesale, of cast iron; when the ammunition could be prepared at no more cost than the common musket cartridges; while the power of the weapon would be about three times that of the best Minié rifles.

I have tried every expedient I could think of as a substitute for the greased patch for rifle balls, but always had to return to this. Any species of wad, however attached to the ball, retards its flight so much as to render distant practice impossible, whatever may be the initial velocity used.

The best method I am acquainted with of preparing military rifle ammunition, is to stitch slightly to the balls, patches of thin cotton cloth completely deprived of starch (or conjee), and then to dip them in melted tallow.

The fore-part of the ball being hard, cannot be injured by any maltreatment by the ramrod, nor by knocking about against each other, and are best carried loose in a pouch; the powder being in blank cartridges in a separate partition.

Such arms would be found worthy of our noble English soldiers. Their use implies skilful workmen in our ranks, instead of pipe-clayed automatons.

The proper use of such arms implies an entire change in our tactics, so as to give full scope not only to the bodily, but to the high moral and intellectual powers of our men.

The idea of governing English soldiers by fear of punishment, and that punishment bodily pain, is gone by, or fast passing away for ever.

It is a gross absurdity to attempt to make men, and such men, brave through fear.

The attempt is as wise as is the cramping of our men's bodies by absurd clothing and accoutrements.

Let soul and body be free; strive to *develope* instead of crushing the powers of both; abolish all separate codes of laws for the Army, the existence of which implies that soldiers are more inclined to commit crime than other citizens. Appeal to the highest and noblest faculties of man.

Fill the ranks of our private soldiers with the *élite* of our peasantry and yeomen, (and it would be most cheap economy for the country to do this, if it paid ten-fold the pecuniary amount now expended on soldiers' hire); train and arm the men in a manner worthy of their noble nature, and 50,000 such soldiers would be a match for a world in arms.

Any numbers or mere masses of semi-barbarous enemies, ay! or of ordinary soldiers, would be powerless against such foes.

Cavalry would become of little value against such infantry, and our present artillery absolutely useless against them.

With open files and ranks, each man a skilful single combatant, but still all acting in perfect concert—as would be easy with such brave, trusty, and intelligent and skilful men—they would sweep their enemies from the earth, themselves almost unseen; while a single discharge from a company at 1000 yards distance would annihilate the best field battery now existing.

The native qualities of the Englishman (hitherto, in modern times, in England's soldiers crushed and forced down nearly to a level with the soldiers of the rest of Europe) would then again become as pre-eminently valuable in our Armies as they were with the bold bowmen of Cressy, Poictiers, and Agincourt.

Nay! as with those bowmen at Homildon Hill and Flodden, even men naturally equal to ours would be absolutely powerless before skilful English soldiers so armed, and trained both to independent and combined action. The value of individual skill and practice would be immensely greater than under the present system. No amount of mere "food for powder," could successfully oppose even a small force so formed: opposition to the English soldier would become as impertinent on land as it has been said to be by a celebrated French author to our seamen on the ocean.

With such Infantry, so armed, our Artillery must be abolished, *or improved.*

For cannon, especially field pieces, similar shot to these found so effective for small arms might be used, perhaps, with advantage, instead of the shot with wooden bottoms formerly proposed by me.

The only objection seems to be the cost of the lead; which, however, would not probably be very great, as the quantity may be much reduced by making the dove-tailed tenon of the iron larger.

Shot, partly of lead, for rifled cannon, have been, I understand, not long ago tried and found to fail, at Woolwich; but these proposed by me are of entirely

different construction, and seem free from the defects of the others.

Nothing but actual trial can decide the merits of these things; and if such trials be made, it should be borne in mind that great weight is essential to the correct performance of rifled cannon. The observations on the vibrations of the barrels of small arms tell here with redoubled force. Strength to resist the bursting force of the powder is by no means sufficient; weight and mass are required; and, whatever the strength may be, the rifled cannon should not be of less weight than one hundred and twenty times that of its shot.

Judging from experiments made, as an old artillery officer as well as a rifleman and practical mechanic, I am deliberately of opinion that a four-grooved rifled iron gun, of a bore of four inches in diameter, weighing *not less* than twenty-four hundred weight, could be made to throw shot to a distance of ten miles, and more, with force and accuracy.

The "Lancaster" guns *must*, I think, fail. The mode of rifling adopted in them is the *very worst possible. It is only the two-grooved rifle in disguise—thus:*



Let the shoulders of the grooves of a two-grooved rifle be removed, as shown by the dotted line in the sketch, and you have the Lancaster rifle.

But by the removal of these shoulders, the friction, if the twist be considerable, becomes *enormous:* the ball and the bore are not quite round, but nearly so, wherefore, as the ball is compelled to follow the twist of the bore, it acts like a "cam," and endeavours to burst the gun; or the dotted part in the sketch becomes a very acute wedge, which the spiral motion causes to be driven with great force into the bore as the ball is driven out.

The heat developed by the friction must be very great, and the tendency of the gun to burst, or the shell to crush, also very great.

It would be far better than this to use a 4-grooved rifle with projections on the ball, *even of iron*, with a greased leather patch.

One more remark appears requisite. The experimenters at Enfield have published the opinion that great twist to the grooves of a rifle is of no advantage.

This does not accord with my experience; or at least does not apply to the balls used by me.

The twist I use, and which I find best, is one turn in twenty-four inches, or more than double that recommended by the Enfield gentlemen.

This I find necessary to maintain the spiral motion of the ball quite up to the last, in the long ranges attained by my rifles; and a rapid spiral motion is necessary to preserve the light end of the ball truly

foremost throughout its long flight; which it is perfectly successful in doing.

I have now little time for carrying on further experiments with rifles, being more than fully occupied with public duties; but when opportunity occurs I purpose continuing them: and meanwhile, enough has been done here to aid, perhaps, in pointing out the way and smoothing the path for others.

JACOBABAD, ON THE DESERT OF UPPER SINDE,
20th March, 1855.

REMARKS

ON

THE INDIAN ARMY.

BY

MAJOR ANDREW CRAWFORD,

OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

Printed, for Private Circulation only,

BY SMITH, ELDER AND CO. 65, CORNHILL, LONDON.

1857.

TO

THE HONOURABLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS

OF THE

EAST INDIA COMPANY,

THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED

BY THEIR MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT,

ANDREW CRAWFORD,

MAJOR IN THE BOMBAY ARMY.

JERSEY,

11th December, 1856.

ERRATA.

Page 8, line 13, *for* "Pir Punjaub," *read* "Pir Punjaul."
— 10, *read* Stavropol, Ekaterinograd, and Astrachan.
— 19, line 3, *for* "forces," *read* "foes."
— 40, — 7, *for* $\frac{\text{"11296500} + 4}{300} = 156620$," *read* $\frac{\text{"11296500} \times 4}{300} = 150620$."
— 61, — 32, *erase* the comma after the word Tirailleurs, and *read* "Tirailleurs Indigènes."
— 65, Table A. Column of Remarks, *for* "Battalion," *read* "Ban."
*** The remarks in this column refer to the preceding column only.
— 76, line 5, *for* "Bynore," *read* "Bijnore."
— 76, — 18, "Agriculture is the most beautiful of all arts," &c. &c., should form the commencement of the following paragraph.

PREFACE.

In venturing, as I now do, to put forth my opinions on the State and Requirements of the Indian Army, I feel that I may be laying myself open to the charge of great presumption; I am, therefore, desirous of stating, in briefest terms, my reasons for thus obtruding my views upon others—to deprecate too hasty censure, and to beseech a lenient judgment.

I most readily admit that my self-imposed task might have been better undertaken by better men,—by abler heads and more facile pens; and in the hope that some such would, ere this, have come forward, and in their own name advocated the Reforms necessary in our Army, I have hitherto remained silent. But years have rolled and are rolling on, and whilst the evils of

our system are as glaring as ever, no one seems inclined to be the first personally to denounce them.

I have been twenty-four years in the Service; and the whole of that period, with the exception of about one year, has been spent by me in Regimental duty, or in a Staff situation (that of Brigade-Major) that has brought me constantly in contact with Officers and men of every grade, and under every aspect,—in the Field and in Garrison,—and therefore it is I deem myself somewhat competent to express an opinion on the existing condition and requirements of the Army to which I have the honour to belong, and a sincere regard for which, and sense of duty to the Authorities under whom and in whose name it is constituted, lead me now to give utterance to these my earnest convictions.

Of the evils which exist in our Army, and which in the following pages I pass under review, there can be no doubt; but there may be many doubts of the propriety or advantages of the remedial measures I propose; and, therefore, I bring them forward with all due diffidence, and in the hope that, should they themselves fail to secure the approbation of those who alone can cause their adoption, partially or wholly, in the Military

Administration of India, they may, at any rate, be the means of calling serious and immediate attention to the questions submitted, and that the result may be most satisfactory to all who have the true interests of our Eastern Empire and its magnificent Army at heart.

A. CRAWFORD.

"Most of us begin by sitting diligently upon ten or eleven great schemes of life, the greater part of which are inevitably addled from the first moment of incubation".

Friends in Council - 2nd Series.
2nd Edition, page 286.

Here is one of my addled eggs -

A. C.

REMARKS

ON

THE INDIAN ARMY.

"No prudent man, having any knowledge of Eastern affairs, would ever venture to predict a prolonged continuation of peace in India. We have learned by hard experience how a difference with a native power, which seems at first to be but the little cloud no bigger than a man's hand, may rapidly darken and swell into a storm of war, involving the whole empire in its gloom. We have lately seen how in the very midst of us insurrection may rise like an exhalation from the earth, and how cruel violence, worse than the excesses of war, may be suddenly committed by men who to the very day in which they broke out in the frenzy of blood, have been regarded as a simple, harmless, timid race, not by the Government alone, but even by those who knew them best, who were dwelling among them, and were their earliest victims."

The above are the expressions of a statesman, whose recent brilliant rule over our Indian empire was extended to a period considerably beyond that usually accorded to Governors-General, and whose administration has called forth the hearty and almost unqualified approbation of men of all parties.

These expressions may be found in the reply of the Marquis of Dalhousie to the farewell address presented to him on his departure from Calcutta: they appear also, somewhat abbreviated, in the fourth paragraph of his lordship's minute, dated 28th February, 1856.

The opinion of such a man so deliberately recorded—that carries with it the assent of every one acquainted with Indian history, and is ratified by experience—demands our profoundest attention; and whilst pursuing the current of thought to which the sentence just quoted gives rise, the questions naturally suggest themselves to the mind,—

1st. Is our Indian army in a state to meet the calls that may at the briefest notice be made upon it? Is it numerically adequate to the work it has to perform?

2d. Is its constitution such as to insure to the zealous officer promotion, if not rapid, at any rate sufficiently so to warrant his hoping for command ere age and climate have sapped his vigour, and rendered him indifferent to renown or incapable of earning it?

3d. Does the training and discipline of the Indian army evince itself in the thorough professional knowledge of the officers, the physical aptitude of the men, and the general capability of the whole to take the field at the shortest warning, prepared by constant exercise and habit to endure all the vicissitudes of climate, and, as far as men may, under all or any of the trials of a campaign, to remain effective instead of filling the hospitals with sick?

4th. Are the incentives to good conduct, and the eventual rewards of such, as held out to the Native army, adequate to the object in view, and such as should thoroughly attach the men to us, and place their fidelity beyond doubt?

5th. Is the position of the Honourable Company's European soldier incapable of improvement: has he all the advantages compatible with his situation, and that should render him contented, well behaved, and hopeful?

To these queries I fear none but unsatisfactory answers can be made. The universal outcry raised by the press, by members of both Houses of Parliament, by pamphleteers, by the country at large, on the defects of the British army as evidenced in the Crimean campaign, might all be re-echoed and applied with greater or less justice to the Indian army; and assuredly if the powers and resources of the latter were taxed in a protracted war with a foe like Russia, its numerous weak points would speedily become manifest, hazarding disgrace to our arms, and the stability of our Oriental empire, and calling forth the just

wrath of the nation whose interests in the East are committed to its guardianship.

Hitherto the spread of our rule in India has been almost uninterrupted: seldom have our arms met with any serious reverse, and when occasionally our progress has been checked, the difficulty has proved but temporary, giving, as it were, but zest to the warfare by depriving it of the tameness of constant, easy triumphs.

Rarely have affairs assumed an aspect causing serious uneasiness to the local government; but there have been times when the political horizon has, indeed, been overcast, when our victories have been bloody and doubtful, our treasury exhausted, the troops dispirited, and but few reserves of men or means to fall back upon, and when matters have worn an appearance altogether so threatening as to justify the fear entertained even for our very existence as a power.

From these dangers, and all other, Providence alone has extricated us; and when the resources of our empire, the wisdom of our rulers, and the military skill of our generals, have been taxed to the utmost and found wanting, some act of treachery or blunder in the camp of the enemy has saved us from defeat, and restored to our grasp the sceptre which had appeared slipping from our fingers.

In thus speaking, I wish not for a moment to disparage the great and good men who have swayed our Indian councils and led our armies. I advert briefly to the difficulties they have encountered in the hope that we may thence draw lessons for our future guidance; and whilst gratefully ascribing our delivery from past danger, and the glory of our arms, to the Giver of all victory, to whom alone the praise is due, I would suggest that our proper appreciation of such mercies may best be shown by using all diligence in preparing ourselves for every exigence that may yet await us in our future career in those regions wherein, though aliens, it has pleased the Almighty to grant us supremacy: to do, in short, our duty to God and our country in the sphere we find allotted to us.

Up to the present period our Indian wars have been principally waged with native potentates, who, one after another, have succumbed to our arms; and now our rule virtually extends from Cashmere to Cape Comorin, whilst within that wide expanse of

territory exists no power that is likely to call us to the field; unless some petty prince should raise the standard of revolt, or any outbreak similar to that of the Santhals should take place.

These are contingencies that may occur at any moment, and it behoves us to guard against them by having a sufficient force always in hand prepared to launch instantly against the aggressor, and to crush revolt on its first appearance, and so save the country from a repetition of those atrocities lately witnessed in Bengal. But while adopting measures for the preservation of internal peace, we must not overlook the equally or more imminent dangers that threaten us from without.

We have subdued Hindostan, and all may be called ours from the Pir Punjal to Ceylon, from Burmah to the Suleiman Range; but the very subjugation of so vast a tract has added to our difficulties, both in providing for its internal welfare, and for the defence of a frontier now advanced into immediate collision with tribes, hardy, warlike, and lawless, many of whom glory in traditions of their forefathers having swept as victors over the rich plains now ruled by the British, and would rejoice at any opportunity offering to emulate their deeds; but whilst lacking that chance, they are not the less actively inimical to us to the extent of their power, and are ever ready for a foray on any unprotected village or caravan that tempts their cupidity.

These frontier difficulties are of little moment so long as they are confined simply to desultory affrays with the clans resident on the borders; nor need we, perhaps, entertain any great apprehension even should we hear of their attempting combined efforts against us: provided always that they be not backed in such endeavours by any European power,—*but in that direction lies the principal danger*. We have a widely extended frontier, and enemies, open or concealed, scattered along the whole line.

The Burmese are sore at recent defeat and loss of territory, and their embassy now in France shows that they are looking about for friends, whose aid or countenance they may invoke in any future misunderstandings with us.

The Nepaulese do not forget the reverses they suffered at our hands, although nearly forty years have elapsed since we checked them in their career of conquest, and on many occasions they have evinced a spirit ready to avail themselves of any embarrassment in which they might perceive us seriously entangled.

The Afghan and Belooch tribes are avowedly hostile, and fear alone restrains them within their mountain fastnesses. None of these are likely in themselves to prove formidable antagonists to us; but whenever we find ourselves engaged in a European war, our western opponents may experience little difficulty in effecting a powerful diversion, and rendering nugatory a large portion of the force of our empire, by simply intriguing with our Indian frontier neighbours, and prevailing on them to assume a threatening attitude towards us, even if they stop short of actual hostilities.

I have never laboured much under that Russo-phobia which for a long time past has periodically attacked the British public, whenever attention has been called to our Indian possessions and the steady advance made by the Muscovite in their direction.

Though within the bounds of possibility, I have never greatly anticipated the presence of the Czar's battalions on the Indus; but it needs not their visible presence there to inform us how much injury the power of the Autocrat can work us in that quarter. He has but to band Persia and Afghanistan temporarily together, supply a little money and a few officers, and a force could be assembled behind the passes of the Suleiman mountains which, even if never hurled upon our plains, would suffice to raise the hopes and expectations of every malcontent in India and on our border, and would compel us to maintain large bodies of troops for the preservation of internal tranquillity, whilst others should be pushed forward to meet the impending attack. We might try, as we have done before, a counter-diversion by an expedition to the Persian Gulf; but there again a little assistance judiciously given would convert Bushire into a Sebastopol, which would demand a large fleet and army for its capture, and so lead to such protracted and expensive operations on our part as fully to achieve the purposes of Russia.

We are now at peace with that power; but what is the nature of the peace so recently concluded? England has lavished her blood and treasure for the sole purpose, apparently, of effecting Turkish, French, and Austrian objects. The treaty has freed the mouths of the Danube, and given back a small slip of marsh on its banks to Turkey; and the veto placed on the re-formation by Russia of a Black Sea fleet and naval arsenals has, for the time, staved off the destruction that impended over

the Ottoman empire. But the line of attack alone has been changed, and possibly but been removed to a theatre where the advance of the formidable northern power will eventually be the more rapid and permanent, inasmuch as it will not excite so much the attention and distrust of other European states, Great Britain excepted.

We have sacrificed 20,000 men and 80,000,000*l.* of money, to concentrate the future efforts of Russia on the Caucasus and adjoining provinces as a base, and Asiatic Turkey, and the countries to the south and south-east of the Caspian, as the scene of the development of her plans. Already events show that this is no prophecy of future import, but that even now the Russian government has accepted its new position, and has commenced the career indicated. Troops are moving in large numbers to the Caucasus, and the public prints and private intelligence from the Russian camp alike announce the vigorous prosecution of hostilities against the Circassians. The forts on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, Anapa, Gilengik, Redout-Kale, Sokoum-Kale, &c., will all speedily be rebuilt; and with such a cordon as Russia will now draw around the district named, the mountaineers must sooner or later succumb, if solely from want of ammunition.

The Russian communications from Stavropol by Ekaterinograd and Mozdok, through the passes to Tiflis, will then be free, and the security of the Trans-Caucasian provinces—Shirvan, Georgia, Mingrelia, &c.—and their suitableness as a base for further operations, will be improved by the transfer (now in progress) of the crews of the late Black Sea fleet and the naval arsenal establishments of Sebastopol, Odessa, and Nicholaieff, to Astrachan.

The Caspian will become (indeed, already is) a Russian lake, and through the medium of the Volga will afford means of transporting troops and all the munitions of war to any extent, with ease, rapidity and economy, from the centre of the empire to the scene of its future aggrandizement.

In what direction is that advance likely next to be pushed? It may be on the very ground from which the Muscovite battalions are now slowly withdrawing. There is a general feeling abroad that the present peace is not stable. Russia, momentarily exhausted in the struggle, has gladly acceded to terms which,

while inflicting no disgrace and little positive loss upon her, affords her breathing time. The recent campaign has shown her the weak points in her system which required rectifying; already we hear of projected lines of railroad to be completed with the utmost despatch, and which when ready will give the Czar the power of speedily concentrating his masses of troops, in high order and unfatigued by hurried marches, on any portion of the European frontier of his realms that may be threatened with invasion. In a few years those iron lines of communication will be finished; Sebastopol will have risen from her ashes stronger than before; the army will again number its 1,200,000 combatants, and the holder of that enormous power will then be prepared to call in question the interpretation of any of the clauses of the present treaty which he may find it convenient to disallow, or to avail himself of any pretext for unfurling his colours and repaying us for the check we have lately given to his arms.

The anticipated *difficulty* might arise between Russia and Turkey alone (as in 1828), and England might, or might not, be actively mixed up in the dispute; but undoubtedly we should view with the most serious uneasiness the certain irruption of the Russian forces into Asia Minor, and their occupation of the upper waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, from whence they would dominate the whole line of those great rivers and menace the head of the Persian Gulf.

Or we might find ourselves the principal in the dispute with the Autocrat of all the Russias, and that, too, single-handed. In the solution of the recent question, we have had the benefit of the alliance of France, Turkey, and Sardinia, and the good wishes of many of the European state-fraternity; but it is not probable that in the onward march of time we shall be permitted to reckon on those allies for continued exertion in the enforcement even of the present treaty, much less shall we be able to calculate on their aid in the settlement of any fracas wherein our own national interests may alone be involved. Indeed, as regards our Asiatic interests, we may rather anticipate that any dilemma they may cause to us would prove more gratifying than otherwise to some of our very dear allies, who would consider the antagonism of Russia in that respect an admirable balance to our power. Since the reign of Peter the Great the cabinet of St. Petersburgh has kept steadily in view the line of policy

dictated by that Emperor, and more especially his projected conquest of India. Each year has seen the Russian frontier advanced, or some advantage gained that has diminished the distance or the difficulties of the route from the Muscovite outposts to the Indus. These instances it is needless to enumerate, or to dwell on the intrigues that have gradually rendered Persia in effect but a Russian Satrapy, and have brought under Russian influence or awe, in a greater or less degree the whole of the warlike tribes of Central Asia.

Suffice it that we feel and know that in Russia we have an unwearied enemy to the progress or stability of our power in the East, and whose hostility is only likely to be sharpened by the rebuff so recently received at our hands.

We hear of the exertions being made on the Caspian, and rumour adds that a cession of territory on its southern shores has been obtained from the Shah. This denotes the great attention being bestowed on that quarter from whence a blow may be so readily and effectively aimed at our rule in India. It remains to be seen whether for some time yet we are to be annoyed only by covert intrigues, keeping our political relations with our immediate neighbours in an unsatisfactory state, or whether our great northern adversary will proceed openly to extend his power to the southward and eastward of the Caspian.

With Astrabad for a base, little trouble would be experienced in moving a Russo-Persian army to Herat. Some difficulties, of course, would present themselves; but none insuperable: none equal to those we ourselves overcame in marching from India into Afghanistan. Herat once in the possession of our foes, the Cabool and Candahar chiefs would feel themselves compelled to declare for them, even should their own inclinations prompt otherwise.

We have, then, to guard against all possible disturbers of our internal tranquillity—against the independent tribes and powers whose frontiers march with ours, and to adopt all precautionary measures to meet the danger so long threatening from the North-West.

Nor are the demands that may be made upon our military resources limited thereto. India has ere now been called on to furnish troops for service in Arabia, Egypt, China, Java, and the Mauritius, and similar requisitions may at any moment be

again preferred. It is necessary then to look abroad, to turn all things over in our minds, and to be ready for all contingencies. Our Asiatic policy must now, year by year, become more connected with that of Europe, and we must be prepared to play our parts worthily in those great events, in which, sooner or later, we shall assuredly find ourselves actors. The hand-to-mouth system—the course of momentary shifts and expedients, must be abandoned; plans must be devised on the effectual working of which we may confidently rely against the day of trial; and such cannot be arranged when the trumpet-call to the field is sounding in our ears: it would then be too late to commence our reformatory measures. We are now enjoying a period of tranquillity that, if duly availed of, will enable us to provide against all the perils of which a political prescience would bid us beware; but if we let slip the golden opportunity, the loss may hereafter prove irreparable.

I will repeat, then, the queries put at the commencement of this paper. I will consider them *seriatim*, and having done so, will endeavour to sketch briefly the remedial measures that propose themselves to my view. It is needless at present to do more than trace the measures indicated, for I put them forward in the humble trust that their general merits and value may in some degree be admitted; and if they do so find acceptance at the hands of my superiors, the details of the plans may at any moment be readily and rapidly elaborated.

1ST. IS OUR INDIAN ARMY IN A STATE TO MEET THE DEMANDS THAT MAY AT BRIEFEST NOTICE BE MADE UPON IT? IS IT NUMERICALLY ADEQUATE TO THE WORK IT HAS TO PERFORM?

To these questions a most emphatic reply in the negative must be given.

Throughout India, and especially in the Bengal and Bombay Presidencies, constant difficulties arise whenever a few troops may be needed for any particular service, and the Quarter-master-generals are hard pressed to determine from what stations the men required can best be spared, and with the least probable hazard to the tranquillity of the neighbourhood. So much is this the case, that the ordinary reliefs of each season involve a careful preliminary calculation of the movements of every corps, that their arrivals and departures may be so timed as to leave

the various Cantonments minus their established strength for the shortest possible period. But when any serious emergency arises requiring the assembly of a Field-force, and the consequent permanent withdrawal of troops from certain districts, then, indeed, are the authorities puzzled to decide from whence the draughts may best be made; whilst loud and long are the remonstrances of Collectors and Political Agents, deprecating the diminishing of the force in their respective provinces, and the consequent risk to their peace. Nor is this to be wondered at, seeing that our regular Army, always numerically small in proportion to the population to be overawed and the extent of country to be defended, is now only some 30,000 men stronger than it was twenty years ago; although, in the meanwhile, we have added to our realm Scinde, the Punjaub, and Pegu. I make no mention of Sattara, Nagpore, and Oude, as their annexation involved little or no additional duty on our troops; we having previously been virtually in military occupation of those countries.

This increase to our territory and responsibilities, unfortunately unaccompanied with a corresponding increase of revenue, has compelled us to have recourse to a variety of make-shift measures for the security of the territory itself, (*e.g.* the raising of local battalions only,) the hope, doubtless, being entertained, that the lapse of time would improve our finances, and admit of our placing the defence of our Indian empire on a more satisfactory footing. Years have swept on; and though in their progress they have witnessed a wonderful development of the resources of Scinde and the Punjaub (whilst Pegu also promises well), yet does the Indian budget show no such annual increase or surplus of revenue as to warrant an addition to our military forces, (at least, not as at present constituted,) and the result evinces itself in the difficulty adverted to, as experienced whenever a few regiments are specially needed, and in the danger to which our authority is exposed in those provinces which we have partially or altogether denuded of troops, in the endeavour to protect those more urgently demanding our vigilance.

A few years ago the line of the Ganges, from Cawnpore to Barrackpore inclusive, exhibited a number of stations,—Allahabad, Mirzapore, Benares, Dinapore, Berhampore, Chinsurah, &c., where, generally speaking, considerable bodies of troops were maintained. These Cantonments have, I believe, in one or

two instances, been entirely abandoned, whilst in most the strength has been considerably diminished. Again, in Central India, Kamptee, Saugor, Jaulnah, Mhow, Neemuch, Nusseerabad, and Deesa, have, in like manner, been reduced from strong brigades to one or two regiments at each place; and this not for the gratifying reason that the presence of an imposing array of battalions is no longer requisite in those districts, but because the battalions themselves are more pressingly needed on the frontier. The greater portion of the Bengal and Bombay armies have been draughted to the Northern provinces of Hindostan, the Punjaub, and Scinde; whilst our recent acquisition, Pegu, in addition to the quota of Bengal troops, takes about a seventh of the Madras army for its occupation.

"If," again using Lord Dalhousie's words, "we have lately seen how, in the very midst of us, insurrection may rise like an exhalation from the earth," and if such rebellion and its concomitant excesses may at any moment be expected, even at the hands of those whom we have hitherto regarded as the most peaceful of all over whom our sway extends, how much more does it behove us to be on our guard against those tribes who, among the heterogeneous races included in our rule, are proverbial for their warlike or turbulent character?

If the absence of the necessary check subjected the plains of Bengal to devastation by the hitherto harmless Santhals, what a fearful shock to our *prestige*, and what enhanced atrocities may we not anticipate should any injury at our hands, real or imaginary, or any sudden fit of religious fanaticism, cause the Rajpoots, Mahrattas, or Puthans of Central India to rise suddenly in arms! Such an event is at any moment possible; and should such occur, the few troops we have scattered throughout the country in isolated Cantonments would, at the utmost, be able but to hold their respective positions, and invaluable time would be lost ere a sufficient force could be concentrated to act against the rebels.

It is not, moreover, in Central India alone that we may dread an outbreak. The numerous disturbances that have arisen, and the petty campaigns in which the last quarter of a century has seen us engaged, show that there is no part of India where we can expect to retain our authority but by the possession of the requisite physical power; whilst the very disturbances are in

themselves proof positive that the numbers and distribution of our troops are not such as to forbid to malcontents the hope of successfully combating them. The sword gave us India, and by the sword must our rule be upheld. In so saying, I do not for one instant deny that we are bound to appeal to nobler motives than fear and self-interest, to win from our Indian subjects the obedience we desire. Our conquest has laid upon us a heavy responsibility; and fully do I recognise our duty in regard to the conquered,—to train them in the paths of civilization, to open prompt justice to all, to secure to each man the full fruits of his industry, and, by working in every way zealously for the welfare of the people at large, gradually to earn their sincere respect and gratitude. That tribute to our honest endeavours we cannot, however, hope to obtain so long as the masses are sunk in their present ignorance. I believe that at this moment the benefits of our rule are truly appreciated but by a few of the natives of India, and those few are resident at the Presidencies, beyond the walls of which their very names are scarcely known, and consequently they carry no weight in the country. Until a better knowledge of their rulers is diffused among our Indian subjects, and we can draw from them a cordial recognition of the blessings of our sway, we dare not risk that authority by a spirit of parsimony in our Military establishments. Should we do so, we should be false to ourselves and to that charge in the world's progress which it has pleased Providence to entrust to us.

Hitherto I have spoken in general terms on the inadequate strength of our Indian armies for the work required from them; but let me now examine the question a little more closely, and test my assertions by a brief comparison of India and its military resources with other countries, and their means of aggression or defence.

British India (strictly such), if I may depend on the accuracy of some tables now before me, comprises an area of about 840,000 square miles, exhibiting within that space every modification of climate, soil, and aspect, and having a population estimated by the best and most recent authorities at about 102,000,000; these myriads again being composed of numerous races, diverse in origin, habits, language, and religion, and all most essentially different in every respect from their English conquerors. For the defence of this empire—for the repression

of internal commotion, for the safety of our frontiers, and for the chastisement of external foes (should such necessity arise)—we maintain an army (as per Parliamentary papers) showing a gross total of 281,940 combatants, of whom 41,475 are European troops (Queen's and Company's), and the remaining 240,465 are natives; that latter amount, however, including 3,644 English commissioned and non-commissioned officers. From the same amount I think should be deducted the strength of the Police battalions, 24,015, for assuredly they cannot be deemed in any way on a par with the troops of the Line: recruited from an inferior stamp of men, scarcely drilled, and always dispersed in small parties over the face of the country, their Military organization is of the slightest description, and the most favourable light in which they can be regarded is as a Reserve Force, that in case of urgent need may be speedily assembled, and that may then, after some drilling, be rendered fit to undertake ordinary Garrison duties. Even so much, however, can hardly be expected from them, as they will always have employment enough in the discharge of their own special functions; whilst in like manner the subsidiary Contingents of Native states will, in the event of disturbances, be pretty well occupied in overawing the very states from whence they are furnished.

I consider, then, that our disposable army, European and Native, Regular and Irregular, is limited to about 260,000 men, and that number represents the whole of our Military power in India. We have no Reserves of any sort or description (at least none readily available). We have no Militia, no conscription,—and in the event of disaster in the field, there is no nationality, no spirit of patriotism, to which we could appeal in the hope that it would be responded to and thousands voluntarily rise in arms to aid us against our foes.

For the support of our Army at its present strength, or to increase it if needful, we depend solely on the system of voluntary enlistment: that system has hitherto been found adequate to our necessities, but it is obvious that its successful working depends entirely on the continued prosperity of our rule, the inducements we may be able to hold out to the recruit, and the degree of faith he may be led to repose in our ability to secure him regular pay and eventual pension. As long as all goes smoothly we need anticipate no lack of candidates for our ranks;

but let matters look gloomy, and we shall speedily find, as we have done before, recruits few in numbers and of an inferior class offering themselves; whilst any succession of heavy reverses would probably immediately deprive us of all further supply of the human material.

We should remember, too, that soldiers are not made in a day; and even if we had the power at any moment to add 40,000 or 50,000 recruits to our muster-rolls, these would be but recruits, and as such useless for a considerable period after their enlistment.

The superficial extent of British India corresponds very nearly with that of continental Europe westward of Russia, excluding Italy and Denmark, whilst its estimated population of 182,000,000 is also about the same as that of the countries indicated, computed at 127,000,000 souls. When, however, we contrast the armaments of the same countries, a large disproportion becomes apparent. The army of India, as just mentioned, numbers some 282,000 fighting men, whilst the forces maintained by the foreign powers adverted to exhibit an aggregate of 1,234,000, being in the rough ratio of nearly 4½ to 1. These numbers, moreover, though large in themselves, comprise only the standing armies of the said European states, and do not include the reserves that all possess, under the various denominations of National Guards, Militia, Landwehr, Landsturm, &c. (*Vide* Table A.)

If from these facts, and the grand scale of the Military establishments maintained on the Continent, I should attempt to deduce the necessity of a corresponding increase to our Indian armies, it might at once be alleged, that the cases are by no means parallel—that the denser populations and larger revenue of European kingdoms admit of the support of more numerous armies, whilst their juxtaposition and clashing interests compel them to keep an armed watch upon each other; a state of affairs which they themselves mutually deplore, as entailing a heavy annual outlay, and the loss of so many useful hands restricted from labour.

The truth for India lies, I conceive, in that middle path which is proverbially deemed the safest. Undoubtedly our Army requires a considerable increase of strength to admit of our relying with confidence on its continued and satisfactory fulfil-

ment of the duties entrusted to it; but as we need only apprehend much internal danger when in combination with external efforts directed against our peace, and as our frontier [redacted] are not to be compared for their power of doing injury with those against whom each particular continental state has to guard, we need not adopt or adhere precisely to the European scale as a numerical standard for our Indian forces.

It may be taken as an axiom, that "to preserve peace we must have an army equal in quantity and quality to any number of peace-breakers." The Armies of our three Presidencies would suffice to meet all who are likely to contend with them in the field, if their full strength could be made available for that purpose; but unfortunately by far the largest portion of our force (as at present constituted) must be kept in hand for the military tenure of the country, and comparatively a small amount only can be concentrated for offensive operations.

With difficulty we have at different times assembled 50,000 or 60,000 men for a campaign; and then, when stout opposition on the part of our foes, and the casualties that must always be looked for on service have thinned our ranks, we have been brought to a temporary stand-still (as after the battles of Ferozeshar and Chillianwalla) until fresh men and material could be slowly gathered and brought up from the rear. We cannot but feel that at different periods of our Indian history our reputation and our rule have been repeatedly endangered by the want of Reserves; which want has on some occasions led us to the very verge of defeat, and at others has prevented our converting doubtful victories into assured success.

I take it for granted that the majority of those who are conversant with Indian affairs will at once admit the truth of all that I have urged, and readily assent to the advisability of largely increasing our Eastern army, if the state of our finances would justify the measure. The mode by which I would propose greatly to augment our forces, whilst the additional expense thereby incurred should be limited to a comparatively trifling amount, I will show hereafter, when I have first examined the remaining points noted for consideration. The plan of reform that I desire to bring forward embraces all the evils that are prominent in our present system, and therefore, I conceive, may be more advantageously stated

in its unity after I have concluded the remarks that I have yet to make.

I will proceed then to my

2D QUERY. — IS ITS CONSTITUTION (that of the Indian Army) SUCH AS TO INSURE TO THE ZEALOUS OFFICER PROMOTION, IF NOT RAPID, AT ANY RATE SUFFICIENTLY SO TO WARRANT HIS HOPING FOR COMMAND ERE AGE AND CLIMATE HAVE SAPPED HIS VIGOUR, AND RENDERED HIM INDIFFERENT TO RENOWN OR INCAPABLE OF EARNING IT?

To this question a reference to the Army List will at once compel a negative reply. The annexed table (B) gives an abstract of the periods of service and age of the General and Field Officers of the three Presidencies.

From this it appears that our youngest General Officer cannot be under fifty years of age, whilst over the head of the oldest upwards of ninety winters have passed, the average age of the whole body of those officers being about seventy-two! two years beyond the duration of life assigned by the Psalmist to the strong man! And yet these ancient officers are all borne on the effective strength of the Army!

Napoleon, speaking of himself at the age of forty-three, when still in perfect health, declared that he no longer enjoyed the physical stamina requisite to discharge the duties of a General vigorously. It is too, I believe, the rule in the French army, at the present day, to place every General Officer on the Retired List when he has attained the age of sixty-five, unless he has proved the possession of unusual talents, combined with undiminished power of constitution. If such a rule be necessary to secure efficient leaders for an army whose services are called for only in temperate climates, how much more requisite is a similar regulation for legions whose officers pass their whole period of servitude within the tropics or closely adjacent latitudes! The stagnation existing in the highest grades of our Army extends its effects downwards, and exhibits its results in the age and protracted service of the whole body of Field Officers, the ranks of Regimental Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors being filled up by men aged respectively fifty-three and forty-eight years, whilst in like manner they have spent thirty-six and thirty-two years in attaining their positions.

The evils inherent in this system require no comment; they are obvious: they are universally admitted: the difficulty is to apply a remedy that shall prove satisfactory, both to Government, by keeping the pay and pension abstracts within just limits, and to the Army, by quickening promotion generally, and insuring that the same in extraordinary cases be justly bestowed. A solution of the difficulty has been sought in the scheme of promotion by Brevet, and to a certain extent that device meets the requirements of the case.

If, in the execution of the project, Brevet-rank were indeed conferred solely on the deserving—on those who had well earned the honour—and thus opened to them the path to further promotion and eventual emoluments, the plan might be regarded as the salvation of a service wherein the ordinary course of promotion is by seniority only. I am confident that no officer would object to see himself superseded by another *of undoubted worth*, and who had proved his claim to superior rank. The former might feel the natural regret that talent, or the opportunity of evincing it, had been denied him; but he would not therefore seek to deprive his more fortunate comrade of the guerdon of his merits.

Unhappily for the repute of the Brevet system, its whole history is associated with another difficulty,—that of insuring its just administration,—and to this is to be principally attributed the ill odour in which the system is held by so very many. During the Peninsular war, Brevet-rank was but sparingly awarded, and in most instances it fell to the lot of men of aristocratic connexions, whilst many officers who distinguished themselves greatly on the field and in the breach, but could not boast of family interest, were left to sigh in vain for the promotion which was justly their due. Their services were passed over unnoticed but in the page of history.

In more recent campaigns the error has been in the opposite direction: whilst in the one instance honours were illiberally withheld, in the other they have been as recklessly lavished. The Duke's despatches were most parsimonious in praise of his subordinates; but, now-a-days, after a victory has been gained, every officer on the Staff, and every one who happened to have been in command of a Division, Brigade, Regiment, or Battery, would consider himself aggrieved if his name were not lugged

into the official account of the affair, no matter whether he was actively or passively engaged, or even a non-combatant. Formerly, honours and promotion were granted with a niggard hand; but now titles, rank, and decorations, are so freely given, and with so little discrimination, that they lose half their value to the good soldier, who sees no difference made between the casual or nominal sharer in the action and himself, who may have borne the brunt of the fight; whilst others who may be superseded by the fortunate winner of Brevet-rank growl deeply at the injustice done them in the instances where the rank has been accorded probably to men whose special avocations were in the Civil Department, and who, perhaps, never heard the whistle of a shot, or participated in any of the real hardships of the campaign. In this latter respect I allude chiefly to service in India, where in recent times, after a successful war, the same rewards have been granted to Commissaries, Paymasters, and Judge-Advocates, as to Officers who have earned their honours under the ordeal of fire. Surely this is not right. The voice of the Army is, at any rate, universally against it: and I think, too, with good reason; for, setting aside the feelings of jealousy which naturally rise in the bosom of soldiers who have fought and bled for their decorations, when they see the same displayed by men who really had no share in the actions blazoned on their medals, there is a positive injustice in bestowing Brevet-rank on Military Officers employed in the departments generally regarded as civil; as by such process a fortunate Commissary or Paymaster may, after one or two easy campaigns, find himself in a position to look for the command of a Brigade: a post for which, in all human probability, neither his tastes, habits, nor previous training, at all qualify him, and of which he himself would not be desirous but for the emoluments attached; and thus the tried soldier may be superseded, and find the reward for which he was hoping, striving, and which he deemed peculiarly his own, snatched from his grasp.

But whilst I thus confidently assert that public opinion, among the officers of the Indian army, condemns the system of conferring Brevet-rank on those who may have shown themselves zealous Commissaries, trustworthy Paymasters, or acute Judge-Advocates, I am equally confident that it is far from the wish of the same body to deny to their comrades in civil employ such meed of praise, or the more substantial rewards to which they may

be entitled. The honours which are considered essentially Military should surely be bestowed alone for services which may be regarded in the same light, whilst civil duties satisfactorily performed by Military men might be adequately acknowledged by the grant of Batta, or that of time to reckon in the period of servitude required as claim to pension, or in many other modes that might be readily devised.

My views with regard to the best plan of accelerating promotion throughout the Army, and insuring, as far as may be, the efficiency of all Officers, in respect to their age, physical capabilities, and general talent, shall be stated hereafter.

THE THIRD QUERY I have proposed stands thus:—

DOES THE TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE OF THE INDIAN ARMY EVINCE ITSELF IN THE THOROUGH PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFICERS, THE PHYSICAL APTITUDE OF THE MEN, AND THE GENERAL CAPABILITY OF THE WHOLE TO TAKE THE FIELD AT THE SHORTEST WARNING, PREPARED BY CONSTANT EXERCISE AND HABIT TO ENDURE ALL THE VICISSITUDES OF CLIMATE, AND, AS FAR AS MEN MAY, UNDER ALL OR ANY OF THE TRIALS OF A CAMPAIGN, TO REMAIN EFFECTIVE, INSTEAD OF FILLING THE HOSPITALS WITH SICK?

The answer to this query may, I conceive, be sought and obtained in the history of the recent contest in the Crimea, as the training, discipline, and general system of the Indian army is modelled as closely as may be on that of the Royal Forces; and if the latter have, during the past struggle, been found to fail in any instance, then it will be wisdom in the Indian Government forthwith to place the finger on the weak part indicated, and adopt speedy measures to correct the evil.

From every quarter, from friend and foe, and even from our own ranks, we have of late heard numberless comments on our Army, all concurring in the one opinion, that whilst the material is the finest the world can produce, the machine itself, except on parade or in actual combat, is most inefficient. The Officers, for the most part gentlemen by birth and by education, gallant in the extreme, proud of their country and its service, are all that Officers should be, except in one most material point—*they* (as a body) *will not make their profession their study*. That this is a fact I shall not attempt to prove,—it does not need it,—it is so

universally admitted, that when asserted and deplored by Mr. S. Herbert in his place in Parliament on the 5th of June last, the accusation was listened to with cries of "Hear, hear;" but by no single member of the house, Military or other, was the fact itself disputed. Colonel Dunne tacitly assented to the truth of Mr. Herbert's statement; but urged as "the reason why a high degree of education had not hitherto been general among Officers was, that *knowledge of the profession was no step to advancement.* The real cause which checked a desire in the junior ranks of the Staff to learn the profession perfectly was, that appointments were given, not as a reward for proficiency, but simply from favour and affection." If to this be added that a very large proportion of Officers in Her Majesty's army are men of private fortune (greater or smaller) and not dependent on their commission for a livelihood, but seek it only as affording an agreeable semi-occupation for a few years, together with a certain status in society, it is no wonder that thorough professional knowledge is at a discount among them.

The Indian army is officered by men of the like blood, education, bearing, and character, with those of the Royal Forces; with, however, this important exception, that the generality are entirely dependent for their bread on the position they hold. They have, then, one very great incitement to exertion; but, on the other hand, the same evil exists which Colonel Dunne describes as so thoroughly repressing all zeal or desire for study in his own service. "Professional knowledge is no step to advancement." *No* CERTAIN *step.* With regard to the disposal of Staff appointments in India, much has been done of late years to insure their being bestowed on competent individuals only; but whilst tests of competency have been prescribed, and pretty rigidly observed, in the distribution of appointments —whilst it is next to impossible to name any Officer on the Staff unfitted for his post, it will not be very difficult to point out men (in the Bombay army) who have fulfilled the requirements for Staff employ—who have passed in two or three languages and in the Military course inaugurated by Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, but who feel that, wanting the additional aid of local interest, they may yet spend years in the vain expectation of finding themselves bettered by their exertions.

The acquisition of any Oriental language, or the acquirement

of considerable Military lore, are not in themselves their own reward; nor will they induce men to rob themselves of their time and incur the expenses incidental to study, except they can perceive a very tolerable certainty that their labours shall not be in vain. If any rule can be devised to insure that each officer shall reap as he sows, Government need then only indicate the nature and amount of professional knowledge desired in each grade and arm of the service, and the standard will be speedily attained by the majority of their Officers. How our system works with regard to the private soldier affords no matter of more satisfactory consideration. We subtract so much labour from the productive resources of the nation; we take a man from the plough, or from the shop; we allow all that he has learnt of any handicraft to fall into desuetude, and we teach him nothing in lieu thereof but drill, to pipe-clay belts, to dress himself smartly after the mode which for the time being is pronounced "soldier-like;" and when we have completed his Military education, we find we have rendered him useless for aught but the parade-ground or field of battle. For the future we must clothe, house, and feed him most carefully; for we have rendered him utterly shiftless and incapable of taking proper care of himself in the event of accident depriving him of his accustomed requirements. He cannot build or repair his own barracks or hut himself. He cannot make or keep in order his own clothes, or accoutrements. He cannot even cook his own food properly; and the result is, that the real innate value of the man, which is great, is half lost to the country; whilst for want of constant physical training he is unable to cope with the hardships of a severe campaign, and under such trials speedily becomes the inmate of an hospital. Finally, when discharged from the army he would perish of want, but for the pension awarded him. Of all unhappy, useless beings—unhappy because useless—the old soldier is proverbially the chief.

What is here said of the English soldier applies equally to the Sepoy, except in one single instance, that the customs of the country, and his religion, compel the latter to cook his own food, or, at any rate, render him capable of doing so if need be. We adhere closely to the system that obtains in the Royal Army: we train our Indian soldier as a parade automaton. We achieve an indifferent imitation of a bad model, and we have our

reward in the possession of some 200,000 men as useless to the State, for all general purposes, as their Saxon comrades.

4TH QUERY. ARE THE INCENTIVES TO GOOD CONDUCT, AND THE EVENTUAL REWARD OF SUCH, AS HELD OUT TO THE NATIVE ARMY, ADEQUATE TO THE OBJECT IN VIEW, AND SUCH AS SHOULD THOROUGHLY ATTACH THE MEN TO US, AND PLACE THEIR FIDELITY BEYOND DOUBT?

Paragraph 151 of Lord Dalhousie's Minute, dated 28th February last, commences thus: "The position of the Native soldier in India has long been such as to leave hardly any circumstances of his condition in need of improvement." And with this brief notice the Most Noble the Governor-General dismisses the case of the Sepoy.

Let it not be deemed presumptuous on my part to differ from the opinion expressed by his Lordship. In respect to pay, or to pension on retirement, none of our Native soldiery (Regulars) have any cause to complain, regard being had to their grades; and to the duties performed by them: but there is one point that, I believe, rankles in the bosom of all,—indeed must do so, if they have the feelings common to men,—and that is, that beyond the trifle of present pay and future pension, there is scarcely aught for which they may entertain a hope.

The gradual spread of our rule over India has been accompanied by the ruin of all whom we may term its ancient *Noblesse:* a matter, perhaps, not much to be regretted, considering the character that history generally assigns to Indian chieftains; but, on the other hand, we equally exclude the present children of the soil from any substantial advancement. Trade is now the only avenue open to them for the acquisition of wealth; and as that opening can be availed of only by those classes recognised as traders by the customs and the religious system of the country, the rest of the mass of the population—including not simply those classes usually termed dangerous, but likewise all that is talented and all that is ambitious—find themselves cut off from every reasonable prospect of gaining riches or distinction.

To soldiers—to all the ordinary candidates for the profession of arms—this must be pre-eminently irritating. The men who, quitting or turning from all other avocations, embrace a Military life, are generally those who perceive themselves wanting in

aptitude for those callings wherein patient, quiet industry is required, and is rewarded with a moderate subsistence. Throughout the world, the very name of soldier is coupled with a life of supposed adventure and excitement, conjoined with visions of wealth and honours to be gained by the skilful and daring. But a very few years have elapsed since India afforded a wide field wherein such men might hope to reap an ample harvest; and titles and Jagheers have been, even at recent date, won and held by Sepoys, who, leaving our ranks, have enrolled themselves in those of Native princes. In Scindia's army, and especially in that of the Sikhs, were numerous officers holding commands as Generals and Colonels; men who had been trained in our own service, and who showed us at Maharajpore and on the Sutledge how well they could train and lead others against us. Now, throughout the length and breadth of the land our power is dominant, and the immediate consequence has been the complete closing of the few paths wherein the Native Soldier of Fortune might still have trusted to carve his way to fame, and to its more tangible results. This renders it but an act of prudence on our part to provide, if possible, some outlet for the energies of men who feel they have within them capabilities and desires above those of the common herd, and who can no longer resort to Lahore, Oude, Nagpore, or Gwalior, as a market for their talents, or a field wherein they might realize their aspirations.

I must not entirely ignore the fact, that to the Native officers and men of the Anglo-Indian army are extended the honours and pecuniary benefits of two "Orders," those of "Merit" and of "British India;" but I must add my own opinion that, in themselves, they form but an adequate reward for very ordinary service, whilst they are by no means an equivalent for those brilliant prizes which we have withdrawn from the Indian Military lottery; and which, though few, and but seldom obtained by lucky warriors, yet, like the Marshal's baton to the French conscript, existed *in posse*, and served to gild with hope a career that, but for it, would have proved intolerable.

Having, then, dissipated for ever the golden dreams in which, until lately, Indian Military adventurers have been able to indulge, and whilst we steadily deny to our own Native army all but the scantiest promotion and emolument, we are naturally induced to ask ourselves what guarantee we possess that, under

such circumstances, our troops will continue to serve us with fidelity, and effectively.

Fortunately for us, there is a feeling which from time immemorial has existed throughout the East, rendering it a point of honour to "be faithful to one's salt." To that feeling we are indebted for the finest and trustiest army of mercenaries that the world has ever seen; and frequent have been the occasions in which our Native soldiers have evinced their sense of our claims on their fidelity, and, in spite of urgent temptation, have remained true to those who fed them. Still, on their present footing, they are but mercenaries, and, being such, it is impossible for us to expect from them unalterable attachment or service beyond a bare return for the pay we issue.

If in our dealings with our soldiers we lose sight not only of the great inducements to faithful and good service, but of the most ordinary motives that actuate every human breast, we cannot be surprised if some day or other our system should lamentably fail us. Dissatisfaction has shown itself from time to time in our Native Regiments—mutinies have existed, and desertions have taken place—and in nearly every instance the disorders and defections have, I believe, arisen in the one case in misunderstandings connected with the subject of pay, and in the other from our men being dazzled with promises of advancement far exceeding aught they could expect under our rule.

I would, however, earnestly deprecate the idea of continuing to regard our Sepoys simply as mercenaries, and the endeavour to secure their fealty by a frequent rise in the scale of their pay or pension; or, as has been recommended, by setting before them a few great prizes in the shape of Jagheers, Killedarships, or titles. Such prizes there should certainly be, but they should not be lightly granted; they should form the well-earned rewards of real service: not regarding as such the mere fact of having passed so many years in the ordinary routine of Military employment, Garrison or Field, as could be boasted by numbers of our present Subedars and Jemedars. Titles of dignity, grants of land, and extraordinary pensions, should be the recompense only of extraordinary services. As our Native Army is at present constituted, it is almost impossible for any in its ranks so to distinguish himself as to establish a claim to those higher honoraria; but I trust, ere concluding this paper, to show how the character of our

Army may be greatly changed, its *morale* raised, and the prizes I have designated used as a means to elicit from our ranks the talent that undoubtedly exists there; and which, when found combined with zeal and probity, should entitle the individual, after due servitude, to expect at our hands similar recognition to that accorded to the higher grades of Native Officers in the Civil Department.

QUERY 5.—IS THE POSITION OF THE HONOURABLE COMPANY'S EUROPEAN SOLDIER INCAPABLE OF IMPROVEMENT: HAS HE ALL THE ADVANTAGES COMPATIBLE WITH HIS SITUATION, AND THAT SHOULD RENDER HIM CONTENTED, WELL-BEHAVED, AND HOPEFUL?

Having dismissed the case of the Sepoy in few words, Lord Dalhousie, in his Minutes before quoted, proceeds to notice the condition of the European soldier in India, which he states "was susceptible of great improvement, and has received it liberally."

Whilst fully recognising the great and judicious alterations that during the last few years have been effected in the condition of our comrade in the ranks of the Indian Artillery and European Regiments, "in his terms of service, his food, his lodging, and the infinitely greater care than heretofore that has been bestowed upon his occupation, his recreation, and his health,"—and whilst gladly giving the due credit to those authorities who, individually or collectively, have so bettered the position of the British soldier in the East, I would respectfully note my opinion that they have omitted one material point which above all others would tend to banish drunkenness and vice from the European ranks, raise the tone of the Service, and implant hope (and with it happiness) in every breast—I mean the granting Commissions, *in a certain assured proportion*, to men from the ranks, *who can pass the prescribed tests* and so establish their claims to the honour.

It is true, that even now Commissions are occasionally granted to old and deserving non-commissioned or warrant officers; but these grants are only occasional: they are very few in proportion to the thousands of candidates, and in the shape in which hitherto conferred, as "unattached," leave the individual so distinguished with but a vague prospect of further promotion.

Not many years ago, severity of punishment, and almost that alone, was regarded as the best means of upholding the discipline of our Army. Latterly a course, wiser, more humane, and more consonant with the tenets of our religion, has been adopted; and with manifest advantage both to the Army and to the State. Still we do not proffer to the intelligent, zealous, and faithful soldier the rewards which men of like qualifications are constantly winning in the other walks of life. For soldiers of the ordinary stamp the incentives to good conduct, in the shape of appointments on the non-commissioned and warrant Staff, are perhaps sufficient; but in the European ranks throughout the three Presidencies are numbers of men of fair, nay, even of good education, whilst there are also many who, though uneducated, (in the general sense of the term,) have nevertheless the innate talent and ambition which need but opportunity of worthy display.

These are the men (putting the radically bad aside) who, dissatisfied with the petty guerdons of the service, and seeing but small chance of their ever gaining the higher prizes, are too apt to become reckless, and rushing to the canteen for solace, lead a brief career of disgrace to themselves and trouble to their Officers. Under a more considerate system, hope (even though never realized) might induce these soldiers to cultivate the talents bestowed upon them, and live on in the steady, earnest, and cheerful discharge of their duties.

Having thus glanced at the principal evils that characterise the constitution of the Indian army: having discharged the invidious office of fault-finding: I will now proceed to the task (presumptuous though, I fear, it will appear in me) of pointing out the remedial measures that I conceive may be adopted, with every prospect of their proving thoroughly efficacious, and of placing the future tenure and defence of our Eastern Empire on a most satisfactory footing.

The propositions that I venture to bring forward, involving a radical change in our Military polity—the sweeping nature of the reforms advocated—may tend to hazard their summary rejection. I would, however, most earnestly beseech a quiet unbiassed consideration of the project I am about to submit; and let it be borne in mind, that the alterations, though great, may be very gradually introduced:—may, most of them, be tried on a small scale at first, and in a mode that shall scarcely attract the public

attention. If found to answer, the system may subsequently be extended, at whatever speed may be deemed desirable by Government: on the other hand, should the experiment fail, it will cause no shock to the existing economy of the Army, and will have been attended with a very trifling outlay.

In unfolding my views, I shall divide my remarks under the following heads, viz.—

1. THE GENERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE ARMY.
2. ARMY OF THE RESERVE.
3. EUROPEAN OFFICERS—THEIR EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND PROMOTION.
4. NATIVE OFFICERS — THEIR EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND PROMOTION.
5. EUROPEAN SOLDIERY.
6. FINAL RETIREMENT OF OFFICERS AND MEN, EUROPEAN AND NATIVE.

1. THE GENERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE ARMY.

In the earlier ages war was not a trade; arms were not a profession: the soldier was such only for the time being: he followed his king or chief to the field, and on the cessation of hostilities resumed his previous peaceful occupations at the plough or at the loom. With modern progress and the division of labour, standing Armies were introduced; and it was deemed good policy to vest the defence of nations in the hands of men thoroughly trained to the use of their weapons, to act together in large bodies, and ready at any instant to enter on a campaign.

The system is undoubtedly good, and has been accepted by every civilized community; but with it has crept in an evil, not inherent in the system itself, and the origin of which I am at a loss to surmise. I allude to the *idleness* which we seem content to consider the normal condition of soldiers, and which we tolerate in no other body of men.

Why, or wherefore, this should be, I cannot understand. In former days the expenses of war were limited to the actual struggle: with the return of peace the army vanished from observation; and although its component parts were liable to be re-assembled for service if the State so required, yet, in the meanwhile, each individual member supported himself by his own industry.

With the standing Army appeared the Budget of the Minister at War, the heavy annual drain on national resources. This is submitted to in recognition of the axiom that "to insure peace, we should always be prepared for war." But as each nation is now armed, keeps a strict watch on its neighbours, and is ever ready to assert its just rights, aggressive powers hesitate long ere entering on hostilities; and so it results that peace has become the general rule, and war the exception. This is a great blessing, but it is purchased at a heavy price. A large proportion of the finest and most vigorous of the male population of each state is withdrawn from productive labour, and the rest of the community are taxed for their support.

Assuredly, if troops are maintained, the utmost care should be devoted to their discipline, training, and equipment, to insure an adequate return for the outlay incurred. This may be done, and is done; and yet, when all the work (so called) that can be devised is exacted from the men,—after full attention has been paid to their instruction on the parade-ground, and after all due supervision of these and other duties has been required from the Officers, it is notorious that much of their time is still disengaged; —that the life of Officers and men, in time of peace, is essentially an idle one, and by no plan possible can full employment be provided for them. I mean *professional* employment, or such as is deemed part of the avocation of the soldier of the present day.

We cannot always be drilling, or always dunning instruction into men's ears: indeed, the late Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, laid it down as a rule, that "one hour's drill-parade each day is more than ample for a well-disciplined and well-trained regiment;" and such light exercise, combined with the cleaning of his arms and accoutrements, and an occasional hour of guard-mounting, is nearly all the work (!) we look for from the soldier when not in the field.

The fault is in the system, not in the men. They, both Officers and soldiers of the British Army, are not constitutionally sluggards. The former, though somewhat aristocratic, are, nevertheless, principally supplied from the classes from whence also spring our merchants, lawyers, manufacturers, clergy, and others, who depend on their brain for a livelihood, and with whom industry is a virtue. They possess, too, in themselves a

large amount, not only of intellectual activity, but of physical vigour, that seeks for enjoyment in its constant exercise. The privates are drawn from the race whose good sound, sense, mechanical skill, and industrious habits, have placed the agriculture and manufactures of England in advance of those of all other nations. Such men do not willingly subside into idlers. We may compel them to become so. We may take the youth fresh from college, bestow on him a Commission, and with it prescribe duties that need occupy but a modicum of his time, and call for no intellectual exertion in their discharge. We may suggest to him the propriety of employing his leisure in the study of the higher branches of his profession, and so to qualify himself for eventual command; but unless we can show him that there is a rational chance of his studies being so rewarded, and that he is not likely to be deprived of such prize by some one of greater interest than himself with the powers that be, we cannot express surprise if the lad eschews such unprofitable labours—does as those who have preceded him have done; as numbers of those around him are doing—considers even his trifling duties a bore, and becomes a mere garrison saunterer; or, if endowed with exuberant animal spirits, probably distinguishes himself as the leader in practical jokes, such as have recently been brought so prominently before the public. He may do worse: he may exemplify the truth of the old school-text, "Idleness is the parent of vice," and contract habits of extravagance, gambling, and intemperance, which have been the ruin of so many of our young Officers; and which I firmly believe may, in most cases, be traced to the *ennui* created by the system in vogue in

During the four-and-[redacted]y years I have been in the Service, I have known numer[redacted]victims to the propensities just mentioned, and who in co[redacted]nence have been dismissed, or compelled to tender the resignation of their Commissions; but I do not at this moment recollect a single instance of a Staff-Officer among the number: and this I consider, not simply as a proof that in the selection of Officers for the Staff particular regard is had to their moral character, but that the full and happy employment of their time secures them from the many temptations that beset their less fortunate comrades.

If we turn our attention to the private soldier, burdened,

like his Officer, with heavy hours, for which no occupation is provided, and, unlike him, possessed of few or no internal resources, can we wonder at the amount of intemperance that prevails in our ranks, and for which, unfortunately, our Army is proverbial?

By this compulsory inaction, moreover, we not only lose the present value of each soldier's labour; but by permitting the mechanical skill generally possessed by the recruit to fall into disuse, and his physical powers to diminish from non-exertion, we greatly lessen his effective capabilities for the field: we render him a shiftless, helpless, dependent creature. This has been abundantly proved in the recent campaign. Whilst our soldiers were starving with hunger or perishing from cold before Sebastopol, though both food and clothing were in abundance in the stores in Balaclava, the Naval Brigade, under exactly similar circumstances, kept themselves well supplied, and maintained their efficiency in every respect; and this was simply owing to the fact that sailors are accustomed to hard and incessant work, and being constantly called on to use their wits, they are ever ready with an expedient for any difficulty that presents itself. Further, to show the positive deterioration in muscular power and ability to endure fatigue that want of practice entails upon our Army, I will quote a passage from a paper lately published by Mr. Chadwick, C.E.

"Navvies work in gangs of five, and will admit no men into their gangs who cannot, as their *minimum* task, load twenty cubic yards, or twenty single horse loads, of earth in a day. In the Crimea, under the directions of our Army administration, the ordinary labour and tasks of earth[illegible] required from soldiers, raised chiefly from those same [illegible]om whence the best navvies have been obtained, and [illegible]wledged by impartial observers to have in *physique* no [illegible]riors amongst all the troops in the field, were only to remove ten cubic yards a day in a loose soil; that is to say, that at least *two* soldiers were required to do the work done with an interest and a *will* by *one* navvy."

Here, too, is what the "*Times*' Correspondent," writing from the Crimea, says on the subject of Army labour:—"That our Engineer Officers displayed admirable devotion, zeal, and courage, is attested by all who witnessed their conduct, and is written in

their blood; but no one who compares the labours of the two Armies can deny that in the magnitude of the works, and in the success of the operations, the French have excelled us; and their approaches to the Bastion Centrale, the Quarantine, and the Bastion du Mât, are monuments, cut in the living rock, to *their energy* and *skill*. But who supposes for a moment that it is owing to a difference in the personal or mental capabilities of the two bodies of men that the greater development of the French attack is to be attributed? The causes of that touch the whole constitution of our Army very mainly and very deeply. The English soldier,—so say the Engineers,—works badly, and frequently the Officers commanding parties in the trenches are indifferent to the execution of the allotted tasks, and seem to think it is quite enough for them to be ready to fight when called upon. The men soon catch this infection,—they work listlessly, &c. &c." Again:—"It is to be hoped that our men in camp at Aldershott and the Curragh will not be merely drilled and manœuvred, but that they will be taught *to work*, above all things. As labourers, our soldiers are not equal to the French, and are far inferior to the Russians. In fact, only those soldiers who were originally agricultural labourers, and were, therefore, used to the spade and pick, can get through the labours usually required for the construction of approaches or defences."

No, the existing system does not do justice to the Army or to the country on whose resources it weighs so heavily and so *needlessly*. I can see no reason why the soldier should be an idler, and why, when all around him are labouring, he only should be *forced* to enact the drone; why his duties in time of peace, (for it is of that period I particularly speak,) should be rendered wearisome by their very triviality; why he should not fulfil the obligation laid on all mankind, of earning his bread by the sweat of his brow; and why he should not be always ready either to work or to fight, like the Roman Legionary two thousand years ago.

I appeal with delight to the Roman, as affording a brilliant instance of the citizen, the workman, and the soldier combined. Why should not the British soldier, whose arms have been carried into every quarter of the globe, imitate the glorious example of his antitype, the world's old conqueror? Why should the Army continue to be simply an engine of destruction, of

no value but for war? Why should it not equally be the medium of spreading civilization and the arts of peace? Why should the vast amount of intellect and of physical force embodied in the Army be useless except when war rages? Strange, is it not, that the true value of such a magnificent engine should be overlooked by the State, that pays so dearly for its maintenance?

What has been done before may be done again. What Roman discipline could effect may readily be revived in the British ranks, aye, and under greatly improved auspices. The conversion of our Army from its existing organization to that which I would recommend is certainly no light undertaking, and the process would be attended with many difficulties; but still, when carefully considered, these difficulties become as nought in comparison with the magnitude of the object aimed at: none insuperable—none that, for such a reward as lies before us, should not gladly be encountered and overcome.

Quitting the general consideration of the subject, let us see how the measures I would advocate may be made specially applicable to the Indian Army. In no other of the Forces of the British Empire could the experiment better be tried. In India we have no wealthy holders of Commissions, who regard the same merely as a passport to good society. All are workers, or would be so, if allowed: all, I firmly believe, would eagerly welcome the introduction of a system that, whilst adding fresh honour to their calling, would also proffer to each man, Officer or private, the just recognition of his increased exertions—that would provide a place for everybody, and put every man in his right place.

I will assume as undeniable that—

1st. The State, paying its Army liberally, has a right to demand in return the best services of its Officers and men, rendered freely in any shape that the interests of Government require.

2d. A fair day's pay should insure a fair day's work.

3d. Eight hours is a fair day's labour in India, for European or Native: special care being taken that the work be executed at proper times, under suitable circumstances, and with due intervals for rest and refreshment.

In time of peace the duties of our Army (as at present constituted) are next to nominal; and were it not that the existence of the Army is essential as a guarantee for the continuance of tranquillity, its work might be readily performed by one-tenth of its strength, and the remainder be paid up and discharged.

With the exception of an hour's drill per diem, (the outside average,) an occasional escort, and their tour of guard—the latter coming round perhaps once in four or five days—our soldiers have no other call upon their services. As respects Guards, moreover, their number might everywhere be vastly reduced: that is to say, if it be thought worth while to alter our system, and *really* to employ our men. At present we make work for them: we establish Guards, we plant sentries; more, I believe, by way of showing that the soldiers have something to do, and affording them a little practice, than for any necessity that exists for Military precaution being observed. For instance, there is Bombay, a large and wealthy island, with a population of 500,000. We garrison it with three Regiments of Infantry and a Company of Artillery, from which are furnished Guards over the Castle, the Mint, the Bank, the three gates of the Fort, &c. &c., in addition to what are termed Regimental Guards; the whole requiring a large number of men for daily duty.

I believe that, under ordinary circumstances, its gates might be just as efficiently looked after by a Police Peon as by a Sergeant's Guard; and in like manner that many other of the Garrison and Regimental Guards might be somewhat reduced, doubled up, or altogether discontinued; rendering the men so economised available for real work, whilst they would still be immediately at hand, if necessary, for the suppression of a riot, or any other contingency that might arise.

The finest body of men in the British service—physically well-developed, intelligent, well-behaved, and whose praises are in everybody's mouth—are the Royal Engineers (recently Sappers and Miners). These men are all more or less acquainted with some handicraft that may be useful for Military purposes. Why should not all soldiers resemble them, be similarly trained, and their services made generally available for the use of the State, on all works whereon they might be reasonably employed, and from which they might gather practical skill and experience that would greatly enhance their value in the field?

Even in India, the labour of our Artillerymen and soldiers of the European Regiments might, with very little trouble and arrangement, be turned to good account. The avocations of the carpenter, joiner, smith, brazier, shoemaker, wheelwright, &c. &c., might all be pursued throughout the day under the shelter of work-sheds; and in this manner much of the material required on the Public Works might be prepared with that skill and nicety for which the English artisan is famous, and in which he so greatly surpasses the Native artificer. Much, too, of the clothing and accoutrements of each Corps might be made up in its own work-shops.

The Sepoy also should be called upon to exert himself: no recruit should be entertained who would not engage to practise or to learn some handicraft, or render himself useful as an ordinary labourer. This would be a far greater innovation in the Army of Bengal than in that of Bombay. In the Western Presidency we have long been accustomed to take advantage of the workmen we have got in our ranks, and with the aid of our own tailors and shoemakers to provide, alter, or repair (though not to the extent that such might be done) the clothing and accoutrements of the Sepoys.

In Bengal, Durzees and Mochies are not enlisted: *we* are glad to get them, if physically fit, as soldiers; and we do not find the Hindoostan Brahmin, or Chettree, at all averse to enter our Regiments because they may have to stand shoulder to shoulder with a low-caste man, or even find themselves commanded by a Purwarie Subedar.

The most efficient body of Native Infantry that I have seen during the whole course of my service was the Corps raised by the late Major Broadfoot for Shah Soojah's Contingent.

They were called Sappers and Miners; and as such they, under the guidance of their lamented Commandant, raised the fortifications that enabled Sale's Brigade to defend Jellalabad. But they were ready for any work: they were well drilled, and I saw them, in skirmishing order, drive the Afghans out of the vineyards of Istalif, and enter the town with their opponents, in a style that would have done credit to any Light Infantry Regiment.

They took their share in all duties of the Brigade to which they were attached. Each man, in addition to his ordinary

pack, carried on the march a pick, a shovel, or bill-hook; and so well were they taught to use these, that their outlying pickets always flung up a breastwork, cleared the ground in their immediate front, and rendered their position for the night secure; whilst other pickets, right and left of them, depended solely on the natural advantages their position might possess, and could not improve their defensive capabilities.

Why should not all our Sepoy Regiments be organized like Broadfoot's? Or rather, why should they not even surpass his Corps in general efficiency and service to the State?

The Honourable Company's Army musters just 230,000 combatants, European and Native. If of these we allow one-fifth as on duty, one-tenth on furlough, and another tenth sick, (an ample allowance,) we shall still have left 138,000 men available for daily work. But again, we must allow the average hour each day required for drill purposes, and another for care of arms and accoutrements; thus consuming a quarter of each working day: the labour of the above body of soldiers would then represent only that of 103,000 men doing a full day's work.

"But what a grand amount of labour even this places before our eyes! With such means at command, what magnificent works of public utility might we not execute from year to year! And yet we, as it were, lock up all this productive power; and that too at a period when the local newspapers are constantly teeming with complaints of the increasing scarcity of labour: a scarcity that must yet continue to increase in proportion as the Railway and Irrigation works are extended.

I have now before me two recent newspaper paragraphs: one (from the *Lahore Chronicle*) states the want of artificers that exists in the Punjaub; the other (from the *Calcutta Morning Chronicle*) mentions, "that Government has been compelled to increase the pay of the workmen in the Mint. This is the fifth or sixth notice of the kind: the rise of wages extending gradually to all classes."

"In the towns along the Hooghly, day-labourers of the lowest class are scarcely to be procured. The boat Manjees complain that they have to give a larger share of their profits to the rowers; and one cause at least of the outcry among our weavers is the impossibility of obtaining assistance."

During the year ending 30th April, 1855, the large sum of 22,593,000 rupees was expended on public works in India. If half that sum be allowed for material and superintendence, the remaining moiety shows the annual cost of labour; and assuming that the average wages of skilled and unskilled labour be four annas per diem, and that there are 300 working days in the year, then, $\frac{11,296,500 \times 4}{300} = 156,620$, { The number of men daily employed on public works throughout India.

If this very rough estimate be approximate to the truth, then it appears that in our own ranks we possess an amount of labour equal to two-thirds of all that is required for Government purposes, and which will represent a money value of at least 7,500,000 rupees per annum, if calculated only at the previous rate of four annas for a man's pay daily.

I make this last calculation on 100,000 men alone, deducting the odd 3,500 for superintendence, and considering that the working "Batta" that would be demanded by the Military labourers would be counterbalanced by the superior character of their work: combining, as it would do, that of a considerable proportion of skilled English artificers, and the whole effected under the close superintendence of a large body of European Officers.

It is true that of the 103,500 Officers and men of the Indian Army, whose services I deem might be made daily available on public works, the European soldiers could only be employed under shelter; whilst the Native Cavalry and Artillery also could not well labour except in the immediate vicinity of their Cantonments, and under conditions which I will more particularly dwell upon hereafter. Deducting all those arms, however, there would still remain upwards of 70,000 Native Infantry throughout the three Presidencies, whose energies might be constantly engaged on works similar to those executed by the Legionaries of old. Every battalion that could be spared from Garrison duty might, during the working season, be employed in the construction of roads, bridges, canals, dams, tanks, harbours, piers, &c. &c., returning to Cantonments for the Monsoon; or, if circumstances rendered it advisable, hutting themselves in the vicinity of their labours. By the judicious employment of troops as proposed, a vast amount of improvements might be effected; such as, though exceedingly desirable for Imperial pur-

poses, yet as offering little probability of pecuniary profit, are not likely to be undertaken by private enterprise. For instance, in the Minutes of the Most Noble the Governor-General, dated October 12th, 1854, his Lordship strenuously recommended that the Honourable Court should give its sanction to the entire section of the contemplated Railway from Bombay to Baroda; urging, that whatever might be the value of the allegations against that portion of the line between Bombay and Surat, regarding the same commercially, yet in a political point of view alone the importance of that very portion would justify the guarantee by Government of the interest of the capital needed for its formation.

The Honourable Court negatived Lord Dalhousie's recommendation, and the communication between Bombay and Surat will, therefore, continue to be interrupted for three months every year; until circumstances call still more loudly, or appear more favourable, for the completion of the link. This, then, is a work whereon our troops might be advantageously engaged. The Railway from Bombay to Surat, if formed, would be of *certain* political value; and though commercially an experiment, would probably prove successful in that respect also. Its construction would form an admirable school for Officers and men; and, when finished, the road might continue in the hands of Government, or be sold or leased to any company anxious to work the line. In like manner, feeders to the Grand Trunk Lines, roads required for strategical purposes, and other works of assured general utility, but of which the mere commercial value might not be so certain, could be created by the travail of the troops.

Further to exemplify how I would wish to see the system worked, and the mode in which even our permanent Garrisons might devote some of their energies to productive labour, I will again advert to the force quartered in Bombay. By reducing all Guards not absolutely essential, the services of one of the Native corps there stationed might be rendered disposable, and the battalion could be sent to labour in the Vehar Waterworks; from whence, on any emergency, it could be recalled by Rail in half an hour.

The men of the second Native regiment, when not on guard, might labour under the direction of the Garrison or Dockyard Engineers; and for the European regiment at Colaba and the

Artillery in the Fort, ample occupation could be found in the gun-carriage, cooperage, powder-works, and other departments where the services of skilled artificers are needed.

I am fully aware that my proposal to *work* the Army is not likely to meet universal acceptance. There are many in our ranks who seem to think that in time of peace it would be a perversion of a soldier's powers to require him to do aught beyond drill and mount guard, and that every hour not passed in the latter occupation might be profitably devoted to the former. Others, again, appear to consider the normal condition of the soldier as that of intense exertion in war-time, or profound idleness in that of peace; and that we have no right to expect it should be otherwise. A third party, after duly studying the scheme, may raise reasonable objections to it on the score of the difficulties that would arise in carrying it into effect. I admit there would be difficulties, but none insuperable. The most plausible of all the probable objections that suggest themselves to my mind is, that the labour of the troops would not be zealously and efficiently yielded, and, consequently, would not be worth anything like the value assigned it.

If not given *con amore*, then undoubtedly the labour of the Army would be comparatively worthless; but I think means could be devised to insure due exertion on the part of all, Officers and men.

Government has a right to demand "a fair day's labour for a fair day's pay." A scale of *minimum* daily tasks to be performed by the soldier-workmen in their various capacities could readily be framed, and their exertions stimulated to the *maximum* by the system of *piece-work* and *payment in accordance* being adopted as far as possible. Further stimulus might be applied, and the feeling of the Army interested and guided in the right direction by the well-timed bestowal of public praise on those who laboured diligently and effectively; whilst the names of battalions, companies, or individuals, might be attached to and recorded on works executed by their skill and industry.

Such means have often in the world's history sufficed to rouse exertion; and I do not anticipate that they would fail in the present instance.

I have roughly valued the productive power of the Indian army at 7,500,000 rupees per annum, including therein the work of some 30,000 Artillery and Cavalry; who, however, for obvious

reasons, could not well be employed, like their Infantry brethren, on indiscriminate labours. The former soldiers could not be separated from their cattle, and I therefore conceive that the most profitable exercise of their services (including those of their horses and bullocks) would be in raising their own subsistence; and this might be achieved, if the whole, as far as circumstances would permit, were *colonized* on a plan somewhat similar to that adopted with regard to portions of the Austrian and Russian Armies.

Setting aside the horses of the European Dragoons, the Indian Government maintains permanently the following establishment of cattle for its Military Service:—

Native Cavalry, Regulars,	Horses . .	10,584
„ Irregulars	„ . .	16,820
Artillery	„ . .	7,200
„	Bullocks .	960
	Total	35,564

Now, allowing 110 rupees per annum for the grain and grass of each of the above animals, their mere keep amounts to the enormous sum of 3,912,040 rupees annually; but if, by the combined labour of the horse and soldier, the requisite food *for both* can be raised, (and there is no just reason why they should not,) then the sum mentioned may be added to the former estimate of 7,500,000 rupees, and the total of 11,412,040 rupees, or 1,141,204*l.*, exhibited as the annual pecuniary saving that would accrue to Government by the adoption of the working system.

For ages past soldiers have been called upon, more or less frequently, to exercise their powers as pioneers: their employment in that capacity is, therefore, no novelty; but it is comparatively novel to see soldiers (*bonâ fide* such) support themselves as agriculturists; and therefore, when recommending that our Artillery and Cavalry should raise their own sustenance and that of their cattle, it will be well to show that the plan has been *proved* feasible.

Let me, then, briefly sketch the subject of Military Colonies, as they exist in Austria and Russia.

A century and a half has elapsed since the necessity of watching and checking the incursions of the Turks on the Austrian territory, led Prince Eugene to form the happy idea of

locating self-supporting bodies of soldiery along the frontier. He recommended, and was permitted to organize, the force known as the *Gränz Regimenten.* This now consists of seventeen Infantry Regiments, of 2,400 bayonets each, (in three battalions,) officered in every respect like those of the Line; one Regiment of Hussars, and one of Carabineers, with an admirable Corps of Artillery. These troops, mustering upwards of 45,000 men, form a complete *cordon* along the frontier, at posts distant from each other on an average fifty miles, and extending over a line 800 miles in length, from Gospich, in the south-east corner of Croatia, to Naszod, in the north-east angle of Transylvania.

The force supports itself entirely by its own labour; and not only does so, but actually exhibits on its annual expenditure a balance in favour of Government to the extent of 700,000 florins (or about 75,000*l.*), which is paid into the Treasury!

Two systems have been acted on in its organization, and both have been found to work well. By the first plan, some of the regiments receive regular pay, and cultivate gigantic farms, the produce of which becomes the property of Government, and its sale provides funds to meet the expenditure incurred.

By the second mode, the remaining regiments receive allotments of land in a certain proportion of acres, according to rank, from Colonel downwards, and which land is their private property, for which the holders render Military service.

The soldiers of these corps are exercised at Company drill twice a week throughout the year, and at Battalion drill for three weeks consecutively in spring, and for four weeks after harvest. The force furnishes at all times a chain of Patrols over the whole frontier to be protected, and is ready, at a moment's notice, to turn out *en masse,* and repel any threatened attack.

It is not liable to move beyond its own districts in time of peace, but during war it furnishes a quota for the field in a proportion as high as two out of the three battalions of each Regiment; and, whenever they have been so called on for service, the *Gränz Regimenten* have always distinguished themselves by their general good conduct, gallantry, *esprit de corps,* smartness, and intelligence.

The gradual development of the system appears to have been attended with the happiest results, not only to the troops themselves, but to the provinces in which they are quartered. "On quitting Hungary," says a modern traveller, "and entering on

the territory of the frontier Colonies, a decided difference is immediately observable in the good condition of the roads, the regularity and cleanliness of the villages, with the comfort of the houses; all bearing witness of having arrived in a country better governed and cultivated."

Another writer observes: "There is no region in Europe, probably, which contains so numerous a Military population. Out of 1,200,000 inhabitants, 45,000 men are always fully trained and equipped. Their Baggage-train and Magazines are in excellent order. The district is rapidly increasing in population, and improving in social and agricultural respects. In times of war, a battalion of reserve is added to every Regiment, and, in great emergencies, a provisional battalion is called out. The Militia is then substituted for Garrison duty, and the regular disposable force is set quite at liberty.

"Under this system, the Military frontier supplied as many as 100,000 men to the Austrian ranks in 1809."

These Colonies having been found so fully to answer the object had in view by their originator, Russia was induced, in 1818, to follow in the steps of Austria; and two divisions of Infantry of the Line, 48,000 men, were accordingly colonised in the province of Novogorod, whilst three Corps of Cavalry, with twelve Field Batteries attached, were similarly located in the district known as New Russia.

The first of these, the Infantry Colony, proved a failure, owing to the sterility and unhealthiness of the tract of country selected for the experiment, and from a spirit of insubordination that manifested itself among the troops themselves: the establishment was, therefore, broken up. The Cavalry Colony, to the southward, however, prospered; and so much so, that eventually the system was still further carried out. Infantry Colonies were again organized, and, in 1853, the whole of these self-supporting establishments exhibited a grand total of—

	MEN.	HORSES.	GUNS.
Cavalry	61,660	61,660	—
Infantry . . .	29,950	—	—
Artillery . . .	5,050	4,750	152
Baggage Train .	1,600	4,800	—
	98,260	71,210	152

And let it not be supposed that the above troops are only half disciplined, or partaking of the nature of Militia, and would require considerable polishing up to fit them for the field: on the contrary, they are kept in the highest state of efficiency: they are composed of *some of the best Corps of the Russian Regular Army.* The Infantry is a portion of the Imperial Guard, (thirty Battalions of Grenadiers, Carabineers, Light Infantry, and Sappers,) whilst the Cavalry is formed of Cuirassier, Dragoon, Hulan, and Hussar Regiments, whose superb appearance has repeatedly elicited the highest admiration of all who have witnessed the reviews at Wossnesenk. They are maintained under their existing organization, simply from motives of economy; the Russian Government having learnt from experience that its troops may be thus colonised with profit to the coffers of the State, and with no hazard to the general efficiency of the troops themselves.

With the guarantee of Austria and Russia for the soundness of the measure, I would hope that the Indian Government may not hesitate to adopt a similar step with regard to its own forces. I would hope, too, that the example set by the troops of the above-named nations might reconcile our own to the task of rendering themselves essentially and permanently useful.

During a period of peace, our Indian Artillery has positively no duty to perform, except to furnish its own Guards, and to exercise. But little additional demand is made upon the services of our Regular Cavalry: with the exception of an occasional bit of escort work, they, like the Artillery, have only to take care of themselves. Why, then, should not the whole of the Artillery and Regular Cavalry be *colonised*, as far as circumstances may allow, and devote their time, not otherwise engaged, to the cultivation of the soil? By the Artillery, this might most easily be effected. Their cattle are draught cattle, and the tasks of ploughing, harrowing, &c. &c., would be capital practice for the animals, and, at the same time, keep them in good wind.

Under the present system the gun-bullocks positively suffer from plethora. Being castrated, they have a natural tendency to fatten, which is not checked by the trifling amount of work exacted from them on the parade-ground; the consequence is, that when, in the course of reliefs, or from other circumstances, they have to quit their Cantonments, it takes several days' journey to get them into really good marching order.

The gun-horses, though not so fat as the bullocks, would benefit also by field-work. In England it is not unusual, in the height of the ploughing season, to take ten hours' work from the horses; in India nothing so severe should be dreamed of: less than half of such amount of labour would raise the food of both men and cattle, and neither need be distressed.

The Cavalry might probably be somewhat horrified at the proposition to work their horses, and at once object that they are for the saddle, and not for draught; and to put them to the latter use would render them heavy in hand, and spoil them for the purposes for which they are intended.

This objection would be well-grounded, if it were necessary, under the proposed plan, to exact hard and constant labour in the collar from each horse; but I have already said that such would by no means be requisite.

In England a pair of horses will suffice for all the work on a farm of forty to fifty acres. Let us suppose the lesser number; and that, as an English cart-horse far exceeds in size and strength an Indian Cavalry charger, it would require two of the latter to do the task of the former; then a pair of our Light Cavalry horses would only be capable of cultivating twenty acres of ground, and that under nearly constant work.

But to render the toil really light, we might allow ten acres only as the quantum to be worked by each pair of horses; and even that would be more than required for the simple support of the horses themselves, and their respective troopers. From seven and a half to eight acres would be ample for such purpose.

For his own pleasure a gentleman would, of course, desire that his saddle-horse should be employed in no other capacity; but we know that people of limited means do constantly use their horses indifferently in the saddle or harness; and that, too, without any material disadvantage being apparent from the practice. And further, it should be remembered that the trooper's horse is maintained, not for his private gratification, but for the service of the State; and Government has a right to insist on that maintenance being effected in the most economical plan compatible with the efficiency of the charger.

Finally, I would hope that Officers and men, as good soldiers, would speedily overcome the first rude shock thus given to their established ideas, customs, and prejudices; and, further, would

not only acquiesce in the justness of all that I have advanced, but would eventually take a delight in carrying out the proposed system. As a general rule, all men have in some degree a natural bias towards agricultural pursuits; and such as I would wish to see undertaken by our Artillery and Cavalry should be deemed by them an amusement rather than a labour.

Having thus roughly given an outline of one of the great reforms that I am anxious may be introduced into our Indian army, I will proceed to the second of the topics I have noted for remark, having reference to a measure which I conceive to be of nearly equal importance to the service—The establishment of,

2. An Army of Reserve.

If, by some magical process, we could at any moment raise any desired number of recruits, and in the same facile mode convert them as instantaneously into trained soldiers, we should need no Reserves. Unfortunately for us, there exists no such ready way of maintaining or increasing the strength of our battalions.

I have already stated my opinion that the Army of India is numerically too small for the calls that may be made upon it. Its numbers suffice, under ordinary circumstances, to overawe the country we rule, and to protect our frontiers from insult; but in extraordinary cases, when to crush internal revolt, or to proceed actively against external foes, it becomes necessary to assemble a large force, we can do so only by denuding the country of its usual Garrisons, and thus exposing ourselves to fresh dangers. We have but a choice of difficulties. If this be admitted,—and few, I think, will deny it,—the only question is, "To what extent should the Army be increased, and in what shape may the augmentation be made, with due regard to the finances of the State?"

The addition to our muster-rolls should, I submit, be such as would allow of our sending 60,000 or 70,000 men into the field, without disturbance of the existing precautions for the tranquillity of our provinces. I would not augment the Line, but I would organize a Reserve Force of the above strength; and on such a footing as would admit of the Regiments being at any moment called into activity for the performance of Cantonment duties, and so render an equivalent number of the Line disposable for general service.

If for every two existing Battalions of regular Native Infantry we raise one of Reserve,—if, according to the usual proportion, for every 300 of the men so raised we establish one Reserve Field-piece, and if to every Regiment of Cavalry, Regular and Irregular, we add a Reserve squadron of the present strength, we should obtain the following addition to our Military power:—

	Men.	Guns.
Native Infantry	69,420	—
„ Artillery	3,800	228
„ Cavalry, Regular . .	3,528	—
„ „ Irregular .	7,400	—
	84,148	228

This force should consist not of recruits, but of veterans;—of men who, having done (say) fifteen years' WORK in the Line, and being past the actual prime of life, might have just reason to expect that the remainder of their servitude should be rendered somewhat lighter.

The whole of the Reserve should be colonized and self-supporting. To be transferred to its ranks would, I am of opinion, be always considered a boon by the old soldier of the Line, as, in all probability, it would make him stationary, until the completion of his period of service: it would enable him to have his family about him, and to live in far greater comfort than under our present Cantonment system; and his duties generally would be of a much easier nature.

The labours of the Reserve would be entirely agricultural, the Infantry and Artillery working large farms; which, as Officers and men gathered experience and skill, might become models to the surrounding districts, and be the means of introducing a far higher standard of cultivation than at present obtains throughout India. Doubts may arise whether such would be the happy result,—whether our Officers and old Sepoys would become such good farmers as I anticipate. To those misgivings I would reply by pointing again to the Austrian Military farms. They afford a positive profit to Government, and I think I may safely assert, that what can be done by Austrian troops may be as readily effected by our own. Assuredly the inauguration of the system in India would be attended with much trouble; many blunders,

more or less serious, might be expected; many disappointments would have to be borne; and it would be nought but up-hill work for the first two or three seasons. But as the zeal and intelligence of Officers gradually overcame the difficulties besetting them; as the Sepoys became habituated to their new calling, and things generally fell into train, I deem that the system would rise rapidly in estimation, and that we should find it even far more advantageous to our State interests than it has proved to those of the nations with whom it is at present in vogue.

Hitherto no great exertions have been put forth to improve the Agriculture of India, and little or no success has attended the desultory efforts that, from time to time, have been made in the cause. Government is most anxious on the subject, and is ready to do all in its power to forward so important an object; but the machinery appears lacking.

In Europe it usually suffices to show to the acute and hard-working population that their interests are concerned in any particular branch of industry, and the hint is at once responded to: landholders, manufacturers, labourers, all are eager to avail themselves of any suggestion that may be turned to profit. In India, on the contrary, apathy reigns supreme. If it is not apathy, (and I half doubt the correctness of that term,) then it is some other cause equally potent for evil, and to me inexplicable, that blinds the Indian races to any advantages that can be reaped only by stepping beyond the paths of routine. The Hindoo is proverbially quick-witted in all that *ordinarily* concerns himself; he is a ready calculator, he is not wanting in industry, and he is fully alive to the charms of a rupee; and yet he remains alike unmoved by the exhortations and the promised prizes of the Collector, or by the practical example of the English Planter, who extracts a fortune from the same soil that only yields to the other a bare subsistence. The Native will not forsake the road beaten for him by his fathers: as they raised their crops, so will he; and no powers of persuasion, it seems, will induce him to abandon the old track for others not sanctioned by custom.

Might we not enlist this very tyranny of custom gradually to combat the evils that, as regards agriculture, it now perpetuates in India?

The estates of European Planters, isolated and comparatively

few in number, have hitherto had little or no effect upon the Indian husbandry; but eighty or ninety gigantic farms, distributed over the face of the country, must, in the course of time, work a visible change in the agricultural system; not only by the force of example on the neighbouring landholders, but by the body of trained agriculturists which they would be constantly turning into the ranks of the population. Under my proposed scheme, all Sepoys would pass from the Line to the Reserve; whilst in the latter force they would acquire a practical knowledge of the best modes of farming: we might, consequently, hope that when eventually pensioned off, and settled in their native districts, they would cleave pertinaciously to the better system to which they had been trained and *accustomed*, and would so become the instructors of their fellow-villagers, and, by degrees, induce them to adopt the improvements introduced. (*Vide* Appendix.) I may here observe, it strikes me very forcibly that if Corps of the description under consideration had been established in the Jungle districts of India, instead of the existing Police Battalions, the Bheels, Coels, Ghouds, and other wild tribes, would not only have been just as effectually overawed, but would, moreover, have been trained and incited to habits of industry.

I fear that at present, though compelled to remain quiet, they have made little or no progress in civilization, and, in that respect, are no better than when first we cantoned our local regiments among them.

The Artillery and Infantry of the Reserve might have their own bullock-studs, and the cattle so raised would provide draught for the guns, and means of moving stores and baggage of the troops on any emergency. Should an Infantry Regiment be called out for Garrison or other duty, eight Companies would be available; the other two might remain in dépôt to look after the farm establishment, and prevent damage arising to buildings, crops, or herds, during the absence of the head-quarters.

The cattle of Reserve Squadrons of Cavalry might be entirely mares, and so form a remount establishment to each corps.

In the event of a Regiment taking the field, all further horse-breeding by the Reserve would be temporarily stopped, and the Squadron got into order for Cantonment duty. This plan would

enable Government to dispense with the large and costly studs maintained for remount purposes in Bengal and Madras.

With regard to European Officers for the Reserve, the number for each Infantry regiment need not exceed three, and proportionately for the Artillery and Cavalry. I will show hereafter how I would propose to make appointments in the Reserve the means of relieving the Line from Officers disqualified for active service, and to quicken promotion generally.

The cost of the Reserve to Government would, I hope, be limited to the capital needed for its first establishment.

The third subject on which I have to suggest reformatory measures is that of,

3. EUROPEAN OFFICERS—THEIR EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND PROMOTION.

I have already remarked, that "if any rule can be devised to insure that each Officer shall reap as he sows, Government need then only indicate the nature and amount of professional knowledge desired in each grade and arm of the Service, and the standard will be speedily attained by the majority of their Officers."

The expense incurred in the study of the Native languages is, to some extent, reimbursed to Officers, and in instances of great proficiency handsome pecuniary rewards are granted: so far so good; but in many cases Officers find that, by passing an examination, they lay themselves open to constant duty as interpreters, without deriving any remuneration for the trouble which devolves upon them only, and is avoided by their brother Officers, who cannot or will not qualify themselves for such service.

For many years past an order by the Supreme Government of India has existed, under which no young Officer can hold charge of a troop or Company until such time as he has passed a colloquial examination in Hindostanee. In the Bombay Army he is further required to prove to a committee his acquaintance with the interior economy of a Company, the general Regulations of the Service, the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, and, finally, to handle a Company or Troop on the Parade-ground. If he does all this satisfactorily, he may then hope, after two or three years' service (often less), to obtain the desired charge; and

with it his pecuniary affairs are bettered to the extent of some thirty rupees a month.

Might not some similar rule be framed to insure more general proficiency on the part of Officers, and to reward the industrious; and that, too, without creating any very heavy burden on the State finances? For instance, let every Captain and Subaltern doing Regimental duty, and who may pass in two languages, draw a monthly allowance of twenty-five rupees. Let the like allowance be drawn by the same Officers who may graduate as Civil Engineers. And again, grant a monthly stipend of fifty rupees to all those, or to a certain number, who may qualify themselves for the Staff. Touching the two latter propositions:—

The Marquis of Dalhousie, in paragraph 139 of his Minute of 28th February last, states, that to meet the demand for additional supervision, made by the great increase of public works, Military Officers, Artillery and Line, have been withdrawn in large and unprecedented numbers from their Regimental duties. The expedient, though advantageous to the individual interests of Officers, and affording relief to the present necessities of Government, is objected to as likely eventually to prove injurious to the Military efficiency of the Army; and a hope is expressed that, for the future, constant recourse may be made to the employment of Civil Engineers for the vigorous prosecution of works of public improvement throughout the country.

I would respectfully but earnestly deprecate the introduction of Civil Engineers in large numbers for Government employ in India; *their services being available only on the duties for which they are expressly engaged.* A few men of note, trained in the numerous gigantic undertakings constantly in progress in England,—men of repute and proved talent,—might with advantage be entertained *as counsel* in the initiation of new works, and general directors in their execution; but for the subordinate executive in such labours, the knowledge and skill of Military Officers, *élèves* of the College of Roorkee, and the similar Educational establishments now forming in Madras and Bombay, would, I conceive, be all that would be requisite; whilst, in the event of war, or any demand arising for their services as soldiers, those Officers could be immediately placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. It would, therefore, in my opinion, be better for the interests of the State to increase its establishment of Army Officers

to an extent proportionate to its requirements for the public works, and, indeed, for all the detached or Staff duties that of late years have been entrusted to the charge of Military men.

With regard to those who qualify themselves for the Staff, an order of Government, now of long standing, prescribes that such candidates shall prove themselves linguists. The rule is good; but the amount of knowledge insisted on is limited to a proficiency in the Oordu, or Camp language, and which, being in itself essential to the perfect efficiency of every Officer in India, should therefore form the least, instead of the sole qualification that ought to distinguish the aspirant for the honours of *l'Etat Major.*

Applicants for commissions in the Infantry and Cavalry are at present subjected to an examination absurdly trivial, and which cannot by any means be deemed a test of a good education. At the age at which youths are brought forward for the grade of Officer, a far higher scale of acquirements should be demanded from them; and that such would be readily attained is proved by the result of the competitive examinations for direct appointments in the Royal Artillery and Engineers. At any rate, the acquisition of a certain amount of professional knowledge should be made imperative on all Officers within a prescribed period of their nomination to the Service; and such might be achieved, and a vast improvement effected in this respect, without any great tax either upon the time or the mental capabilities of our young Subalterns. They need not become bookworms, but every one of them should acquire a thorough knowledge of Indian History; of Military History, as illustrating the art of War; and they should have a practical acquaintance with Field Fortification and Sapping, so far as to render them individually competent to strengthen and defend an outpost, or to conduct the labours required from working parties in the trenches.

For the departments of the Adjutant and Quartermaster-Generals, and for the personal Staff of General Officers, no Officer should be deemed eligible who had not evinced his competency for the discharge of the honourable and arduous duties devolving on the General Staff. No better criterion of such eligibility, or means of insuring it, could be devised than the course of study and general training demanded from the Officers of the French *Etat Major.* A like training could be easily given to Officers in

India; the cost to Government being limited to the salaries of perhaps a dozen Professors, whilst the gain would be incalculable.

Not only would the efficiency of the Army at large be wonderfully increased, but a body of talent would be evoked that, ably directed, would tend to the rapid development of the resources of the country.

At this present date, out of thirty-two Regiments of Infantry on the Bombay Establishment, there are only four among whose Officers none are noted in the Army List as having passed as Surveyors or Civil Engineers. We may safely assume, then, that a very little encouragement would bring forward numerous aspirants for scientific distinction, and that the working battalions I propose would have no lack of Officers fully capable of superintending their labours.

Those Officers whose superior attainments qualified them for employment on the General Staff might, pending vacancies, be engaged on the Grand Trigonometrical Survey; or attached, as in the French army, one to every Regiment of Cavalry and Infantry: and in the latter instance their services would be peculiarly advantageous for the more effective supervision of the work of each Corps.

Further, if the Officers of Cavalry and Infantry were organized in each Presidency in single bodies, similar to the existing Corps of Artillery and Engineers—that is to say, the promotion made entirely *line*—the following benefits would result:—

1st. The general necessities of the Service could be met exactly: the number of Officers could be at any moment augmented or reduced to the precise extent requisite.

At present, to avoid jealousies and ill feeling, all such alterations in the strength of the Forces are made with reference to every Regiment; as it is felt it would be invidious, nay unjust, to effect such changes in a manner that would operate advantageously, or the reverse, on a portion only of the Officers.

Thus, for example, if Captains be needed in the Bengal Infantry,—perhaps twenty or thirty would suffice,—Government would feel compelled to add eighty (one for each Battalion) to its muster-rolls, or none.

2d. The services of Officers being rendered generally available throughout each arm, the numbers present with Regiments could always be regulated according to their respective need; Corps on

service or at unhealthy stations being kept completed by the transfer of Officers from Battalions not so urgently wanting them.

3d. The supposed necessity for a distinct Staff Corps would be obviated, as Officers could be freely selected with regard to their qualifications, and employed in whatever manner and wherever their services were essential, without detriment to the efficiency of Battalions.

4th. Promotion would no longer be a lottery, rapid in one regiment and slow in another; it would be equalized in each arm of the Service, and might be generally accelerated *by the formation of Retiring Funds*, and by the introduction of one or two measures that would tend at the same time to render the Corps of Officers more thoroughly effective.

The satisfactory framing of any general scheme of retirement for Officers could, of course, only be arranged by a Committee, of which one (at least) of the members should be an actuary. I calculate that in each arm the body of Officers could, without distressing themselves, raise annually an amount sufficient for the tender of a retiring bonus to one-sixth of the Lieutenant-Colonels: this would not be any great hastening of promotion, but it would be somewhat towards it; and I would put it as a query, whether, the Army being reorganized and converted from a non-productive into a most hardworking body, its Officers might not reasonably hope for some substantial mark of favour from the Honourable Court of Directors, in the shape of a certain number of Good-Service Pensions, to be granted annually (as in the Royal Artillery and Engineers) to Officers below the rank of Regimental Colonel, and the acceptance of which should be made dependent on retirement from the Service?

I hope that the labour of the Army would save to Government upwards of one hundred and fourteen Lacs of rupees per annum. Nine and a half Lacs would suffice each year to grant to thirty-eight Field Officers a bonus of 25,000 rupees each; and that, with the sums raised by Officers themselves, should reduce by one-half the period now consumed in passing through the grades of Regimental Lieutenant-Colonel and Major.

I have already remarked, that the organization of a Reserve Force might be made the means of relieving the Line, in some measure, from Officers disqualified for active service.

By "disqualified," I do not mean men who by reason of broken health are completely incapable of discharging their duties, but those who in the lapse of time have lost their first zeal for the Service; perhaps have but indifferent health; have been disappointed; are soured; or, in general terms, have ceased to regard their profession in any light but as one in which their necessities compel them to remain.

Of such men there are not a few in our ranks; and though their names may do to fill up the muster-rolls, and represent effective Officers, that appearance is fictitious, and to it the real efficiency of the Army is sacrificed. It would be better for those Officers, as well as for the Army, if they gave place to younger and more energetic men; seeking for themselves quieter and lighter duties in the Reserve Force.

A Major Commandant, with two Captains under him, one to superintend the drill, and the other the agricultural operations of the Corps, would form a sufficiently numerous body of European Officers for Regiments of the Reserve; and, as an inducement to *demi-invalid* Officers to volunteer for such posts, they might be permitted to receive from those below them in the Line a *bonus* to the amount of three-fifths the value of their Commissions.

On entering the Reserve, the promotion of Officers would cease; but as they would continue to *work*, Government might extend to them the boon of their further service counting for higher pension: a limit, however, being placed to that service, and final retirement insisted on after a certain number of years (say ten) passed in the Reserve. This latter clause would prevent stagnation, and save the Reserve from being encumbered with absolutely worn-out men.

There are, moreover, certain Staff situations, at present filled by Officers of the active Army, but which, it strikes me, might far more profitably be kept as posts of retirement for old and deserving, but infirm Officers; thus forming another safety-valve to relieve the Commissioned ranks of the Line of men whose continued presence in it would be but a clog to the machine.

The appointments to which I advert are those of the Pay, the Audit, and the Army Clothing departments, together with the Cantonment Magistracies. The duties of these offices cannot be deemed essentially Military, nor do they afford to incumbents any degree of Military training, or add to their knowledge any

experience that may be turned to future practical account; and yet an Officer, after holding a divisional Paymastership, or similar berth, and losing all sight of his *profession,* perhaps for many years, expects that, on obtaining his Majority, he may with it look for the command of the Regiment on which his name has continued to be borne! This is an injustice to the *working soldier.*

But, it may be said, this objection applies, not only to Officers in the departments above-named, but against all holding Civil situations. True, in some measure; but in most of the avowedly Civil vocations in which Military Officers are frequently employed, clear heads, sound judgment, and personally active habits are required; whereas the appointments I have specified might readily be entrusted to any men of average intellect, nor would their duties of routine need any great amount of physical vigour for their discharge. I would, therefore, hope to see them (*with a limit on their tenure*) made places of comparative repose for deserving but worn-out Officers, instead of being bestowed on those who might be more useful to the State. At the same time, a regulation to the effect that *no Officer*, joining his Corps from Civil employment, should be eligible for its command, until he had done at least one year's Regimental duty, would allay much heart-burning on that point, and uphold the discipline of the service.

4. NATIVE OFFICERS—THEIR EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND PROMOTION.

A century ago, when each Sepoy Regiment had but two or three European officers with it, Subedars and Jemedars were *really* Officers; at present they are so but in name. The interior economy and discipline of every Battalion is supervised and maintained almost solely by the exertions of the English Captains and Subalterns; the Native Officers being made of little other use than to fill a vacancy on the Parade-ground, and discharge minor Guard or outpost duties. Whether this is a correct state of things or otherwise is a matter of opinion; and, accordingly, every shade of opinion may be heard upon the subject, from the stout laudation of the system under which Clive won his honours, (and which would involve the Company and Troop duties being left entirely in the hands of Native Officers,)

to the general disparagement of the whole body of Native soldiery, as incapable of aught beyond the carrying of a musket.

I admit that the Native Officer of *the Line* of the present day cannot be considered as at all on a par with the Commissioned European; he is not a gentleman, either by birth or education. It has suited our policy to create the class; but using, or, rather, *not using* them as we do, we can only regard our Subedars and Jemedars as Sepoys placed on a retired list, with honorary titles and fair rates of pension. Yes, handsome pensions for ordinary Sepoys, but no great reward for the talented and ambitious; though numbers of such there must be amid the thousands that wear our uniform.

The old Native gentry have nearly vanished from the face of the country, and now, between the aristocracy (if I may so call it) of the British conquerors, and the mass of the people, there is no middle class. The moan for the Hindoo or Mussulman gentleman of the past may soon be made. We may feel some degree of poetical regret for the ruin of a body of men who certainly possessed many good qualities; but we cannot banish from our minds that they also exhibited many glaring vices, and that the latter, rather than our system, have proved their destruction.

Still, we miss them from their places: they were a part of the body politic, and their loss is, at times, forcibly perceived. We cannot address or act upon the masses directly, nor can our Civil functionaries, European or Native, fill the *rôle* of a local resident gentry, and lead the population.

However unintentional on our part, the demolition throughout India has been sweeping and rapid, as respects those families whose Cadets regarded the profession of arms as the sole occupation worthy of a Native gentleman, and who, *having served*, looked forward to eventual retirement to their paternal estates.

We have thrown down; can we as readily build up? I trow not: but should we not try? Would it not be an act of justice to India, and good policy on our part, to endeavour to re-create a class that in all civilized countries forms the most valuable portion of society? I would not wish to see a simple reproduction of the men whose lapse from their original sphere is in itself

a proof that their task was completed, and that they might vanish from the scene; but I would wish to see a body of Indian landholders arise, boasting of the chivalry of the bygone race, but free from their vices, and really worthy of the name of gentry by a training under European moral and scholastic discipline.

In each of the Presidencies great efforts have been made, and are making, to imbue the rising generation with a knowledge of Western Arts and Sciences, and a taste for our literature. Colleges have been established and Scholarships founded for the encouragement of learning; but all with reference solely to Civil life. The soldier is almost entirely overlooked. If he chooses to accept it, the merest elementary education is provided for him, just sufficient to qualify him to write a muster-roll and keep the pay accounts of a Company in the vernacular. Beyond this he cannot well progress: nor indeed is there any inducement for him to aspire to better things.

Yet, why should we treat 250,000 men with such neglect? We cannot expect them to remain to the end of time content with the trifling reward we now accord them. Would it not, then, be wiser on our part gradually to open to them brighter prospects, *to render them worthier of such*, and then gracefully and voluntarily to bestow those honours and emoluments which otherwise, ere long, they may *demand* from us?

In almost every department we find the Natives of India apt scholars, and speedily capable of rendering effectual assistance in the further progress of study or labour. Setting aside the machinery of Government, which depends so greatly on the support of the Native subordinates to keep it in motion, we see our Indian fellow-subjects distinguishing themselves at College, graduating in Medicine, conducting the duties of Observatories, attracting notice as Engineers, Architects, and Ship-builders, and generally evincing that in intellectual capacity they are little, if aught, inferior to the European. Why then continue to overlook the mine that is lying ready to our hand in the Sepoy ranks? If we work it, we should call forth talent that may be turned to account in numberless ways; and, moreover, in so doing we may recollect that the men who respond to the call would be those who, if we did not provide them with mental employment and the opportunity of rising in life, would probably be brooding as

malcontents, and calculating the chances of bettering their fortunes under other auspices.

In the French Army every soldier or non-commissioned Officer is admitted, to the age of twenty-five, to undergo the entrance examination, into l'Ecole Polytechnique. Should he succeed, he will, after two years' study in that institution, find himself a Commissioned Officer, and all the prizes of the Service within reasonable expectation of attainment.

Might not a somewhat similar system be advantageously introduced into the Indian army? Improve the Regimental schools: render them capable of imparting an amount of education that will permit their *élèves* to meet the preliminary examination for entry into the Roorkee College, or its fellow institutions now in course of establishment. Allow a certain number of non-commissioned Officers and Sepoys from each Regiment, who can pass such test, to pursue their studies for two years; and then, if they have acquired a competent knowledge of the English language, history, geography, mathematics, surveying, and military drawing, they would be fit for and worthy of Commissions. They might be promoted to the first vacancies in their respective Regiments: there, in *the working battalions*, their acquirements would prove most useful; and eventually, when, by due servitude in the grades of Jemedar and Subedar, they had substantiated their claims to further promotion, they might be transferred to the Reserve as Ensigns, continuing to rise to the rank of Lieutenants and Captains.

The idea of granting such promotion to our Native soldiery is not new: it was, I understand, recommended by Sir Charles Napier; and, having been well acquainted with the constitution and working of our Indian army, his opinion on the point must carry weight with it. The idea, moreover, is acted on in the French Army in Algeria: in the regiments of Tirailleurs Indigènes, and Spahis, (exactly corresponding to our Native Infantry and Light Cavalry,) one half of the Subalterns of each corps are Arab, who take full rank with their French brother Officers.

With us, I would suggest that the creation of *real* Native Officers be first made in the Reserve, where they would not clash with, but only render valuable aid to, the European Officers to whom they would find themselves subordinate. The number

of Native Officers with each Reserve Battalion need not exceed twenty-two, say:

5 Captains,
10 Lieutenants,
7 Ensigns;

allowing two Officers to each Company, with two Subalterns in excess for the performance of the duties of Adjutant and Quartermaster. The pay of these Officers might be the *English rates* of full pay, and the retiring pensions the half-pay of their respective grades. These emoluments would form handsome but not extravagant incomes, compared with those at present accorded to our Subedars of the Line: they would be *earned*, and therefore might be given without grudging; and they would, I think, fully content the recipients: for though, it might be urged, the rules of pay or pension are not so high as those granted to English Officers *in India*, they are identical with those issued to them *in their own country*, and the position of the Indian Native Captain or Subaltern would therefore be precisely on a par with that of the British Officer whose services may be restricted to home employment.

Finally, I think we should have just grounds to hope, that as the new order of Native Officers gradually passed from servitude to the Pension Establishment, they would form a class whose superior mental attainments, combined with their acknowledged rank and incomes, would secure them considerable weight and influence in the districts where they settled; and we might surely reckon on that influence being ever exerted in the support of those who had made them what they were.

5. EUROPEAN SOLDIERY.

I have already noted, that in my estimation, the two great desiderata for the English soldier in the Company's service, are "constant employment and assured promotion to the meritorious." I have shown how the first may be provided; and the latter may be as readily arranged, if the Honourable Court will but consent to assign a portion—a small portion—of its patronage to the local Governments.

There are some 14,000 Englishmen in the ranks of the Indian Army. If sanction was granted, that for every two hundred of those soldiers, there should always be one man sprung from and

representing them in the list of Officers, it would need but seventy out of the whole number of 5,433 commissioned appointments in the Army to constitute the prizes; the bestowal of which, I deem, would conduce more than any other measure to the well-being of the European branch of the service.

The proportion of such prizes to the number of candidates may, at the first glance, appear very low; but let it be remembered, that of two hundred young soldiers starting in the Military race, death will inevitably claim his victims,—that many never attain even a Corporal's stripes,—that of the non-commissioned a large number are fit for no higher grade, and that the same may be said of those who rise to the position of Warrant-Officers;—eventually, then, the struggle for Commissions would rest between a comparatively small number of competitors; and to them the proportion of honours suggested would, I think, prove a sufficient and liberal allotment.

For the conferring of such Commissions, I would recommend rules similar to those already proposed with reference to the new class of Native Officers. Let a certain number of non-commissioned Officers and soldiers of each European Battalion of Artillery and Infantry (with a limit as to their age) be permitted to present themselves for examination in those branches of knowledge considered essential for Officers;—let the most promising be selected for further instruction in our new training institutions; and if, within a prescribed period, they can demonstrate their having duly profited by their studies, let them reap their reward by being passed into the Line as Ensigns, from the date of their final examination; their further promotion proceeding in the ordinary course.

6. Final retirement of Officers and men, European and Native.

On this point, and in conclusion of the whole subject, I have but a few brief remarks to add. For the system that in the foregoing pages I have ventured to advocate, I would claim this special merit,—that it would implant habits of activity and industry throughout the Army, and insure to all classes a general and varied training, which might prove of good service to them when they retired into private life. The European Officer who, during his career, had acquired some

knowledge of surveying, road-making, Civil Engineering, and probably (in the Reserve) of the principles of agricultural science also, would not be the helpless and still dependent individual that so many of our pensioned Officers are,—men who cannot shift for themselves or for their families: he would be well able to establish himself in one or other of our Colonies, and he would, doubtless, prefer that to an idle life of genteel poverty in England, and the sad task of appointment-hunting for his children. Whilst the Honourable Court would feel pleasure at the brighter prospects thus opened to their old Military servants, it strikes me it would also form a fair subject of self-gratulation to them,—the being relieved, in some measure, from the crowd of applicants whose claims the total amount of patronage at their disposal would not suffice to meet.

What I have just said of the European Officer applies nearly equally to his pensioned comrade from the ranks, and in a considerable degree to every class of our discharged Native soldiery. We would not wish the latter to emigrate; but with the instruction gained, and little fortunes accumulated during their service, they would be fully capable of undertaking the management of land on their own account, and farming it according to the most approved system; and by the grant of favourable terms to them, they might be induced to devote their skill and capital to reclaiming the wild districts, of which there is such a great extent within our provinces.

NOTE.—It will be seen by the date of this Paper, that some time has elapsed since it was completed in manuscript. Circumstances beyond the author's control, and, among others, the desire to consult absent friends as to the expediency of committing it to the Press, have delayed its appearance in its present form (for private circulation). This explanation seems necessary in reference to the realization, in the meantime, of some of his anticipations—in the occurrence of a war with Persia, consequent on the occupation of Herat by that Power.

A.

States and Countries.	Area in Square Miles.	Population.	Revenue in £ sterling.	Standing Army.	Army of Reserve.	Remarks.
France	160,000	35,781,628	43,889,000	396,000	1,300,000	Garde National.
Austria	197,000	36,950,401	14,433,000	286,000	214,000	Landwehr.
Prussia	83,300	14,907,091	8,866,000	131,565	201,295 97,200	Ditto, 1st ban. Ditto, 2d ditto.
Spain	145,100	13,900,000	4,454,000	103,900	56,000	Urban Guards.
Portugal	26,200	3,231,000	2,231,000	30,000	45,000	Estimated, National Guards.
Holland	10,905	3,054,396	7,000,000	60,000	150,000	Ditto, ditto.
Belgium	12,569	4,064,235	4,924,970	41,800	590,907	Garde National, 3 ban.
Swiss Confederation	14,900	1,980,000	642,600	64,019	64,019	Landwehr.
Federal Germany, including 36 Kingdoms, Dukedoms, Free Towns, &c., but excluding the Austrian and Prussian Territories, and Contingent Forces	198,427	13,612,859	11,020,000	120,969	44,000 60,000	Ditto, 1st ban. Ditto, 2d ditto.
Total of above	848,401	127,481,610	97,460,570	1,234,253	2,822,421	
British India, including Oude and Pegu	840,000	101,552,312	30,000,000	257,925	None.	

B.

Number.		Maximum Length of Service.	Minimum Length of Service.	Average Length of Service.	Average Age.
		Years.	Years.	Years.	Years.
25	Generals	77	59	63	80
50	Lieutenant-Generals	62	52	56	73
145	Major-Generals	58	32	46	63
116	Colonels (including Brevet rank) . .	52	19	38	55
107	Regimental Lieut.-Colonels, Bengal .	51	25	37	54
76	Ditto, ditto, Madras .	45	31	36	53
46	Ditto, ditto, Bombay.	39	29	35	52
107	Regimental Majors, Bengal . . .	37	18	31	48
76	Ditto, ditto, Madras . . .	37	20	33	50
46	Ditto, ditto, Bombay . . .	37	16	30	47

APPENDIX.

It is, indeed, time that decided steps should be taken for the improvement of our Indian Agriculture generally, and that its advancement should no longer be left almost solely to the casual endeavours of a few amateur societies, or to the vague hope that it may attain a greater development, naturally, as it were, with the progress that, we trust, the people, as a body, are making, or may make.

"Whilst in Europe the various industrial arts, lying in well-defined channels, are readily observed and measured, and every invention and improvement noted with precision," India is sadly deficient in such records; and its Agriculture especially has no history, no statistics (at least none worthy of the subject,) no Board or Minister whose peculiar avocation it should be to watch, to aid, and to chronicle its progress; and yet there is no single branch of art or industry that has such urgent claims upon the attention of Government.

If the finances of India prove incommensurate for its expenditure, and if, after the due exercise of economy and retrenchment, wherever such be admissible, it yet be found that to meet the calls upon it the fiscal resources of the State must be expanded, we shall, as heretofore, experience the greatest difficulty in raising an increased and steady income, except from the land,—the original parent of wealth,—and which, throughout the East, is popularly regarded as almost the sole legitimate object of taxation.

The creation of fresh, or increase of existing imposts, would in all probability be attended with violent and successful opposition throughout the country; and it is not likely that any such experiment will again be made after the lessons we have on sundry occasions gathered, touching the resistance that the native will make when taxed beyond his capabilities, or in a mode that he may deem unjustifiable.

From the Customs we cannot expect any great or immediate access of riches to the State coffers. They form an index to the general prosperity of the community, and, unless that prosperity itself is progressive, the amount realized annually from the Customs will remain stationary, or even fall below the average, should enhanced duties be levied on imports, and their consumption consequently checked.

The other three principal sources of Indian Revenue—Opium, Salt, and the Excise—are not, I believe, susceptible of any great change or improvement in their management that promises enlarged pecuniary results; and, as I have just observed, we shall therefore be compelled to look to the land alone for any important addition to the State Income.

But whilst the interests of Government are most intimately connected with the welfare of Agriculture, those of the people are involved therein to a far greater degree. Upwards of one-half of the Revenue of India is drawn from the soil by a direct tax, averaging one-third of its yearly produce. If, then, by any means we can permanently raise the annual yield per acre, the material welfare of the Ryot will be improved to the extent of two-thirds of that addition to his crop; whilst the State will benefit, both by its immediate share (the other third) of the result, and the indirect but certain gain in the Customs; as we may fairly assume that with increased means the native will become a more liberal purchaser of our British manufactures.

Up to the present period the attention of the Indian Government appears to have been directed almost exclusively to the simple extension of cultivation—to the bringing of waste lands under the plough, and augmenting the facilities for irrigation; and, I believe, from thence alone has any accession to its Land Revenue been derived, and not from the introduction of any new species of agricultural products, or better mode of cropping. The measures just noted, though attended with great advantage to the resources of the State, can scarcely be deemed *improvements* in our agricultural system; such are still wanting, and, moreover, must be made, ere it can be said that we have done full justice to the country, or to the people subject to our rule, or have duly availed ourselves of the opportunities lying ready to our hands.

It has been customary to regard India as possessing a soil of wondrous fertility,—one which the husbandman has but to stir lightly, scatter the seed, and then in a short period to reap an abundant return. This is a grievous error. How it originated matters

little. Probably it arose and obtained currency in England from the evidence offered daily to the eyes of the community in the arrival of rich cargoes of sugar, silk, cotton, spices, &c., all being articles requiring for their production a far more genial temperature than our own clime can boast; and to which advantage the popular belief would naturally ascribe that of soil also, as the readiest means of accounting for the supposed superiority of Oriental harvests over those of our native country: and this belief would in many be confirmed on their learning the fact that the greater portion of our Indian Revenue,—amounting to a sum nearly equal to the joint revenues of Austria and Prussia,—is contributed solely by the land-holders.

Any one who entertains these ideas of the excessive wealth naturally teeming in the fields of India, will find them greatly modified if he will but test their truth, even most briefly, by the statistics, such as they are, of that portion of our empire.

It is true that our Land Revenue alone approaches very nearly to the total amount that Austria and Prussia can together raise from every source; but then the area of our Eastern territory is exactly three times that of the countries just named, and its population double in amount; consequently, to form a fair comparison with the wealth of the above Continental States, the revenue of India should exhibit annually some 60,000,000*l.*, instead of 30,000,000*l.* only. Further, if we compare the average produce per acre of our Indian staples with the like acreable results under British farming, we shall at once perceive the vast superiority of the latter; and that the large income Government derives from the land in India is owing simply to the great area under tillage, and not to any advantage inherent in the soil itself, the mode of working it, or the particular description of produce raised.

I annex a table (C), the two first columns of which exhibit the principal items of cultivation in the North-west Provinces. These are extracted from "Campbell's Modern India" (pages 335, 336); and I wish that the average yield therein shown had been given for all the articles, and not for the three first only,—wheat, barley, and millet; but if we contrast the quantities so noted under the heads of wheat and barley, with the average produce of the same grains in England (*vide* third column), it will, I think, not only establish the superior results of British husbandry in those special instances, but will warrant my inference that if the same degree of skill, capital, and high farming were brought to bear generally on Indian rural economy, the standard of cultivation would speedily be raised to the

extent of an additional half, or even two-thirds, of the present ordinary crops.

As regards the Cereals and Pulses, this conjecture may assuredly be taken as only reasonable; for, whilst claiming no advantage over England in respect to soil, India indubitably enjoys more certain seasons and a brighter sun, all conducing to the more perfect development of the different varieties of grain. Such form from eighty to eighty-five per cent. of the produce of her fields, and constitute the food of her population, leaving the small balance of per centage to represent the sugar, cotton, indigo, and other essentially tropical crops that she raises. That these also might be vastly improved in quantity and quality by the application of agricultural science is, I deem, satisfactorily evinced by the perfection to which cotton has been brought in the United States, and sugar in the Mauritius; the latter place, small island though it be, alone supplying nearly one-third of all the sugar consumed in Great Britain.

If, then, in India we could but extract the same average amount of produce from the soil that is yielded annually by that of England, we should thereby at once add some 8,000,000*l.* to the Revenue of the country, and another 16,000,000*l.* to its general wealth; this rough calculation being based on the assumption that the total sum annually raised as Land Revenue (15,000,000*l.* in 1852) represents one-third of the actual value of the year's crops throughout the country. But I speak only of equalling the English *average;* that average being formed not merely upon the results of the good soil and good farming, but also upon that of the large amount of indifferent land and of the slovenly cultivation which (to our shame) still exists in many counties.

Whilst that general average, moreover, is far below that of the ordinary well-tilled English farms, it sinks still lower when compared with the produce and profits of estates managed on the best principles, and is infinitely inferior to the standard aimed at by the scientific agriculturists of the day. Thirty-four to forty-eight bushels of wheat per acre are the results announced by many farmers as the usual reward of their skill and labour, exerted according to the customary routine of English husbandry; that is to say, without having recourse to aught beyond the established system of good tilth, drainage, and a liberal supply of the ordinary manures. Farmers who have brought irrigation and liquid manures to their aid boast of producing fifty to sixty-eight bushels of wheat to the acre; and one of them, Mr. Telfer, of Ayr, reports the enormous return of eighty-five bushels of wheat from an acre of his land: but in this particular

instance guano and irrigation were combined to promote the almost unprecedented yield.

But, putting aside the extraordinary profits which can be realized only by the farmer who unites in himself the three requisites of skill, energy, and *large Capital*, there is certainly nothing in the ordinarily good husbandry of England which we may not hope to see achieved by that of India. It will need, it is true, considerable exertion, time, and perseverance to effect this; but I feel assured that no endeavour will be spared by Government, or its servants, to attain so desirable an object; and great will be the attendant reward—increased food, wealth, and happiness to the people; Revenue to the State, and honour to all concerned: and with such a prize within reach, who would not strive to grasp it?

I have said, that if we could but raise the yield of the Indian acre even to the average produce of the like area in England, we should at once create a yearly addition of 8,000,000*l.* to the Revenue, and 16,000,000*l.* to the national wealth; but this, I conceive, considerably under-estimates the advantage gained, for the calculation is made principally with reference to the grain harvests, and does not take into consideration the large profits derived from the extension of green crops, and their application to the development and improvement of live stock in every shape,—horses, cattle, and sheep; all of which form an essential part of the English system, and without which good farming and its large results cannot be obtained.

What would be the amount of these contingent gains to the country, I will not venture to predict; for I fairly own I cannot form an opinion that might be deemed even an approximate to the truth, as, from the want of Indian Agricultural Statistics, no sufficient data exist on which to base such computation. It will be evident to all who are conversant with agricultural subjects,—with the system pursued in England, and the no-system of India,—that the introduction of the former into the latter country, (with the modifications that circumstances demand,) must necessarily be attended with the collateral benefits adverted to; and though it be impossible forthwith to assign them a distinct pecuniary value, we may fairly characterise them as immense: this, I trust, will be fully admitted, and, for the present, considered sufficiently descriptive.

But how are these advantages to be communicated to India? How are the skill of its farmers and the capabilities of its soil to be developed?

In reply I would ask, how have like advantages been won in England? Two or three generations ago, English agriculture was in

a state as rude and unsatisfactory as that of India at the present day, whilst the occupation of husbandry was regarded as fitted only for the clowns who pursued it; the land and its produce, together with the tillers of the soil, were looked on as alike incapable of improvement: the former was supposed to yield as much as could reasonably be expected from it, whilst the latter were deemed proverbially stupid, and, as a class, incapable of amelioration. All this has been changed, and from it we may take heart of grace for India, and for the myriads who earn their bread from the cultivation of its fields.

Stimulated by the high prices obtainable for all articles of agricultural produce during a period of war, our landholders, from the latter part of the last century, gave themselves earnestly to the task of increasing the yield of their acres and their flocks; and whilst nearly every other class of the community suffered from restricted trade, they rejoiced in a certain market, and high rates for all their labour could create in their fields or stock yards. Soon after the conclusion of peace in 1815, prices of farm produce fell considerably, but rents did not experience a corresponding decrease; and the numerous body of tenant-farmers, who previously had been urged to exertion by cupidity, were now compelled to make the same strenuous endeavours to extract the utmost from their lands, that they might be prepared with their rent, and also obtain a livelihood for themselves.

The result of those exertions is now apparent, not only in the permanently increased produce of English husbandry, but in the beneficial effects that have been developed in all dependent upon the soil for their support. Whilst of late years great advance has been made by all classes in civilization, in science, in art, and in general information, by no portion of the people has more real progress been made than among Agriculturists. The capitalist who invests his money in land to manufacture bread, and meat, and wool, and calls himself a farmer, (landlord or tenant,) has discovered that, to keep pace with all around him, he needs to possess the same acumen and energy which were once supposed peculiar to our manufacturers resident in towns—the mill-owners of Manchester and Leeds, or the hardware-makers of Sheffield and Birmingham. He has also been led to perceive that his occupation, to be profitably carried out, must be studied and prosecuted by the light that of late years science has thrown upon it; and it has further become apparent to him, that unskilled labour is dear at any price, and that activity and intelligence are as requisite in the workmen on his land as they are in the operatives engaged on the loom or at the forge. The demand for a better description of farm-servant that has thus arisen has been answered by the class to whom the

appeal was directed; perhaps not spontaneously, but with the assistance and encouragement of their immediate superiors, who, by providing pretty generally that a theoretical acquaintance with the rudiments of agricultural science should form part of the education imparted in the village schools, and by the practical training subsequently given on their own estates, have created a race of farm-servants who, as a body, are as intellectually superior to their congeners of the early part of the century, as are their masters to the Squire Westerns of yore.

Whilst thus organizing an efficient corps of Bailiffs, Foresters, Stock-keepers, Ploughmen, and the other subordinate workers of the soil, the farmers have not been negligent in providing for their own educational necessities. Within a recent period, numerous establishments for the express purpose of teaching the science of Agriculture in all its branches, and in the most effective modes, have sprung up throughout the United Kingdom. At their head must be placed the Royal Agricultural College, at Cirencester, (under the immediate patronage of H.R.H. Prince Albert,) with its highly qualified body of Professors, thoroughly competent to convey instruction, both in those divisions of liberal knowledge ordinarily deemed requisite for the youth of our better classes, and in those special departments of Chemistry, Geology, Botany, Mechanics, Surveying, the Veterinary Art, and Practical Agriculture, a sound acquaintance with which would qualify a person to superintend his own estate, to act as Land Steward for others, or to fill satisfactorily any of the professional posts that the onward march of Agriculture and the division of labour have called into existence.

Since, too, that Scientific Husbandry has so greatly risen in acknowledged importance, the Chairs of Agriculture at the various Universities have become invested with increased interest, and lectures are no longer given to empty benches.

Further, many of our best Agriculturists—themselves small landowners or tenant-farmers—are accustomed to receive as pupils young men who can afford to pay a handsome premium for a training in the management of land and stock; and thus, in a variety of shapes, adapted to the wants of the different classes, a thoroughly good professional education is rendered easily attainable by any lad who may be turning his attention to Agriculture as a means of livelihood.

These, however, are aids for the rising generation of Agriculturists, rather than for those actually engaged in the occupation of land: for them also instruction is necessary; but in their case, it must be sought and obtained from one another, by the mutual interchange of the

information that each may elaborate for himself in the experience gained upon his own farm. Great as has been the recent progress of Agriculture, its further development still must be mainly dependent on the publication of what is already known and practised by the few; and this is well effected, not only by the succession of standard works from the pens of such men as Morton, Stephens, Caird, Low, &c., but by means of the numerous Societies, constituted expressly for the purpose of eliciting, discussing, and disseminating information on all matters connected with the economy of the soil. The list of these Associations exhibits the names of upwards of six hundred and twenty Agricultural Societies and Farmers' Clubs existing in Great Britain; the roll being headed by that of the Royal Agricultural Society, which has already contributed so greatly to the advancement of the Science of Husbandry, and which promises so largely for the future. Some of these public bodies have a staff of salaried Secretaries, Chemists, and Civil Engineers, who can thus afford to give their whole time and attention to the furtherance of the objects in view, and with far more beneficial results than can ever be attained by the casual efforts of amateurs, exerted only as caprice may dictate or an abundance of leisure permit. All, or nearly so, of these Societies, have stated meetings, at which papers relative to Agricultural Art are read, or the subjects themselves discussed *vivâ voce*, and these proceedings are given to the world in a periodical literature devoted to the purpose, or in the pages of the local newspaper press; and so, in one mode or another, few are the English farmers of the present day who do not become immediately acquainted with every step that their Art is gaining in advance, whilst the avidity with which, as a body, they note and appropriate every practical truth, is most remarkable. Whilst giving my humble testimony to the merits of the above Societies, I must not omit to make mention of "the numerous Example Farms which the public spirit and wealth of many of our Nobility and Gentry have established, and of which a specimen now exists in almost every county; showing what can be accomplished by a resolute enthusiasm in the adoption and carrying out of all the improved resources which capital and general intelligence can bring to bear." These are really patriotic establishments; pioneers to explore the untrodden paths of husbandry, and to push research into every quarter from whence profitable information and results may be expected.

With all these aids and appliances, is it to be wondered at that English agriculture has attained a position so creditable to itself as a science, so fraught with benefit to the nation that has cherished it?

Possessing not one corresponding advantage, can it be matter of surprise that Indian husbandry is no further advanced than it was centuries ago?

The improbability that a similar succession of events will occur in India as they occurred in England to stimulate exertion on the part of landholders, and the well-known lack of energy in natives to originate or improve any feature in their social system, alike forbid us to hope that, unaided, they will do aught towards a radical reform of the rude routine pursued in the cultivation of their fields. In this, as in most other cases, Government must take the initiative, and, if it desires full justice to be done to the soil of India, it must teach the cultivators of it the true theory and practice of their art, and almost compel them to recognise and act upon the principles which English sagacity has eliminated, and proved to be the sure foundation of agricultural science, and the certain source of wealth.

If this be conceded, and we then glance around us for the means of carrying out the objects in view, we shall be somewhat discouraged on perceiving the almost total absence of the requisite machinery. That also will have to be created.

There are four Agricultural Societies (so called) existing in India: I know of no more; viz., three bearing respectively the designation of the three Presidencies, and a fourth, that has taken the Punjaub as the special sphere of its labours. But how differently constituted are they to their fellow societies in England! Whilst the latter are principally composed of practical and earnest men, taking a hearty interest in the objects and working of their associations, actuated thereto either by patriotism, or the all-powerful incentive of self-interest, or by both those motives, our Indian Agricultural fraternities can scarcely show a name on their rolls but those of simple amateurs: excepting, perhaps, in Bengal, where a few Indigo Planters and Zemindars may give their support to the Agricultural movement; otherwise the mass of the members of the above Indian Societies is composed of Government servants, civil or military, utterly unconnected with the soil, unless, as it may be, officially so—ordinarily speaking, uninterested in all that concerns it, excepting in the official instances supposed, or as mere well-wishers to the cause—and none being capable of fully devoting their time and talents to the advancement of the work for which the societies were originated, all having distinct avocations of their own, engrossing their time and powers of labour.

This applies especially to those Civil functionaries, Commissioners, Collectors, and their respective assistants, who, from their very posi-

tion and specific duties, it might at first be supposed would be ready and able vigorously to aid the development of husbandry in the Districts under their charge. But experience has shown that this is not the case; and I have now before me a letter from a Bengal Civilian (Mr. C. Gubbins, late of Bijnore), written in 1855, detailing his own failures in the endeavour to introduce a more profitable description of cultivation into his Collectorate. It may truly be asserted of the Civil authorities named, that all of them would be delighted to aid the progress of Agriculture generally throughout the country, as well as in their own immediate zillahs, but they have not the time necessary; already they are overworked, and if they be expected to give a portion of their attention expressly to the subject of rural economy, it must be at the expense of the other portion of their duties.

The fact is, that to deal with the question of Agriculture *en amateur*, and to leave its progress dependent on such assistance, as a few gentlemen may, in their leisure hours, be pleased to accord it, can never be attended with satisfactory results. "Agriculture is the most beautiful of all arts, but it is also the most difficult, and requires especially patience and perseverance." So writes one of the best authorities of the day upon this subject: and I may add that if the high position now unanimously accorded to Agriculture, and the worthy fruit that it exhibits, be the reward only of years of patient toil; and if among a race so shrewd and energetic as the English, it has needed to make Agriculture a special study, and to insure its true development by constant experiments conducted at great expense, can we in the East hope for similar results, except by the adoption of similar measures?

We have, however, this advantage over the Agriculturists of England. We can avail ourselves of their labours: we need not re-traverse the ground over which they have so painfully toiled, but we can take up the science at the perfection to which they have brought it, and at once apply its truths, its unvarying principles, to the amelioration of our land, and the consequent improvement of the people whom that land supports.

In my "Remarks upon the Indian Army," I have suggested as a precautionary measure the formation of a Reserve Force, organized in a mode analogous to that observed in the Austrian and Russian Military colonies; and I have noted that, if raised, such Regiments might not only be made self-supporting, but also prove real schools of Agriculture, from whence a better system of husbandry might gradually be spread over the length and breadth of the country.

The more that I revolve this subject in my mind, the more firmly am I convinced of the feasibility of my proposition, and the many and great advantages that it promises to the State.

All the principal European Powers have of late years organized Agricultural Colleges, schools, and Model Farms, as a means of disseminating a better knowledge of the science throughout their respective territories. These educational establishments are maintained at considerable cost, and but little direct return is made from them as a balance to the money expended. But, if I may use such an expression, they are not supposed to be "*paying concerns*," in the ordinary acceptation of the term. The return that is looked for is that ulterior gain that increased knowledge brings in a thousand forms to the community enjoying it; and that gain is deemed sufficient to warrant the outlay incurred. The plan that I advocate avoids this distinct outlay, or reduces it to the lowest possible amount; rendering the Agricultural Educational Scheme secondary to, but a component part of the System of National Defence, and providing that the whole shall eventually maintain itself. I say "eventually," for I would not compromise the character of my project for practicability, by holding forth any expectation that I do not conscientiously believe it would redeem; and the self-maintenance referred to I must beg may be considered as limited, in the first instance at any rate, to that of the Native Officers and men only, and not as including the cost of their arms and clothing, or the pay of the European Officers. Promising too much might justly give rise to doubts, not only on particular points, but even as regards the whole plan.

If a man goes into the back-woods to hew him out a farm, he must be prepared with a sufficiency of food and money for his maintenance for a year at least, until in the due season he shall reap his first crops; his future success will then depend upon his own continued industry, and God's blessing on it. So too, with the scheme I submit. If it finds favourable acceptance, and the Government be inclined to try the plan with one Battalion as an experiment, then undoubtedly that Battalion would have to be paid and supported in the ordinary manner for the first year, and no receipts could be placed *per contra* to the expenditure until the first season's crops were harvested. I have before said that the development of the project would be up-hill work for a considerable time; for though convinced that it would eventually be attended with complete success, it would be impossible to lay down any preliminary sketch of procedure which would provide for all contingencies, and preclude failure

in any material instance. Having set before us the object to be kept broadly in view, we should have to strive for its attainment on general principles—working out the details, and solving all difficulties as they arose—rather than to attempt an implicit adherence to any course prescribed at the outset. The final success I consider as guaranteed by that which has attended the system in Austria, and the admission which I claim for English Officers: that their zeal and talent, duly encouraged, is fully capable of achieving the like desirable results in India.

It would, indeed, be impossible for any man to lay down a thoroughly devised system of farming for India on the scale I contemplate, and to enter immediately on the task of carrying it into effect. At ten beeghas, or five acres for each Sepoy, a Colonised Regiment a thousand strong, would need for its support a tract comprising at least 7,000 acres of *arable* land; and I am sure there is not a man in India, or I may say, farmer in England, who would feel himself competent to undertake individually the management of so large an estate and such a body of labourers.

Should my suggestion for the establishment of a Reserve Force be entertained by Government, I would propose that the first, or Experimental Battalion, should be organized thus:—The whole of the European Officers, the non-commissioned Staff, and one complete Company, to be permanently embodied, mustered, and paid like the troops of the Line. To this Head Quarter Company should be allotted sufficient ground for its Cantonment, and for the exercising of a Battalion; and about six hundred acres a sa farm, to be kept in cultivation by the labour of the Company, under the immediate supervision of its own Native Officers, guided and controlled by the European Commandant and his Staff: in whose hands the general management of the farm would be vested.

The farm itself, whilst as large as the authorities just named could well look after, would suffice to give full occupation to the Company working it, and afford the means of introducing or testing every system of husbandry, and every variety of agricultural produce that might be deemed worthy of attention, and likely to prove profitable. The diary of the farm would soon accumulate a mass of most valuable memoranda; for, whether noting advantages gained or failures experienced, the record would prove, in the one instance a guide, in the other a beacon, not only to the Superintendent in his farther labours, but to the Battalion generally, and to all interested in Agricultural matters, and for whose information extracts from such records or reports might, from time to time, be published.

The produce of the farm would be disposed of, and the proceeds carried to the credit of Government.

The other nine Companies of the Regiment I would at first establish in separate villages located around, and as near as possible to the Head Quarter Company, as a common centre. To each of these villages should be allotted land, at the rate of about five acres for each Sepoy (and proportionately for the higher grades); and this, if the soil were ordinarily good, would be sufficient for the support of each man and his family.

For these little estates the holders should render Military service annually, to an extent that would compensate Government for the Ground rent that would be remitted.

This sum may be set down at 4 rupees per acre, or 20 rupees (nearly three months' pay) per Sepoy. Let me suppose the amount to represent 80 days' pay, and that the Sepoy-tenant would, consequently, be bound to give that number of days' Military duty to the State. He might then be required to assemble at two periods, say of 30 and 20 days respectively, at slack seasons (agriculturally) for training in Battalion drill. The remaining 30 days (representing 240 hours) might be devoted to Company drill, ball practice, &c., the instruction being conveyed in lessons, not exceeding an hour each, and distributed over the whole of the year.

These minor lessons might be given in the Company villages, at times convenient for the men, interfering as little as possible with their field labours. For any additional duty exacted, as escort, or other work, the Sepoys would, of course, become entitled to pay at the usual rates. Further, in the organization of these nine Companies, I would proceed upon a plan analogous to that which has been found to answer so admirably in the Irregular Cavalry, and which appears to be so completely in unison with the feelings and habits of the people with whom we have to deal: I mean the Bargeer or Retainer system. In the Irregular Horse this is simply a contract between Government and the Native Officers, by which the latter are bound to provide a certain number of effective men and horses for Military duty, and are compelled, by a regard for their own pecuniary interests, to see that their animals are duly cared for by the Sowars; beyond this, however, they have no claim upon the personal services of their Bargeers.

This system could most readily be modified and rendered applicable to troops maintained in the manner I advocate; and its adoption in the formation of Colonized Regiments would, I conceive, be attended with inestimable advantages.

The greatest facility would be experienced in the embodying of such Regiments. They would, I feel assured, be eminently popular. Native Officers and men of a superior stamp would hasten to enrol themselves; and that *esprit de corps* and excellence of demeanour which has always characterised our Irregular Cavalry in camp and in quarters, would, I am confident, be evinced in a still higher degree in the ranks of the proposed Infantry Battalions.

Allowing that a Company consist of

1 Subedar,
1 Jemedar,
5 Havildars,
5 Naiks,
2 Drummers and Fifers,
86 Sepoys,

it might be organized thus:—

The Subedar to hold 150 acres of land, and to provide therefore 30 Sepoys. He might also hold 35 acres as his own personal Military fee.—Total, 185 acres.

The Jemedar in like manner might receive 100 acres, to provide therefore 20 Sepoys, and hold 20 acres for himself.—Total, 120 acres.

Each Havildar might farm 30 acres; ten as his own fee, and 20 for 4 Sepoys to be provided by him.

A Naik to have 8 acres for himself, and five for the *assamie* of one Sepoy.

There would then remain 2 Drummers and 11 Sepoys to complete the Company; their allotments of five acres each might be independent holdings, and would afford the means of gratifying individual Sepoys whose feelings or circumstances rendered it desirable that they should maintain themselves free of connexion with other persons.

A Company village would require, then, for rent-free allotments, 585 acres; and, allowing for the site of the lines, for roads, for a small bazaar, and a private parade-ground, a little more space might be granted, and the whole allotment raised to (say) 640 acres, or one square mile.

This would, at the utmost, be all that could be required for public purposes; that is, to provide by the assessment remitted remuneration to the troops for the Military duty to be annually performed. In this calculation I suppose, of course, that the ground made over to the troops would be of fair quality, such as would ordinarily yield a Government rental of 4 rupees per acre; and which, therefore,

should be capable of supporting occupants on holdings of the size mentioned; *provided always that the said occupants be skilful and industrious agriculturists.* In Guzerat, ten beegahs, or five acres, is about the average extent held by individual Koonbies, and is sufficient for the maintenance of a small family of the class specified. That maintenance is, however, very inferior to the living earned by a Sepoy of the Line: his stipend is, at the lowest, 7 rupees a month, or 84 rupees per annum; whereas, if the Government assessment on land be considered as usually representing one-third of the produce, then five acres, giving a rent of 20 rupees to the State, would leave 40 rupees only as the annual income of the tenants; and though that sum, eked out in many little ways, may prove a bare subsistence to a Koonbie family, it certainly would be very inadequate for a Sepoy, who, besides the probable support of a wife and children, would have to provide his own food, and that, too, of a description sufficiently nutritious to render him physically capable for the discharge of his Military duties.

Under skilful farming—such as I hope, ere long, to see prevalent in India—five acres of land should yield a handsome support to the cultivator; but I must make my calculations on *ordinary* data; and therefore, assuming that the rent-free allotments would prove to the Military tenants as equivalent only to nine months' support, it might be made optional to them to increase their holdings to the extent of three-fifths of their area, paying to Government the customary assessment on such addition.

This would just admit of a Colonized Sepoy earning the same income as his comrade of the Line, thus:—

	Rupees.
Annual return from 5 acres of rent-free land, at 12 rupees per acre	60
Ditto, from 3 acres, at 8 rupees per acre only, Government assessment being deducted	24
Annual Receipts	84

By the foregoing arrangement, the total area of rent-free land required for the Colonization of a Regiment one thousand strong would be just ten square miles; and should the Native Officers and men desire the suggested addition to their allotments under terms of assessment on the same, the space occupied would be extended to nearly sixteen square miles.

By the scheme thus roughly sketched, I believe that a most efficient Battalion might be raised and maintained at a cost that should never (in time of peace) exceed one quarter of that of a Regiment of the Line; and which cost, I would trust, might gradually be

still further reduced as agricultural experience was gained, and farming operations rendered more remunerative.

Districts thus colonized would, I am convinced, speedily present an aspect most gratifying to all interested in the welfare of the country, and the stability of our rule. Whilst kept up at the smallest possible charge to Government, such forces would prove quite as effective for the preservation of tranquillity, (especially with regard to the immediate vicinity of their Cantonments,) as the more costly troops of the Line; they could, moreover, if occasion so required, be withdrawn at briefest notice from their more peaceful pursuits, and permanently embodied for Garrison duty, or even brought actively into the field. We might reckon also on these Militia Battalions proving admirable nurseries to the Line, just as has been the case always in England itself; and that, on any emergency, the excitement of real service and the temptation of a bonus would induce numbers of the younger men to volunteer from the Colonized Regiments to fill the ranks of the active Army. Such recruits, too, would be invaluable; being already trained to arms, used to Military discipline, hardened by daily labour, and fit at once and in every respect to take their place, and do their duty in the Regiments for which they might give in their names.

The tract of country occupied by a Colonized Battalion would exhibit within its limits estates of every description, from the large experimental farm of the Head Quarter Company to the petty holding of the individual Sepoy. All would be adapted to the requirements, objects, and capabilities of the parties respectively working them.

The Head Quarter allotment would assume the place which in England is filled by the Example Farms alluded to in the preceding pages, and would afford to the Commandant the means of practically ascertaining, and then demonstrating to those under him, the advantages or disadvantages appertaining to this or that system of husbandry—to this or that description of produce.

In so doing he could not take a better guide than the advice given by M. de Lavergne, that "those who may desire to devote their time to agricultural improvements should first of all study the local causes of what is called the routine. Very often these causes are only transitory, or accidental, and may be boldly set aside. Often, also, they are deep-rooted and fundamental, and failure is certain if they are attacked by direct means. The most prudent plan is, therefore, to proceed step by step, getting knowledge always by experience, and leaving a large margin to time." It would never be admissible in the least degree to *coerce* the Native Officers and men in the management of their land; yet, doubtless, sound precept, deriving

additional weight from authority and practice, would have its just effect, and eventually lead to the full recognition and observance of the best principles of Agriculture.

The Subedars' and Jemedars' farms would be of a size needing some little capital for their effective working, and Native gentlemen who possessed such capital, and influence enough to bring the requisite number of followers into the ranks, would be well entitled to the commissioned grade for which they would thus qualify themselves. The class that I thus seek to originate, I am of opinion would eventually prove most valuable in the economy of the State.

The old aristocracy of India has nearly vanished from existence, and its few representatives are scarcely now to be found, except as impoverished men glad to obtain service in our Irregular Horse. It may be good both for Government and for these individuals that they should be so employed; but it leaves them as it finds them, still poor, and without any position in society at all corresponding to that which their pride of blood leads them to consider should be theirs by right. That pride, too, forbids their seeking any occupation but that of the soldier or the landholder; and to follow either of those paths is now, to the generality of these men, a most difficult task. Our regular Military service is distasteful to them; and for the pursuit of Agriculture, on a scale in accordance with their ideas of respectability, they are deficient in Capital. Most of them, however, can raise a little money, if opportunity offers of placing Bargeers in our Irregular Cavalry; and such funds would suffice to stock and commence the working of a small farm, *if the land itself could be obtained on easy terms.*

Now the project that I have briefly outlined promises, I think, to smooth the difficulties that beset the poor Puthaun, Rajpoot, and Mahratta gentry. The well-connected of these men would experience little trouble in inducing friends and relatives to enter with them as their retainers into the ranks of the Militia; so doing, the humbler individuals would secure a Sepoy's livelihood, whilst their chiefs would at once become both Officers and landholders: a position doubly gratifying to their feelings, and insuring to them a commensurate income.

Their holdings, free and assessed, would together form farms that even in England would be deemed of handsome size; their retainers would both work these farms, and by their numbers give importance to their superiors; and I think I may safely predict that Native Officers of the above class—men whose interests would be bound up with those of the rural population—would speedily obtain a local

weight and influence of no inconsiderable amount, and that the same would ever be readily and joyfully exerted, as occasion might require, on behalf of that Government to which they owed their existence.

Going downwards in the scale, the Havildars' farms, though in size far below those of the Commissioned Officers, would form very comfortable holdings, and be eagerly sought after by men of steady habits and possessing the means of doing justice to the land.

The allotments of the Rank and File, though comparatively small, might, under good management, be made to rival the garden-farms of Lombardy and Belgium, and yield to their occupants a return far exceeding the average extracted from the soil by the indifferent husbandry at present practised.

In each and every grade of the Colonized Regiment we might with confidence look for that same superiority of conduct and demeanour which it is allowed characterises our Irregular Cavalry; and, indeed, I conceive it would exist in an enhanced degree in the ranks of the proposed Corps, its men having additional motives to prove themselves brave soldiers, good citizens, and faithful subjects of the Government under which they enjoyed so many privileges and so excellent a provision for themselves and families.

If patriotism, or a real well-founded attachment to Government and appreciation of our rule, is ever to be developed in India, I think it would take its rise and be most firmly established in the breasts of men, trained as I have suggested, as soldiers and tillers of the land.

It may be right here to notice an apparent discrepancy between the system for a Reserve Force as now advocated, and that put forward in my first "Remarks upon the Indian Army." My first suggestion was, that the Reserve should be formed of Native Officers and men who had already served twelve or fifteen years in the Line, and to whom the change would be from hard service to one of comparative repose. *Now*, I am recommending the raising of Battalions seemingly from a distinct class of men, and talking of them as likely to prove a nursery for the ranks of the Line, instead of becoming a simple support thereto. The explanation is this. If the Line was *now* a really *working* body of men, *or should ever become so*, Sepoys on being in due course transferred from it to the Reserve would hail the change as a boon, and from their habits of industry and skill in manual labour, would be perfectly capable of entering at once upon their duties as petty farmers, and with every prospect of success attending their exertions. But to attempt the Colonization of a body

of our present old soldiers—men who have been only trained to idleness—would certainly not be a fair test of my scheme; and therefore it is that, if tried at all, I would hope the experiment may be made with men thoroughly interested in its successful result, and likely to do their best to insure it.

This, I conceive, would be the case if the execution of the project was, in the first instance, confided to a Regiment organized expressly for the purpose on the Bargeer system, and composed principally of Officers and men raised for the occasion; but I would not absolutely exclude all old soldiers from the experiment: on the contrary, the presence of a considerable number of such would be extremely useful in first disciplining the new Corps, and, with a little care exercised in the selection, I have no doubt the quota drafted from the Line might eventually show themselves good Agriculturists as well as good soldiers.

I may here, too, offer a short comment on the economical features of my proposal for a Reserve Force.

If the Native Infantry (Regular) was again placed on the establishment of 1837, its strength would be reduced by 33,790 men, and a saving effected of about 34,10,000 rupees per annum. Calculating the annual cost of a Colonized Regiment at 42,840 rupees (including the Staff Pay of its European Officers,) the above sum would defray the expense of just eighty Reserve Battalions, *each of a thousand men;* and, consequently, after allowing for the reduction made, we should actually obtain 46,210 additional bayonets to the Indian army, without any increased outlay, except for Arms and Clothing; and these, too, would be men who, whilst thoroughly efficient as soldiers, and, by their presence, securing the tranquillity of the country, would, by their industry, be fostering its resources, and setting a most beneficial example to the rural population.

Again, if the Reserve Battalions were organized on the Legionary principle—that is to say, each complete with its due proportion of Cavalry and Guns—there might be attached to every Battalion a squadron of *Yeomanry* Horse, and half battery of Artillery (self-supporting); and this would give a further increase to the strength of the Indian army of 11,200 Cavalry and 240 Guns; the whole arrangement enabling Government to reckon on some 57,000 men, and the above number of Guns becoming available *from the Line:* the withdrawal of a proportionate number of the latter for service at any moment, being unattended with danger to the internal peace of the Country; as their vacated Cantonments might, if necessary, be at once occupied by the Reserve.

Ere concluding this paper, I may briefly advert to those Agricultural reforms which I deem are most urgently needed in India. A *treatise* might be written upon each head; but any lengthened disquisition on the various topics is here unnecessary: all that I will venture to intrude will be little more than a bare enumeration of the points, and a few words indicating the nature of the existing evils, with a view to prove that most of them may best be counteracted by such *practical teaching* as would be given to the men of the proposed Militia Regiments (and to the neighbourhood) on the Example Farms of each Corps.

The first means toward arriving at a proper estimation of the state of Husbandry in India would be the collection of a body of

Agricultural Statistcs.

On the 5th March, 1856, at a meeting of the Society of Arts, presided over by Prince Albert, His Royal Highness, in moving a vote of thanks to Mr. Hoskyns, observed,—

"If he has taught any one lesson of greater importance than another, it is that the future progress of Agriculture will mainly depend upon the close and intimate union and the hearty co-operation of Science, Art, Manufactures, and Commerce, and that the primary condition of a successful progress for the future will be the obtaining of accurate and complete Agricultural Statistics. And here, I hope, I am not trespassing in asking you, Gentlemen, and every one of you, in his particular circle, to contribute his mite in obtaining those Statistics which are so much wanted, and which Government is now trying to collect."

The vital importance of sound information on all points connected with, or bearing upon, the state of the National Agriculture is here duly affirmed, and the assistance of all parties invoked for the furtherance of the object in view. With machinery, in this instance, and for this particular purpose, such as no other Government in the world possesses, India has not yet taken any effective step to ascertain the resources of its soil, the Capital employed thereon, and the return for the same; the number of cultivators, the varieties of crops, and their comparative values; the quantity of Live Stock, its increase or decrease, or any of the numerous subjects, constant acquaintance with which is requisite in forming just conclusions on the state and progress of the Rural Economy of a nation.

In the ordinary routine of our Revenue offices, full information on most of the above points, and others bearing on the same question,

must be constantly submitted to the Collectors; but beyond them, I believe such information does not pass, except in the shape of a brief *résumé* of the affairs of their districts, furnished monthly to Government, or any report that may be specially called for.

This, then, might be easily rectified, and it would entail but a little —a very little—additional labour in the Collectorate offices if Returns, embracing the required intelligence in a tabular form, were called for periodically: if accompanied by such remarks and comments as the local experience of the Collectors might enable them to offer, the value of the documents would be vastly increased.

I have next to remark upon—

The Cultivation of the Soil, and the Implements used.

Both, it is notorious, are of the rudest description. The first consists in little beyond a mere scratching of the surface of the ground; but such is all that can be effected with the wretched tools employed. It would be useless haranguing a Koonbie on the superiority of the English Farm Implements, their beauty and admirable suitability for the various operations called for in Husbandry; he would admit all that was advanced, but would reply that such implements were far beyond the means of men who have to contract debt for the very seed for their ground. Still something may be done to improve matters in this respect. All Indian farmers are not involved; and to all, indebted or otherwise, it might be practically demonstrated that a good plough,—something worthy of the name in shape, dimensions, and penetrating powers,—would pay for itself in a season, by the double crops yielded from the fresh soil it would bring to the surface. This and the economical advantages of other simple tools,—scythes, forks, rakes, &c.,—could best be shown and impressed upon THE USERS on an Example Farm. Expensive machines for threshing, drilling, &c., would not be needed in India until agriculture had made considerable progress, and the cost of labour had risen proportionately.

Crops and their Rotations.

In speaking on this subject, I shall confine myself to a glance at food-crops only: those upon which the bulk of the population depend for their support and that of their cattle. Wheat, Barley, Millet, Rice, and Lentils, form the principal food of man in India;

whilst Gram, Mutt, and Kooltie are the ordinary Pulses appropriated for cattle. I have never been much in rice-producing districts, and am not aware of the degree of skill bestowed generally upon its cultivation; but, excepting that item, I can assert that all the others on the above list are produced in quantities far below the yield that should, by proper treatment, be obtained from each acre. This, however, is not to be wondered at; seeing that, as far as my experience goes, no regular rotation of crops is observed anywhere, excepting in Guzerat. Little or no manure is bestowed upon the fields, whilst the best and most ordinary restorative of the soil—the dung of the cattle—is almost universally consumed as fuel; and no depth of cultivation is given to enable the crops to gather food for themselves by their roots. The ground is lightly stirred, the seed is cast in, and the result is left to the bounty of the soil and the seasons.

Green Crops,

In the English acceptation of the term, as comprising forage and roots expressly for the support of Live Stock, are utterly unknown in India; the small quantities of Lucerne grown in the vicinity of most of our Cantonments, solely for the food of the residents' horses, can scarcely be regarded as forming an exception to this assertion. Indian farmers are in complete ignorance of the axiom that British Agricultural experience has established, "that to reap largely of Cereals, it is better to reduce than to extend the breadth of the land sown; and that by giving the greatest space to the forage crops, not only is a greater quantity of butchers' meat, milk, and wool, obtained, *but a larger return of corn also;* as with abundant food for cattle, animal life is extraordinarily developed, the quantity of manure is proportionately increased, and, with it, the production of those plants required for the support of mankind." This is fully verified in M. de Lavergne's recent work on the Rural Economy of England; in the fourth chapter of which he so ably contrasts our Agricultural System with that of the French, showing, in detail, how from 4,500,000 acres only —*but assisted by green crops*—we annually reap 15,468,750 quarters of wheat; whereas in France, where Green Crops are comparatively little understood, the quantity of wheat that is obtained from 14,260,000 acres is but 24,062,500 quarters; thus exhibiting a relative superiority of about two to one in favour of English Husbandry. Happy will it be for Indian Agriculture when Green Crops become a recognised portion of its routine! Happier still will it be for

when due consideration for their requirements, and appreciation of the advantages to be derived from proper attention to the breeding, working, and general care of domestic cattle, shall lead to due provision being made for their sustenance.

At the present day, no method whatever is perceptible in the management of the Farm Cattle in India. It may be almost said that they are left to look after themselves,—to propagate, to live, and to die, as chance may direct. Even in those parts of the country, (Guzerat for instance,) where, undoubtedly, a fine race of horned cattle exists, no care is taken to preserve, much less to improve, the breed. The cows of each village are taken out in a herd to graze, and when *in season*, are *served* or *mounted*, hap-hazard, by the vagrant bulls, commonly known as Brahminies: these may, or may not be, animals such as should be selected for breeding purposes, and the results are, therefore, always attended with uncertainty. In no part of India that I am acquainted with are bulls kept privately for stock purposes. If little care is shown in the propagation of cattle, equally little is that given by the Ryots to their support. No calculation of the amount of food beasts may require in the year appears ever to be made. During the monsoon, the animals revel in an abundance of natural pasturage, and get into fair condition; this degree of strength and flesh is maintained for a time upon the straw of the crops, gathered in from October to January; but when that supply is exhausted, (as it generally is pretty soon,) the poor brutes have nothing to keep life in them but what they can graze from the parched-up surface of the ground; and ere the monsoon comes round again, they are reduced to moving skeletons, and numbers die. No wonder, then, if the rains are late in setting in, that the loss extends, and hundreds of cattle, unable to hold out, sink from sheer inanition; whilst the Murrain (pestilence with the famine) usually appears at the same period, to add to the destruction.

These losses are most serious, not only to the Ryots, but to Government; the Revenue suffering from remissions granted on account of such misfortunes: this is the more to be deplored, as a little skill and ordinary forethought on the part of the farmers would save their cattle from such havoc, except in seasons of positive dearth.

Horses are not used for agricultural purposes in India; their employment marks an advanced stage of husbandry, and such as, I fear, we are not likely soon to attain. Yet such may be accomplished by encouragement and *instruction* being given to the Ryots; and its

being shown to them how, by working their mares, the animals may be made to support themselves, leaving their produce profit to their owners. Could the system be pretty generally introduced, India might again, and ere long, have its breed of horses to boast of; and Government would be rendered independent of foreign importations for the re-mount of the Madras and Bombay Cavalry.

The smaller cattle, sheep, one would suppose might meet with greater attention in India than is there bestowed upon oxen, as the flesh of the former is generally eaten, whilst that of the latter is not. But, no; sheep also are abandoned to chance, to breed and to live as they may: they, unhappy creatures, do not get even a modicum of fodder allowed them at any time, and all that they have to depend upon, from one year's end to the other, is what they can pick up by their own exertions. The result is a nearly worthless wool, and carcases that, when dressed, average only from 15 pounds to 18 pounds per sheep!

The introduction of Systematic Forage Crops would completely revolutionize the Live Stock of India. By creating for them an adequate supply of food, their worth would at once be raised to the extent of the difference of value between fat stock and lean. Capability of improving the different varieties of cattle would be insured; and by the increase in numbers, which always follows an increase of nutriment, the farmers would obtain an abundance of the simplest and the best of the

Manures.

I have said that Manure is seldom given to the fields, the Ryots consuming as fuel the cattle-droppings that should be so bestowed. Beyond such stable-litter, they are scarcely aware of any substances that may be used as invigorators of the soil. I must admit having sometimes seen refuse fish used on the coast; and in the vicinity of Jungles I have also occasionally witnessed leaves collected for application to the land; but beyond this, I have never heard of any means adopted for restoring to the ground the organic matters absorbed and carried off in each season's crops.

With the numerous varieties of fertilizers constantly used in Europe, the Indian farmers are utterly unacquainted: at least as regards the benefits they can confer upon the fields; and, consequently, though many are procurable in greater or less abundance throughout the country, they are completely neglected. I allude especially to lime, gypsum, saltpetre, and bones. The first of these, one of the most ordinary and valuable of manures, I have myself used

in India, with results proving the great advantages that would be derived from its general application, *particularly* to those soils so common throughout the country, rich in vegetable matters, and needing only lime to assist their decomposition. Yet, when I have broached the subject to cultivators, they have simply laughed, and asserted that a dose of lime to their land would at once burn up all its produce; and with that assertion, *founded on supposition only, and not on any trial*, they have rested satisfied. The fact is, that talking alone will never convince natives on such points; but when the truth of our theories is exemplified to them *in practice*, they may be induced to adopt them. Still the "talking" even ought not to be neglected; and we might follow with advantage in India the course that is now being pursued in Ireland by the Board of Education, under whose auspices "we see farm-schools springing up in every county. Peripatetic lectures have been started; a new order of Missionaries carry agricultural preaching into the poor villages, and disseminate cheap pamphlets among the cabins of the people. No pains are spared to acquaint the people with the two or three fundamental principles which form the basis of good husbandry,—the theory of rotations, the beneficial use of manures and improvers, and the art of breeding and fattening cattle."

If this direct action on the part of Government is deemed advisable in Ireland, how much more urgent is the necessity for similar beneficent exertion by the authorities in India! I do humbly but most earnestly hope that the attention of the Honourable Court may be given to the points that I have now ventured to bring forward, and that the plan I have proposed for combining the Military defence of the country with the improvement of its Agriculture, may be received with favourable consideration.

C.

	Percentage of Cultivation in the Agra District.	Average Produce per acre in the Agra and Seharunpore Districts.	Same Produce in bushels, calculated at— Wheat 63 lbs. } per bushel. Barley 54 „ }	Average Produce per acre in England.	Excess Produce per acre in favour of English cultivation.
		lbs. avordp.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.
Irrigated Wheat	13½	1,434	22¾	58	35¼
Non-irrigated ditto		1,060	17¼	28	10¾
Irrigated Barley	11¾	1,528	24¼		
Non-irrigated ditto		1,013	16	39	23
Millet and Similar Grains	46	638			
Grain	11				
Rice and Indian Corn	½				
Cotton	14				
Sugar-Cane, Indigo, Tobacco, Vegetables, &c.	3½				
	100				

THE END.

FIVE LETTERS

TO THE

EDITOR OF THE "DAILY NEWS"

ON

INDIAN RE-ORGANISATION.

28020

BY C. D. L.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.

1858.

ON INDIAN RE-ORGANISATION.

LETTER I.

THE QUESTION STATED.

SIR,—Whatever may be the future constitution of the Home Government of India, that Government cannot be established upon a sound and permanent basis, unless supported by a loyal and efficient army serving in India. It is manifest that a large proportion of that army as heretofore constituted is neither loyal nor efficient, and the question is therefore urgently pressed upon England, as to what measures shall be adopted in view to re-organising or replacing it.

I propose briefly to review some of the more evident causes which have contributed to the disloyalty and inefficiency of our present native army, and to summarise some of the reasons which should determine our proceedings when arranging for the re-organisation or replacement of the same.

As relates to the causes of the present disaffection, there may be and probably are many of a more or less remote character. We know for instance, that our Consuls have submitted, from many widely scattered points in the East, independent evidence of a vague feeling generally prevalent among Orientals of some impending revolution in the religious and political relations of society. We may assume again, from

facts which leaked out during the Russian and Persian campaigns, and from evidence more recently adduced during the King of Delhi's trial, that the agitation in British India was in greater or less degree encouraged from quarters to the westward of our Indian possessions. But with these remote causes it is not my intention to occupy your time—I come at once to those more proximate and more palpable.

In my opinion, the two great causes, to which all others are subordinate, are—first, a vicious system in the organisation of our native battalions; and, secondly, a vicious system of centralisation persistently maintained, and tending to aggravate the evils of an originally vicious organisation. Reverting to the first of these two main causes, we find from twenty to thirty English officers posted to every native battalion. These officers are in turn supported by an equal or larger number of native commissioned officers, so that with every battalion of native infantry there are about sixty commissioned officers, native and European. It is the professed duty of these sixty officers to remain during their long period of military service in command of some eight hundred sepoys, stationed in an enervating climate, remote from the praise and censure of public opinion, and frequently in almost absolute isolation. Now, I ask any man of common sense or energy moving in this capital, whether he conscientiously believes that, so situated, for some twenty years, he could maintain an interest in his profession, find stimulus to exertion, or refrain from seeking by one means or another to escape from an existence at once so monotonous, so isolated, and so useless? The conditions of life in the native armies of India, as above stated, are such that, I do not hesitate to affirm, they would, had they been really acted up to, have resulted, long ago, in the deterioration of the material composing its English element. It would, by degrees, have been discovered in England that the military service of the East India Company was that which, while it held out the greatest en-

couragements to listlessness and vice, withheld also every fair chance of distinction or even inducement to exertion. Happily, however, the condition of India generally was such that this principle of organisation was not fully carried into practice. For the entire administration, as well civil as military, of India, we had but a limited stock of English energy and mental power. When properly organised and applied, this total stock was inadequate to the requirements of the empire, and when province was added to province, and annexation followed annexation, there must have resulted a palpable failure in the civil portion of the administration, had there not been found lying idle an efficient but neglected body of Englishmen with the native battalions. The state accepted this available power; it would not, indeed, allow the monopoly of its civil arm to be infringed on, but it would support this monopoly with men who might be taken from and returned to their regiments at pleasure, and who, while acting as stop-gaps for their more fortunate fellow-servants, would find a temporary chance of employment and distinction at rates of pay which the State should never have offered, but which these officers thankfully preferred to the idleness and obscurity of an Indian military out-station.

Thus, on the whole, the organisation of the native army came to be this, that while on the one hand the State, by allotting a most unnecessary number of English officers to its native battalions, wasted an enormous proportion of the scanty governing power available, and by maintaining these officers in trivial employments tended to cripple their energies and to depreciate their positions in their own eyes, and in those of the natives of the country,—the State, on the other hand, by opening to them the door of industry and lucrative employment, tended to increase the dislike which these officers already entertained towards their original positions, and to render an appointment with a native regiment a position less sought for than any other employ.

It is true that the officers thus detached improved with exercise in aptitude for business, in decision of character, and in those qualities generally most essential in all departments of the public service. It is true that these officers so trained were found, whether in military or other power, to be more efficient than those whose abilities had remained uncalled forth during a long servitude with a native regiment. Still the vice, the original vice, of the organisation remained, viz., that the State wasted and depreciated a vast portion of its governing power upon trivial military employments, which could have been as well, and with better policy, conducted by natives of the country. And still the aggravation of this originally vicious position remained, namely, that having wasted and depreciated this power, the State then increased its causes of discontent, and placed it in a false position. For, as I shall hereafter show, the posting under a good organisation of such number of officers as may be *bonâ fide* requisite efficiently to command a native battalion, is a very different thing both in its own essence and in its results upon the minds and characters of those concerned, from the leaving of the same number of officers with a viciously organised battalion, while their more fortunate brethren have been selected, professedly on the score of superior merit, to more lucrative and more sought-for employ.

I revert now to the second main cause. It is manifest that during a long series of years there has been a perseverant tendency to centralise the details of military power at the head-quarters of our empire. It is manifest that exactly in proportion as this tendency has obtained, the loyalty and efficiency of our native army have given way. In the Presidency directly subordinate to the central authority almost the entire native army may be said to have ceased to exist. In the Bombay Presidency, where native troops have, since the commencement of the Afghan war, been frequently associated with the troops of the Bengal army, and gradually assimilated to the system

obtaining in Bengal, the service has become in part tainted with the spirit that pervaded its sister army. And if we may credit the highest authorities in the Bombay army itself, a perfect assimilation with the central system would have ultimately resulted in a complete dissolution of the Bombay army. In the Madras Presidency, whose troops have been less in contact with and less subordinated to the central system, and who may be, in other respects, less amenable to its evil tendencies, the native army has apparently remained sound. From these broad facts we may infer that the central system lies at the foundation of our disaster, and that exactly in proportion as this system has been enforced, these disasters have been accelerated and wide-spread.

Looking into the workings of this system, it is not difficult to state its principal evils. The first and foremost of all these is the transference of power from the hands of the commanding officer of a battalion into those of a central authority. In every army the battalion is the unit, and unless all the details of this unit centre in its head, its integrity is destroyed, and with it dissolves the organisation of the entire army in which it is an integral. If this be the case with any army, how much more is it the case with an army of mercenaries commanded by foreigners? Once teach the native soldier that his commanding officer is rather a transmitting post-office to higher authority than the last and complete judge of all his complaints, and you at the same time teach that native soldier to disregard, to disobey, and to ignore his commanding officer. In turn this relation reacts from the commanding officer down through the entire chain of all the European and native commissioned officers of the battalion, until it reaches the sepoy, who gradually discovers, without perhaps very clearly knowing why, that his officers have ceased to take an interest in him, and desire even to quit the battalion. Thus, on the whole, all proper confidence between the officers and their soldiers is destroyed.

A second evil, and one which indeed greatly contributes to the first, is the Mutiny Act. I do not here deal with the Mutiny Act as it is understood in England, but with a mutiny act modified in letter and applied to foreigners, to whose social and professional conditions it is wholly inapplicable. A sepoy enlists to obey his commanding officer; taken from the fields, he has no other thought, and no other wish: a central power is to his mind an incomprehensible abstraction. He joins his regiment, and, provided only there were no interference between him and his commanding officer, he would never look beyond the latter. He would entertain no wish so to look; and, implicitly trusting in the good faith of his English leader, he would remain, as in the old days thousands have remained—as in the present day, where commanding officers may be strong enough to hold their own, some do still remain—contented and obedient, in the knowledge that their promotion, their disgrace, their interests, and their complaints are all cognizable by and wholly in the hands of their commanding officer. But what is our system? No sooner does the sepoy join, than the interpreter of the regiment, in Moonshee's dialect and in foreign accent, drills into his ears that there is such a thing as caste, that there is such a thing as law, that there is such a thing as unpunishable disobedience, and that there is such a thing as appeal. To whom this appeal may be the sepoy knows not; it is an abstraction—it never becomes more than a myth to him; he sees it, indeed, in part personified once a year in the form of an antique general officer, who moves silently, slowly, on a quiet horse, under a heap of ostrich feathers, down the line of review. So much seen, the myth retires into the vague inane, and is only still understood to exist from inapplicable replies to irrelevant petitions, resulting in no positive good and a great deal of very positive harm.

The third evil, and which also contributes to the first, lies in the substitution of innumerable precedents and

regulations, in lieu of trusting to the exercise of local discretion checked by thorough responsibility. To such a climax have these regulations and precedents brought us, that not only no commanding officer of a battalion, but no civic authority, of whatsoever rank or power, can act, or even write, on the simplest military detail without bringing down on his devoted head the objections, quotations, or positive refusals of every military department through which the reference has to pass. Should you wish to pass a trial bullet from one station to another, you will be informed by the commissariat that they have no instructions from the Quartermaster-General's department. The latter will inform you they await orders from head-quarters. Head-quarters will refer you to page blank of the code. In the meantime, in despair, you instruct a transit agent to transmit the bullet direct and without delay; he humbly submits that to do so were synonymous with his own dismissal. In the last resort you put the bullet in an official envelope, and forward it as an emergent document on the public service. In about two months the bullet comes back from the dead letter office, with an intimation from the Deputy-postmaster that the letter was too heavy for any but the parcel post, and that, for reasons which the central postal authorities deem sufficient, they had withdrawn the parcel runners pending a further intimation from Calcutta.

The tale of the bullet assumes a more serious aspect when we supply its place with the name of a battalion emergently required for active service. On such an occasion there is no alternative other than for the chief local authority to declare the code to be locally suspended, and his dictum to be enforced on his own responsibility. And to this point, in all difficulties, the discussion at length arrives.

I think I have now briefly summarised the main proximate causes to which our present military dissolution in India is attributable, and on which many

subordinate causes depend. I know that some portion of this summary has been gone over by others, but it was necessary for me to resume it in order to render my coming positions clearer. In my next letter I propose to discuss the means at our disposal for remedying our present disorganized condition.

I am, &c.

C. D. L.

March 30.

Letter II.

THE REMEDY THAT MUST NOT BE APPLIED.

Sir,—The failure of our military system in India, and the causes of that failure, being those summarised in my former letter, the consideration is urgently pressed upon us of some reasonable remedy. I presume that no man in his senses would advocate the restoration of that system and that organisation which have combined to disgrace us. I presume, further, that it is out of the question to impose upon India an army of Africans, and thus, while humiliating and disgusting the empire, to place in the hands of some of the most untameable and treacherous beings upon earth those arms which we dare not trust in the hands of our own Asiatic subjects. It remains, then, for "England, if she still purpose to hold India, to do so by means either of undisguised English military occupation, or of a native army re-organised upon sound and lasting principles." This is the question to be solved; and upon its solution depends the maintenance or destruction of our empire in the east.

I, for one, emphatically declare against the former alternative and in favour of the latter. I do so upon two main grounds, viz., that for England to attempt to subject India to pure military force, expressed in English soldiers, instead of endeavouring to rule by the will of the governed expressed in a native army, is, first, unjust, and, secondly, impracticable. I know it is contended that a military occupation would not necessarily imply the introduction of a rule based solely on brute force; but I ask in rejoinder, if our own country should be subjected to a military occupation by foreign troops while our own army was dis-

banded, what interpretation the English people would give to the principle of government which the commanders of those foreign troops proposed to introduce? If a government so supported be, as I assert, a government of brute force, then I ask further, what right England has to subject the peninsula of Hindustan to so humiliating, so retrogressive, and finally so intolerable a condition? Let us look to our title deeds. Upon what tenure have we from the first professed to exercise power in India? First, as merchants benefiting the country by trade—more recently, as leaders developing the country by superior energy, higher civilisation, and greater moral and mental power. Those qualities—that love of fair play common alike to the English peasant, the English gentry, the English noble—those sterling qualities which, even in the gristle, we derive from our mothers, those invaluable qualities which are prevalent in a state that has worked and grown into a freedom at once strong, bold, and generous—those are the qualities by which we govern India. In cunning, in mere intellect, the Asiatic is our equal, in physical power he is nearly so, but in moral power he is far below us. And if we proceed to base our empire on physical force, we at once, and by that very fact, forego all the power we derive from higher sources, and yet further weaken our position by introducing with this rule an irresistible sense among the governed of being subjected to an unjust yoke, which no people on God's earth will ever permanently endure. But the injustice of the position contemplated is so obvious and so odious, that I entertain but small apprehension of its being questioned by any dispassionate man.

The impracticability of subjecting India to an English military occupation, though not less certain than the injustice of the measure, is not perhaps, at a first glance, so strongly felt. I will, therefore, as briefly as possible, summarise some of the difficulties which occur to me as contributing towards this impracticability. First, then, the rule of English

muscular force once proclaimed, all trust in Asiatic military forces ceases for ever. You cannot half trust a sepoy any more than you can an English soldier; so long as he remains in your ranks he is one of two things—a faithful servant of the state, or a traitor deserving to be shot; there is no medium. To say that you will half trust him, that you will give him a Brown Bess but not an Enfield rifle, is unjust to the man himself, unjust to the officer whom you send into action under these conditions, and certain to result in your own stultification and disgrace; therefore, we must have either sepoys in whom we show implicit faith, or else no sepoys at all. If you choose the latter alternative your real position becomes more apparent. The position in fact is that of a limited number of English regiments attempting to hold a continent as large as Europe exclusive of Russia—a continent containing, moreover, nearly one quarter of the entire human race—a continent containing enormous regions, where during a long portion of the year no Englishman can expose himself and live—a continent containing many nations more or less civilized, warlike by nature, habituated to the construction of arms and to the use of arms; and lastly, a continent in which, as we have already learned, dwell a people so cunningly combining discretion with secresy of plan, that a general revolt can be hatched and matured under our very noses, and our own prisoners in turn be concealed and saved, even in the camp of our enemy.

I suppose that we should not attempt to hold such a continent with less than 80,000 English soldiers. To maintain 80,000 English soldiers fit for duty in India would involve the presence of at least 120,000 soldiers, in depôt, in transit, or in camp. And the question naturally suggests itself, are our military resources adequate permanently to supply this demand? It is true that at the present moment recruits are enlisted in sufficient numbers; but have we not lowered our standard, and are we not antici-

pating the recruit market of future years? The case is analogous to that of Napoleon when he anticipated the conscriptions in the last years of the empire. As he was taught to his ruin, there is a point beyond which conscription cannot anticipate without losing by death what it gains in number—without deteriorating the present quality, and without exhausting the future sources of an army. Again, if our military resources be adequate to the required demand during years of peace, would they continue adequate in the event of an European war? In such contingency the strain would come on the cable at both ends at one and the same hour. There would be an enormous demand for the home service; there would be an extraordinary demand for the India service. Could we readily meet even the former demand? Could we have done so five years ago? If not, is it probable that we shall do so now that we have lowered our standard and fore-stalled our market? Before answering these questions, I would beg you to recollect the Foreign Legion, and remember the days of the Crimea.

But if the military resources of England cannot meet our demand, neither can the financial resources of India. If India cannot keep free of debt under a native army, what will be her condition under an European army, every soldier in which costs three times the amount of a sepoy? Nor is this all, for the sums which are disbursed to the sepoy in the form of pay and pension are by him re-disbursed in the country; the money in truth changes hands but only to circulate in the Indian Empire. Not so with an English army—its clothing, its pensions, its provisions, and its pay mainly find their way to Europe, and form an unproductive drain upon the financial resources of the empire. We already drain India of some four millions on account of our home government; this drain is declared to be compensated by the amount of English brains and honesty which we introduce into India. But what will be the extremity

of that unhappy country, if, having exported four million pounds annually for an import of English moral power, she be compelled to export twelve million pounds annually for an import of English brute force?

However, for the sake of argument, let us suppose our English army to be established in India—where would you propose to station it? Would you wish to mass or to scatter its forces? And how would you propose to maintain the peace in the intervening regions? Should you mass your troops, you would probably distribute them in divisions of not less than five thousand men each. So disposed of in some twenty stations, the rest of the continent has to be provided for. Should you scatter your forces in small detachments, the usual consequence, demoralization, would assuredly ensue. You could not collect your forces during a long portion of the year, and the probabilities are that in the event of a rising your detachments would be cut off almost before apprised of attack. In either event, the entire continent exterior to your camp limits must be left either wholly without any military or civil control, or else the peace must be maintained by some description of native force, call it police, burkundaze, or what you will. Now either this force must be armed or unarmed; if armed, it is simply a native army combining all its possible disadvantages, with scarcely any of its advantages; if unarmed, the force were useless and discreditable for our purposes, while in the event of revolt it could readily arm itself, unless, indeed, we intend to impose upon our English soldiers not only the duty of crushing the empire, but of precluding also the manufacture and the import of arms, an attempt which, to any person who like myself is thoroughly aware that even in the provinces which we have heretofore disarmed, there is scarcely a native of military habits who could not speedily arm himself in the villages, seems too absurd to argue against. While on the subject of this police, I would

remark that experience gained in the districts of India has convinced me that there is no point in the whole of our Indian administration where the good will of the administrator to carry justice into effect is in such imminent danger of being turned into tyranny as at that point where the detached policeman, armed not only with the sword, but with the law of the state, comes into personal contact with the peasant. The anomaly of our original position in India renders us in every branch of the administration ever liable to impose upon the governed a government which, well adapted to other conditions of society, is too strong for that to which it is transported and applied; and the extreme of this axiom obtains in the police.

There is another contingency—remote, I hope, but still possible, and not wholly without precedent. It is this—that in imposing upon our Indian subjects a military despotism, we may teach that despotism to impose its yoke upon ourselves. Rome was—God forbid that England should be—undermined by the misgovernment of her dependencies. I repeat, this contingency is remote; but I cannot at the same time forget that it is possible; neither can I forget there was a time when a Governor-General ruled supreme at Calcutta, and a great General commanded on the frontier, to whom, had they desired, it might not have seemed quite impracticable to declare the independence of British India.

I am, &c.,

C. D. L.

March 31.

Letter III.

THE REMEDY THAT MUST BE APPLIED.

Sir,—If the reasoning in my two former letters be sound, we arrive at the following conclusions:—

1st. That the failure of our military system in British India is mainly attributable to a constitution essentially false, and to a practice inevitably destructive;

2nd. That to restore this system would be to ensure a second failure—so long as the same causes produce the same effects;

3rd. That, rejecting this restoration, it remains for us to elect between yielding up India; introducing there a military despotism; or, re-organising a native army, which, while like its predecessor it shall express the principle that England rules India by the will of the governed, shall yet be so organised and administered as that theory may argue and practice prove it to be suitable to our requirements;

And 4th. That while withdrawal from the East is at this date out of the question, to introduce there a military despotism would be to ignore the pretext upon which we entered, and to subvert the ground on which we profess to hold India, and would be otherwise unjust and impracticable.

I am reduced, then, to the extremity of endeavouring to re-organise our native army. I accept the position with pleasure; and relying on truth, evidenced by a respectable array of facts, I shall use no manœuvres, but move straight to the point. We want a model on which to re-organise, and we want a man able for this task. My model is the Sind Irregular Horse; my modeller, General John Jacob, Commandant of that corps.

In publishing this opinion, I deliberately put forth a conviction slowly arrived at in spite of early prejudice. Myself, an officer of the Indian regular army, I was at first as little disposed as others, to admit that any good thing could come out of the Galilee of an irregular corps; but the chances of the public service having placed me in positions where I could not avoid witnessing the successful results of General Jacob's practice, I was compelled to admit that issues so successful must be the gods' decisions; and although by no means inclined to accept their godships' decisions for gospel, I yet considered it reasonable to inquire into the causes of the issues themselves. I found them to lie in the perseverant endeavour, through a long term of years, of an able and firm man (in some respects favourably circumstanced) to perform successfully a specified duty; always keeping his aim in view—always adapting his means to his end—regardless of personal considerations, and ready to risk all sooner than fail, he dared to make regulation succumb to common sense, and precedent yield to practice. No opposition, no obloquy, no threats could move or turn him aside. Possessing full faith in that law of nature which allows every leaf to vary and yet secures to the whole tree the highest possible degree of harmony and strength, he dared to apply this law in the development of his solders. He would render them, not like a Dutch garden, where all growths are trimmed into dull uniformity, but like an English garden, where every individual nature is recognised and made the most of. I apologise for appealing to nature in these artificial times; but, after all, does she not still underlie us? and, strange as it may appear, she did not in the instance before us, discredit the trust reposed in her. For, like Cromwell, acting under similar conditions, General Jacob succeeded in forming, first one, then a second regiment of cavalry, exactly adapted to our native requirements in India. I have seen these regiments on parade and on the march, in camp and on service; and so naturally

do all their arms, equipments, carriage and supply arrangements seem adapted to rendering the entire body thoroughly loyal and in all respects thoroughly efficient—that, like the boy at the play, I have more than once been tempted to exclaim, "The whole business is very easy, and I should do much the same myself if similarly circumstanced."

Going a little more into detail, I find the history of this corps to be the simplest explanation of its success. Nearly twenty years ago its present commandant assumed command of it. He was selected to the command by a General who understood how to confide tools to the right workman, and allow him to use them after his own fashion. This fulcrum secured that exercise of power without which no officer commanding a native regiment ever can succeed. It had to be exercised on a then thoroughly irregular regiment, so illiterate that no man could call, and so wild that it was more than doubtful if any man would attend the roll. Discipline had therefore to be instituted from its very elements. Power in his hands, and so rude a material to work on, all depended on the wisdom and firm tact of the commander. Had he wished to imitate, there was before him on the one hand the system obtaining in our regular army; and on the other hand the proceedings of the irregular bodies. He accepted neither; but himself elaborated a system based on common sense, and rectified by experience. He considered in the first place that the relation of the soldier with his officer should be that of commanded to commander; and he therefore ignored all religious and other prejudices, and enlisted his men to obey. He required that they should be physically suitable. But he knew also that something more than mere muscular strength was required, and he therefore required every recruit to find two securities for good conduct from men already in the regiment. But it had been in vain thus to render enlistment more difficult, unless the regiment were sought after; and to this end it was requisite that

the regiment itself should be of high repute, and all its grades be paid fair wages. The rates of pay were fixed accordingly; the reputation of the regiment was maintained by the exercise on the part of the commandant of his power of dismissing worthless men; and dismissal was on every account considered by the men to be a severe punishment.

It may, perhaps, be imagined that these fair wages upon which the success of every organised body of workmen so much depends would result, if applied to the entire native army, in a greatly increased military outlay. Far from this, however, I find that the "cost of each trooper in the Regular (Native) Cavalry is about 83 rs. a month," while "the cost of each man of the Sind Irregular Horse, as it now stands, is about 36 rs;" the explanation being that in the former case the cost and maintenance of the man's horse and arms devolve on the State, and are provided for by Government agency; while in the latter case the State pays the soldier a lump sum to render and maintain himself thoroughly equipped, in carriage, supplies, arms, horse, and clothing, without any interference whatsoever, further than may be implied in the command exercised by the commanding officer. In other words, it is private enterprise competing with Government agency.

But the advantages of this self-provision by the soldier are not limited to the question of finance. They stretch out on all hands, and, while tending to make the soldier exercise his own energies and faculties, teach him self-reliance; and teach him, above all, that when on service, or on the march, grain is cheap, and provisions abundant precisely in proportion as he encourages a free market and maintains friendly relations with the neighbouring peasantry. So complete are the carriage arrangements, and so certain the laws of supply and demand, that I have known the regiment ordered at a moment's warning to march through a country almost a desert, and yet the supplies be up and all things in trim even

from the very first day; while regular regiments, ordered on the same expedition, and with all the means and appliances of a commissariat to boot, could not move under from fifteen to twenty days.

The same principle of common sense applied to practical details I find at work in every portion of the constitution of this corps. The best curtailment of unnecessary baggage is found to be the soldier's own purse: this principle is admitted accordingly. Compensation for losses is found to engender carelessness; it is rejected by the State accordingly. It is found that a regiment with fixed head-quarters moves more readily, and leaves its followers in greater comfort and security, than a regiment which has, as it were, no central home; fixed head-quarters are established accordingly. It is found that the best check to all ill-feeling and smothered grievances, in every rank, lies in the possibility of openly stating the same without demur; daily orderly room is held accordingly. It is found that the native soldier does not really become more efficient from induement in an English soldier's coat, a stock, shoes in which he never walks if he can escape them, pipe-clay, and what not; and the soldiers of the Sind Horse are therefore dressed as natives would wish to be dressed when sent upon hard work in hot climates. It is found that horses have various descriptions of mouths; so the bits are modified to suit them. The saddle is fitted to the horse's back at the soldier's discretion; but if the animal's back become sore, its allowance from the State is stopped and its owner is compelled to walk: the result is that sore backs are almost unknown. It is known, again, that in sword exercise Orientals are habituated to the cut instead of the point; and the swords are formed to meet this requirement. But why multiply details? Those who feel interested in the discussion may gather them from a very useful collection recently published. And from that work it is apparent that not only is the system obtaining in the Sind Horse applicable to all

arms in the native army, but that while pointing out the defects and impending failure of the regular system, General Jacob has reiteratedly made practical suggestions for extending his system, under specified circumstances, to both native infantry and artillery.

But, if thoroughly efficient, is this corps also thoroughly loyal; I appeal to the past twelve months for an answer to this question. Its own men, mainly drawn—as being the best available material—from the agricultural districts around Delhi, Goorgaum, and Furruckabad, its home may be said to be the heart of the revolted country. Yet every man has stood, and stands staunch, though subjected to the severest temptations, and scattered, during the period of the mutiny, under its native officers, at stations where mutiny was being plotted or enacted by regular troops. To my certain knowledge, the regiment of Sind Horse which remained on the frontier during the past autumn, was the obstacle to a general rising on that border, and to a massacre of our Europeans in Upper Sind. And why is it that amid the general corruption these men remain thus loyal? There is no mesmerism in the matter. It is due simply to the exercise of common sense and honesty in the organisation of a military body composed of natives of India. And it is no more to be wondered at that this corps has succeeded while the regular corps have failed, than it would in this capital be wondered at that one manufacturer who proceeded in the usual course of trade should succeed, while another who sought for labour below its price, crippled it by injudicious rules, and supplied it with bad tools, should fail.

Before leaving this question of loyalty, I would beg permission to quote some of General Jacob's own words upon this subject, and indeed upon the Silidar system in general, as exemplified in the Sind Horse:

"For I maintain that the silidar cavalry on the proposed scale would be superior in every way to the native cavalry now existing. The best among the

native gentry, who now have no connection with the army, would be proud and delighted to enter such a service, where the native officers have real command and authority, and where much of that harassing stable duty, &c., which is so disagreeable to them, does not exist. Not only would the service be composed of a class of men very superior as soldiers to any now entering the native army, but the political effects of such a service would be immense: the most influential native sirdars, men of landed property, and so forth, throughout India, would have a distinct interest in this part of the British army, which would be filled with their brothers and sons. Neither could their connection with the army in this manner ever be attended with danger to the State, for to their position in the British army would they feel that they owed greatly-increased respectability and honour; they would be grateful to the British Government, and be proud to serve, instead of only fearing it. The effect of such a state of things, in securing the fidelity and attachment of the people in general, must be very great. At the same time, not only is the cost of such a service much less than that of the present native cavalry, which has no connection at all with the most influential and best families of India, but the silidar corps is, from its construction, at all times much more ready and much more easily moved than any other troops whatever; and by its movement the State is put to no extra expense, save in the extreme case of a march through a desert country for more than a few days successively. There is but one thing required to ensure the perfect success of the proposed scheme, viz., a proper choice of officers to command, and the entrusting them with full and sufficient powers. The subordinate grades of European officers would then form an excellent school for future commandants, and the supply would never fail. The commandants should always be allowed to choose their own European officers. The service should always be one of careful selection; and if the

commandants be really and honestly chosen by merit and fitness alone, Government need never find difficulty in appointing properly-qualified individuals." *

Sir, those words in the above quotation, which relate to the native gentry, seem to me to have very broad bearings. I cannot but feel that not only in the military but in all branches of our administration, the absence of a middle and higher class, having real interests in the maintenance of order and the existing form of Government, is increasingly dangerous.

To return, however, it is sometimes contended that the system of the Sind Horse, although excellent when applied by an able man, would fail under the direction of the average material we could place in command. To this I reply—as when I hear it contended that the system though good in theory would fail in practice, I ever shall reply—that it is long practice on a sufficiently large and increasing scale which has evolved the theory, and that among the axioms thus established by practical results is this: that in regard of all ranks, the school forms the men. I am personally acquainted with nearly all the officers of the Sind Irregular Horse, and I am confident there is none among them who would not instantly acknowledge that he was so formed; and, moreover, that once trained in this school, retirement from the service would be to him preferable to a return to the old system. To enforce a bad principle, thereby to cripple your material, and then to assert that this material would not be adequate, under other conditions, to the development of a better principle, does truly appear to me like tying up a man's arm in a sling until the sinews are all relaxed and wasted, and then to point to the skeleton in proof of the non-competency of the original arm for the healthy work. But the fact is that the past twelve months (without

* "Views and Opinions of Brigadier-General John Jacob, C.B., &c., Collected and Edited by Captain Lewis Pelly, author of 'Our North-West Frontier.'"

going any further back) have amply proved that lieutenants trained in the new school are thoroughly competent to perpetuate, under adverse circumstances and on active service, all that is required by the school.

To sum up, then: It seems to me that in the silidar principle, as exemplified in the constitution of the Sind Irregular Horse, we possess a model for native re-organisation whose soundness and applicability are warranted by the facts; that its theory was elaborated from practice under circumstances similar with those to be encountered by any future native force; that while elaborating this system its founder exposed the vices of the regular system, and predicted its present failure; that the testimony of every officer who has served in the Sind Horse is strongly in favour of its soundness and efficiency; that upon the strain bearing on our entire military system in India, this corps remained staunch under very trying conditions; that, looking into the works of statesmen who have formerly addressed themselves to the question of army reform in India, we find men like Sir John Malcolm, Sir Thomas Munro, and Lord Metcalfe, all giving independent (and until recently unpublished) evidence in favour of views very similar to those practised by General Jacob; lastly, that, looking ourselves into the details of the system, we find them to be adapted to the requirements of the service, and to be in accordance with those broad principles of common sense which, in every trade not interfered with by the State, are found to be essential to success.

From these facts, from a careful study of General Jacob's works, from a long and watchful observation of his daily proceedings, and from personal contact with his men and officers, I have arrived at the deliberate and unalterable conclusion that, partly owing to circumstances and partly owing to original character, he has succeeded in forming a model upon which, in our present crisis, we may permanently mould our native armies in India.

That these armies should always be supported by European troops I readily concede; but this support, in the event of foreign invasion, combined with mutual trust during time of peace, is diametrically opposed to the principle and practice involved in the establishment of an English army of occupation, to the exclusion, half trust, or subordination, of a native army.

I hope in my next letter to state the manner in which I would apply the proposed system to the actual state of things in India, bearing always in mind that gradual growth is preferable to sudden convulsion.

I am, &c.,

C. D. L.

April 2.

Letter IV.

THE REMEDY APPLIED TO THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF THE PATIENT.

Sir,—Having shown that we possess a model upon which to re-organise the native army of India, and having pointed out, without any reserve or circumlocution whatsoever, that there dwells at least one man in our empire who can discern the material for such a force, and who has proved himself able to organise it into loyalty and efficiency, I proceed now to render my argument yet more practical, by indicating the manner in which the proposed re-organisation may be carried into effect with the greatest eventual completeness, and with the least possible present convulsion.

To this end, I must take a rapid survey of the governmental distribution and military condition of the Indian empire. At present, there are in British India three presidencies* subordinated to a Governor-General, and the only change I would propose in this constitution is the creation of a fourth presidency, accompanied with some convenient modifications in the boundaries of its fellows. The four presidencies should be, severally, the Presidency of the Ganges Valley, the Presidency of the Territories of the Indus, the Presidency of the Western Coast, and the Presidency of the Eastern Coast. The presidential towns might be, for the first, Agra; for the second, Kurrachee; for the third, Bombay; and for the fourth, Madras. Supreme over all, the Governor-General would, as at present, have his capital in

* In enumerating three presidencies I include, of course, the North-West Provinces in the Presidency of Bengal.

Calcutta. Among the advantages of this re-distribution would be the greatest practicable compactness; a less marked difference among the societies of men contained within their several limits; and, in the instances of the Presidencies of the Indus and the Ganges, a greater unity of authority along their lines of trade, their lines of water carriage, their external political relations, and their military frontiers. Subordinate to these Governorships should be Commissioners of Provinces, whose jurisdictions might be defined, as nearly as practicable, upon a consideration of the revenue and judicial systems already obtaining within the same. It is not, however, my intention to enter into the details of this question of civil administration. It has been adverted to only to render clearer my military proposition, and to those I now return.

We may consider that the Bengal Native Army has almost wholly ceased to exist; that the army of Bombay contains two or three regiments who have shown themselves more or less disaffected; and that the Madras army still continues loyal. We may further assume that the regiments which have mutinied will not be recruited; and that neither reason nor prudence will permit us to restore arms to those regiments which in times of danger we have deemed it necessary to disarm. This actual state of circumstances, then, I would accept; and while holding in view the re-organisation, as opportunity or occasion should permit, of all the native armies of India, I would, in the first instance, limit its introduction to that sphere which is open for its operation. Thus doubt and distrust would be precluded among our still loyal sepoys; thus experience would find time to modify details as we proceeded; and yet, whether by transference of individuals to the new regiments, or by casualties and retirements, no long period would elapse ere our object should be thoroughly attained.

The fields then open for the introduction of our

system would, under the proposed distribution of presidencies, be those of the valleys of the Indus and the Ganges. So much determined, I would, in the first instance, select the points at which the European portion of my forces should be stationed. These points should be selected in healthy localities; in the vicinity of inland water-carriage and military roads; should be, if possible, on the seaboard; should be connected by telegraphic wires; and should be maintained thoroughly complete in all the details of carriage, supplies, &c., requisite for an immediate march on active service. These European troops should be massed in divisions as large as possible, so that the men might be accustomed to work together; and, when sent on active service, might understand combined as well as independent movement; and not, as is too frequently the case, find themselves, when in the presence of an enemy, in a position somewhat similar to that in which a body of workmen for the first time collected and thrown into a manufactory would feel themselves, when directed to turn out their first piece of goods. These troops, thus massed, would form the support of the native army in the event of foreign aggression; and while preserved from constant personal contact with the natives, and from consequent perpetuation of the race-hatred which has now unhappily been generated, they would still be in hand, and in all respects be ready to pounce upon and extinguish any spark of rebellion ere it should find time to spread. I am careful, however, to repeat that this European force should be considered, and should be treated, not as the controllers, but as the support, of the native army. Upon the principle involved in this distinction depends, as I said before, the maintenance or otherwise of our rule in India.

We cannot, I think, too soon set to work upon this task of re-organisation. Once earnestly taken in hand, a sense of returning confidence would spread among the native military population. As the new regiments

were enlisted, some of the English regiments might be withdrawn, and thus one great source of race-hatred be removed. With regard to the Indus Presidency, the work should, in my opinion, be commenced at once. Along the westward of that territory lies our most vulnerable and most disturbed frontier; a frontier which, although nobody will at present attend to it, will one day startle England with intelligence as terrible, and not less dangerous, than that which has startled her during the past year. That line is not only vulnerable, but is of so deadly a climate, that European soldiers could neither work nor even exist there; so that under any circumstances it must be held by native troops. At the centre of the line you have, moreover, the regiments upon which I propose to reorganise the army, and the general to whom I look for the successful conduct of the task. And, therefore, without any ambiguity, I say, direct General Jacob to take in hand the organisation of a native force, complete in all arms, and organised on the Silidar principle, as exemplified in the Sind Irregular Horse, to be called "the Frontier Field Force," to range to the westward of the Indus from Kurrachee to Peshawur, and to be supported at these two extremities by divisions of European troops. In so directing, you would, I consider, secure every element both of person and principle, towards a successful issue of the experiment. If the experiment fail, the failure will be but local, and the divisions at Kurrachee and Peshawur could at once crumple up the intervening light troops. But screw your courage to the sticking place, and we 'll not fail.

Before quitting this portion of my subject, let me again urge that we are even now at the turning point of our career in India. If we use our brains and proceed wisely, we shall establish our rule more firmly than ever; if we trust to our muscles, we are lost. Whatever we may think of the natives, they do not look on themselves as vile, or upon the atrocities committed by the sepoys as other than the venge-

ful but natural and inevitable consequences of causes emanating from ourselves. I hope there is no man living who abhors more than I do the atrocities committed under the authority of Nana Sahib, but I cannot at the same time conceal from myself that he is not abhorred by his own caste, nor by the people. I well know upon what tender ground I am touching. I well know that had we not shown ourselves unequal to the great task of an Indian empire, I had never touched upon this controversy at all; but injured and angry as we are, let us endeavour still to look truth steadily and dispassionately in the face, and rising superior to all personal feelings, re-establish our power in India upon sound and lasting principles. Your English bulldog has excellent pluck, but his weight is not quite up to holding down the Indian elephant; and the sooner you now draw him off the better. Be sure, if you do not, the day is coming when Nana will be regarded by the natives as an exemplar, and his dead followers as martyrs.

It remains now to review the means at our disposal for recruiting that portion of the proposed force which must be derived from England. I allude, of course, to the European officers. These, for the native army, whatever they may be for any other army in the world, must be obtained, not by purchase, not by patronage, not by seniority, but by selection; selection, pure and simple. I know the objections urged against this principle. I have seen those objections disproved over and over and over again; but so far as my limits may admit, I will now recur to them. To do so, however, I must again advert to the civil department of our administration; and I premise by asserting that all the English youth sent out from this country for the government, whether civil or military, of India should be collected in one general list for general duty. It should receive in England that education which may adapt it to the work of general administration; but the particular sphere of each individual should be determined in India after

trial, and, if possible, in accordance with the inclinations of the individual himself. There is ample room and verge enough for all. I know that in populous and highly organised societies the division of labour is inevitably carried out to an extreme degree—the competition of numberless highly accomplished aspirants compels this. But this condition is not arrived at in India. What you want there is not genius but common sense, not special excellence but general capacity, aptitude, and diligence. The soldier statesman, as he has been called, or what I shall call a man taken from the middle classes of English life, who understands how to govern a larger or smaller society in India—this is the man we want there. Place him, if you can, in the position for which he shows most aptitude and inclination; but let him be prepared also for emergencies which may and probably will befal him in all departments of public business. This end is best secured by casting all, in the first instance, into one general list, and thence selecting them as their characters develop and the requirements of the service demand. But if the strength and durability of the entire fabric of your power in India depend upon this careful and wise selection of material, surely, when selecting for the native army, which is in truth the corner-stone of that fabric, it were wise to select a good bit of stuff and carefully shape it to its place.

The main objections urged against the principle of selection are two—first, that you cannot find men to select; and second, you cannot find men to be selected.

Let us look a little into it, and see how it dovetails in with the system. The centre round which the entire system of selection revolves lies in the endowment of your local administrators with full powers, and demanding from them commensurate responsibility. In India these heads should be, for the civil department, the rulers of provinces; and for the army, the commandants of regiments. The centering

of all power in these commanders is, it is manifest, widely different from a system of centralisation at a capital. These governors have all the local and personal knowledge requisite for success, and all the responsibility of failure. Allow them the selection of their materials, and every motive, as well self-interested as public, will conduce to make them select the best men available. More than this you cannot expect, so long as humanity remains imperfect. Again, in regard of the men to be selected, the question is not as to whether by a system of selecting you will secure perfection, but whether the original material remaining the same, you will not more nearly approach that unattainable point than by any other system you ever have tried or can adopt. Coming into India on the general list, your young men would gradually be known, and know themselves. If an individual showed an aptitude for an appointment to a native regiment, he would be appointed accordingly. If he proved incompetent, he would be returned by the commanding officer to the general list; if he proved competent, he would find himself respectable and respected, with sufficient employment, and with duties which formed his pleasure. I repeat, the tendency of the selection system is in the right direction; it will never be immaculate, but it will always progress. What, on the other hand, is the tendency of any other system you have ever seen in operation?—towards stagnation, towards death. This general argument would, in my opinion, apply even in a free country, whose press, whose religious institutions, and whose government, more or less accurately express the general sense of the people; but with what thousand-fold power does it apply in India! Here the Government is as it were the growth, the skin of the nation; there, it is like an adult's coat thrown on the body of a child. We are ever in danger of encumbering India with our civilisation; we are applying the England of Queen Victoria to the time of Herodotus in Assyria.

Here, public measures may, I believe, be generally traced to the people—public opinion ticks on to the hour for a necessary change; the press proclaims the time; and the hand of government points accordingly. There, the agents of government are *bonâ fide* the mainspring of the machine. They may under govern or over govern, or not govern at all, and be assailed by no more than a petition in the vernacular. There is no expression of public opinion, no revulsion against aught, save violent innovation. All centres in the administrator; and that is best which is best administered. One district may become desolate, not through the ill will, but through the ignorance of an unselected administrator; while the neighbouring waste becomes populous and cultivated, because blest by a man who, having once defined and recorded rights, knows how to stand by and keep the peace, and let the people grow.

Whatever you strong free people may be able to do here in England, there, in God's name, govern India by selected administrators, subjected to full responsibility. If your administrator fail, remove, disgrace him, but do not trammel his successors with rigid precedents, for which no perfectly analogous point may ever recur.

I am, &c.,

C. D. L.

April 3.

Letter V.

THE INDIA BILLS.

"Governments grow; they cannot be made."

Sir,—I am astonished that a nation so jealous of innovation, and so conservative in reform, as the English have ever shown themselves to be in England, should prove themselves to be so reckless of established institutions and so radical in revolution as the English are now showing themselves to be with regard to India. Is it possible that the people who owe all that distinguishes this country to the gradual growth of its constitution, have actually within a period of three months allowed their representatives to manufacture two successive bran-new constitutions for their greatest dependency? Is this the lesson our own history of the past eight hundred years teaches us? Is this the fruit of all the warnings we have received from the constitution-mongering of Europe? Why, you could not make two watches to order in the same time; and do you think the machinery of an Anglo-Indian government is less delicate to handle, less intricate to put together, and less difficult to regulate than that of a watch? Why, your spring crops were sown ere the first bill was hatched, and your crops will not ripen till autumn. What! do you suppose constitutions grow more quickly than corn?

But not content with one constitution a season, the first bill was no sooner taking root than, like impatient children, you must needs pull it up to see how

it is getting on; and, not being quite satisfied with its progress, you cut out its only vital eye, and then popped the dead carcase in again. Truly, if you continue to sow thus, you will reap the hurricane with a vengeance. Was it thus you proceeded in your own Revolution? was it thus the great Lord Somers drafted the change in the succession? was it thus you arrived at the Reform Bill? Is it thus you would wish to see a handful of Frenchmen disposing of your island Government in the Chambers of Paris? Or do you suppose, because a hundred and twenty millions of human beings, native to the other side of the globe, are weak enough to submit to your guidance, that they will assent also to become the shuttlecock of your factions, and the mere instruments of party? Incredible folly of so really wise a nation as this is! Yet, I do not attribute this madness to the nation. I accuse, rather, its Government. Sir, there was a time when I was innocent enough to believe that the English Government represented the English people. This illusion is now gone for ever. Like brilliant foam on the great ocean of British thought, Ministry follows Ministry—now blue, now orange—each dazzling, each claiming to reflect the hues of heavenly light; each hollow, each destined to be blown to atoms by a blast, and to sink again into the general mass. Lord Derby at the Mansion-house, Lord Palmerston jeering the India question out of Parliament: it is all one. Each cares for nothing but party, and each loves nothing but power.

I entreat the English nation to step in, before it is too late, between these ready-made constitutions and that ancient empire in the East. Can you see in the first anything but a great "perhaps"—a vapoury ghost, not yet gathered into shape? Can you see in the second anything save the workings of prejudice, despotism, and eager revenge, disguised in the least practicable quantity of gammon required to wash the mixture down? Have you considered that the day after the passing of the latter measure the

Minister for India will be absolute despot over one quarter of the human race; and that ere Parliament re-assemble the enforcement of one arbitrary principle may result in the destruction of your empire? Again —and it is a question of comparatively trivial moment —you possess a few thousands of English gentlemen administering your affairs in India, whose prospects, whose fortunes, whose honour, whose lives, and whose families' lives and honour, are involved in these India bills, and it might not, perhaps, be altogether unreasonable to bestow some little consideration on them. I am bold to say that they expect from you a grand united effort to restore the health of your Indian empire; and that while they think very little of which side may be in, and which side out, they think a great deal about a reasonable re-organisation of the Indian government in India, and about the evils of a protracted intermediate condition of incertitude.

Sir, I am more and more in favour of continuative growth. I deprecate sudden convulsion or change anywhere. I especially deprecate it in the instance of our Indian "empire." If the Members of Parliament in general evinced that knowledge of the measures to be discussed, without which legislation becomes mere chance-work, I should trust to a rejection of both Bills as they at present stand, and to the settlement, point after point, of some moderate reform by a Committee of the whole House. But it is impossible not to perceive that Parliament is quite uninformed of the details upon which the Government of India rests. Parliament knows little more about our Indian empire than the Ministry do. And I am compelled to admit therefore, that Parliament is incompetent to pass any Bill involving a radical change in the constitution of the Indian Government. On the whole, then, let as little be done as possible, and let that little be done without further delay. So shall your Indian government the longer endure, and the suspense and danger of India be curtailed and lessened. Deal with this India question as you would deal with a similar question

affecting your own government. Bear in mind that in every quarter of the globe human nature is in its essentials one, and government at bottom one. Act, then, towards the natives of India, and towards your servants of India, as you would wish to see a foreign dominant power—had you the misfortune to be subjected to one—act by you and your representatives. Place the government of the empire directly under the Crown; but administer it through the Board of Directors with the President of the Control-office sitting as chairman; so shall you superadd to the authority of the Company that of the Crown; so shall you avoid suddenly discountenancing and abolishing constituted authority in a critical juncture; so shall you combine into one a double and often divided Home Government of India; so shall you prefer continuative growth to ill-considered revolution; and so shall you leave yourselves at liberty to reform gradually hereafter, in conformity with those wise principles which have preserved your own country inviolate, progressive, and still to progress, amid the general anarchy and ruin of continental States.

I am, &c.,

C. D. L.

April 10.

London: Printed by Smith, Elder and Co., Little Green Arbour Court.

[PRINTED FOR PRIVATE USE ONLY.]

REPLIES

BY

BRIG. GENL. JOHN JACOB, C.B.,

&c. &c.

TO QUESTIONS REGARDING THE

REORGANISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

1858.

BOMBAY:
Printed at the EDUCATION SOCIETY'S PRESS, Byculla.

No. 19.

From Lieut. Col. H. M. DURAND, C.B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General,

To Brigadier General J. JACOB, C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

Allahabad, the 21st May 1858.

SIR,

1. Under instructions from the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, I have the honour to forward a printed copy of letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Honorable Court of Directors.

2. Circumstances having rendered it hitherto impracticable, notwithstanding the successes which have attended our troops in the field, and the important advance which has been made towards the re-establishment of the authority of Governmment in the disturbed Districts to constitute such a Commission as the Honorable Court desired to see appointed, the Governor General has determined to adopt the alternative of obtaining in writing from eminent and experienced Public Servants, Civil and Military, their opinions on the several heads of the inquiry, the conduct of which would otherwise have been entrusted to the Commission.

3. In respect to the order in which these heads shall be taken up, His Lordship is of opinion, that the

main features of the revolt of the Native Army in Bengal, and the general and financial considerations which the issue of this unparalleled mutiny entail, are, of themselves, sufficient to prescribe the point to which, practically, the attention of the Home Government must first be directed; that point being the strength and the composition of the European Army, which must be permanently maintained in India as the broad and fixed basis of our power and security.

4. This being so, the 5th paragraph of the Honorable Court's Despatch becomes the one of primary importance. And, indeed, a decision on the point above noticed, as well as on the question raised in that paragraph, viz. the proportion which the European should bear to the Native portion of the Army in India generally, and at each Presidency separately, will go far to simplify inquiry into other parts of the whole subject, the financial aspect of which will then be brought clearly into view.

5. Impressed with the necessity for a speedy, though a well considered settlement of these fundamantal data, the Governor General has directed me to forward, for your attentive consideration, the appended series of questions, and to request that replies may be returned, with as little delay as the weighty nature of the points referred for you opinion may render practicable.

6. This series of questions will be followed by other series upon the various heads to which the Court's Despatch calls attention; therefore, in replying to those which I am now directed to place before you, there will be no necessity for touching upon the many important particulars to which the letter of the Honorable

Court adverts, but which are foreign to the main question raised in the 5th paragraph.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) H. M. DURAND, Lieut. Col.,
On Special duty with the Governor General.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

No. 235 OF 1857.

OUR GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

1. We trust that when success, by the blessing of Divine Providence, shall have attended your efforts to put down the mutiny of the Native Army of your Presidency, and to re-establish the authority of the Government in the disturbed Districts, you will be enabled to take advantage of the services of select Officers of ability and experience to assist you, by investigation and by practical counsel founded thereon, in forming wise conclusions on the most important subject which must soon press for decision, namely, the proper organisation of our Army in India.

2. To this end, we authorise you to appoint, as soon as circumstances will permit, a Commission, composed of Military Officers of the Armies of the three Presidencies (with whom should be associated Officers of the Queen's Army, who have had experience of Indian service), on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you can rely; together with one or more Civil Servants whom you may consider to be specially qualified for such a duty by their knowledge of the native character, and general administrative experience.

3. In framing instructions for the guidance of this Commission, we are desirous that the following heads of inquiry should be specified, in addition to any others which you may consider to deserve their attention:—

1*st*.—Should Corps be raised each in a prescribed District, and be recruited there and there only?

2*nd*.—Should Corps be composed of Troops or Companies, each of which shall consist of separate Tribes or Castes; or should the Tribes or Castes be mixed up together in the whole Regiment?

3*rd*.—Should a Company or Companies of Europeans form a component part of Native Regiments?

4*th*.—What alterations should be made in your Recruiting Regulations relating to Tribes and Castes with a view to determine the future composition of the Native Army?

5*th*.—Will it be expedient to enlist Natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the Natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate Regiments, or in Companies, or otherwise?

6*th*.—Whether, in Native Infantry Regiments, the discontinuance of the grades of Native Commissioned Officers, and the substitution of an European Serjeant and Corporal to each Company is advisable; and, if so, whether, in lieu of the prospect of distinction and emolument arising out of these grades, it would be advisable to establish graduated scales of Good Service Pay and Retiring Pensions, claimable after specified periods of service?

7*th*.—Whether the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to the grades of Native Commissioned

Officers (if these are retained) should not be altered, and assimilated to the systems in force at Madras and Bombay?

8*th*.—If separate Corps are to be maintained for Military and Police purposes, what will be the best organisation for each Branch respectively?

9*th*.—Have the powers of Commanding Officers of Native Corps, and the powers of Officers in charge of Companies been diminished? What consequences have been the result? Is it desirable that those powers should be increased, or what other measures should be adopted for the improvement of discipline?

10*th*.—Should Cadets be trained and drilled in European Regiments before they are posted to Native Regiments? or what would be the best mode of drilling and training Cadets before they are posted to Native Regiments?

11*th*.—Should the special rules regulating punishment in the Native Army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British Army; or ought there to be any, and what changes in those rules, or in the system of punishment?

12*th*.—How can the demands for European Officers for staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of Regiments?

4. It is to be understood, that the inquiries be made by the Commission, and the opinions to be offered by them are to have reference to the several branches of the Native Army—Infantry, regular and irregular; Cavalry, regular and irregular; Artillery, and Sappers and Miners; and with respect to the Artillery, and Sappers and Miners, whether they should be composed,

as heretofore, of European and Natives, or be entirely European.

5. To aid your Government in forming an opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the Native portion of the Army in India generally, and at each Presidency separately, we would recommend that your Government should call upon the Commission to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with valuable information on this head.

6. Having obtained opinions on all these heads of inquiry, and on such other heads as you may deem to be essential to the thorough development of the important questions at issue, you will refer the views of the Commission for the consideration of the Commander in Chief, and will then furnish us with the result of your careful deliberation upon the whole of the measures which should, in your judgment, be taken for the organisation and maintenance, in the utmost practicable state of efficiency, of whatever Military Force you may think it desirable to form.

7. The Commission itself may be instructed to make to the Governor General in Council any suggestions or recommendations which occur to them, although not on matters comprised in the specified heads of inquiry.

We are, &c.

(Signed) R. D. MANGLES,
" F. CURRIE,
&c. &c.

London, the 25th November 1857.

No. 60.

From Lieut. Col. H. M. DURAND, C.B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General,
To Brigadier General J. JACOB, C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

Dated Allahabad, 16th June 1858.

SIR,

My letter No. 19, of the 21st May last, will have prepared you for the receipt of other series of questions upon the various heads to which letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Honorable Court of Directors, had called attention.

2. By direction of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, I have now the honour to forward a series of questions connected with the reorganisation of the Infantry branch of the Service.

3. The questions now forwarded are upon the Recruiting and Composition of Corps. The questions upon the second, third, and fourth heads of the general classification will follow as soon as they are received from the Press, and will be despatched without any accompanying letter.

4. Such of the questions as are not applicable, will, of course, require no other reply than a statement to that effect. The questions having to be framed for wide and general circulation, entailed the necessity of their being comprehensive, and precluded their limitation, otherwise than by marginal manuscript direction, to the special circumstances of the several Civil and Military Authorities to be addressed.

5. I have only to repeat, that the Governor Gene-

ral is desirous, that replies be furnished, with as little delay as the nature and complexity of the points referred for your opinion may render practicable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND, Lieut. Col.,
On Special duty with the Governor General.

Enclosures :

1. Series of Questions, Bombay Presidency.
1. Series of Questions, Sind.

No. 293 OF 1858.

From Brigadier General J. JACOB, C.B.,
Commandant in Chief, Sind Irregular Horse,
To Col. H. M. DURAND, C.B.,
&c. &c.,
On Special duty with the Governor General.

Jacobabad, 7th June 1858.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt this day of your printed letter No. 19, of the 21st May 1858, to my address, with accompaniments, and with reference to their subject to state, that with respect to the questions regarding the numbers, distribution, accommodation of troops in the Bombay Presidency generally, I am not in possession of the information necessary to enable me to

reply to these queries with precision; and as you will of course receive replies from those Officers who have the necessary records to refer to regarding such matters, it seems best that I should not trouble you with approximations only to exact information.

2. With respect to the other questions on the list, having reference to the Presidency of Bombay, or to India generally, I beg leave to observe that it appears to me to be wholly erroneous to suppose that the numbers of European troops to be stationed in that Presidency or in India, should bear any particular proportion to the numbers of Native troops employed.

3. It cannot, it appears to me, be wise to attempt to regulate the numbers of Europeans to be employed in the Service, by any such considerations as the proportion which these numbers may bear to the Native troops, but it seems that such numbers must depend on totally different circumstances, such as the nature of the duties to be performed, the climate, local position, &c.

4. For instance on this frontier Europeans would be totally useless; they could not live in this climate, and, in one year, Regiments would be probably reduced to companies, however well the men might be sheltered; while if they had to take the field in the summer time, one day might suffice to destroy the whole force. Kurrachee, on the contrary, is probably the best place in all India at which permanently to mass a large European force for imperial purposes, and totally irrespective of merely provincial requirements.

5. I would also remark that it seems to me to be absolutely certain that we cannot hold India, by an arm chiefly, or in large proportion, composed of English

soldiers, and that to attempt to do so must be attended with speedy and utter ruin.

6. In the first place England could not supply the numbers of soldiers, supposed, on the most moderate estimate, to be required for the purpose of maintaining such an army in the East.

7. And again it is clear to me that if we could command even such a host of Europeans as the grand army with which Napoleon invaded Russia, the attempt to coerce India by such forces would only end in more complete and hopeless failure.

8. The mere brute force of hundreds of thousands of men becomes powerless before that of hundreds of millions of such people as the nations of India. The whole force of the Mogul Empire was never able to subdue even one of these nations—the Rajpoots.

9. To attempt to govern India by the force of numbers of English soldiers must, it seems to me, alienate from us all of the best of the inhabitants of the country who are now assuredly inclined to favour and to support our power. While those inclined to be dissatisfied with our rule, who have hitherto been effectually restrained by the knowledge that the feelings of the great body of the people were with us, would then be free to display their hostility.

10. Whatever the numbers of European soldiers employed, if we found ourselves placed in opposition to the whole people of India, composing all the classes above referred to, the result could not long be doubtful.

11. We should, I conceive, speedily find ourselves in the position of a waggoner who, finding his horses unruly and troublesome, and, perhaps, getting a kick from one of the animals, should dispense with the

services of the team, and place himself with one or two of his friends between the shafts. It is certain that though the men might break their hearts with their exertions, they would not move the load one inch! But let the driver, instead of finding fault with the poor horses, improve his own guiding power a little, let him handle his team more skilfully, and he would soon find all working together with irresistible power, quietly, steadily, and well.

12. Thus I am convinced that this great Empire also cannot be controlled by English bone and muscle,—by numbers of English bodies; but that it can be held in perfect safety and security by English mind,—by English moral power, by the influence of a moderate number of cultivated English gentlemen, rather than by a multitude of rude soldiers.

13. It is certain that the Natives of India, even of Hindoostan proper, habitually under proper treatment, and commanded as *men* in accordance with living principles and natural laws, can be made as good, true, and faithful soldiers as any Europeans whatever.

14. This has been long known to me, but its truth has been placed beyond a doubt by the facts which have occurred. While I was absent in Persia during the last year, in Upper Sind, where a body of Native Officers and Hindoostanee sepoys, mostly from the most disturbed districts around Delhi, standing alone amidst the rebellious inhabitants of the country and the disaffected sepoys of other corps in the Government Service, when tried and tempted, as none of their brethren have been tried or tempted elsewhere; not only remained themselves perfectly faithful and true, but, without an European soldier within hundreds of miles of them,

controlled and repressed every attempt, however insidious, or however formidable, by whomsoever made, whether by secret persuasion, or open force, at mutiny and rebellion around them, and thus saved the lives of all the Europeans in this Province, and prevented a violent open rebellion throughout Sind and Beloochistan.

15. While, in some instances, they knew that their sons and relatives, though probably as true men as themselves, were being executed as traitors by British Officers in Hindoostan.

16. I beg leave to suggest that the correspondence relating to the conduct of the troops, the proceedings on this Frontier, and the treatment of men detached from hence on recruiting service in Hindoostan, during the past year, be called for from the Commissioner in Sind, or from the Government of Bombay. This correspondence would, I think, with reference to the subjects now treated of, be found most significant and interesting.

17. Previously to the receipt of your letter, under reply, I had been requested by the Commissioner in Sind to answer questions with respect to this Province similar to those which I have now been favoured with from yourself, wherefore it seems to me that I cannot do better than forward herewith a duplicate of my reply to Mr. Frere, which I have accordingly the honour to do.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on
the Frontier.

Questions referred by the Commissioner in Sind to Brigadier General John Jacob, C.B., with his Replies thereto.

Jacobabad, 5th June 1858.

1. The number of European Troops of each Arm now serving in Sind.

I am not informed on this head.

2. The Number and the Distribution of the European Troops of each Arm you deem necessary for the occupation of Sind.

It seems to me that this question cannot be answered wisely if the occupation of Sind be considered as a provincial matter only. Sind being the most exposed portion of the frontier of India, the Military occupation of this Province can only be properly discussed with reference to imperial interests.

For local purposes, for the mere occupation, no European troops are actually necessary, except two companies of Artillery.

But, with a view to imperial interests and necessities, Kurrachee seems to me to be, in every respect, the best position in all India, at which permanently to station a large body of European troops. The climate is most favourable, as good, perhaps, as any in the world; while the troops there stationed would be in the best possible position as a reserve force for service in the Punjaub, or anywhere on our North-West Frontier. The means of transport, by land and water, are continually improving, and, if placed on a proper footing, a force of ten thousand men might reach the Punjaub

from Kurrachee in the space of one month. On the other hand, being massed at a seaport town, the troops could be readily transported by sea to any other part of the Empire.

The presence of a large force of European troops at Kurrachee would, in my opinion, tend more than any other measure to keep all quiet throughout and beyond our North-Western Provinces. While, if the Regiments had their permanent head quarters established at Kurrachee, they would always be able to move anywhere on service, leaving sick, weakly recruits, and unfits, as well as the wives and families of the members of the corps, in safety and comfort at their homes, to which the men would return on the conclusion of the duty on which they might be commanded, and this seems to me to be an arrangement which conduces, in a most powerful manner, to the efficiency of soldiers in the field.

I should recommend then, that a force be permanently stationed at Kurrachee, consisting of two troops of Horse Artillery, and four field batteries, fully horsed and manned—ready at all times for field service, with a Grand Arsenal and Ordnance Depôt, and four reserve companies of Artillery. Two companies of European Sappers, and ten Regiments of European Infantry. There should be no other European troops anywhere in the Province.

3. The number of Native Troops actually now in Sind; and the number you regard as indispensable for Sind; also their distribution.

I have no means of supplying the information required in the first part of this question.

With respect to the latter part, the only Native troops required for Sind are those composing the Frontier Field Force.

The Frontier Field Force might consist of the three Regiments of Sind Irregular Horse, with three troops of Sillidar Horse Artillery, and three Regiments of Sillidar Infantry, as detailed in former correspondence with the Commissioner in Sind and with Government. The permanent head-quarters of these corps should be established at Jacobabad. No troops are, in my opinion, required at other stations, or anywhere in the interior of Sind. A properly organised Police force should be maintained for internal duties, such as jail guards, &c. One thousand five hundred (1,500) mounted, and four thousand five hundred (4,500) foot Police might suffice for Sind, exclusive of the Frontier; but on this matter I am not fully informed, and am doubtful as to exact numbers without having the records to refer to.

5. What proportion the Europeans should bear to the Native portion of the Regular Army in Sind?

This question is answered above, but it would be highly advisable to attach a full company of Gun Lascars of the old strength of one hundred and twenty (120) men to each troop and company of European Artillery and of European Sappers.

6. What proportion the Europeans should bear to the Native Troops—Regulars and Police together?

It appears to me that the numbers of Europeans to be employed should be determined on without any reference to the proportion they may bear to other troops, but on considerations depending on totally different questions and principles.

7. What Barrack Accommodation exists in Sind for European Troops?

There is accommodation for a troop of Horse Artillery and two Regiments of Infantry at Kurrachee, and for one Regiment at Hydrabad.

8. What Barrack Accommodation, if any, must be provided in order that Sind may have adequate cover for the European Troops you consider necessary?

Good barracks must be provided at Kurrachee for a troop of Horse Artillery, and eight companies of Foot Artillery; two companies of Sappers, and for eight Regiments of Infantry.

9. What proportion the Europeans should bear to the Native portion of the Regular Army in India generally, and what proportion when Native Police Corps are included?

The idea of any such proportion appears to me to be wholly erroneous. Forty thousand (40,000) European Infantry would be ample for all India: of these I should advise that ten thousand (10,000) be quartered at Kurrachee; five thousand (5,000) at other convenient stations in the Bombay Presidency; five thousand (5,000) in the Madras Presidency; ten thousand (10,000) in the Bengal Presidency; and the remaining ten thousand (10,000) in reserve at Simla.

The whole of the Artillery in India should be European, with the exception of a few troops and companies formed for special service in particular localities where Europeans could not live.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

REORGANISATION

OF THE

ARMIES OF INDIA.

CLASSIFICATION.

The heads of inquiry in the Court's Despatch may be classed as follows:—

I.—THE RECRUITING AND THE COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

II.—THE MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

III.—ORGANISATION, PROMOTION AND REWARDS.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

INFANTRY.

I.—*The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.*

1. What are the Races, Tribes, or Castes, of which the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army is composed ?

Nearly all the races, tribes, &c. of the Bombay Presidency, with the exception of Parsees, and in considerable proportion of those of Hindoôstan Proper.

2. What Districts are the several Races, Tribes, and Castes drawn from ?

All the districts of the Bombay Presidency, and from Hindoostan Proper.

3. Have any Races, Tribes, or Castes, been excluded from Enlistment, either by the Regulations or the practice of the Bombay Army ?

Yes; occasionally enlistment has been ordered to be confined to certain races and districts.

4. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of Enlistment, from whom Recruits might, with advantage, be drawn for the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army ?

I think it would be far the best proceeding to take no notice of any questions regarding race, tribes, &c., but to entertain men with consideration of their individual fitness only.

5. What Agency is employed for the Enlistment of Recruits in the Districts from which the Bombay Army is Recruited ?

No special agency, the business is managed by Regimental Commanding Officers.

6. On Enlistment of Recruits what precautions of Registry and other forms are observed before the local Authorities of Districts ?

None that I am aware of.

7. When Recruits are Enlisted in Cantonments or taken from the families of Sepoys, or the Followers of Regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken ?

None that I am aware of.

8. What alterations should be made in existing Recruiting Regulations and Practice, relatively to Races, Tribes, or Castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the Infantry of the Native Troops in the Bombay Army) ?

I would leave all such arrangements wholly to the Commanding Officers, and enlist men solely with respect to individual fitness.

9. What are the words of the Oath administered to the Recruit on his entering the ranks of the Native Infantry ?

I have not a copy of the oath ; but it is well known.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay Army ?

Since 1798 I believe.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the Oath administered to the Sepoy of the Bombay Army?

I think all such oaths are bad in principle, and that it would be far better to use none whatever.

12. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes in the Bombay Presidency of seafaring habits, and could Marine Corps be formed from such Races, Tribes or Castes?

Yes; the greater part of the inhabitants along the whole coast are such.

13. Has the Bombay Presidency any Marine Corps; and, if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?

Yes; there is a Marine Battalion, which is, I believe, eight hundred (800) strong. Its ranks are filled with Concanees, Purwarees, and Soortees. These men are most efficient for the particular service required of them.

14. Should each Infantry Corps be raised each in a prescribed District, and be Recruited there and there only?

Each Corps should have a permanent head quarter, and there, of course, recruits would generally be entertained.

15. Or should each Corps be Recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to Districts?

In enlisting men nothing should be considered but their fitness, morally and physically, for the work

required of them. All such matters should be left wholly to Regimental Commanders.

16. Should each Corps be homogeneous as to Race, Tribe, or Caste?

No race, tribe, or caste, &c. should be acknowledged or attended to in any way, the sole question should be the qualities of the men as men only, and with reference to the performance of the duties on which they were to be employed.

17. If a Corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the Companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each Company consisting of men of one Tribe or Caste, or should the Tribes and Castes be mixed up in each Company?

This question is replied to in the last answer. No questions relating to tribe, caste, &c. should be entertained for one moment, such distinctions should not be acknowledged at all.

18. If Corps are not homogeneous but composite; in what proportion should the Races, Tribes, or Castes be entertained?

Distinction of tribes, castes, &c. should neither be attended to or acknowledged in any way.

19. If separate Corps are to be maintained for Military and Police purposes, should the Recruiting for both be allowed in the same District, or kept to separate Districts, or should Police Corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to Districts?

The Police should be wholly distinct from the Army; and Policemen should not be encouraged or allowed to consider themselves as soldiers. Nothing seems to me to be of more mischievous effect than such a practice.

I would leave all such questions as to recruiting wholly to the discretion of individual Commanding Officers.

20. Would you regard Police Corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the Army Corps?

No, assuredly not. Nothing could be more mischievous to both services. The Policemen should be constables, and as little combative as possible.

21. What Agency should be employed for Recruiting in the District of the Bombay Presidency or of its Dependencies, or in Districts of other Presidencies?

No special agency is employed. None seems necessary; but, on the contrary, its employment would, in my opinion, be hurtful. I would leave all such matters to be managed by individual Commanding Officers.

22. Would you employ the same kind of Agency for Recruiting for Police Corps, or a distinct Agency?

23. What precautions should be taken before the local Authorities, or through their instrumentality in connection with Recruits for the Army of the Bombay Presidency?

None whatever; all should be left to the discretion of Commanding Officers. No regulations, no precau-

tions will suffice to supply the want of an intellectual activity on the part of Commanding Officers.

24. Should similar, or different precautions be taken in connection with Recruits for Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency?

The only precaution required in all cases is, that care should be taken to choose proper European Commanders, to whose discretion all details should be left.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist Natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the Natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate Regiments, or in Companies, or otherwise?

The only question with regard to entertaining men in the Service should be, whether they be fit for that Service, or otherwise.

All recruits should be considered as men only without any acknowledgment of differences with respect to country, religion, tribe, caste, &c.

26. If recourse be had to Recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the Countries and Races to be preferred?

Answered above.

27. What would be the best Agency to employ for such Recruiting?

All recruiting arrangements should be left wholly to Commanding Officers.

28. Should a Company or Companies of Europeans form a component part of Native Regiments?

No. A Native Indian soldier should never be associated, if possible, with any Europeans but gentlemen. He should, as far as it can possibly be managed, never see an European in any but a superior position, none not possessing higher and nobler attributes than his own.

29. If so, should such Company or Companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European Corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European Corps, and subject to periodical relief?

None but the utterly degraded, the very off-scourings of Eastern society would take service under such an arrangement, which, in my opinion, would prove utterly ruinous to our power.

30. Where should the Barracks of such Companies be placed relatively to the Lines of the Native Troops?

31. Would such Detachments seriously complicate Commissariat arrangements?

Helplessly so; but if the arrangements were attempted, there would be an end to our Indian Empire at once.

32. How should such Companies be Armed, with similar or different weapons from the Native Troops with whom they would be associated?

33. How should the Native Infantry of the Bombay Presidency be Armed?

All Infantry should be armed alike—with short double-barrel small-bored rifles.

34. How should Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency be Armed?

This must depend wholly on the particular work to be done. The Police in the towns are best armed with sticks only.

35. Do the advantages of making the Dress of the Native Soldier a close imitation of that of the European Soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

There are no advantages whatever to be counterbalanced. The dress and equipment of our English soldiers are ludicrously absurd. The dress and accoutrements of the London Fire Brigade are probably the best model for the soldier's equipment. Certainly the only principle which can, in such matters, be wisely adopted, is to study the bodily comfort, protection, and freedom of action of the men without the least regard to anything but power and efficiency.

36. How should the Native Infantry of the Bombay Presidency be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the Native Soldier?

The best dress for the soldier in India is a *loose* broad-cloth tunic, with plenty of pockets in it, like a shooting coat; loose cloth trowsers to button round the ankle, and a good cotton-cloth puggree. In the hot season, in the day time, white or drab-coloured cotton clothing, of the like make, should be adopted; pipe-clay, knapsacks, and cross-belts, be wholly abolished.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local Regiment, a Native Irregular Regiment, Officered from that European Regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an Auxiliary Native Regular or Irregular Corps of Infantry in close and permanent association?

This arrangement would answer admirably if the Commanding Officer of the European Regiment were a man who understood how to treat properly respectable Natives, and if he felt a pride in his *Native* soldiers, otherwise it would signally fail, and, at best, it is quite unnecessary.

38. Do you consider that the association of European Artillerymen with Gun Lascars and Native Drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

No; the Gun Lascar arrangement is excellent; but the Lascar is considered and treated wholly as an inferior being, and such treatment would exclude from our ranks all the best soldiers in India. The men of the Sind Irregular Horse always fraternise most readily with English soldiers wherever and whenever they meet each other, and they associate on terms of *perfect equality*. I have known a Sowar knock a stout European down with his fist when the man had been insolent to him, and yet neither party made any complaint; but their comrades on both sides pronounced all fair, and the men shook hands over it, and by way of proving restored friendship, the English

soldier handed over to the Mussulman his short clay pipe to smoke, which he did readily, and they passed it backwards and forwards from mouth to mouth without the least scruple. This is a most common practice among them when they meet European soldiers, yet they are perfectly good Mussulmans, and are highly respected by all classes of Natives. They delight in taking care of the English soldiers whenever they require their aid, and they take care of a drunken European as if he were one of their own children. They conduct themselves very much like the French Zouaves.

39. How would you dispose of the Barracks and Lines of the two associated Corps?

The arrangement seems objectionable, wherefore this question need not be entered on.

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European Troops which is an element of strength?

There is no real strength which is not founded on natural law. Both our European and Asiatic soldiers will always be more efficient and more faithful, in proportion, as we strive more and more to cultivate their individual powers as men, and to make them respect themselves.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the Service in Peace and War?

42. Is it desirable that the Native Troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependance upon European support; and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of Auxiliary Native Battalions in permanent association with European Corps?

It is certain that all soldiers should be trained to habits of self-reliance as much as possible; and it is quite clear to me, that with properly selected officers, and with a proper organisation, our Native India Army may be made as powerful, as true, as completely trustworthy as any European on earth. Nothing has failed us now except our own foolish work; we have persisted for a long series of years in opposing every law of nature in our treatment of our Asiatic soldiers, and, having systematically destroyed health and living force throughout our Army, we need not be surprised that it has fallen to pieces.

Had we striven to cultivate and to develope living power instead of crushing it under blind regulation, all would have been sound, healthy, and strong. All would soon become so now, if true principles were adopted.

I annex a scheme for the reorganisation of the Native Indian Army, which, in my opinion, cannot fail of complete success if adopted at once.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

Pol. Supdt's Office, Jacobabad, 27th June 1858.

Jacobabad, 24th March 1858.

My dear Sir Charles,

I am obliged by your letter of the 3rd February, which reached me to-day.

With respect to the English army, I almost entirely agree with your doctrines. It is certain that that army can never be in a sound condition until purchase be wholly abolished.

If this were done, and the free action of public opinion admitted, no member of the Service being prohibited or discouraged from publishing discussions of facts or ideas, a Mutiny Act would scarcely be requisite, and the flower of all England would press forward to fill the ranks; while every man of every grade might be free to retire from the Service whensoever he thought proper.

Let these reforms be made: establish fixed permanent head quarters for each regiment in its native country; allow men to rise, as a matter of course, when fit for promotion, by merit, from among the private soldiers to the highest grades, and the business is done.

Each Regimental Head Quarters would be a military nursery and school of the best possible description.

The arrangements there should be such as to make every one as comfortable and as little under unpleasant restraint as possible, consistently with the object in view. There all recruits would be enlisted and trained; invalids and veterans would return there for health and repose; wives and families would reside there in peace and comfort, while their husbands and fathers were on service elsewhere; and the service men could,

with the greatest possible ease and advantage, be relieved in a body every one, two, or three years—the latter period should never be exceeded I think. At the same time, individual members of the Regiment might continually be passing to and fro, as convenience or the wants of the Service might require. I need not, however, enlarge on these details, for you will readily perceive how the arrangement would develope itself.

This would make all England warlike, and ready to serve. The soldier would cease to be separated entirely from the citizen, and the whole male population would probably, in time of need, be ready, able, and willing to take to arms.

The proposal to hold India by the bodily power of English soldiers, by force of muscles instead of by force of brains, which seems at present to be universally accepted, appears to me so enormously unwise, that I feel certain, if the attempt be actually made, it must result in the total ruin of the Empire. Nothing seems more certain than that we can only hold this great Empire of India by our moral superiority. The inhabitants of India are not barbarians. Science, knowledge, social condition, administrative wisdom, &c. &c. were in India, under Akbar, very far in advance of the state of things in England under Elizabeth. No amount of mere brute force could coerce two hundred millions of such people. The influx of large numbers of the lowest class of Englishmen, of ten thousands of English bodies, with very little English mind in them, will more than anything else tend to destroy the reputation and the reality of our superiority as moral beings; coarse vice and brutal manners, as the Oriental esteems them, will be then chiefly appa-

rent to the Asiatics as the characteristic attributes of Englishmen, who will thus very soon be hated and despised. The idea of holding India by an army of English private soldiers appears to me to be so intensely absurd, that it is difficult to deal with the question with becoming gravity. We could hardly obtain recruits for the Crimea: how can we expect, under the present system, to obtain them for this country in greater numbers? Without the assistance of large numbers of Native Indian troops, an army of Europeans could not move or subsist in the field; the enemy would only have to keep a little out of the way at first, to leave the Englishmen to follow their own strange devices, and they would all die,—aided by knapsacks, cross-belts, and pipe-clay, the sun and the climate would do the business most effectually. Indeed, the helplessness and ignorance of Europeans unaccustomed to this country at first is often ludicrous. While it should be remembered that they would then, under the new arrangements, have no association with the Regular Native Army to aid their inexperience, and that the wants and habits of the Englishman are entirely different from those of the people of the country, so that no amount of force would enable them to help themselves to what they required.

Again, seasons frequently occur (I have known many such) when every man is disabled by fever: at such times our Military force would be annihilated, we having no regular Native Indian Army, and having wilfully placed the people in the position of conquered enemies, restrained by physical force only, instead of their being, as now, generally our fast friends.

But, after all, what is it that has failed us in India, and caused all this outcry for European bodies?

Not the people, for they have generally remained quiet, and even friendly. Not the native qualities, even of the sepoys in our ranks, who have been murdering our women and children; for those of our Native Indian soldiers who most nearly remained in the state of raw material—who had imbibed the least of what we have been pleased to call regular discipline—have behaved the best—our Regulation men have rebelled!

Nothing indeed has failed us,—nothing turned against us but our own foolish work.

We have systematically degraded and corrupted the European mind in India, and especially in Bengal; have destroyed all its commanding power over the Regular sepoy; while, at the same time, for a quarter of a century past, we have been flattering the sepoys, and petting them most when they most deserved serve punishment: we have been perpetually telling them that they are the finest fellows on earth, instead of really making them decent people, and raising them in the scale of being. Lastly, we were always afraid to tell the disorderly Bengalees they were wrong, and, instead of correcting what was amiss with them, we always forced the other armies—whose men were true, and well-behaved enough—to "assimilate with the practice in Bengal," however faulty such a practice might be.

We can depend absolutely, with certainty and safety, on the power for good which goes out from our own minds, and which we have accumulated in the minds of our Asiatic soldiers; such power never has failed, and never can fail us at our utmost need. But if we

give forth no such power, we shall find none at our service in the sepoy when we require it.

Our Regulation system has merely corrupted the raw material of our Native army, made the men think us afraid of them, and made them strong only for evil. A system equally ill-adapted to the nature of the men would have made murderous and mutinous ruffians even of Europeans, as this has done with the Asiatics.

There are many millions of men among the Natives of India fitted to make as good and faithful soldiers as any men on earth. There is no fault justly to be found with the raw material.

The men of the Sind Irregular Horse—Natives of the districts around Delhi—are quite as trustworthy as are European soldiers. Yet such ignorance prevails with regard to these matters, that even now, in organising my third Regiment, it was actually proposed to alter the construction of the Sind Horse—to "assimilate it with the practice in Bengal"! The fact is, that the system now prevailing in the Service destroys all healthy growth of mind, wherefore true principles are seldom to be found anywhere acted on in our Indian administration. It is quite clear to me, that the Army of India must be a Native Indian Army; that great numbers of European private soldiers are not required for India, and would even be injurious to our rule.

What European troops we have other than Artillery, should be massed at certain places where the climate is favourable, and whose position might enable the troops readily to be despatched to any part of the Empire requiring their presence. The European regiments permanently belonging to, and forming part of, the

Indian Armies, should have their Regimental Head Quarters in India.

The seat of the Indian Government should be removed from Calcutta, and established either in Bombay or at Agra,—either place has some peculiar advantages.

A new Presidency should be formed, which should have a separate Government, Army, &c. &c., while the Supreme Government should have no connexion with any Presidency in particular.

The new Presidency should be the North-Western Presidency, and it might include the Punjaub, Sind, Cis-Sutledge Seikh States, Bhawulpoor, and the Thurr, also Delhi and the districts adjoining. The Indian Presidencies would then be Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and Lahore; with the Supreme Government at Agra or Bombay.

Forty thousand European Infantry would be ample for all India: of these I would quarter ten thousand at Kurrachee, as the best and most convenient Station in all India for European troops; five thousand might suffice for the Bombay Presidency, and a like number for Madras; ten thousand for Bengal; and the remaining ten thousand I would place at Simla.

The whole of the Artillery in India should be European, with the exception of a few troops and batteries, formed for special service in particular localities where European troops could not live, such as this Frontier of Sind.

The strength of the Artillery in India should be increased. All the Native Artillery in the Armies of the three Presidencies should be replaced by Europeans, the Gun Lascars attached to whom should be replaced

on their old footing, as they were in 1828, a full and complete company of Gun Lascars being attached to each European company. These men are most useful, and save the European Artillerymen from fatal exposure and fatigue, while they themselves are not of a class ever to become dangerous to us.

In each Presidency there should be a full regiment of European Sappers and Miners, all the men of which should be good artificers, surveyors, &c., each company of European Sappers having a company of Natives attached to, and working with it. Such corps would be invaluable for the superintendence and execution of public works.

For the new Presidency of Lahore, the Artillery might consist of six Battalions of the usual strength, and one Brigade of four troops of Horse Artillery. These four troops, with twelve field batteries, should always be kept complete, fully horsed and manned for field service.

The Reserve Artillery might be chiefly posted at Kurrachee and Lahore; at both which places there should be grand Ordnance depôts.

A Native Army for each Presidency might be formed and organised, as described by me in the printed scheme for the reorganisation of the Indian Army, &c.

The total strength of the Native troops should not, I think, be much reduced.

No alterations as to numbers appears requisite in the Madras Army, and the three armies of the other Presidencies might about equal in numbers the old armies of Bengal and Bombay together.

For all internal public duties, such as Jail guards, &c., a properly organised Police should be employed,

something similar to that which has been found to answer so well in Sind.

The Frontier Field Force, so often recommended by me, should be embodied for service in this quarter, and no other troops are required for Sind.

Some room should be found for common-sense in the Audit Department, and the paralysing effect of centralisation should be partly remedied by a system of local audit.

If these recommendations were followed, and the principles set forth in my letter to Sir J. Lawrence, of the 12th December last, were acted on and carried out in practice, our Indian Empire would speedily be brought into the soundest and strongest condition possible.

The greatest dangers to which that Empire is now exposed are the consequences of European violence and folly.

If we attempt to govern by brute force, or by patronising Christain Priests, Bishops, and Missionaries, we shall inevitably bring about absolute ruin.

It seems to me, that to introduce our State religion at all into our rule in the East is a very great and fatal error. The Government of such an Empire, which comprises hundreds of millions of men, holding twenty different faiths and creeds, to which they are attached as to their lives, cannot, consistently with any sort of justice, patronise or acknowledge any one of those creeds rather than another. The only safe, honest, and righteous course is, as a Government, entirely to ignore all.

No priest of any religion should be appointed, patronised, or directly paid by the State. Let private

persons, communities or congregations, make their own arrangements to provide for their respective spiritual wants, and all will be well; while the most fearful and deplorable mischief must and will assuredly ensue from the contrary proceeding.

Our proceedings and their results in the Sind Irregular Horse are sufficient to show you what can be made, under the most difficult circumstances, even of the Hindoostanees of Delhi—fathers, brothers, and sons, of the sepoys of Bengal.

The whole essence of the matter in question consists in the fact that I have been working on those attributes which are common to us and to the sepoys as men, and which lead towards the highest moral nature. I have endeavoured to cultivate and to aid in the development of these common attributes, and those in which we differ have retired out of sight.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. JACOB.

To

SIR C. TREVELYAN, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

Scheme for the Reorganisation of the India Army, by Brigadier General John Jacob, C.B., &c. &c.

The Queen of Engand formally to assume the style and title of Empress of India, and to be proclaimed accordingly.

The armies of the several Indian Presidencies to be henceforth styled the Royal Armies of India.

In each of these armies, the whole of the European officers of the Cavalry and Infanty, and the European officers of the Artillery and Engineers above the rank of Colonel, to be formed into one general gradation list, in which, under ordinary circumstances, all will rise by seniority.

Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank, all regimental and other rank being temporary only, and to continue only so long as officers may be serving with regiments, or be otherwise employed in a military capacity.

In case of officers being promoted for good service, &c. by the Queen, they are to take their places in the general gradation list, according to the dates of their promotions, and are to enjoy every advantage, exactly as if they had risen to such places by seniority only. This general gradation list to be styled the "Unemployed List." All the officers borne on it, who may hold no special appointments, will reside in India, at such places as Government may direct, but will have no public functions to perform.

A fourth Presidency, to be styled the North-West Presidency, and a fourth army to be formed; our present Bombay and Bengal armies together being divided into three equal parts for this purpose.

Ultimately, the whole establishment of European officers may probably be somewhat less than at present; but, under the proposed arrangements, the number of officers in the whole general list of each army can readily be adjusted in practice to meet the demands of the public service; when these shall have been correctly ascertained, no further changes will probably be requisite.

For an army of the strength of the present army of Bombay, the following establishment might be proper:—

Battalions or Regiments.	Colonels.	Lieut. Cols.	Captains.	Lieutenants.
5 Artillery	5	10	50	50
4 Engineers.....	4	8	40	40
3 Cavalry.....	3	6	30	30
33 Infantry	33	66	330	330
45	45	90	450	450

Generals	5	The ranks of Major and Ensign to be abolished.
Lieut. Generals	10	
Major Generals	15	

The several ranks of officers while unemployed in India, to receive pay as follows:—

General	1,500	Rs. per mensem.
Lieutenant General	1,200	„
Major General	1,000	„
Colonel	600	„
Lieutenant Colonel	400	„
Captain	300	„
Lieutenant.....	200	„

These rates of pay to be allowed to officers wherever residing, by permission, in India, and the like number of pounds per annum to be allowed to each when absent from India on leave to Europe or elsewhere.

The option of retiring on full-pay of the rank attained to in the general list to be allowed after 30 years, and on half-pay after 20 years.

Leave of absence to be granted at the discretion of the local governments.

Subscriptions to military and all other funds to cease to be compulsory.

A distinct and separate civil service to be prospectively abolished.

Officers while unemployed or employed in civil capacities are not to be in any way subject to the

authority of the Commander in Chief of the army, or to military rule or etiquette.

All candidates appointed to the Indian service to be educated at a military college in England, and to reside at such college for at least two years, and not more than four years.

The minimum age for admission to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years.

The course at the college to include full instruction in mechanical and in physicel science generally, and in political economy, also riding, rifle practice, and hardy exercises.

The residence at the college to be free of all pecuniary charge to the cadet, unless he decline proceeding to join the service in India in due course, in which case—to cover all cost to the State—he should pay at the rate of 100*l.* per annum for the period during which he has resided at college.

From the general list formed as above mentioned, officers are to be selected for every species of public employment,—civil and military.

For each Native Infantry Regiment, the establishment of English officers may be as follows:—

	Pay.	
1 Colonel	600	Rs. per mensem.
1 Lieutenant Colonel	400	,,
2 Captains (to be each Adjutant and Quartermaster)	300	,,

The pay assigned to each being in every case staff-pay, to be drawn in addition to the pay due to each according to his rank in the general list. But though an officer may hold a lower rank in the general list than that which is assigned to his position in a Regiment or in other military employment, the temporary

rank is always to hold good for precedence and command during the period of employment.

For the Cavalry, the like establishment of officers may be allowed, with one hundred rupees extra pay to each rank, to cover the cost of horses and other expenses.

For a Brigade of any strength:—

	Staff Pay.	
1 Major General	1,000	Rs. per mensem.
1 Captain, Major of Brigade	400	,,

For a Division:—

1 Lieutenant General	3,000	Rs. per mensem.
1 Lieutenant Colonel, Adjutant General	400	,,
1 Lieutenant Colonel, Quartermaster General.....	400	,,
1 Captain, A.D.C.....	300	,,
1 Major General, Adjutant General of the Army	1,500	,,
1 Major General, Quartermaster General	1,500	,,
1 Colonel, Deputy Adjutant General	500	,,
1 Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster General	500	,,

Proper office establishment, &c., to be allowed to commanding and staff officers; company and troop allowances and contracts as usual.

All officers, when absent on leave beyond the division in which they may be serving, are to receive unemployed pay only; and, if other officers act for them, when absent even within the division otherwise than on duty, the officer acting for the absentee is to receive his staff-pay in addition to his own.

Officers of the rank of Captain in the general list are to be considered eligible for selection to fill any of the regimental ranks or other appointments. Lieutenants on the general list are not to be considered eligi-

ble for higher regimental or other military appointments than that of Lieutenant Colonel.

At their own request, and with the approval of the Regimental Commanding Officers, any unemployed officers may be attached to do duty with Regiments or Departments without extra pay.

The recommendation of officers commanding Regiments, with respect to the appointment of officers to fill vacancies in their corps, or to their removal therefrom to the unemployed list in consequence of proved incapacity, &c. are to be attended to. All enlistments, discharges, promotions to and reductions from all ranks of Native officers and soldiers, are to rest with the Colonels of Regiments, and are to be signified by them, with reasons, &c., if necessary, in Regimental Orders.

Articles of War for Native Indian troops to be entirely abolished.

Colonels commanding Native Indian Regiments are to have full magisterial authority over all ranks of Natives of India in their Regiments,—followers as well as soldiers. Such powers to extend to the award and infliction of imprisonment, with hard labour, for a period of seven years, without the confirmation of higher authority being required; to imprisonment for fourteen years, subject to the confirmation of the General Officer commanding the Brigade; to transportation and capital punishment, subject to the confirmation of the General Officer commanding the Division.

Regimental Lieutenant Colonels and Captains are likewise to exercise magisterial powers under the control of the Colonels commanding their Regiments, and to such extent as he may think proper to authorise.

In all cases involving the award of a graver punish-

ment than three months' imprisonment with hard labour, the infliction of corporal punishment above twenty-five lashes, or of a fine above fifty rupees, regular proceedings of the trials are to be recorded in full, to be laid before the General Officer commanding when required.

Cases of less serious nature may be dealt with summarily, on due investigation by the Commanding Officer at public regimental orderly room. A record of all such proceedings is to be entered in a proper book kept for that purpose, and preserved among the Regimental Records for the inspection of General Officers.

Colonels of Regiments are to be held strictly and solely responsible to their superior officers and to the State, but not to the Native Indian soldiers, for the propriety of all such proceedings.

Permanent head quarters to be established for each Native Indian Regiment, and complete carriage for every corps to be always kept up ready for a march, at a day's warning.

For the European Infantry, the establishment of officers per Regiment may be:—

1	Colonel	600 Rs. per mensem.
2	Lieutenant Colonels, each	400 „
10	Captains	300 „
1	Adjutant	300 } To rank above the
1	Quartermaster	300 } Lieutenants.
20	Lieutenants	200 Rs. per mensem.

The officers of Artillery and of Engineers each to be borne in a separate list up to the rank of Colonel, inclusive; and thereafter to be incorporated in the general list of the whole army. The senior Colonel of Artillery or Engineers, when senior in the army,

being promoted to Major General as vacancies may occur.

Unemployed pay to be the same for all arms.

Employed pay, whether Regimental or Ordnance, &c. to be allowed as for the Cavalry.

Each Battalion of Artillery to have field officers and staff as for an European Regiment, the numbers of Captains and Lieutenants being adjusted according to circumstances, to the number absent on leave, and the number required for the Ordnance Department, and other Artillery staff duties. All Artillery officers in India to be considered as "employed" when not on leave.

In the Ordnance Department, the rank and pay of the various grades to be adjusted as follows:—

Senior Commissary.....	as Colonel.
Senior Deputy Commissary	as Lieutenant Colonel.
Commissaries of Divisions.....	as Captains.
Assistant Commissaries	as Lieutenants.
Commandant of Artillery—Major General.....	1,100 Rs. per mensem.
Major of Brigade—Captain	500 „

Inclusive of horse allowance.

No difference of pay between Horse and Foot Artillery.

Engineer officers attached to the Engineer corps, or holding other military appointments, to be on the same footing as Artillery officers; but the duties of Engineer officers in India are generally purely civil, and their salaries, &c. should be adjusted specially for each appointment.

In all appointments other than military, officers will receive their unemployed military pay, in addition to such emolument as may be assigned to them in their civil capacities; and when absent on leave, or on any

account other than public duty, beyond the range of their immediate superior, they will receive only the unemployed rates of pay.

JOHN JACOB.

INFANTRY.

I.—The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

1. What are the Races, Tribes, or Castes of which the Police Infantry of the Sind Police is composed?

All the races and tribes of the country, except the Hindoos of Sind, who never bear arms.

There is also a large proportion of all classes of the men from other countries in the ranks of the Police.

2. What districts are the several Races, Tribes, and Castes drawn from?

All the neighbouring countries and provinces.

3. Have any Races, Tribes, or Castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the Regulations or the practice of the Sind Administration?

No.

4. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of Enlistment, from whom Recruits might, with advantage, be drawn for the Sind Police?

No; individual fitness alone has been considered, no objections are ever made on the score of tribe, caste, &c.

5. What Agency is employed for the enlistment of Recruits in the Districts from whom the Sind Police is drawn?

The candidates offer themselves; no agency is requisite.

6. On enlistment of Recruits, what precautions of Registry and other forms are observed before the local Authorities of Districts?

No special precautions are adopted or found requisite; he usual registry takes place.

7. When Recruits are enlisted in Cantonments, or taken from the families of Sepoys, or the followers of Regiments, what precautions (if any) are taken?

None.

8. What alterations should be made in existing Recruiting Regulations and practice, relative to Races, Tribes, or Castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the Infantry of the Native troops in the ——)?

None.

9. What are the words of the Oath administered to the Recruit on his entering the Ranks of the ——?

None used in the Sind Horse, or in the local corps, that I am aware of.

10. How long has this Form been in use in the——?

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the Oath administered to the——?

All such oaths are futile, and tend to induce the recruits to suppose that it is only an oath which binds him to truth. I hold all such practices in utter contempt, and have never adopted or permitted them in the Sind Irregular Horse; but have rather endeavoured to make the men feel that nothing can be more true than truth—nothing more faithful than fidelity. If a soldier be base enough to rebel against his Officer, he will not be bound by any oath.

12. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes in the —— of Seafaring habits; and could Marine Corps be formed from such Races, Tribes, or Castes?

There are great numbers of fishermen and boatmen in Sind. They are a fine race of men, but as yet they have never enlisted; they are much attached to home.

13. Has the —— any Marine Corps; and, if so, of what Strength, and whence Recruited?

No such corps in Sind.

14. Should each Infantry Corps be raised, each in a prescribed District, and be Recruited there and there only?

15. Or should each Corps be Recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to Districts?

Every Infantry corps should have a permanent fixed Head Quarter which should never be changed, and there all recruiting should be carried on, the recruits being entertained without the least regard to race, tribe, caste, &c. &c., or to any considerations but those of individual character and qualifications.

In time the very best recruits are those born and bred in the Regiments, and all the men's families settle at Regimental Head Quarters, wherever their Native country may be.

Nothing can give greater strength and security than this arrangement.

Under it the corps proceeds on service with full confidence that their families are left in the enjoyment of every comfort and protection, and that they are well cared for, however long the absence of the Regiment, and however distant the service on which it may be employed.

Pensioners should be mustered with their Regiments, and reside at Regimental Head Quarters, and when the Regiment might proceed on service an Officer and a small detachment should always be left at Head Quarters.

16. Should each Corps be homogeneous, as to Race, Tribe, or Caste?

17. If a Corps is not homogeneous will it be desirable that the Companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each Company consisting of men of one Tribe or Caste?

Or should the Tribes and Castes be mixed up in each Company?

18. If Corps are not homogeneous but composite, in what proportion should the Races, Tribes, or Castes be entertained?

19. If separate Corps are to be maintained for Military and Police purposes, should the Recruiting for both be allowed in the same District, or kept

to separate Districts, or should Police Corps be Recruited from a wide area without reference to Districts?

No differences of tribes, caste, &c. should ever be acknowledged; individual fitness should alone be considered.

20. Would you regard Police Corps as Nurseries from which men might be drawn for the Army Corps?

No; the Policemen should never be taught to look on themselves as soldiers; they should not be combative.

21. What Agency should be employed for Recruiting for the Sind Police?

No special agency is required.

22. Would you employ the same kind of Agency for Recruiting for Police Corps, or a distinct Agency?

I would leave all such matters wholly to Commanding Officers.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local Authorities or through their instrumentality in connection with Recruits for the Army of ——?

None.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with Recruits for Police Corps in Sind before the local Authorities of the Districts from whence the Police are drawn?

None required.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist Natives of other Tropical countries equally qualified for Service in India, with the Natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate Regiments, or in Companies, or otherwise?

No.

26. If recourse be had to Recruit in other Tropical Countries, which are the Countries and Races to be preferred?

27. What would be the best Agency to employ for such Recruiting?

28. Should a Company or Companies of Europeans form a component part of Native Regiments?

Certainly not.

29. If so, should such Company or Companies be Enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European Corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European Corps, and subject to periodical relief?

The arrangement is utterly bad in principle, it is, therefore, useless to discuss details.

30. Where should the Barracks of such Companies be placed relatively to the Lines of the Native Troops?

Answered above.

31. Would such Detachments seriously complicate Commissariat arrangements?

Hopelessly so.

32. How should such Companies be Armed, with similar or different Weapons from the Native Troops with whom they would be associated ?

33. How should the Native Infantry of the—— be Armed ?

All Infantry soldiers should be armed with short double-barrel rifles.

34. How should Police Corps in Sind be Armed ?

According to the work required of the men in each particular locality. The Rural Police with common muskets; the Town Police with staves.

35. Do the advantages of making the Dress of the Native Soldier a close imitation of that of the European Soldier counterbalance the disadvantages ?

There are no advantages whatever. The disadvantages are very great. This question is answered in detail above.

36. How should the Native Infantry of the Sind Police be Dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the Native Soldier ?

Answered above.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local Regiment, a Native Irregular Regiment, Officered from that European Regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon the proposed combination of an European and an Auxiliary Native Regular or Irregular Corps of Infantry in close and permanent association ?

Answered above.

38. Do you consider that the association of European Artillerymen with Gun Lascars and Native Drivers, present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

Answered above.

39. How would you dispose of the Barracks and Lines of the two associated Corps?

Answered above.

40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European Troops which is an element of Strength?

Answered above.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the Service in Peace and War?

Answered above.

42. Is it desirable that the Native Troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act independence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of Auxiliary Native Battalions, in permanent association with European Corps?

Answered above.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

Pol. Supdt.'s Office, Jacobabad, 27th June 1858.

II.—Military Code and Rules of Discipline.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War in use in the Native Army of the Bombay Presidency?

I would abolish them in toto. These Articles of War are simply mischievous.

2. Should the special Rules, regulating punishments in the Native Army, be retained, or should they be assimilated to the Rules which obtain in the British Army?

They are entirely opposed to every oriental idea of Government.

3. Does the system of Native Courts Martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay Army?

The system appears to me to involve the unspeakable absurdity of an assembly of Native Officers judging between the English Commandant and the men under his command.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the Native Troops of the Bombay Army with the Military Code under which they live and are governed?

The Articles of War are read to the Troops every month.

5. What proportion of the Native Troops can read for themselves, in the Vernacular dialect, the Articles of War?

I should think about one-half.

6. Under what Military or Civil Code are Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency?

No code that I am aware of.

7. How is Discipline maintained, and the Authority of Officers, European and Native, upheld in Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency?

I do not know enough of the details of the arrangements in the Police Corps in Bombay to answer these questions.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the Discipline of Police Corps, and the Authority of their European and Native Officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

The corps themselves are very different from each other as to organisation and all else.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

II.—Military Code and Rules of Discipline.

Nos. 1 to 5. No replies required.

6. Under what Military or Civil Code are Police Corps in Sind.

No Code.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of Officers, European and Native, upheld in Police Corps in Sind?

By the common sense of the Captains and Lieutenants of Police.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of Police Corps, and the authority of their European and Native Officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

Yes.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

III. Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. In the Native Regiments of the Bombay Army what is the system of Promotion, is it based on Merit alone; on Seniority alone; or on Merit and Seniority combined?

Merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the Native Officers of the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

I think that they are far more so than could have been justly expected under the organisation of our Native Regiments.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

Undoubtedly they generally are so.

4. Is there any Test or Examination prior to promotions to a Commissioned grade, or in promotion from one Commissioned grade to another?

No special examination is used I believe, but the man's whole service is an examination.

5. Does the intervention of the Native Officers, between the European Officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European Officers?
Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the Native Commissioned Officer?

Nothing can possibly weaken the influence of English Officers but their own want of moral power, or their being prohibited from exerting it.

The present organisation of our Native Regiments is utterly destructive of that moral power, and very greatly injurious also to the developement of the powers of the Native Officers.

6. Has it been found in the Bombay Army that, on the occurrence of Mutinies, the Native Officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European Officers to check Mutiny?
Have the Native Officers sided with the European Officers?

I am not in a position to answer as regards the Bombay Army generally. Among my own soldiers of the Sind Irregular Horse the feeling and conduct of the Native Officers has been exactly similar to the feelings and conduct of the European Officers; and the men have behaved just as the best English soldiers might have done.

7. Should the grades of Native Commissioned Officers be continued or discontinued in the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army?
8. Is the substitution of an European Serjeant and Corporal to each Company of a Native Regiment in lieu of its Native Officers advisable?

The Native Officers, under a proper organisation, would be the very nerves of the whole body of which the sepoys formed the bones and muscles, and the European gentlemen the brains. A Native soldier should never be associated in the same corps with Europeans, other than gentlemen, he should only observe the European Officers holding high and important posts and being worthy of such positions.

9. If the abolition of the grade of Native Commissioned Officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the Native soldier, would a graduated scale of Good Service Pay and Retiring Pensions, claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the Commissioned grades?

My ideas on these subjects have been, for long past, in print before the world, and it seems to me that

I cannot better answer these questions than by giving the following extracts from my published works:—

"*Extracts from Tracts on the Native Army of India, by Brigadier General John Jacob, C.B.*"—SMITH, ELDER, and Co., *London*, 1857.

"There is one erroneous opinion, with regard to our Native Indian troops, which would appear unworthy of notice, were it not that it has lately proceeded from those considered to be high authorities on these matters, but who, in truth, were totally ignorant of the feelings and springs of action of our Indian soldiery.

"I allude to the often expressed opinion, that, if we were to make too much of our Native Officers, they would take the command from us. Nothing can possibly be more unfounded,—more contrary to truth, than such an idea. We hold India by being, in reality, as in reputation, a superior race to the Asiatic. If this natural superiority did not exist, we should not, and could not, retain the country for one week.

"Whatever tends to make European gentlemen 'cheap,' to lessen their evident value, to hold up their vices rather than their virtues, to the view of the Native, to show them to the Indians only in inferior positions, where their powers are not called forth, and where they have little influence for good, must tend to destroy, in no slight degree, the hold which we have on the people.

"Whatever raises the European character in the eyes of the Natives of India, and in reality must greatly add to our security and power.

"The Native Officers feel the greatest devotion and gratitude towards their European Commanders who

most succeed in raising their character and position. The more the European is able to improve them the greater does he appear in their estimation. They cannot govern themselves; they are too proud to submit to an equal, but they will all with the greatest delight and pride submit to the English gentleman, whom they all acknowledge and feel to be their superior.

"If we really are a morally superior race, governed by higher motives and possessing higher attributes than the Asiatics, the more the Natives of India are able to understand us, the more they will know and feel this, and the firmer will be our power.

"The seniority system, so far from being just, is the greatest possible injustice to the really deserving men, while it holds out the greatest possible encouragement to the lazy, the idle, and the good-for-nothing. Throw everything open to fair competition, and let the best man win. This is the style of justice which sepoys and all other men really like best in their hearts. Let there be no favouritism, but let the European Officers honestly and continually endeavour to choose the best men for promotion, and the best possible feeling will assuredly be created and maintained between them and their Native soldiers.

"The real error is in employing such numbers of costly Europeans in command of Native companies, whose duties would be just as well or better performed by Native Officers properly chosen, and formed in a good school.

"The great number of European Officers now allowed prevents the Native Officer, whatever his merit, from attaining a responsible or very respectable position in the Army, thereby keeping out of its ranks Natives of

birth, wealth, and family, and preventing in the Native soldier the full development of that love for and pride in the service, which are essential to great efficiency.

"There are already too many European Officers with reference to regimental duties only. A certain number of European Officers is necessary, but very few suffice. Three to a regiment actually present is, perhaps, the best number. The duties of subaltern officers, and even of Captains of troops and companies, are most efficiently performed by Native Officers.

"If there were but one European Officer in a regiment, he would, if possessed of proper qualifications, and if entrusted with proper power and authority, soon form around him such a body of Native Officers as would make the corps far more effective under the one Englishman, than it could be under any number of Europeans who held the opinions with regard to Native troops which now, to a great extent, prevail.

"The want of power entrusted to regimental Commanders is one erroneous evil now existing in our Native Army. It is, perhaps, a necessary consequence of another very great error.

"The seniority rise among the Officers of a Native regiment, originally appointed at hazard, renders it impossible at present to ensure their being at the head of each Native regiment a man capable of wielding the powers necessary to govern it efficiently and well.

"It is quite possible to select for a large army, when the matter is rightly understood. It is the quantity of power given out by the European brains, not the number of European bodies employed, which controls the Native soldiers.

"The posting of Officers to Native regiments, without

regard to qualification, is a proceeding attended with ruinous consequences.

"The presence of unselected Europeans, in such numbers, as are at present borne on the strength of Native corps of the line, is not less ruinous.

"Qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of Native Indian soldiers. One active, energetic, right-feeling, and right-thinking English gentleman can, even when alone, infuse an excellent spirit into thousands of these Eastern soldiers, till they will follow him anywhere, obey him in all things, and feel the greatest pride in acting in his absence, as they know he would wish them to do if present.

"The feelings thus engendered are most powerful and most honorable.

"The Native Officers and men feel the deepest gratitude towards him who has raised their moral, intellectual, and worldly position, and are actuated by the strongest wish and energetic zeal, to show that they are worthy of the respectable position in which they find themselves.

"With thirty European, on the contrary, instead of one, the Native Officer finds himself of no importance, and the sepoy becomes a lifeless automaton.

"The Englishman becomes too common to be held in proper and wholesome respect. He is seen holding no important position but in the performance of trifling duties, which any Native Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer would do equally well.

"He is often seen idling away his time in frivolous, or wasting his energies in vicious pursuits.

"The prestige of the superior race is thus destroyed, while it too often happens that the European Officer,

having nothing important to occupy him, loses somewhat of his own self-respect.

"The young boy is placed in command of the old Subadar, from whom, when anything is to be done, he has to crave instruction; and the men see that, so far from taking a pride in them and in the service, their European Officers are generally longing to be removed from them, craving intensely for staff appointments, &c.

"The example of the idle, the evil minded, and the indifferent does more harm than the good can remedy. To be in a healthy state, the Native soldier should never see his European Officer living an idle, useless life, or holding a degraded or unimportant position.

"While the European Officer should be proud of his men, and, as Sir J. Malcolm most justly observed (Government of India, Appendix E., paragraph 25), it should be arranged that the command of Native corps should be the most sought after of all existing appointments."

10. Have Retiring Pensions proved effectual in attaching the Native Troops to the British Service?

The beneficial effect of retiring pensions has been greatly injured by the troublesome forms which have to be gone through regarding them, but they certainly have been of very considerable effect notwithstanding.

11. Should not the system of Promotion, generally, by Seniority to the grades of Native Commissioned Officers (if these are retained), be altered, and Promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Yes; this question is answered above in the extracts given from published works.

12. Should the system of Pensions, as now in force by Regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Each Regiment should have a fixed Head Quarter, and there all its Pensioners should reside; they should, in fact, remain attached to the Regiment, and under the Regimental Commander only.

13. What is the Charge to the State of Military Pensions to Native Officers and Men of the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army?

I cannot say.

14. Are Native Commissioned Officers generally fit to take part in Courts Martial?

In the Bombay Army they are so, generally, I believe.

15. Are Native Commissioned Officers on a par with European Serjeants and Corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

The Native Officers of the Sind Irregular Horse are quite equal to any European subaltern in the performance of their ordinary duties, and very far superior to the usual average of English private soldiers. The qualifications of the Native Officers of the Bombay Army generally, must, of course, be proportionate to the care bestowed on their selection, and the importance of the duties entrusted to them.

16, 17, and 18.

All these questions are answered above.

19. In Police Corps, is there on first admission

any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? or are qualifications tested on promotion to Non-Commissioned grades? or on promotion to Commissioned grades?

I cannot say.

20. Has the distinct Organisation, and the difference of System, Regulations, and component Races in the three Native Armies, proved favourable to our power in India?

It certainly has to this extent, that had "assimilation with the practice in Bengal," which has been forced on the other two Armies with such injurious effect for the last quarter of a century, been carried a very little further, the Indian Empire must have been totally lost to England.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of System, Organisation, and Composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or, should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three Armies?

The organisation should be the same in *principle* in all. The details should vary to suit the wants of each locality, of which the local Government should solely judge, there should be no attempt to amalgamate, and none to assimilate to anything but the dictates of wisdom and common sense.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

IV.—European Officers.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of Commanding Officers of Native Corps been increased or diminished in the Bombay Army? and state the orders, or measures, or changes, in the practice of the Service to which you attribute such effect?
2. During the above period, have the powers of Officers of European or Native Corps been increased or diminished?
3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of Commanding Officers of Corps upon the discipline of Corps in the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army?
4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of Captains or Officers in charge of companies?

1 to 4. At the end of the last century, a new organisation was introduced into the Native Indian Army, which was then, in fact, completely remodelled.

Up to this time, each Battalion of sepoys had been commanded by a Captain selected from an European corps of the Indian Army. Thenceforth, the number of European Officers was increased nearly to the present complement, and then the rule of regulation commenced to supersede that of individual character.

The change then commenced has continued to increase until Regulation wholly superseded common sense, and reason, and centralization destroyed every vestige of personal influence and individual

power. It would be useless to allude to particular orders; since the date above mentioned the system of centralisation and blind regulation has, gradually, but unceasingly, been growing to the perfection in which it was lately seen before the largest of our three Indian Armies fell to pieces.

All vital power, all good feeling, all personal attachment, all binding force of reason and moral sense, had been eradicated from our Native Army.

The outward appearance, the showy form, the mechanical discipline were greatly improved, but the ties which formerly bound the sepoy to his English Officer, completely destroyed—a tradition of them hardly remained, and, on the least shake given from without, the whole fabric fell to pieces.

Our system had at last destroyed the commanding, the administrative, the organizing powers of our English Officers on the one hand, while it tended to make the Native Indian soldiers less obedient, less inclined to submit to our rule, on the other.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a Corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a Native Corps? Upon the distant authority of Head Quarters? or upon the authority and influence of Officers in Command of Companies and of the Commanding Officer of the Regiment?

The real, effective, and only useful discipline of a Native Indian corps, whether on service or otherwise, depends solely on the moral power and influence which the English Commander brings to bear on the sepoy.

6. Should the power of Commanding Officers and

of Officers in charge of Companies be increased or diminished?

The power of the English Commanding Officer should be very greatly increased. The Officers Commanding companies should be Natives of India.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

Few European Officers to be appointed to Native Regiments, and those carefully selected for such appointments; full power to Commanding Officers, abolition of Regulation and centralization.

8. Is the influence of the European Officers among Native Troops greatest in time of Peace, or in time of War.

The influence of the higher class of English mind, when fairly and freely brought to bear on the Oriental, is at all times absolute; but the effect of such influence will, of course, be most apparent when there is most to be done, and most to be dared and endured.

9. What conclusion do you draw as to the course to be pursued with Native troops in times of Peace, with regard to the strength at which Regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

I think that eight hundred (800) is about the best strength for a Regiment in time of Peace. In War, I would add two or more companies, which should remain at Regimental Head Quarters, and from these casualties should be supplied, as often as circumstances

might allow—all recruits being entertained at the permanent Regimental Head Quarters.

No occupation is ever wanting in a well trained and well instructed Regiment; continual exercise is requisite to perfect order.

10. Has the strength of the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army ever been so great in times of Peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere Military duties?

I do not think so to any great extent, but I have several times known Regiments to be so employed with advantage. Both the 21st and the 18th Regiments Bombay N. I., to my personal knowledge, built their own lines and houses for their Officers in Sind—mixing the mud, moulding the bricks, and doing every species of work themselves.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the Troops upon Public Works?

Not without great increase of numbers—they have generally been fully employed on their ordinary military duties.

12. In apportioning European Officers to Native Troops—

1*st.*—Should Native Corps have a full complement of European Officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of Native Commissioned Officers; or,

2*nd.*—A full complement of European Officers and no Native Commissioned Officers; or,

3*rd.*—A smaller number of European Officers than at present, and a full complement of Native Officers?

Four European Officers are ample for each Native Regiment. The Commanders of companies and their subaltern being Native Officers.

13. If a full complement of European Officers, would you attach Cadets at once to Native Corps, or first to European Corps?

Yes.

14. If a smaller number of English Officers be assigned to Native Corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

Officers for Native corps should be appointed by careful selection from the general roll of the Army.

15. Is the efficiency of Regiments affected by the number of Officers taken from Corps for Staff employment?

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of Mutinies, between the conduct of Regiments with few, and those with many European Officers present?

17. How can the demand for European Officers for Staff and Detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of Regiments?

Questions Nos. 15, 16, and 17 are best answered, I think, by an extract from a published work of mine given below.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the Officers of the Army as Regimental Officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of Staff employment affords to young men to qualify

themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State ?

It would, I think, be fatal to whatever may remain of efficiency under the present organisation, but the rule should be to select for Native Regiments, not from them.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the Officers of the Army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency ?

Answered above.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

Extract from a published Work alluded to above.

Remarks.

The cause of the late failure of the Native Army is inherent in our modern Indian Military system. We have, more especially since the great Madras Mutiny in 1809, which was organised by the English Officers with their Commander in Chief at their head, sedulously persisted in separating the sepoy from his European regimental superiors. We have endeavoured to place him directly " en rapport" with Government and the Commander in Chief, who are generally as myths to the Native Indian soldier, and have made him despise his own European Officers, and cease to regard them as superiors.

This state of things acts and re-acts on both parties; and, perhaps, the most fatal effect of long persistence in the system we have pursued, is the actual degradation of the European mind, which follows on the stagnation which it produces.

Without due exercise, the strongest natural powers fade and disappear. Slavery unfits men for freedom, and the power of commanding comes with the exercise of command.

The Natives of India are quite incapable of self-government. They do not, in the least, understand what it means. They cannot conceive that a subject can have any rights whatever not dependent on the favour of the Sovereign. They expect their Sovereign to govern them absolutely, and according to his own superior knowledge and ability, not according to their instructions.

We have never appeared to them to have acted as Sovereigns in India; we have, on the contrary, shown what must appear to the Asiatic to be marks of fear, and of distrust of our own rights, throughout our whole administration. We hold India as foreign superiors only; but we have been perpetually proclaiming to the Natives of India that they are our equals, that we only rule as their representatives, and by their sufferance, that they are not bound to obey us, and that we have no right to command.

Our "regulations," civil and military, are all to the same effect.

The English soldier, as a free citizen, is on an equality with his Officer. He has rights as such which he well understands, and which he is able to make use of; and a portion of such rights he voluntarily surrenders

on entering the Army. Our Mutiny Act defines what portion of such rights he thus surrenders; and he retains all others.

The pre-existing quality is the very essence of the Articles of War.

But this equality is precisely what does not exist with respect to the Indian soldier. He does not even pretend to such equality; he understands nothing about it. In his ordinary condition, before enlisting as a soldier, he must either be a despot himself or be subject to despotic rule. It is indeed only because the European Officer is a superior being, by nature, to the Asiatic, that we hold India at all.

The Native of India enters our service without an idea beyond that of implicit obedience to his Officers being his duty. He cannot even imagine any other state of things, if the Officers are to have authority over him at all.

But the effect of our regulations is such, that, after entering the service, he soon perceives that his Officers are quite powerless, and, their demeanour, formed in the regulation school, shows that they do not expect him to be unhesitatingly obedient.

Nothing can be weaker than this. Such a state of things must tend to develop the worst qualities of both parties—Native and European.

The Army is, therefore, not bound together by any strong internal force, and the least pressure from without causes it to fall to pieces.

Under the arrangement indicated above it will, ere long, be discovered, what each Officer, on the general list, may be fit for; and he may then be employed accordingly to the greatest advantage.

If, on fair trial, he appears to be totally useless, let him be removed, and let him retire on full or half-pay, according to his period of service; but, in the variety of work required to be performed in India, this will rarely be requisite.

It is essential to the successful working of the organisation here proposed, that the Officers on the unemployed list should be fairly and even liberally paid. The presence alone of a number of English gentlemen in India is attended with much advantage to the British government; and these should have the means of living respectably, and of pursuing those studies and occupations which may qualify them for public employment in this country.

Under a system by which every man must feel that his standing and advancement in the service, and in society, depended wholly on his own industry, acquirements, and cultivated natural talents, the greatest possible amount of mental power and moral growth must be developed, and while the numbers of Europeans in the public service in India might even ultimately be much reduced, their commanding power would be very greatly, almost infinitely, increased.

Where cases of abuse of power occur—as occur they must and will—let them be dealt with individually; avoid, as much as possible, making general regulations, which destroy all healthy freedom of action and mental development.

We should avoid striving too much after outward uniformity. The same just principles, applied equally well and with equally successful results by different men, may cause different arrangements with respect to unimportant details.

No two leaves on a tree may be exactly alike, but the same vital process has produced all from the same materials. To force all the leaves, or all men's minds, into one mould, must be equally fatal to vegetable life and to mental power.

Let the system be such as to tend to cultivate and to develope such power. Let men apply their powers in the manner they find best adapted to produce the desired effect, and let them be strictly responsible for the results.

If Officers will not exert themselves, or if they have done their best in vain, and the results are unsatisfactory, such Officers are in their wrong places, and should at once be removed to the unemployed list, until work more fitted for their powers be ready for them.

The obvious objection to the organisation proposed, is the difficulty of finding properly qualified Officers for the higher positions. But it is certain that time will speedily remedy this; the school will form such Officers, and nothing else will do so.

We must expect to meet with some difficulties at first in remedying such long continued and deep sealed errors; but, if our principles of action be sound, their tendency in practice will be gradually to bring about the best possible state of affairs.

However the details may be arranged and carried out, it appears to be quite certain that until such principles as are here maintained be acknowledged, and be acted on, the British Indian Empire can never be in a sound or satisfactory condition.

I have studied the subject for a long series of years with all the patient research and observation, and with all the power of thought, which I could bring to bear

on it. I have had, in practice, opportunities of applying, on a tolerably extensive scale, the principles which I advocate, such as have fallen to the lot of few men living. These principles have never failed of success in working. They are of universal application, being founded on natural laws; and if carried out fairly in India, they must and would speedily render our Asiatic soldiers quite as trustworthy as their European brethren in arms.

The goodness of the sepoy depends on what his English Officer instils into him. The raw material has no power for good, and very little for evil. The Native Indian soldiers are to us collectively exactly what our limbs are to our individual bodies. They are the bones and muscles of the whole frame, of which the European gentlemen are the brains and nerves; and where the latter are healthy and vigorous, the former will always be perfectly obedient and strong only to do our bidding.

III.—Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards.

Nos. 1 to 16. No replies required.

17. How should the Sind Police Corps be Officered, the question applying both to European and Native Commissioned Grades?

There should be a Superintendent of Police for the whole Province, and an Assistant Superintendent, to aid him in his duties.

A Captain and a Lieutenant of Police in each Collectorate or Division of the Province.

18. If Irregular Corps and Police Corps have Native Commissioned Officers, and Regular Corps have no Native Commissioned Officers, but only Good Service Pay and Pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to Privates and Non-Commissioned Officers suffice to render the Regular as popular as the Irregular and Police Corps, and to draw as good Recruits?

Native Officers appear to me to be absolutely essential to the efficiency of all.

19. In Sind Police Corps, is there, on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? or, are qualifications tested on promotion to Non-Commissioned Grades? or on promotion to Commissioned Grades?

No, I believe not.

20 and 21. No replies required.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

No. 362 of 1858.

From Brigadier General J. Jacob, C.B.,

Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier,

To Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.,

On Special duty with the Governor General, Allahabad.

Dated Jacobabad, 27th June 1858.

Sir,

I have the honour to return my replies to the questions received with your letter No. 60, of the 16th June, to my address.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

Pol. Supdt.'s Office, Jacobabad, 27th June 1858.

Allahabad, 29th May 1858.

My dear Sir,

Though a series of questions having reference to Cavalry will reach you in the course of a short time, I should feel obliged for your opinion on a point which is really of importance at the present moment.

In India we are never likely to have too much Euro-

pean Cavalry allowed on the Establishment, and if the opinions of some distinguished British and Foreign Cavalry Officers be correct, our available means might be made to go further by an innovation which is often advocated.

I allude to the objections urged against the normal formation of Cavalry being in two ranks, instead of a single rank. Very excellent and experienced Officers both of her Majesty's and of the Honorable Company's Cavalry have repeatedly remarked upon the advantages of the single rank formation. I should like to have your opinion, and on what reasons it is based.

Manifestly it would be very advantageous to Government to have ten corps of Dragoons of a strength of 400 sabres each, instead of five or six corps of 800 or 700 sabres, but this depends on the efficiency in conflict of the single rank formation; various other considerations affect the question, though, after all, that War test is the main one.

Yours truly,

(Signed) H. M. DURAND, Lieut. Col.

To Brigadier General J. JACOB, C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

Jacobabad, 9th June 1858.

MY DEAR SIR,

Your letter of 29th May reached me this morning.

I have a strong and deliberately formed opinion that very little European Cavalry is required in India, and

that, even man for man, a properly organised Native Cavalry is preferable, and *more powerful*, for the work to be performed in this country.

I should not have recommended having more than one Regiment of European Cavalry at each Presidency, and besides these whatever numbers of European soldiers might be employed in India, all would, I am convinced, be best employed in the Infantry and Artillery.

The solidity and imperturbable steadiness of good English soldiers is assuredly best applied in those two arms, while the qualities of the Asiatic soldiers are most valuable in the horsemen.

The Turkish Cavalry, until spoiled by the adoption of European equipments, &c. &c. were accustomed to ride over the Russian Infantry like sheep, whenever unprotected by "chevaux de frize," and it seems to me certain that, properly organised and properly commanded, Indian Cavalry would be the best in the world, while the cost of such Cavalry would be about one-half of the European Cavalry in India, man for man.

But be this as it may, it does not appear to me that the formation of our Cavalry in one or two ranks has any bearing on the question of the numbers of Europeans to be employed.

I have often used the single rank formation on particular occasions, or as exercise; and I think it sometimes very convenient, and often more powerful, in attack than the two rank close formation, when the numbers are small.

The most essential thing to success in Cavalry attacks is the having good and ready supports and reserves, and separating the ranks from each other

gives more supports and reserves. This is the whole matter. The single rank formation may be—I certainly am of opinion it is—more convenient, and often more powerful; but it is so because the second rank, removed to a certain distance in rear, forms a better support for the front rank.

But all such matters are best left for Commanding Officers to decide on as they find convenient; and those formations no more affect the question of the numbers of soldiers to be employed than would the general use of fours, lately introduced into the Infantry Service, instead of threes.

It signifies also little, in a tactical point of view, what the strength of your Cavalry Regiments or Corps may be, for the integer, when under arms, is the Squadron, as the Battalion is that of the Infantry.

In my opinion the best and most convenient strength for a Squadron of Cavalry, whether Native or European, is 200 men of all ranks below the Commissioned Officers.

This will give generally, under favorable circumstances, about 80 men of all ranks per troop under arms; and a Squadron of 80 files is as good an one as may be.

Four such Squadrons form a convenient Regimental command, and I would, therefore, have our Cavalry Regiments, whether Native or European, each 800 strong.

I yesterday replied to the first list of questions received from you, and I will now add no more but one remark, which seems to me to be of the most profound and vital importance, it is that India requires English minds, and not English bodies, to control her quietly, powerfully, and well; and that to attempt to

rule otherwise will ensure the speedy destruction of the Empire.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) J. JACOB.

To Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 154 OF 1858.

From Lieut. Col. H. M. DURAND, C.B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General,
Allahabad,

To Brigadier General J. JACOB, C.B.,
Commandant in Chief Sind Irregular Horse, and Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

Dated Allahabad, 8th July 1858.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 362, of the 27th June, with enclosures, and have to request the favour, if you can spare them, of your sending me a few copies of the printed letter (private to Sir C. Trevelyan, dated 24th March 1858), and of the Scheme for the Reorganisation of the Indian Army. Two or three copies would suffice.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) H. M. DURAND, Lieut. Col.,
On Special duty with the Governor General.

No. 438 of 1858.

From Brigadier General J. Jacob, C.B.,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier,

To Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward a few printed copies of the papers referred to in your letter, No. 154, of the 8th July 1858, to my address.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

Pol. Supdt.'s Office, Jacobabad, 17th July 1858.

BOMBAY LIGHT CAVALRY.

I. The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

1. What are the Races, Tribes, or Castes of which the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army is composed?

Chiefly of good caste Hindoos from Upper India, with about ten per cent. of Mahrattas, and the like number of Mussulmen.

2. What Districts are the several Races, Tribes, or Castes drawn from?

Chiefly from Hindoostan Proper; the Mahrattas and some of the Mussulmen from the southern districts of the Bombay Presidency.

3. Have any Races, Tribes, or Castes been excluded from the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army either by the Regulations or the practice of the—— ?

Yes; no very low caste men are ever enlisted.

4. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom Recruits might, with advantage, be enlisted for the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army, if that branch of the Service be continued?

The attending to acknowledging at all, in any way, any distinctions of races, tribe, caste, &c. as giving any rights or implying any merits, appears to me to be a very great error. Men should be enlisted with reference to individual qualifications only, any race, tribe, or caste, the individuals of which possessed high personal qualifications would necessarily predominate over the others, but not by reason of race, tribe, or caste, but simply on account of their personal and individual qualifications. This cannot, I think, be too much insisted on, or too frequently kept in view.

5. What Agency is employed for the enlistment of Recruits for the Native Regular or Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

Regimental arrangements only.

6. On enlistment of Recruits for the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army, what precautions of Registry and other forms are observed before the local Authorities of Districts?

None that I am aware of.

7. When Recruits are enlisted in Cantonments, or taken from the families of Troopers, or the followers of Cavalry Corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

Answered above.

8. What alterations should be made in your Recruiting Regulations and practices, relatively to Races, Tribes, or Castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

All such matters should be left wholly to Regimental Commanders to arrange as they find best. Races, tribes, and castes should not be attended to at all.

9. What are the words of the Oath administered to the Recruit on his entering the ranks of the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

I have not a copy of the oath; it is well known?

10. How long has this form been in use in the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

Since its first formation.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the Oath administered to

the Recruit of the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army when first enrolled?

The practice of administering any such oaths is, it appears to me, very gravely erroneous; it implies that this oath above is what binds the soldier to his duty. Such swearing always tends to induce untruth, inasmuch as it creates the impression, that when not bound by an oath, the soldier may be unfaithful.

12. Should the Light Cavalry Corps of the Bombay Army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

13. Or should the Light Cavalry Corps of the Bombay Army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

All such matters should be left wholly to Regimental Commanders.

14. Should the Corps of Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army be homogeneous as to Race or Caste?

15. Should the Corps of Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army be composed of Troops or Squadrons, each of which shall consist of separate Tribes or Castes, or should the Tribes or Castes be mixed up together in the whole Corps?

All considerations of tribes, races, castes, &c. should be omitted, and such circumstances should never be acknowledged as implying any degree of merit or demerit. Men should be enlisted on consideration of personal qualifications only, and entirely at the discretion of Regimental Commanders, who should be left to make their own arrangement for obtaining good recruits whencesoever they pleased.

16. If the Corps of Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army are not homogeneous but composite, in what proportion should Races, Tribes, or Castes enter?

17. What Agency should be employed for Recruiting?

These arrangements should be left wholly to the Regimental Commanders. If each Regiment had fixed permanent head quarters, an abundant supply of recruits to fill vacancies would always be ready at hand, and no agency whatever would be required.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local Authorities or through their instrumentality, in connection with Recruits of the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

None.

19. Should a Troop or Squadron of Europeans form a component part of the Light Corps of Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

No; the less the Native Indian soldiers have to do with any Europeans, except gentlemen, the better.

20. If so, should such Troops or Squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European Cavalry Corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European Cavalry Corps, and subject to periodical relief?

The proposal, if acted on, would, however carried out, ruin the Indian Army. The chief, the peculiar advantage of our Native troops is their readiness, their independence of all those heavy Commissariat arrange-

ments, barrack accommodations, &c. which are necessary for European troops in India. Under the proposed arrangement all would be rendered helpless; the solid strength of the European Regiment and the activity of the Native corps would both be wanting, while the higher classes of Natives, whose presence is invaluable in our ranks, would be wholly excluded from the service.

21. How should the Barracks and Stables of such isolated European Troops or Squadrons be placed?

22. Would such Detachments of Europeans seriously complicate Commissariat arrangements?

23. How should such Troops or Squadrons of Europeans be Armed? with similar or with different Weapons from those in the hands of Native Troopers with whom they would be associated?

24. How should the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army be Armed?

With cutting swords, and short double-barrel carbines.

25. Has any advantage been derived from the Dress and Equipments of the Troopers of the Regular Native Cavalry of the Bombay Army being assimilated to those of the European Dragoons?

I think not.

26. How should the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army be Dressed and Equipped with a view to the efficiency and comfort of the Native Trooper?

The dress should be a loose double-breasted tunic, of thick broad cloth, with plenty of pockets in it. Cloth over-alls. The head-dress should be a helmet

or Kilmarnock cap, or the Native Indian puggree for summer wear; the tunic should be of grey or drab-coloured cotton cloth, with over-alls of the same. Accoutrements of black unvarnished leather.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

I have a strong opinion that there should be no Articles of War. Such a system of laws appears to me to be founded on principles radically false and mischievous. The practical effect of Articles of War on the mind of the Native Indian soldier is to show him that we expect him to disobey,—that his normal state is disobedience. The only law to the Native Indian soldier should be the orders of his English Commanding Officer.

2. Should the special Rules, regulating Punishment in the Native Army, be retained, or should they be assimilated to the Rules which obtain in the British Army?

I think that there should be no such rules at all. Commanding Officers should have Magisterial powers over their men, but it is clear to me, that any Commanding Officer who would retain in his corps a Native Indian soldier after subjecting him to corporal punish-

ment must be quite unfit to command Native Indian soldiers. Corporal punishment should always be followed by disgraceful dismissal, and should only be resorted to in cases of disgraceful crimes—plundering, theft, violence to country folk, and such like.

3. Does the System of Native Courts Martial work satisfactorily in the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

The present system of Native Courts Martial appears to me to be very deeply erroneous in principle. Such Courts imply that the Native Officers are entrusted with higher powers than their European Commander. The authority of the European Commander should be paramount over the Native soldiers of his Regiment, and his orders should be the only laws recognised. Under such a rule the Native Courts Martial might often be very useful.

4. What measures are adopted to acquaint the Troopers of the Bombay Light Cavalry with the Military Code under which they serve and are governed?

The Articles of War are read out, in the Vernacular, to the Regiment once a month.

5. What proportion of the Troopers of the Bombay Light Cavalry can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own Vernacular?

I cannot say.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

III.—Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. In the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army what is the System of Promotion; is it based on Merit alone, on Seniority alone, or on Merit and Seniority combined?

Merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the Native Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

They are generally as intelligent, useful, and efficient as could be expected under the present construction of the Service, which is such, that the so-called Native Officers are not really Officers at all.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the Troopers from among whom they have risen?

Generally so.

4. Is there any Test or Examination prior to Promotion to a Commissioned grade, or on Promotion from one Commissioned grade to another?

No special examination is adopted that I am aware of, and I have a strong opinion that all such examinations are fallacious.

5. Does the intervention of the Native Commissioned Officer between the European Officer and his Men weaken or strengthen the Position and influence of the European Officer?

This must depend wholly on the personal characters, &c. of the individuals.

Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the Native Commissioned Officers?

The full complement of European Officers proper for a Native Indian Regiment is, in my opinion, four. The fact of the Commanding Officers and Subalterns of Troops and Companies being Europeans is absolutely inconsistent with efficiency in our Native Indian Army. There can be no Native Officers in reality where the youngest Cornet or Ensign commands every Native of every rank.

6. Has it been found on occasions of Mutiny, that the Native Officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European Officers to check or quell Mutiny? Have the Native Officers sided with the Mutineers or with the European Officers?

In the Bombay Army the Native Officers have been generally most faithful and actively useful.

7. Should the grades of Native Commissioned Officers be continued or discontinued in the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

In my opinion the Captain and Subalterns of Troops should be Native Commissioned Officers.

8. Is the substitution of a European Serjeant and Corporal to each Troop of Light or Irregular Corps of Cavalry in lieu of its Native Commissioned Officers advisable?

Most unadvisable—the practice would be found to be most mischievous. Native soldiers should not be commanded by any European but gentlemen.

9. If the abolition of the grades of Native Commissioned Officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the Native Trooper, would a graduated scale of Good Service Pay and Retiring Pensions claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as the Commissioned grades?

It is in my opinion impossible to form a really good trustworthy and efficient Native Indian Army, unless higher rank and position than the service now offers to him be thrown open to the Native soldier. Instead of abolishing the Commissioned ranks of Natives, I would make the Native Officers in effect Captains and Subalterns—give them real command, and impose on them real responsibility.

10. Have Retiring Pensions proved effectual in attaching the Native Trooper to the British service, and the British rule?

The pensions must have had, and have actually had, considerable effect in attaching men to the service. But in this case, as in all others throughout the Indian services, the attempt to prevent the possibility of abuse has crushed all life out of the system; and under a better arrangement the effect of the same amount of public expenditure in pensions would assuredly have been ten-fold greater than it is under existing regulations.

11. Should the system of Pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified? or prospectively abolished?

The pensioners of each Regiment should remain attached to that Regiment. Every man after twenty years' service might be allowed a moderate pension, and after thirty years' service a more liberal allowance.

The Commanding Officer, in consultation with his Medical and other Officers, should have powers to transfer men to the Regimental pension list after the prescribed period of service; and such pensioners should be borne on a separate roll as pensioners of such a Regiment. It should be at all times discretional with Regimental Commanding Officers to discharge any man without pension.

The pensioners should be considered as belonging to the Regiment, and no other than the Regimental authorities should have anything to do with them. They should reside and receive their pensions at Regimental Head Quarters only. There is no circumstance regarding the organisation of our Native Indian Army which I am more clearly convinced of than this: of the advantage and even necessity of fixed permanent Regimental Head Quarters, where pensioners and families can all reside in safety and comfort, and where an ample supply of the very best material for our ranks would be continually in readiness to our hands.

I have heard the proposed fixed Head Quarters for Regiments objected to, because some stations must be much more favoured by climate, and present generally far more local advantages than others. But in practice this objection is found absolutely groundless. *Permanent* residents adapt themselves to the peculiarities

of any locality; and the ingenuity men are called upon to exercise in counteracting local disadvantages, and a kind of pride which all men take, more or less, in overcoming difficulties, soon causes them even to prefer their own place of abode, however little it may be favoured by nature, to any other whatever.

The feeling is universal, and the facts are beyond doubt. I have myself for twelve years past seen the head quarters of my own corps established with perfect success in the most unfavourable locality which could possibly be found on earth, and many of our pensioners now prefer continuing to reside at Jacobabad on the Sind Frontier rather than returning to their homes in Hindoostan—although some of these pensioners continuing at Regimental Head Quarters are Brahmins and high-caste Hindoos; while Sind is a thoroughly Mahomedan country. Each Regimental Head Quarters would, in fact, under the system proposed by me, become a Military colony, where the rising generation would be continually educated for service in our ranks. Many of the best recruits in the Sind Irregular Horse have been born and bred as it were in the service.

12. What is the Charge upon the Finances of the Bombay Presidency on account of Military Pensions to the Light Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

I cannot say.

13. Should the System of Promotion generally by Seniority to the grades of Native Commissioned Officers (if these are retained) be altered, and Promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

All promotion should go by merit only, of which the Commanding Officer should be the sole judge. A Commanding Officer should have full power to admit Natives into the service at once as Native Officers, if he thought proper to do so.

14. Are Native Commissioned Officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of Courts Martial?

Generally in the Bombay Army they are so.

15. Are Native Commissioned Officers on a par with European Serjeants and Corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

The qualifications of individuals of these different classes are so extremely various, that it is almost impossible to institute such comparisons with advantage. The Native Officers of the Bombay Army, even under the present organisation, are, I think, perhaps, superior, in mere intelligence, to the generality of European Non-Commissioned Officers, but very inferior to them in force of character and moral power.

16. What is the best organisation for Native Corps of Regular Cavalry?

1. Should they be fully officered with Native Commissioned grades, as well as with European Officers; or
2. Fully officered with European, but have no Native Commissioned grades; or
3. Be officered like Corps of Irregular Cavalry, viz.—with a full complement of Native Commissioned Officers, but with only three or four European Officers?

The Asiatic and European characters are, in fact, in many respects complemental to each other.

Four European Officers to each Regiment. Troop Officers—Natives only. European Officers appointed to Regiments by careful selection, and other details as laid down in the annexed printed scheme.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of Officering the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

A fourth Officer might be added, as Quartermaster, and Commanding Officers should have full powers to discharge, dismiss, enlist, and promote all ranks of Natives.

Commanding Officers should be allowed the selection of their own European subordinates.

18. Among the Classes which enter the Regular and Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army, which is the most popular, the Regular or the Irregular; and what reasons are assigned by the Natives for the preference?

The Irregular service is certainly generally preferred, chiefly for the reason that in it the Native Officers are really and not only nominally Officers.

But the service, Regular and Irregular, cannot be compared in this way, for there is more difference between individual Irregular corps than between many of those belonging to distinct branches of the Service.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

BOMBAY IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

I.—The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

1. What are the Races, Tribes, and Castes of which the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army is composed?
2. What Districts are the several Races, Tribes, or Castes drawn from?

Of nearly every Race, Tribe, and Caste in India and Central Asia I believe. The Regiments of the Sind Irregular Horse are chiefly composed of Hindoostanees —mostly Mussulmans, the agricultural and landholding classes of the districts around Delhi, Furruckabad, &c.

3. Have any Races, Tribes, or Castes been excluded from the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army either by the Regulations or the practice of the ——— ?
4. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom Recruits might, with advantage, be enlisted for the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?
5. What Agency is employed for the Enlistment of Recruits for the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

None that I am aware of.

6. On Enlistment of Recruits for the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army, what precautions of Registry and other Forms are observed before the local Authorities of Districts?
7. When Recruits are enlisted in Cantonments or

taken from the Families of Troopers or the Followers of Cavalry Corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

8. What alterations should be made in your Recruiting Regulations and practice, relatively to Races, Tribes, or Castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

Everything should be left to the discretion of the Regimental Commander.

9. What are the Words of the Oath administered to the Recruit on his entering the Ranks of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

10. How long has this form been in use in the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the Oath administered to the Recruit of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army when first enrolled?

No oath is used that I am aware of. None has ever been used in the Sind Irregular Horse. I have a deep conviction that the use of any such oaths is of most pernicious effect, as explained in answers to former questions respecting other branches of the Service.

12. Should the Irregular Cavalry Corps of the Bombay Army be raised each in a prescribed District, and be recruited there and there only?

13. Or should the Irregular Cavalry Corps of the Bombay Army be recruited over a wide area—in fact, without reference to Districts?

14. Should the Corps of Irregular Cavalry of the

Bombay Army be homogeneous as to Race or Caste?

15. Should the Corps of Irregular Cavalry of the Army be composed of Rissalahs, each of which shall consist of separate Tribes or Castes; or should the Tribes or Castes be mixed up together in the whole Corps?

16. If the Corps of Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army are not homogeneous but composite, in what Proportions should the Races, Tribes, or Castes enter?

All such matters should be left wholly to the discretion of Regimental Commanders. The practice of recognising differences of tribe, caste, &c. as implying merit or demerit, or in any way affecting a man's position as a soldier, is most faulty.

Men should be enlisted as soldiers, and their merits estimated according to their power and willingness to perform their duties as soldiers. Caste, &c. should never be alluded to, or recognised in any way. If any man's peculiarities of caste, &c. be found to interfere with the performance of his duties as a soldier, these peculiarities should be treated exactly as would be bodily defects or infirmities, and the man so defective or infirm should not be enlisted, or his services should be dispensed with as soon as such defects become apparent.

Peculiarities of belief or of practice, which interfere with Military duty, should be considered and treated, not as conferring privileges, but as signs of weakness, just as would be physical disorders.

I have always acted thus with a large body of Native Indian soldiers for some seventeen years past, and with

the happiest effect. In this corps all men's religions are respected, but none are allowed to be obtrusive; and an Officer might serve for many years in the Sind Horse without ever hearing even any mention of caste.

In these proceedings I have always carried the public opinion of all classes of Natives with me, depending on natural law and on those feelings and attributes which are common to all mankind. I have never met with any opposition, but have, on the contrary, met with cordial support from all classes, even when I positively prohibited all public displays, noisy ceremonies, &c. on such occasions as the Mohurrum and Dewallee.

17. What Agency should be employed for Recruiting?

None; all such matters should be left wholly to Regimental Commanders.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local Authorities or through their instrumentality, in connection with Recruits for the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

None.

19. Should a Troop or Squadron of Europeans form a component part of the Irregular Corps of Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

20. If so, should such Troops or Squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European Cavalry Corps, and subject to periodical relief?

21. How should the Barracks and Stables of such isolated European Troops or Squadrons be placed?

22. Would such Detachments of Europeans seriously complicate Commissariat arrangements?

23. How should such Troops or Squadrons of Europeans be Armed—with similar or with different Weapons from those in the hands of Native Troopers with whom they would be associated?

No; these questions appear to me to be equivalent to asking whether each Troop of Horse Artillery should not have a Lancaster Gun of ten tons weight or so attached to it.

24. How should the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army be Armed?

At the discretion of Regimental Commanders. In my own opinion, good English cutting swords and short double-barrel carbines are the best arms for all Native Indian Cavalry.

26. Do the Dress and Equipments of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army admit of improvements? If so, state them.

This question seems to imply that all the corps of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army are alike. But this is not the case. These corps differ from each other in a great variety of particulars, and, in fact, they have only one peculiarity in common, which is of the horses being the property of the men.

The Sind Irregular Horse are certainly as well and effectually dressed as the means allowed will permit, and their equipment has often been officially reported by various General Officers to be perfection.

But the pay of all our Irregular Cavalry is too low, and it would be true economy to increase that of the

Sind Irregular Horse, serving on the Frontier, to forty-five Rupees per man and horse monthly, and that of corps serving in the interior of India to thirty-six Rupees monthly for each private man and horse complete; with corresponding rates of pay for the higher grades. The style of dress and equipment should be left to the discretion of Commanding Officers.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. Can you suggest any improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

No Articles of War have ever been used in the Sind Horse; how far they have been applied to other corps of Irregular Cavalry I cannot precisely say.

2. Should the Special Rules, regulating Punishment in the Native Army, be retained, or should they be assimilated to the Rules which obtain in the British Army?

There should be no special rules at all. Everything should be left to the discretion of a selected Commander.

3. Does the System of Native Courts Martial work satisfactorily in the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

Courts Martial are not resorted to at all in the Sind Irregular Horse. They have been in use in other Irregular Corps; but the system works most unsatisfactorily.

4. What measures are adopted to acquaint the Troopers of the Irregular Cavalry with the Military Code under which they serve and are governed?

The practices in different corps differ very greatly. No code was ever in use in the Sind Irregular Horse since I have commanded the corps, except the Regimental Orders, and no law thought of except the will of the Commandant.

5. What proportion of the Troopers of the Irregular Cavalry can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own Vernacular?

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

III.—Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. In the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army what is the system of Promotion; is it based on Merit alone, on Seniority alone, or on Merit and Seniority combined?

It is not possible to reply to these questions generally, inasmuch as the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army is not of homogeneous construction. Some corps differ from others as much as Her Majesty's

Life Guards do from Cossacks, and I would observe, that this remark applies to the questions respecting Irregular Cavalry generally. In the Sind Horse, promotion by merit alone is the rule, and the Commandant is the sole judge of such merit.

2. Are the Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

The Commissioned Officers of the Sind Irregular Horse are generally very good, and whether in command of Troops and Squadrons with a Regiment in a body, or in command of detachments, on distant outposts, are, in my opinion, quite equal in efficiency, within their own sphere of action, to the average of Captains and Subalterns of the Regular Regiments.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the Troopers from among whom they have risen?

Undoubtedly so; being chosen for merit only, their acquirements and qualifications are necessarily the highest.

4. Is there any Test or Examination prior to Promotion to a Commissioned grade, or on Promotion from one Commissioned grade to another?

In the Sind Irregular Horse no man is promoted from the ranks until he shall have passed an examination in his drill. Before promotion to be Pay Duffadar, the candidate is required to pass a strict examination as to his knowledge of accounts, Persian, writing, &c. &c.

No other special examination is used. But the first selection of a man from the ranks of the private soldier is the most important move of all, for from that time he is necessarily more prominently brought to the notice of his Officers, so that his whole service is one continuous examination. This is the state of things in the Sind Irregular Horse; the practices differ greatly in other Corps.

6. Has it been found on occasions of Mutiny that the Native Officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding the European Officers to check or quell Mutiny? Have the Native Officers sided with the Mutineers or with the European Officers?

Nothing could have been more noble than the conduct of the men and Officers of every grade in the Sind Irregular Horse on the occasion of the late mutiny and attempted rebellion on the Sind Frontier.

Reports on this subject, in full, have been made to Government in the Secret Department. Never were Native Indian soldiers so tried and tempted,—but not a man failed in his duty. There never has been the least symptom of a tendency to any idea of the possibility of mutiny in our own ranks. I speak of the Sind Irregular Horse only; regarding other corps I am not so well informed.

10. Have Retiring Pensions proved effectual in attaching the Native Trooper to the British Service and the British Rule?

11. Should the system of Pensions, as now in force by Regulation, be maintained, or prospectively abolished?

12. What is the Charge upon the Finances of the Bombay Presidency on account of Military Pensions to the Irregular Cavalry?

The answers given in full to similar questions regarding the Light Cavalry, &c. apply with equal force here, and to every part of the Army.

13. Should the system of Promotion generally by Seniority to the grades of Native Commissioned Officers, if at all in operation, be altered, and promotion for Merit and Efficiency be the Rule?

Are Native Commissioned Officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of Courts Martial?

Any system of promotion for any other reason than merit and efficiency is, and must always be, most mischievous.

The Native Officers of the Sind Irregular Horse have not been accustomed to Courts Martial, but I have always found them quite as fit for any duty required of them as European Subalterns generally.

15 and 16. No replies required.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of Officering the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

18. Among the Classes which enter the Regular and Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army, which is the most popular, the Regular or the Irregular, and what reasons are assigned by the Natives for the preference?

The answers given to similar questions respecting other branches of the service apply with equal force to the Irregular Cavalry.

19. If Irregular Corps of Cavalry have Native Commissioned Officers, and Regular Corps of Native Cavalry have no Native Commissioned Officers, but only Good Service Pay and Pension as an incitement to Good Conduct and Efficiency, will the high pay to the Troopers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Regular Cavalry be an equivalent to the absence of Commissioned grades, and draw as good Recruits to the Regular, as the contrary system will draw to the Irregular Corps?

No, assuredly not.

20. Is it advisable to keep up Regular Native Cavalry in the Bombay Army?

Would the substitution of Irregular Cavalry be as efficient and less costly?

Under the term Irregular Cavalry Troops are classed together, as of one description, which in reality differ from each other as much as the Numatian Horsemen did from the Troopers of Gustavus Adolphus. Really Irregular Cavalry, such as our Belooch Horse, or some of the Russian Cossacks, are often most useful, are frequently invaluable in war. But we must have Regular Cavalry also—we could not carry on war without such an arm; and to the question, as it stands, it must be answered, that we must keep up both Regular and Irregular Cavalry.

But the Sind Irregular Horse, though classed with the Irregulars, is, in reality, more regular than any of the Regulars themselves, and I apprehend that the question refers, not to real regularity of the corps, but to peculiarity of organisation. It is the practice

now to call all corps Irregular in which the horses and arms are the property of the men, and all corps Regular in which the horses and arms belong to and are maintained by the State.

But this practice leads to numerous erroneous impressions, and under this classification Cromwell's Ironsides themselves would become Irregular.

Now, it is quite certain, that if the European Officers were properly selected, and left to rule their Regiments as they found best, a perfectly Regular Native Indian Cavalry could be formed on the Silidar system (that is, the system of the men furnishing their own horses and arms), which should be more efficient than any Cavalry now known in the East, whether European or Asiatic, and which should, at the same time, cost the State only two-thirds of the cost of the existing Native Light Cavalry of India.

21. Under the supposition that the Irregular should be the only Native Cavalry in the Bombay Army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of Irregular Cavalry in this respect?

The whole should be on the Silidar principle; and all arrangements and details be left to the Regimental Commander.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the Horses on which the Troopers of the Regular Native Cavalry of the Bombay Army are mounted?

Five hundred Rupees each.

23. Whence are the Horses obtained, and of what breed are they?

All parts of the world.

24. Whence does the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Presidency draw its Horses?

From the districts in which each corps may be serving. The Sind Horse is chiefly supplied from Beloochistan and Herat.

25. What is the average cost of the Horses of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Presidency?

It is impossible to answer this question; it is like asking what is the average cost of horses in the world. The cost of the horses of the Sind Horse averages about two hundred and twenty-five Rupees each.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bombay Army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining Horses?

I believe not.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining Horses for the European Cavalry and Artillery of the Army of the Bombay Presidency?

Yes. The present system absolutely excludes from our ranks a very great number of the very best horses in the world, and introduces many of the worst. The powers of a horse are not to be estimated by measuring his height at the withers.

28. Is it advisable that the Government Studs

should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the Markets of India, and of Foreign Countries, and of British Colonies, for a supply of Horses for the Army of India ?

The breed of saddle horses in England has notoriously degenerated exactly in proportion as it has increased in height (*vide*, among other authorities, a little book, lately published, entitled "On the deterioration of our Saddle Horses").

If we look back to the English turf about a century ago, we see horses standing no higher than our ordinary Arabs at present, running such distances as four and six mile heats, with such weights as twelve stone on their backs, and doing this in such time as is now unapproachable.

In 1722, Flying Childers, with nine stone two lbs., ran over the Beacon Course at Newmarket, four miles, one furlong, and one hundred and thirty-eight yards, in seven minutes and thirty seconds.

In the same year he beat Lord Drogheda's Chaunter, ten stone each, six miles, for a thousand guineas.

When six years old (1721) he beat Almanzor, and others, over the Round Course at Newmarket, three miles, six furlongs, and ninety-three yards, in six minutes and forty seconds, weight nine stone two lbs. In fact, this short, compact, strong constitutioned horse, with ten or even twelve stone on his back, could, with ease, have doubly or trebly distanced in four or five miles the best horses now in England, even giving the latter two or three stone. Flying Childers was got by the Derby Arabian out of Betty Leeds, whose grand-dam was a Barb mare, and whose sire was the Leeds

Arabian: he was thus of nearly pure Arab and Barb blood, and was what would now in England be called a very small horse, having been only 15 hands high.

Again, twenty years later, little Cartouch, also of Arab stock, standing only 14 hands high, ran repeatedly four and six mile heats, carrying twelve stone; and at these weights and distances he beat everything that could be brought against him. The endurance of the horses of that day, bred from Arabs, was quite as remarkable as were their performances themselves; they remained running season after season,—sound, fresh, and always running for six or seven years together; and one of them won twenty-eight times.

The long-legged, feeble-bodied race-horses of the present day are seldom able to win more than one public race, carrying eight stone seven pounds for a mile and a half, or two miles at most. After this effort they are generally unfit to stand further training—their legs having generally failed.

The introduction of the tall, weak-constitutioned modern English horse into the great Continental studs of Europe has ruined them, as it has done the studs in India, and, for some years past, it has been found necessary to have recourse to Arab horses alone for breeding purposes; but meanwhile the Native breeds in France and Germany have been ruined, and a new race of animals has to be created.

In India the introduction of the English horse has been fatal to our studs. These establishments might, under proper management, have been invaluable to the Anglo-Indian Government; as it is, they have proved worse than a dead loss, for all the old Native breeds of

horses in India have been ruined by them, as in Austria, Prussia, and France.

The Indian breeding studs should, undoubtedly, be maintained; and those in the Bombay Presidency on a much larger scale than heretofore. But they should be established on entirely different principles from those now acted on.

Superintendents should be appointed who possess some considerable knowledge of the physiology of horse breeding, as well as some practical knowledge of the details of the business. The studs should be established in localities favourable to the health of the horse, and particularly where the monsoon rains are light. A number of the best and most healthy mares of any breed procurable (as Arab mares are not to be had at any price) should be taken to commence with, and thereafter none but the best and purest Arab blood should ever be admitted into the breeding stud. Agents should be sent to the interior of Arabia to buy the best horses procurable for stallions; but if this were found impracticable, a sufficiency of good horses for our purpose would, after a time, readily be found in the Bombay market.

Let none but Arab blood be admitted; let due attention be paid to the shape, and particularly to the constitutional qualities of individual horses; let all be excluded from the breeding stock in whom any constitutional defect might be apparent, appoint properly qualified Officers to superintend the business, and it is certain that our Indian studs would, in twenty years time, produce an abundant supply of the best horses on earth.

Meanwhile, abolish all Remount Committees; appoint properly qualified Remount Agents at Bombay and

Kurrachee; permit these Remount Agents to buy up, for the service, all the Arab horses which they consider fit for Cavalry purposes, without any sort of attention to the height of the animals at the wither, or any other particular measurement. If you can get a large and well-shaped blood horse, so much the better; but *large* blood horses are very rare, and a horse of 14 hands high is often able to carry twenty stone with perfect ease, while one of inferior breed of 15 or 16 hands may not be able to carry half so much, half so far, or so fast.

The best horse I ever had was under 14 hands in height; he was of great depth and size of body, was equal to any weight, and was the best hunter of his day (1831 to 1835) in the Deccan. He carried me (eleven stone) forty miles in three hours at a trot. I swam the Godavery on him at Kopergaum, in the height of the monsoon, when the ferry-boat had been carried away by the stream, which was running so strong that no other boat-men could be persuaded again to attempt the passage; and, though carried down a mile or more, the good horse took me, accoutred in heavy hunting gear, across the torrent as steadily and safely as if he had been going along the dry road. There was nothing that this horse could not do well—he worked hard for me for fifteen years; was never sick or sorry; he was as strong as an elephant, as fast as an antelope (I once ran one to death on him in the Deccan, a performance which, at that time, was thought beyond the powers of any horse), and as gentle and docile as a child. But such a horse would have been excluded from the ranks of our Cavalry, because he was two inches below the standard height. From inquiries that I have made in Arabia, as well as in Bombay and elsewhere, I have

every reason to believe, that if the idea of a standard height were done away with, and horses only selected on consideration of their ability to do the work required of them, nearly two thousand Arab horses annually could be supplied for our Regiments more than are now purchased.

As it is, the Arab breeders are disgusted, and will not bring their horses to market. I have heard them declare that we prefer bad horses to good ones,—and low-bred, tall, long-legged, useless creatures, to compact, powerful, little, blood Arabs, who would work the others into fits in a week; and there is much truth in the declaration.

29. What is the Pay of the Troopers of the Irregular Cavalry in the Bombay Army?

The pay is different in different Regiments; that of the Sind Horse is thirty Rupees per horse and man complete.

30. Has the Pay proved sufficient to enable a Corps to be well Mounted and Equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the Field during a protracted Campaign?

30*b*. Have Corps of Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army been embarrassed by Debt or free from Debt?

31. Should any alteration be made in the Pay of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army?

This rate of pay is undoubtedly too low, and should be increased. No debts are permitted in the Sind Irregular Horse. I am informed that the Poona Horse and other corps suffer much inconvenience from debt. Two hundred men of the Poona Horse were

transferred to the Sind Irregular Horse, and they brought with them debts, acknowledged by the Commanding Officer, to the amount of forty thousand Rupees.

32. What is the system of the Irregular Cavalry with respect to Assamees, and the market value of the Assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any Native Officer or capitalist of the Corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence, in Corps of Irregular Horse, of such large vested interests, or not; are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a Corps in Horses, and in Equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

It differs much in different corps. In the Sind Irregular Horse the sale of Assamees is allowed, permission being obtained first, in every instance, from the Commanding Officer, the sales being by open and free auction to the highest bidder,—no buying is permitted. Every case is specially considered; any man wishing to buy a horse (Assamee) asks permission to do so at Orderly-room.

This system works well in the Sind Irregular Horse, but in this, as in other things, whatever is best administered is best, and all these arrangements should be left to Commanding Officers, who will usually produce the best results when permitted to work after their own fashion.

33. What is the Pay of Mounted Police in the Bombay Presidency and in Sind?

34. What is the organisation of the Mounted Police of the Bombay Presidency and that of Sind?

In Sind there are two distinct classes of Mounted Police—the one organised like the Bengal Irregular Cavalry, receiving twenty rupees a month per man and horse; and the other perfectly Irregular Belooch Horse, receiving fifteen rupees a month per man and horse.

35. Of what Races, Tribes, or Castes is the Mounted Police of the Bombay Presidency composed, and of what Races, &c. is the Mounted Police of Sind composed?

The first class is chiefly composed of men of Hindoostan; the second class of the Belooch tribes of Upper Sind.

36. How is the Mounted Police Recruited, that is, what is the Agency employed,—the precautions taken before or by the local Authorities in entertaining them?

By volunteers. No agency is employed, and no precautions are taken.

37. Where Districts are large and duty heavy, has the Pay of the Mounted Police at Rupees twenty per mensem been found adequate, and the Police well mounted and efficient?

The pay, twenty and fifteen rupees respectively, is, I think, sufficient.

38. Is the difference between the Pay of Horse Police and that of Irregular Horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

It does not appear to me that the difference between

the Pay of the Police and that of the Irregular Cavalry can, in any way, affect the supply of horses for the latter.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

IV.—European Officers.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of Commandants of Corps of the Light Cavalry in the Bombay Army, or of Irregular Cavalry, been increased or diminished?
2. During the above period, have the powers of Officers Commanding Troops of the Regular Native Cavalry of the Bombay Army been increased or diminished?
3. What has been the result upon the Discipline of the Light Cavalry and Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of Commanding Officers of Corps?
4. What is the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of Officers in charge of Troops?

The system of centralisation, of subjecting the minds of all Regimental Officers to a blind and unyielding regulation, has greatly diminished their commanding powers. The habitual non-exercise of their own reason and discretion must have, and undoubtedly has, greatly lessened that individual force of character by which

alone the Asiatic soldier can be efficiently commanded by the European Officers.

Similar questions to these have been replied to in full under other heads; these answers equally apply here, and it seems unnecessary to repeat at length what has been before recorded.

5. Upon what does the Discipline of a Corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a Native Corps, upon the distant authority of Head Quarters, or upon the authority and influence of Officers in charge of Troops, and in command of Corps, Regular or Irregular Cavalry?

The real effective discipline and useful military power of a corps of Asiatic soldiers in our service depends wholly on the personal character and influence of its English Officers. The useful power of the Asiatic soldier depends entirely on what the English gentleman has instilled into him. If no virtue have gone out from the English Officer, none will be found in the sepoy.

6. Should the powers of Commanding Officers and of Troop Officers be increased or diminished?

I have answered these questions in full above; and it seems unnecessary to repeat the replies here.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

The scheme for the reorganisation of the Indian Army proposed by me would, I am convinced, be found practically to provide for every want, and to remedy every defect. It would be difficult and troublesome

to carry into effect, at first, by reason of the strong prejudices formed under the present faulty system; but there would be constant and continually increasing tendency towards perfect arrangement; and, before long, the soundest possible state would be arrived at, which nothing could afterwards shake or disorder. The discipline would depend on internal attraction instead of on external pressure—there would be a continual tendency in all parts of the Army to aggregate the more firmly instead of to fly to pieces.

8 and 9. No replies required.

10. Has the Strength of the Light Cavalry or Irregular Cavalry been so great in times of Peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere Military duties?

Certainly not in the Bombay Presidency.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the Light and Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army otherwise, without injury to its Horses and Discipline?

I know not on what duties it is here proposed that the Cavalry should be employed. The Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay Army are already continually employed on every species of duty on which Cavalry could be employed at all.

12. If Native Regular Cavalry be kept up with a full complement of European Officers, would you place Cavalry Cadets at once to Native Corps, or for a time to Dragoon Corps?

It is a most excellent arrangement to cause all Offi-

cers, on first joining the Army, to serve for a year or two with an European Regiment, if such Regiment be well commanded; but the advantage of the arrangement depends wholly on the character, conduct, internal good order, and discipline of the European Corps to which the young Officer may be attached.

13. If a few European Officers are assigned to Native Corps of Cavalry, whether Regular or Irregular, how would you select and train them?

A few known good Officers should be selected at first for merit alone to command Regiments. These Commandants should be permitted to select their own subordinates, and thus a school for the training of future Commanders would at once be found.

A young Officer or two might be occasionally or generally attached to do duty with a Regiment, and would thus have an opportunity of qualifying himself for permanent appointments in the Corps. All these matters are fully provided for in my scheme for the reorganisation of the Army.

14. Is the efficiency of the Corps of Regular Cavalry in the Bombay Army affected by the number of Officers taken away from their Corps for Staff appointments?

The Regular Cavalry is so well paid and is so favorite a Service that there is very little inducement to any Officer to accept any appointment elsewhere: the efficiency of a Cavalry Corps is, therefore, never injured by the number of Officers withdrawn from it for Staff employ.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable, in the course of Mutinies, in the conduct of Corps (whether Regular or Irregular Cavalry) whose complement of European Officers was short or full?

There has been no open mutiny in the Cavalry of the Bombay Army—Regular or Irregular; but I am aware that a large number of men of our Regular Cavalry were disaffected, and inclined not to support their Officers.

The number of European Officers actually present with a corps does not appear to me to have caused any effect on the fidelity, or otherwise, of the sepoys, but the construction—the organisation of a corps, on the principle of having the Captains and Subalterns of Troops European Officers in the one case, and Native Officers in the other, produces a most powerful effect on the fidelity of the Native soldiers. It is not the mere number of European Officers which affects this question; but it is certain that Native Indian soldiers are always more powerful, more obedient, and more faithful, under a few well selected Officers, than under a great number taken at hazard without regard to character or qualification.

16. In the event of Irregular Cavalry being the only Native Cavalry maintained in the Indian Armies, how should the Officers of the Regular Native Cavalry be employed—with European Dragoon Corps raised for Service in India, or with the Irregular Cavalry substituted for the Regular?

With the European Dragoons. No Native Indian

troops can ever be properly organised—can ever be made perfectly trustworthy—unless the European Officers be appointed to them by judicious selection, and then allowed full powers over their men.

Most of the Officers formed in the old Regular school would probably be found unfit to command Natives on sounder principles than those to which they had been accustomed.

17. Of what Strength should the Corps of European Dragoons raised for Service in India be,—that is, the aggregate Force of European Dragoons being fixed, should it be divided into Corps of 400 Sabres, or Corps of 800 Sabres, or of any other number, with a view to effectively meeting the requirements of the Service?

The best strength for a Cavalry Regiment is, in my opinion, 800 men of all ranks.

18. If Corps of the Strength of 400 Sabres were preferred, would the same Number of European Officers as are now attached to Corps of Native Regular Cavalry suffice, and could the Officers be thus rendered available?

Four hundred (400) is, in my opinion, too few for a Cavalry Regiment, and the principle of adjusting the organisation of the Army to provide for a temporary and accidental circumstance seems to me to be very faulty.

19. Is the System of formation in Double Ranks as well suited to European Cavalry in India as the System advocated by many British and Foreign

Officers of experience, viz. that Cavalry should form and manœuvre in Single Rank? Please to state, at length, the grounds upon which your opinion is based.

I have often used the single rank formation on particular occasions—in war as in exercise; and I think it sometimes very convenient, and often more powerful, in attack, than the two rank close formation, especially when the numbers are small.

20. Assuming the Single Rank system to be desirable in India, of what Strength should each Corps be?

The most essential thing to the success of Cavalry attacks is the having good and ready supports and reserves; the separating the two ranks from each other gives more supports and reserves, disorder in the leading rank being then quite consistent with perfect order in the one following it.

The single rank formation may be—I certainly am of opinion that it is—more convenient and more powerful; but it is so solely because the second rank, removed to a certain distance in rear, forms a better support for the front rank than when close up to it.

But these formations do not appear to me to affect, in the slightest degree, the question of the number of men it is best to have in a Regiment.

It signifies nothing, in a tactical point of view, what the strength of a Regiment of Cavalry may be; for, under arms, the integer of the Cavalry lines is the squadron as the battalion is of the Infantry. You may have as many squadrons as you please in a Regiment.

But 800 men form a very convenient number for a Regimental Command, and of this strength I should recommend all Cavalry Regiments, Native and European, to be, whatever tactical formations might be adopted.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European Corps of Cavalry a body of Native Irregular Horse?

It would certainly be practicable to do so, but I do doubt if it would be advisable. It would, I think, be much better to form the Native Irregular Horse into a separate Regiment, and to Brigade such Regiment, when thought proper, with the European Dragoons.

22. If so, what proportion should the Native body bear to the European Dragoons of the Corps? How should it be Armed—how Mounted—how Officered?

Equal numbers would be best, I think. The men should be armed, mounted, and organised as described for Irregular Cavalry generally. Officers for these, as for all other troops of the Indian Army, should be carefully selected, in consideration of qualifications and merit only, from the general list of the Army. But I am very doubtful as to the propriety or advantage of the proposed arrangement; it might answer exceedingly well when the Officers of the Europeans and Native troops thoroughly understood the Asiatic soldiers, and treated them accordingly.

When the Native soldier feels that he is understood and justly appreciated by Officers whom he also respects, there is nothing which he will not readily do or

submit to. But under other conditions a little misunderstanding might lead to fatal mischief.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

ARTILLERY.

I.—Recruiting and Composition of the Artillery.

1. What are the Races, Tribes, and Castes of which the Native Gunners of the Bombay Artillery are composed?

Chiefly men of Hindoostan proper.

2. What are the Races, Tribes, and Castes of which the Gun Lascars of the Bombay Artillery are composed?

Chiefly Concanees.

3. What are the Races, Tribes, and Castes of which the Drivers of the Bombay Artillery are composed?

Chiefly men of the Concan and Deccan.

4. Should Native Gunners or Golundauzes continue to be Enlisted and to form part of the Artillery of the Bombay Army?

I am of opinion that the Artillerymen of the Indian Army should be Europeans, with the exception of a very few Troops and Batteries employed in localities in which Europeans could not live.

5. Should Native Drivers continue to be employed with European Artillery?

I think not; the constitution of the Bombay Horse Artillery is, in my opinion, better where the Gunners and Drivers form one body.

6. From what Districts are the several Races, Tribes, or Castes which enter into the Golundauze drawn?

Hindoostan proper.

7. From what Districts are the Races, Tribes, or Castes which compose the Gun Lascars drawn?

The Concan chiefly.

8. From what Districts are the Drivers taken?

The Districts of the Deccan, the Concan, and Guzerat.

9. Have any Races, Tribes, or Castes been excluded, by regulation or practice of the Service, from the Golundauze of the Bombay Artillery, and if so, for what reason?

Very low castes have been excluded.

10. The same question is repeated both with respect to Gun Lascars and Drivers?

None have been excluded, I believe.

11. Supposing that Native Artillery were continued in the Bombay Army, are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom Recruits for the Golundauze might, with advantage, be enlisted?

I think that the Artillery generally should be European.

The question of considering races, tribes, castes, &c. has been fully replied to in answering questions relating to other arms—the principles there referred to are of universal application.

12. What Agency is employed for the Enlistment of Recruits for the Golundauze of the Bombay Artillery; for the Gun Lascars, and for the Drivers?

Regimental only.

13. On entertaiment of Recruits for the Golundauze, the Gun Lascars, or the Drivers of the Bombay Artillery, what precautions of Registry and other Forms are taken before the local Authorities of Districts?

None.

14. Would you suggest any alterations in the Recruiting Regulations or practice, if Golundauze continue to be Enlisted?

All should be left to Regimental and Battalion Commanders.

15. The same Question is put with regard to Gun Lascars and Drivers?

Answered above.

16. What are the words of the Oath administered to the Recruit on his being admitted into the Golundauze of the Bombay Artillery?

The same as is in use throughout the Native Army.

17. The same Question is repeated with regard to the Gun Lascars and Drivers?

Answered above.

18. How long has this form of Oath been in use in the Bombay Artillery?

Since 1792, I believe.

19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the Oath administered to the Golundauze, Gun Lascars, or Drivers, when first Enrolled; or would you substitute any form or engagement for the Oath?

I have a strong impression that all such Oaths are of most mischievous effect, and would abolish them *in toto*. This subject has been fully treated of in replies to questions regarding the other arms.

20. If Native Artillerymen continue to be used, should the different Battalions be raised each in a prescribed District, and be Recruited there, and there only, or be Recruited over a wide area, irrespective of Districts.

All such arrangements should be left to Regimental Commanders.

21. The same Question is repeated with regard to Gun Lascars and Drivers?

Answered above.

22. Should the Battalions, or Companies, or Troops of Golundauze, be homogeneous as to Race or Caste, or Composite, having all Tribes or Castes mixed up together?

No difference of race, tribe, caste, &c. should be considered or acknowledged in any way. Individual fitness should alone be thought of.

23. If Composite, in what proportion should the various Races, Tribes, or Castes be entertained?

Answered above.

24. The two foregoing Questions are repeated with reference to Gun Lascars and to Drivers?

Answered above.

25. What Agency should be employed for Recruiting Golundauze, Gun Lascars, and Drivers?

Regimental only.

26. What precautions should be taken before the local Authorities, or through their instrumentality, when Enlisting Recruits for the Golundauze, Gun Lascars, and Drivers?

None.

27. If Native Drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European Gunners trained to the duty as part of their Exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?

I would adopt the organisation of the Bombay Horse Artillery—the Gunners and Drivers forming one body.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. Are the same Articles of War applicable to the European Gunners and to the Golundauze of the Bombay Army?

No.

2. Can you suggest any improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the Golundauze of the Bombay Army?

I have a strong opinion that these Articles of War should be totally abolished?

3. Can you suggest any improvements in the Articles of War as respects European Artillery?

4. Are Gun Lascars and Drivers under the same Articles of War as the Golundauze, and do any improvements suggested comprehend these Classes?

Yes, they are so.

The improvement I would adopt would be the having no Articles of War whatever.

5. Should the special Rules, regulating Punishment in the Native Army, be retained, or should they be assimilated to the Rules which obtain in the British Army?

Commanding Officers should have Magisterial powers over all ranks of Native Indians under their command, and no special rules are required.

6. Does the System of Native Courts Martial work satisfactorily in the Native Artillery of the Bombay Army?

No.

7. What means are adopted to acquaint the Golundauze, Gun Lascars, and Drivers with the Military Code under which they serve?

The Articles of War are read to them monthly.

8. What proportion of the Golundauze, Gun Lascars, and Drivers can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own Vernacular?

I cannot say.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

III.—Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. In the Bombay Artillery what is the System of Promotion in force for the Gun Lascars, Golundauzes, and Drivers: is it based on Merit alone; on Seniority alone; or on Merit and Seniority combined?

On merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the Native Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Golundauze generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

My personal experience dates twenty years back: they were so then; but the fact is, that assimilation with the practice in Bengal has ruined the Native Artillery of Bombay.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the Golundauze from among whom they have risen?

Yes, generally.

4. Is there any Test or Examination prior to Promotion to a Commissioned Grade, or on Promotion from one Commissioned Grade to another?

No special examination.

5. Do the Golundauze of all Grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary Gun Drill? Are they practised at laying Guns and Mortars; at cutting Fuses; judging Fuses; judging Distances; adapting Charges to Mortars, &c.; or do the European Officers themselves execute those details?

The Natives are taught everything. The European Officers, of course, also execute the details here referred to.

6. Can the Golundauze of the Bombay Artillery frequently read English and write it?

No.

7. Is it advisable that Native Gunners should be conversant with Laboratory Work?

I would have no Native Gunners; but if there be Native Gunners, they should be taught everything. Suspected servants are the most dangerous of all.

8. Does the intervention of the Native Commissioned Officers between the European Officer and

his Men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European Officer?

The influence of good Native Officers is invaluable.

9. Have the Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers of Golundauze been found, on occasions of Mutiny, to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European Officers in checking or quelling Mutiny? Have the Native Officers passively or overtly sided with the Mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European Officers?

Their conduct has been extremely various.

10. If Native Artillery be continued in the Bombay Army, should the Grades of Native Commissioned Officers be maintained or abolished?

Maintained.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European Non-Commissioned Officers, as would give one to each Gun of a Battery, in lieu of the Native Commissioned Officers of Golundauze, be advisable?

No.

12. If the abolition of the Grades of Golundauze Commissioned Officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the Golundauze, would a graduated scale of Good Service Pay and Retiring Pensions, claimable after specified periods of Service, be compensatory

encouragement, and as efficacious as Commissioned Grades?

No.

13. Have Retiring Pensions proved effectual in attaching the Golundauze to the British Service and the British Rule?

To a limited extent they have so. This seems to me to be a very important subject, and I have treated of it in full in replies to questions regarding other arms.

14. Do the Drivers and Gun Lascars receive Pensions?

The Lascars do; the Drivers do not.

15. Have the Drivers and Gun Lascars of the Bombay Artillery been found faithful in times of Mutiny?

Generally so.

16. Should the System of Pensions, as now in force by Regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Modified, as fully set forth in replies to questions respecting other arms.

Pensioners should remain with their Regiments.

17. Can you state the Charge upon the Finances of the Bombay Presidency on account of Military Pensions to the Native Artillery of the Bombay Army?

No.

18. Should not the System of Promotion generally by Seniority to the Grades of Native Commissioned Officers (if these be retained) be altered, and Promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Undoubtedly.

19. Are Commissioned Officers of Golundauze generally fit to take part in the conduct of Courts Martial?

I believe so.

20. Are Native Commissioned Officers on a par with European Serjeants and Corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

I think so.

21. Under the supposition that the Artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it, as far as practicable, with the Royal Artillery?

The Bombay Artillery does not require re-modelling. It differs from the Royal Artillery only in respect of such matters wherein the difference of localities renders such differences necessary.

22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the System of the Bombay Artillery?

I cannot answer these questions with precision sufficient to render the replies of any value.

23. What would it involve of change in the Material of the Bombay Artillery?

24. What modifications would it be expedient to

maintain in the organisation of the Bombay Artillery, when assimilating it to the Royal Artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?

The principle appears to me to be totally erroneous. The Bombay Artillery is organised for service in the Bombay Presidency—its peculiarities adapt it to that locality. It cannot be right to break up this order and re-arrange the machinery on a plan adapted to different circumstances.

25. Need the Material of the Bombay Artillery, if assimilated to that of the Royal Artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?

26. Do you advocate the maintenance of Horse Artillery, at its present Strength?

Undoubtedly—the Horse Artillery is the most efficient portion of the Corps.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

IV.—European Officers.

1. Within your experience have the powers of the Commandants of Native Battalions of Artillery, and of Officers in Command of Golundauze Batteries of the Bombay Artillery, been increased or diminished?

I cannot say.

2. What has been the result upon the Discipline of the Golundauze of the Bombay Artillery?

Answered above.

3. If Golundauze Artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of Discipline, and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European Officers?

Abolish Articles of War; and leave Regimental Officers to deal with their own men as they find best.

4. Is the efficiency of the Bombay Corps of Artillery affected by the Number of Officers taken away from Corps duties for Staff employment?

No—scarcely any taken away.

5. How can the demand for European Officers of Artillery for Staff and Detached employments be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of the Corps of Bombay Artillery?

By augmenting the numbers of Officers—chiefly of the Captains.

6. Would the General Standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of Staff employment, cuts off the inducement which Artillery Officers now have to qualify themselves in Languages, Sciences, and Special branches of knowledge useful to the State?

Undoubtedly.

All such attempts are ruinous. Every effort should be made to cultivate and develope individual powers

and qualifications, and to employ these wherever they may be found most useful to the State, without the least regard to the particular branch of the service to which the Officer may belong.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS, OR SAPPERS AND MINERS.

I.—The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

Nos. 1 to 32.

33. With reference to the numerous demands for skilled European Overseers and Subordinates in the Department of Public Works, and to Military requirements, is it advisable to have, in addition to Native, a Corps of European Sappers and Miners; if so, of what Strength and how Officered?

Undoubtedly there should be a corps of European Sappers and Miners belonging to the Army of each Presidency. Such corps should be, at least, (800) eight hundred strong, divided into ten companies, fully officered by regular Engineer Officers—a Captain and 2 Subalterns to each company, with Field Officers and Staff as usual.

34. Could the Corps of Bombay Engineers furnish the requisite Number of Officers?

No; it assuredly could not do so in its present strength.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War in use in the Bombay Army?

Nos. 2 to 4.

Abolish them altogether.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

III.—Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards.

Nos. 1 to 18.

IV.—European Officers.

Nos. 1 to 6.

I have not sufficient acquaintance with the details of information regarding the Bombay Sappers and Miners specially, which is necessary to enable me to reply to these questions with advantage. Those questions which have reference to general arrangements

and principles have been fully answered by me in replies to questions regarding other arms, and it appears useless to repeat the answers here.

(Signed) J. Jacob, Brigadier General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier.

Printed at the Bombay Education Society's Press, Byculla.

[PRINTED FOR PRIVATE USE ONLY.]

A

LETTER

TO

COLONEL DURAND, C.B.,

ON THE

REORGANISATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY;

WITH

ANSWERS

TO QUESTIONS HAVING REFERENCE TO THE DESPATCH No. 235, OF 25TH NOVEMBER 1857, FROM THE HONORABLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

BY

H. B. E. FRERE,
COMMISSIONER OF SIND.

BOMBAY:
Printed at the EDUCATION SOCIETYS PRESS, Byculla.

No. 2119 of 1858.

Political Department.

From H. B. E. Frere, Esq.,
Commissioner in Sind,
To Colonel Durand, C.B.,
On Special duty with the Governor General.

Dated 8th November 1858.

Sir,—I have the honour to forward replies to the questions received with your letters noted in the margin, and to express my regret that a constant press of current business has occasioned so much delay. The answers to the remaining questions are now in the copyist's hands, and will be forwarded, I hope, in the course of a few days.

No. 11, of 21st May 1858.
No. 52, of 15th June 1858.

2. I have answered all the questions to the best of my knowledge, believing, that though I can speak with official or professional authority on comparatively few points, the opinions of a non-military person who has lived more with the Military than with any other class of his countrymen in India, would not be without their value on most of the questions which engage your attention.

3. And as you have done me the honour to consult

me, I feel assured that when interests of such magnitude are at stake, you will pardon my expressing, in a more condensed form, my general views on the subject of the inquiry which you have in hand, referring for details to the answers to your questions.

4. Throughout the discussion which has taken place regarding the reorganisation of the Army, it strikes me we have very generally forgotten that the main question is one of Finance. We are now, with no external war on our hands, living far beyond our income, which is at best limited, not capable of rapid extension, and, in some important items, very precarious. The vital question is not "What Army would we think desirable or sufficient?" but "What Army can we afford?" This applies not only to the numerical strength of our Army, but to the relative proportions of Natives and Europeans, and to all the most important points touched on in the Honorable Court's Despatch.

5. It seems to me that in the strictest military point of view, the restoration of our finances and credit is the first thing to be thought of; that a surplus income, good credit, and a contented Native population, which needs no large force to keep it from rising, are as important to the Commander in Chief as a powerful and well appointed Army; and that the command to whoever is entrusted with the task of reorganising the Army, must be, not to "make the Army all you desire, or consider sufficient," but "do the best you can to raise the most efficient Army possible at a given annual charge."

6. The most sceptical must now be convinced that, admitting the reconquest of India over and over again to be within the power of England, no Army which it

can be worth our while to maintain could hold India, unless we can revert to our old normal condition, when our subjects generally acquiesced passively in our rule, and when we were rarely reminded that it was necessary to use our Army, except against independent or semi-independent states. It seems to me utterly impossible that our present system of holding the country with European detachments scattered over it can be persevered in, without the destruction of all discipline and an aggravation of the feeling of general distrust, which makes Englishmen, as well as Natives, suppose that a detachment of Europeans is necessary at almost every Station.

7. The material power of England was, no doubt, ample, if properly directed, to have crushed the United States in the war of independence. We retired from the contest and gave up our colonies, not because we felt we were the weaker party, but because we felt we could not retain them without an expenditure of blood and treasure so vast, and the creation of feelings so bitter, as to render the price of retention greater than the value of the possession to be retained.

8. If we would avoid the necessity which obliged England to cast off her American colonies, we *must* continue to govern our own Indian Provinces hereafter, as we have generally done heretofore, through the respect and with the consent of the Natives, and to trust for the general maintenance of internal peace to our Police. A conviction of our superior Military power is one necessary element of real respect; but such respect derives its greatest strength from a belief in our superior wisdom, justice, and moderation; and is something very different from the simple conviction

of our superior brute force, on which it is now so much the fashion to recommend reliance.

9. Sooner or later the language of the Government of India to the ruler of every subordinate Province must be "we can afford you no more than so many millions per annum for your Army; you must do your best with that, and preserve internal peace at home, and be prepared to assist in repelling attacks from abroad. What you cannot effect by force of arms, you *must* secure by sound policy and good government; and no Government can be good, depending solely on a Military superiority, which requires to be constantly exerted and exhibited in view, in order to check the spirit of rebellion."

10. But for the task which this command would, at the present moment, impose upon the Governments of three-fifths of India, powers the most dictatorial are necessary. We have always hitherto been, and are still in the condition of an insolvent Irish landowner before the Encumbered Estates Act was passed; empowered still further to pledge and waste an income already insufficient to meet the current charges, but without any power to revise the expenditure as a whole; that is, to reduce charges which it is mathematically impossible to meet in full, and to apply the saving to purposes either necessary to the existence of the estate, or calculated to improve its income.

11. One of the most potent causes of this dilemma appears to me to be our false system of centralization. Of true centralization of power in India I at once admit the absolute necessity. Nothing can be more thoroughly centralized than a vigorous oriental despotism, where all the centralization is by persons;

where, from the sovereign down to the headman of the village, there is a continual personal chain of subordination, and where anything like concurrent powers or jurisdiction in the same locality is utterly unknown.

12. But our attempts at centralization during the last twenty-five years have been the reverse of all this. They have been all by departments instead of by persons. I know of no successful instance of the kind in history, and it appears to me to be the true, almost the only source of a general decay of vital power, ominously coincident with a dropsical increase in the extent of the body, throughout which the vigorous action of that power is necessary to continued existence.

13. In every natural despotism,—in every vigorous despotism of which we have any record, each subordinate, from the sovereign downwards, is one of several functionaries who represent, in a more limited area, the grade above them. The delegation of independent power for special purposes, or in a particular department, direct from the sovereign, and independent of his local representative, has always been an exceptional measure to meet some temporary exigency, and generally a sure symptom of decay and weakness.

14. But of late years in India our Government has presented to the people the spectacle of a number of departments with independent or concurrent powers; sometimes pulling together, by virtue of national habits of order and subordination, but oftener unconsciously and unavoidably thwarting and impeding each other to an extent quite subversive of good Govern-

ment. Nowhere in India is it now possible to find any functionary of a grade higher than a village headman, who can say that he represents Government in all its departments; that he has himself undivided authority within the territorial bounds of his charge; and that he is responsible only to one superior representative of Government.

15. From the Governor in Council, with very imperfect legal authority over a great portion of the Army, and some weight, but no authority whatever in matters of legislation, with Post Offices, Telegraphs, and Accounts, under entirely independent control, with but little power to sanction expenditure, and still less to readjust both income and charges, this infinite subdivision of power and responsibility is continued in an increasing ratio down to the subordinate Civil Magistrate, within whose territorial charge, as large as one of the smaller kingdoms in Europe, are a dozen distinct departments—Military, Judicial, Medical, Ecclesiastical, Police, Postal, Educational, for inquiries into Tenures, Surveys, and many others, all independent of local authority, and subordinate to some chief, often so distant that his powers of control for any useful purpose are absolutely nullified. To our Native subjects nothing is more bewildering than this infinite sub-division of authority.

16. We cannot defend our departure from the orthodox pattern of despotic Governments by saying that our system has worked well in practice. In the first day of serious trial, the machinery, moved by such slender threads, from so many and such distant sources of power, became utterly disordered and refused to move, and the action of Government in its

distant provinces was only continued where an irregular assumption of power and responsibility saved the State by acts of happy and patriotic illegality.

17. Nor does our system of pseudo centralization in any way conduce to economy in the finances. Even the Governor General, at the head of his Supreme Council, if he creates a new office, or adds to the salary of an old one, is unable to readjust the expenditure of a single province without risk of his revision being disallowed by the Home Government; and I have known this power very lately exercised on a large scale, and with the most mischievous results to our finances, lacs of Rupees being annually wasted, and lost for want of the establishments which every authority in India, who had anything to say to the subject, admitted to be absolutely necessary to the collection of the Government dues. Yet the same authority, so powerless in one respect, can make peace and war and incur millions of debt. Similar anomalies are found in all branches of our administration. There are few of the superior servants of Government, with a sphere of authority so limited, that they cannot do much to increase the charges of the State, by neglect and apathetic adherence to forms, if not by their own act. or influence. Fewer still who might not, if they had the power, readjust the expenditure of their departments so as to secure greater efficiency, if not an absolute saving of expense.

18. The late alteration in the constitution of India may confer on the Governor General the autocratic powers he requires; but I respectfully contend that a similar process must be continued lower down in the scale, that we must centralize by persons and not by

departments; and that in place of numerous independent departments, undivided power must be delegated to the administrators of all larger provinces, if we would avoid general bankruptcy and ruin.

19. Most of all is this necessary in the Army, where the very essence of the institution is despotic power joined to individual responsibility, and where any division of authority has invariably, in any season of trial, proved fatal.

20. How little our own Armies have conformed to this rule, I need not now point out. Even in Europe our almost invariable want of success at the commencement of a war, and the enormous losses by which final success is preceded, have become proverbial. As we know no nation of which the people are individually at once so bellicose, so full of resources, moral and material, and so subordinate to legal authority, none of the current explanations of this phenomenon seem to me sufficient. It may be that our usual national habits of managing affairs by the counsel and consent of many, rather than by the absolute will of one, form an obstacle to that Military organisation for which the nation is in many other respects so well adapted, and that we do not succeed, till that habit has been for the time laid aside. Be that as it may, we find, as matter of fact, that our most successful Generals and expeditions have been either beyond the reach of post, or have succeeded only when imminent danger or exasperation, at repeated failures, led the nation to a tacit concession of dictatorial powers.

21. These may be truisms, but they point at what seems to me a radical and incurable defect in the means we are now adopting to reorganise our Indian Armies.

22. A commission well selected and faithful to its charge may expose abuses, and trace the causes of disasters; but I submit it must be essentially powerless and useless to create or reform an Army unless it acts at the bidding, and in the confidence of, one man prepared and empowered to carry out at once such of its views as may commend themselves to his judgment.

23. In all great operations the Army must be the creation of the General. A commission can no more supply him with a ready made Army than with hands or teeth. No one can imagine Wellington or Napoleon fighting with an Army organised by an independent commission; nor can we separate the idea of our Indian Army from the Clives, Cootes, Lawrences, and Wellesleys who formed it. It is true that a good Army will ever produce good Generals, but they will always be men of the second order, growing up with, and in the Army; they may be sufficient for the ordinary wants of an empire, but not for the crisis which calls for, and creates the natural general, or great soldier.

24. Such a crisis is the reformation of an Army which has become effete. No Army or Military system can be stereotyped. A career of conquests, like that of the Romans, may, for centuries, if continually operating on fresh fields of action, maintain the vitality of a Military system; but even then the organisation of the Army alters as its bulk increases. The legions which defended Rome in the first Punic War were nearly as different from those which fought under Titus, as either were from the Macedonian Phalanx. Commonly a single generation of profound peace is sufficient to cause such serious change in any Military

organisation as to render necessary a thorough reformation of the Army. It is vain to expect a General, merely system-made, to reform the system which produced himself; still more hopeless is the task if entrusted to a commission of Officers of inferior rank, but still system-made. The only hope is in the man, rare in every Army, but always to be found among a Military nation, who, comprehending the great principles of Military science, can apply them to circumstances different from those under which he learnt them; but he must have power to apply them without reference to precedent or usage.

25. I would, therefore, respectfully, but very earnestly state my opinion, that the duties of any commission should be limited to inquiry into the causes of disasters, and the defects of the system which has broken down, if there is supposed to be any doubt or any room for further inquiry on those heads, leaving the reorganisation of each Army to an individual Officer, empowered at once to give effect to the reforms which he may find necessary, either as Commander in Chief, if the required man be found in the higher ranks of the Army; or as a Minister of War, should he not happen to be a Military man of rank sufficient to give him the supreme command.

26. It seems to me that we have very unnecessarily increased our difficulties by enlarging the sphere of our inquiries beyond what was absolutely called for. About half our Native Army has failed us. We shall, as we proceed, find much to reform in the other half. But there can be no present reason why we should increase our difficulties by undertaking the reform of that which appears, at all events, to answer its present

purpose. The Madras Army may not be perfect, but its imperfections are, at all events, not identical with those of the late Bengal Army. When we consider the large number of Officers present with each Regiment, and devoted to its duty, with no temptation to leave it; the excellent system of recruiting and promotion in the Native ranks, and the admirable standing orders which leave so much discretion to authority, but lay down such sound principles for exercising that discretion, we must see that the Madras Army has not been exposed to some of the most active causes which destroyed the Army of Bengal.

27. Similarly it has been shown that a considerable portion of the Bombay Army is free from the taint of disaffection. There is much, no doubt, in both Armies which must speedily be altered, but not for the same reasons, or in the same way as the Bengal Army, to the reconstruction of which our attention should now, I think, be first devoted.

28. The rage for assimilation to certain favourite patterns has already done infinite mischief. Is there no danger that, abandoning the attempt to assimilate to standards of proved excellence, we may attempt assimilation to ideal standards, of whose practical value we have absolutely no proof whatever?

29. We have further unnecessarily added to our task by including in it the reformation of the Police. No doubt the necessary strength of the Army depends much on the state of the Police, but not more than it depends on the general state of feeling of the people. And for both the loyalty of the people and the efficiency of the Police we ought to look solely to the Civil Government.

30. It seems to me to have been one of our capital errors during late years to confound the functions of the Army and the Police. The employment of our regular Troops on Police duties was not a greater mistake than the maintenance of a Police larger than is required to prevent crime, and the entrusting to it duties which rightly belong to the Army. Nothing can be more distinct than the duties of the two bodies, and the waste of our financial resources, which is caused by our present tendency to maintain, under the name of Police, an Army independent of the Military authorities, and opposed to every sound Military principle, is the least of the many evils entailed by the system.

31. In some of our provinces there is said to be no Police worthy of the name; and there, of course, it is the first duty of the Civil Government to create an efficient Police. But in other provinces the Police is redundant, and is, in fact, a Civil Army: and there the first duty of the Civil Government is to reduce the Police to what is really necessary, and to transfer the surplus to the regular Army. Under the present system of divided duties and responsibilities, it is as vain to hope for the means of supplying the defect, as to expect the self-sacrifice which shall confess and cut off the superfluity.

32. I will now briefly describe the plan which I would recommend for the reorganisation of that portion of the Army which has failed. It will be unnecessary for me to point out how much I am indebted to what Brigadier General Jacob, C.B., has written on this subject; but in expressing, once for all, my general obligations to his writings, and concurrence with his

views, I would state that my opinion is founded on no hasty assent to a speculative theory, but on a close personal observation during many years of the practical effect of his system on both Natives and Europeans.

33. There can be no doubt that the Armies of Madras and Bengal as lately organised, were far too large and scattered for a single command. To wield either effectually in time of war was an Herculean task,—to keep either in real efficiency in dull times of peace was scarcely less difficult; while the reconstruction of the larger of the two, at a period when absolute dictatorial powers are not readily conceded, would far overtask the power of any one man.

34. We may, therefore, safely assume that the number of separate bodies into which the whole Army of India is divided must be increased.

35. There are five grand natural divisions of our Indian Empire: 1*st*, the Valley of the Ganges; 2*nd*, the Valley of the Indus; 3*rd*, the West Coast; 4*th*, the East Coast; 5*th*, Burmah and the Straits (to which might, perhaps, be added Ceylon). Each of these divisions has its separate natural lines of operation, on the first four of which it is hardly necessary to specify Calcutta, Kurrachee, Bombay, and Madras, as the natural basis.

36. It might be possible to adjust five such Armies to the existing distribution of Government in India, but there is an immense advantage in making each Military division correspond with the area of a separate Civil Government; and I cannot believe that, with all the apparatus of a complete Government at Bombay, the anomaly of governing from Calcutta provinces in the Deccan and Guzerat, which are within 200 or 300

miles of Bombay, and the language and races of which are identical with those of the Bombay Presidency, can be long maintained. Again, instead of extending the authority of the Punjaub Government eastwards towards Delhi, the more natural course would seem to extend it down the Indus to the sea, which must ever be the natural base of all operations in that valley and beyond its western frontier.

37. A recasting of the limits of the Civil Government into which British India is divided, seems therefore to me a necessary accompaniment to any reorganisation of our Armies so as to make the jurisdiction of each of the subordinate Civil Governments correspond with the natural division of the country to be occupied and defended by each Army.

38. In the meantime, while such a measure is being matured, there is no necessity to suspend action with regard to the Army. But it is an additional reason why our first efforts at reconstruction should be confined to those forces which occupy the valleys of the Ganges and Indus, and which may be taken at about half of the whole Army required for India.

39. Such restriction in the task of reorganisation would still leave to the Governments and Armies of Madras and Bombay no light task.

40. To each would be assigned a certain portion of the Peninsula, to be occupied and defended by the Army of the East or West Coast, as the case might be, with power to the Commander in Chief, acting under the authority and with the consent of the Government of his Presidency, to modify the stations to be occupied by his Army as he might think best in a Military point of view.

41. The sole restriction imposed on the subordinate governments should be a limit to the total Military expenditure. The ordinary charges must be brought within the limits of ordinary income; extraordinary charges, arising from the present condition of the country, and necessarily met by loans, being separately submitted for periodical revision and sanction to the Supreme Government.

42. The Madras Army would probably extend the ordinary limits of the territory it garrisons by occupying the country it now holds in Berar and the Saugor and Nerbudda territory; while the Bombay Army might retain the stations it has lately occupied in Rajpootana, in Central India, and the Deccan.

43. The Civil Government of each Presidency would have—1*st*, so to rule as to keep the country in order with no other aid than the Police; 2*nd*, to organise, when it does not exist, such a Police force as should suffice not only to detect and prevent crime, but to provide against any disturbance, within our own Provinces, short of actual rebellion—in fact, for all Police and really civil duties, setting the Army free for purely Military duties; 3*rd*, it would also have to consider, in conjunction with the local Commander in Chief, all the great and important questions affecting the organisation of the Army with a view to avoid such errors as have ruined the army of Bengal,—*e. g.* it would have to decide on the number and size of Battalions and Regiments in the Native Army; the number and rank of European Officers; by what device of a Staff Corps, Half-pay List, or otherwise we may avoid the evil effects of draining away, for Staff employment, some of our best Regimental Officers; what can be

done by any change in the system of enlistment, or promotion of Native Officers, to maintain efficiency and fidelity, &c. &c. &c. ?

44. In these and in all other details the utmost latitude of discretion should be allowed to the local Commander in Chief, whose views were supported by the Government of his Presidency, provided that certain limits of total Military expenditure be not exceeded; that the Government be not pledged to any prospective expenditure by alterations of rates of pay or pension, without the sanction of the Governor General in Council; and that a certain amount of force of each arm be kept available within certain geographical limits for such general service as the Government of India may require.

45. The Commander in Chief in India would exercise supreme command, absolved from all charge of the details of any single Army, and, so relieved, the Governor General of India would find in him an efficient coadjutor in estimating the value of each Army, and in disposing of the great military questions which alone would come before them from the subordinate Governments.

46. The relations of the Commander in Chief of each Army to the Civil Government of the territory garrisoned by that Army, and of both Civil Government and Commander in Chief to the Governor General of India would much resemble what, in practice, they were in one of the subordinate Presidencies fifty years ago, when, whatever the theory may have been, distance and the difficulty of communication rendered each Presidency practically independent on all questions save those of really imperial moment.

47. It would hardly be a difficult task for the Supreme Government, if relieved from the necessity for continual interference in petty details, which the present system entails, to fix accurately the proportion which the necessary Military expenditure of each Army should bear to the total Military expenditure of India. Everything beyond this limit would, for the present, be put down as an extraordinary charge, and would come forward periodically for consideration and revision.

48. But the amount to be so allowed, either as fixed or extraordinary charge, should, on no account, depend on the revenue of the Presidency to which the Army belonged. The Army of India should be considered as a whole, maintained and available for the general defence, and the expenditure should be regulated by the means in the General Exchequer, and by the duty to be done, and not by the revenues of the Presidency at which the Head Quarters of each separate portion of the Army might be situated.

49. But it would be otherwise with the Police, whose number and pay should bear some proportion to the amount which the persons and property they protect contribute to the State Exchequer. It must, however, be borne in mind, that the district in which the Police is maintained is often not that which contains the persons or property to be protected.

50. Judging from what is done by the Police as organised by Sir Charles Napier, under Lord Ellenborough's orders, in Sind, and as copied more or less perfectly in every body of Police which has since been raised (though in some places it has been rather travestied), I have no doubt that a thoroughly efficient Police

would prove a measure of economy in the general expenditure, while it would give the Government a grasp on the country such as it has never yet had.

51. I will not enter here into details, because I hold the subject to be quite distinct from Army organisation; but one thing is indispensable in both reforms. The whole subject must be entrusted to one head in each Province, with full power to carry out his views, and not merely to inquire and report.

52. In the organisation of the Armies which are to occupy the Valleys of the Ganges and the Indus, the first principle to lay down is the same as that already stated with regard to the Armies of Madras and Bombay, viz:—that each Commander in Chief, acting under the orders and with the sanction of the local Government, should have power to remodel the Army under his command, subject to the obligation of confining the total ordinary expenditure within definite financial limits to be fixed by the Supreme Government.

53. It is absolutely necessary to the success of this or of any other plan of reorganising the Army, that no Officer should be appointed either to the Command in Chief, or to any command above that of a Company, unless he has been selected for the duty; and the selection, in all the higher grades, should be such as to ensure the appointment of none but men of proved efficiency. I need not dwell on this subject, for the known incapacity of a great number of our superior Officers, the inevitable consequence of our Seniority system, is, I believe, the least disputed of all causes of the wide-spread evil done by the Mutiny.

54. But I speak advisedly, and on careful consi-

deration, when I say, that in the Bombay Army, where the Officers Commanding Brigades and Divisions are generally younger men than in the other Presidencies, about half of the whole number has been, as a general rule,—for as long as I can remember, either notoriously incapable, or past active work; and that of the other half, the majority is so much past the prime of life, as to be unfit to bear severe field service. On looking at the lists, I find that the proportion of Officers in actual Command of Divisions and Brigades, who were really both professionally competent and physically fit for active service, has, of late years, been rarely as great as one-fourth of the whole number, and the Government who appointed them has been, as a general rule, practically powerless to pass them over.

55. I see no difficulty whatever in arranging that every Officer filling such a situation should be really efficient. Veterans of unimpeached character, but unfit for active service, who, under the present system, get Brigades and Divisions, might be provided with good Service Pensions of sufficient amount to compensate for foregoing the position and emoluments of an active command. The total expense of such an arrangement would be a mere trifle compared to the increased efficiency which it would place within the reach of Government.

56. As regards the details of reorganisation in the Armies of the Indus and Ganges, I have little to add to what has been already placed on record by Brigadier General John Jacob.

57. The number of men now paid for purely Military services under various denominations in the tract to be occupied, is, I believe, far beyond what

would be required for the general peace establishment; and the duty of each Commander in Chief of an Army would be to weed out what was useless, and to reduce the rest to such order as to enable him to work with them as one body, rather than to create an Army *de novo*.

58. His first task would be, in conjunction with the Civil Government, to fix accurately the limits of duty and responsibility between the Military and Police, and to take the whole of the Military under his immediate and effective control.

59. In organising into an Army the very heterogeneous mass of Troops which he would find thus placed under his command, two modes of action present themselves: one to prescribe a model and enforce conformity to it; the other to adopt any thoroughly sound body as a germ or nucleus, and to add to, or permit it to grow till it has attained the required dimensions.

60. To the former course there is this insuperable objection, that all our most cherished models have been broken or fallen to pieces. From Peshawur to Bengal, all that for generations past we have been told to imitate has failed us, and this system of assimilation to patterns prescribed by distant authorities, who can never see the results of their orders, is every where execrated by the best informed men as one of the main causes of our misfortunes.

61. But we are not without thoroughly sound examples of Troops who have stood the shock, and who prove that the art of making perfectly good and loyal Soldiers, even of the Natives of the most rebellious Provinces, has not been lost from among us. We

hear of such bodies in other Provinces, and I can testify to their existence here under more than one form of organisation. Getting rid of what is doubtful and insecure, let us make such bodies the *nuclei* of our future Army.

62. Should we then take the best of them and prescribe them as models to the rest?

63. Certainly not; but having selected the best living man (or men, if they are to be found,) who had shown capacity to form such soldiers as we require, I would give him full power as a General of Division to extend the sphere of his operations till he could fill up the existing gaps in our lines of defence.

64. There are many races which contribute the raw material to our Army, and they require very different treatment in detail, though there are a few grand simple general rules which apply to all our dealings with them.

65. That Native Soldiers should be treated as men with feelings, passions, and prejudices capable of being developed and worked on for good or for evil, not as mere machines or animals obeying some invariable instinct of caste or race, still less as incarnate demons incurably prone to every form of evil; that, after various passions, and with various forms of external difference, they will conform themselves to whatever their European Officers are themselves, and wish their men to be, whether brave, zealous, or loyal soldiers, or careless, idle, mercenary, and discontented drones; that they obey the man who represents the Government and wields its power, and not the system or abstraction embodied in rules. All these may seem truisms, but we have too often forgotten them in our dealings with

our Native Soldiers, and obedience to the laws they embody will be found more or less at the root of all successful attempts to command Asiatics, whether in former or more recent days.

66. But it may be asked, granting the existence of sound germs or stocks which may be safely allowed to grow, and that we have discovered and recognised them, what is to be done while a Native Army is in process of growing from such germs as may exist?

67. We have already in the country the European force which, under any circumstances, must form the back-bone of the Army. It will hardly be questioned that a total absence of Native Troops would be a safer condition than the presence of large bodies of men disarmed or distrusted, and requiring to be watched, so that, in many parts of the country, a general disbandment of the remaining Native Army would actually add to our strength.

68. We must, first of all then, get rid of what is incurably bad and dangerous. Race alone, to which we are now trusting, will be a most fallacious guide. Not only shall we dismiss many good and useful soldiers, and retain many bad and traitorous ones, but we shall perpetuate a most false and dangerous principle.

69. It is certain that we shall be miserably deceived if we entrust the expulsion of the bad and corrupt portion of our Army to any distant authority. A good General, personally inspecting a Corps under his own command, will soon find out whether the Regiment is really to be depended on; whether the Officers and men mutually trust each other, as is absolutely necessary, if the body is ever to be better than a broken reed. But it is vain to expect the generality of even good

officers to report that they distrust their men. There are, I believe, hundreds of officers whom no consideration of personal humiliation and ruin would keep silent, but who would be deterred from speaking out their distrust by a mistaken feeling of what is called *esprit de corps*, and who are confirmed in their fatal mistake by a sense of the imminent personal dangers they incur by their silence, which gives to the risks they run an unreal halo, resembling that of an act of duty.

70. No amount of writing or returns to an office at a distance, nor of formal inspections of the old regulation pattern, would elicit the truth in such cases. But a few days with such a corps would show the real feeling to a good General, armed with the powers of a Commander in the field, and able at once to weed the Army of men and officers, whose value as soldiers he had good reason to doubt.

71. But I believe the more frequent result of such close intercourse between a good General and his troops would be to restore confidence where it has not existed for months and years, and to render trustworthy that which at present is really not so. Those who have never witnessed the effect on disorganised and demoralised troops of the arrival of a General in whom they have confidence, could never believe how much he may effect without apparently doing anything; and I am convinced, that the mere presence on the spot of a Commander who could and would at once reward and punish, without previous report or waiting for instructions, would alone go far to make trustworthy soldiers of many corps whose own officers now mistrust them.

72. But even if the only effect of his presence were to effect a great reduction in the numbers of the Native Soldiers now in our pay, I believe the remainder would be more than adequate to our wants.

73. Let it be borne in mind that the Army is to be absolved from the ordinary Police duties, and it will be evident that the events of the past year, if properly interpreted, have shown us how to do, in time of peace, with a smaller Native Army than has heretofore been deemed necessary.

74. We may lay it down as a proved fact, that no force of Europeans in the field for a long campaign is thoroughly efficient without, at least, an equal number of Native auxiliaries to take duties for which Europeans are unsuited. A Native Army equal in numbers to the Europeans may, therefore, be taken as the minimum proportion necessary to efficiency within the regions of tropical heat.

75. We may raise the proportion of the less costly and more easily replaced material to as high as four Natives to one European fighting man; and still, in the opinion of our ablest Generals, the efficient fighting power of the aggregate body will be superior, on their own ground, to that of any Army which can be brought against them. This then may be taken as a safe maximum proportion of Native to European fighting men in any Army for Indian Service.

76. Between the two extremes, one to one and one to four, therefore, we may regulate the proportion according to what we can get in the shape of European recruits, and what we can pay for, both of Europeans and Natives.

77. The sufferings of the past year have been of

little service if they have not taught us how to manage with fewer troops than formerly, and how to make those few more efficient.

1*st*.—They must be more massed than at present, and the number of distinct permanent stations must be fewer.

78. The great obstacle to this now is the prevailing want of confidence which creates a panic wherever there is not a force of Europeans. To remove this and inspire confidence is the part of the Civil Government. It can, and it must be done, otherwise life, away from our large garrisons, will be to all Europeans intolerable; and the tenure of the country, on any terms which can make it worth holding, will be impossible.

79. It needs but little knowledge of Military affairs to know that, unless for a temporary purpose, the system of holding the country by detachments, each so small as to render the preservation of discipline impossible, is a great waste of strength; and that a country can be held by a numerically smaller body of men when they are concentrated into bodies, each capable of independent action, than when they are dispersed in detachments which may be frequently compelled to remain inactive and on the defensive.

80. Even in our present condition as to the means of locomotion and fortified defence, there are many permanent stations which, I think, might, with advantage, be abandoned. In the enumeration, I confine myself to parts of the country with which I am personally acquainted.

Shikarpoor.	Dhoolia.
Hyderabad, Sind.	Sattara.
Bhooj.	Kolapoor.
Rajkote.	Dharwar.
Broach.	

81. 2*ndly*.—Our strength might be further econo-

mized if everything in the shape of an arsenal were made easily defensible by a small body against anything short of a siege, and our larger Military depôts, on the frontier or sea-board, should be fortified so as to stand a regular siege.

82. In all our foreign expeditions it has been a standing difficulty to collect any large body of men without denuding any station of troops. The number of men so locked up and taking no duties but the Station Guards of our scattered, ill-arranged, and unprotected Cantonments, has been in itself a considerable Army.

83. The expense of providing at each of our permanent stations defensible posts, where a very small body of men could protect the families and non-combatants belonging to the Army, its reserve ammunition and baggage, and the more valuable public property, need not be large, and could be distributed over a long period.

84. But in this as in everything else, nothing useful can be done, unless we trust to local and individual power and responsibility. Let the General Commanding and the chief Civil Authorities of the Province know that they can lay out a certain sum, and no more, in the year, on any object of the kind indicated, regarding which they may agree, and something effectual may in time be done for the money. But if the duty and responsibility is to be divided among half a dozen different departments, all practically independent of each other and of the General, and if the result is to be merely a recommendation to a power 1000 miles off, the present state of things will continue while we remain in India. The same money will be spent, but to little or no purpose.

85. Any moral effect produced by many of our small stations would be far better secured by the habitual formation of camps of exercise, when the troops might be annually marched to a certain rendezvous for instruction in field and outpost duty, as well as in manœuvring in large masses. This kind of exercise will become more than ever necessary as railways and steamers supersede daily marching, and the ordinary annual reliefs cease to become, as they now are, a very useful school for field service.

86. *3rdly.*—Better arms and superior organisation in the Natives retained in our Service, would still further aid us to reduce the numbers who must be kept on foot. It is as much as a man's reputation for sanity is worth to urge this truth at a time when it seems an almost universal opinion that Natives are never to be trusted with any but inferior weapons. Yet, I think, it would not be difficult to show the unsoundness of this prevalent belief, not merely because the argument, if good for any thing, would require us to restrict our Sepoys to bows and arrows or staves, but for the plain reason that, if there is a certain work to be done, and it is desirable to employ no more men than are really wanted to do it, it is obviously the wisest plan to give them the best tools they can use. If there are, as all admit, duties for which a Native soldier is more useful to his European comrade than another European would be, why employ two Sepoys with flint muskets, or three with clubs, when one man, with a good rifle, could do the work better? The expense in direct pay as well as in carriage, commissariat, and all incidental expenses, is greater for the larger and less efficient body; and there are three men

to be taught and kept to their duty instead of one. If the Native soldier be, as some (most unjustly and untruly, I believe,) assert, incurably untrustworthy, why employ three traitors, each of whom has a certain amount of physical force independent of you, and which you cannot take away from him, when one traitor with good tools will do the work equally well, and be more manageable?

87. In a financial point of view, the difference is enormous. I once calculated that fully three-fourths of a million might at once have been saved in the Arm of Native Cavalry alone, by adopting the best equipment and organisation we know, while the efficiency of the Arm would have been fully doubled. It would not be necessary to give expensive or very formidable arms to the Police, whose power ought not to rest on their superior physical force. If the population, generally, are prohibited from carrying arms, all you require is, that the Policeman should be somewhat more than a match for the ruffian he has to apprehend, and swords and ordinary light fuzils or carbines are as effectual and sufficient as better weapons. When the Police require Enfield Rifles and Artillery, it is time they should stand aside and make way for a Regular Army.

88. 4*thly*.—A much smaller number of troops would suffice if the facilities for moving them were greater.

89. As regards Natives, I am convinced that one of the readiest and most economical means of increasing their mobility would be, to adopt General Jacob's plan of extending to the Infantry the Silladar principle, which has been found so efficacious as applied to Cavalry.

90. In the latter Arm, the value of the principle is now recognised, and Silladar Cavalry are generally admitted to be fully equal in efficiency, while in facility of movement they are infinitely superior to Cavalry organised on what is called the regular system.

91. But as applied to Infantry, the Silladar mode of organisation has been less known, and the first trial on a large scale is now being made by General John Jacob in the Rifle Regiments of his Frontier Field Force. I will, therefore, at present only express my conviction that the principle will be found as valuable for the other Arms as for Cavalry; and that, while effecting an important saving of expense, it will render the troops we entertain much more moveable than at present, by the ordinary means of field transport, and, consequently, render a smaller number of men able to do the work of larger bodies under the old system.

92. *5thly.*—With respect to extraordinary means of transport, it is fortunate that our great lines of Military communication correspond exactly with our great commercial lines, and that no line of real Military importance can be projected which is not worth construction on commercial grounds. This coincidence is, perhaps, less marked with regard to lines of communication parallel with the sea-coast. But the law still holds good; and, taking into account all Military advantages, Government may, I believe, safely guarantee the usual rate of interest on any line which a respectable Company can be found to undertake. In every point of view, I know no line of more importance than that which would connect Kurrachee with Mooltan, and the latter city with Peshawur and Lahore, running parallel to the only frontier, the invasion of which is

something more than a remote possibility. I feel convinced that no expense which the finances of India can bear should be spared to render this line, by both river steamer and rail running parallel to each other, as perfect as possible. The effect, however, cannot be very immediate, and I will, therefore, refer for details to a separate memorandum on the subject, as applied to the portion of India with which alone I am personally acquainted.

93. For the formation of common roads, much greater latitude should be given than is at present allowed to local authorities. Every head of the Province should have a certain sum allowed to him yearly for this purpose, and he should be desired to do his best with it towards improving the communications within his charge, beginning with the trunk lines. Sums unspent in one district might be transferred at the end of the year to another which could spend more. I am convinced no other system will, for centuries to come, give to India the roads we require for Military or commercial purposes.

94. *6thly.*—In estimating the strength of the Army required for India, we must take into account that the events of the last year have, to a very considerable extent, relieved us from all apprehension of active hostility on the part of subordinate Native States within our border. The force required at any Native capital is now clearly necessary, rather for the defence of our ally than to coerce him; and I cannot but believe, that the declaration of a more liberal policy in cases of succession, guaranteeing all Native Chiefs who are not, according to Native custom, heirless, against annexation of their estates, except in case of

proved disloyalty, would do much to reduce still further the chance of our ever having to use our Indian Army against the Chief of an Indian State. No such guarantee need, of course, extend to what are really attributes of sovereignty. It would merely assure Chiefs against all fear of their estates and property being confiscated under colour of an extinction of the line to which the rights of sovereignty may appertain.

95. *7thly.*—The system of permanent Head Quarters for Regiments, recommended by General J. Jacob, might, I believe, be made the means of greatly promoting both economy and efficiency in our Native Army. It would then be possible to allow men who had served past the prime of life in the active ranks of the Army, to retire with a provision for their maintenance, which would secure to the State their services during a portion of each year for exercise, and for permanent garrison duty on full pay when required. This arrangement might be made far less costly and less liable to abuse than the Pension List, to which it would be a valuable auxiliary, and often an excellent substitute in securing efficient men for the active ranks of the Army.

96. There can also be no doubt that the system of permanent Head Quarters would greatly facilitate recruiting.

97. The combined effect would be, that it would be possible, on emergency, to move out for active service every formed soldier capable of enduring a campaign, leaving, at the same time, a sufficient garrison of veterans, convalescents, and recruits to afford protection to the station, and to the regimental families and property, the disposal of which is now so frequently a source of serious inconvenience.

98. It would also be possible with safety to reduce much more extensively and rapidly from a war to a peace establishment, and to consult immediate economy without the risk of reducing too far the available strength of the Army.

99. It does not appear to me at all impossible, by the system I have described, in the course of two years, to bring our Military expenditure within the limits of our present income; and still, if we steadily persevere in it, for the few years required to extend our Railway system, to be able to concentrate 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior of India, with two months' notice, and 60,000 at three months' notice, and similar numbers with half that notice on the frontier or sea-board.

100. With less than this I cannot think that our Indian Army is equal to our requirements; but I must again repeat, that the first of our necessities seems to me to be, to bring our ordinary Military expenditure in time of peace within our ordinary income, and to be able to trust to our Police for the preservation of internal peace.

101. I believe the principles above stated are applicable more or less to the whole of India. But I will not attempt to show how they should be applied beyond the valley of the Indus and those portions of Western India, of which alone I have some personal knowledge.

102. It has always appeared to me one of the capital errors of the existing organisation of India, that the sea-base of all Military operations in the Punjaub should be laid on the banks of the Hoogly, and that the Civil and Military administration should be but a branch of that of Bengal.

103. Nor is it possible to be blind to the inconveniences of a division which makes the Southern portion of the valley and its Army a dependency on Bombay, while the northern looks to Calcutta for orders.

104. Believing that the jealousy of local self-government, and the disposition to meddle in affairs which can only be properly settled by local authority, which we mistake for centralisation, is one of the most potent causes of our misfortunes, and that it is certain, if persevered in, to ensure our ruin, I would increase, rather than diminish, the powers of local administration, which already exist here in Sind; but it seems to me absolutely necessary that the Army and Civil Service of the whole valley of the Indus should be as distinct as those of the other great divisions of India.

105. By making the Army of the Indus a body as separate from the Army of Bengal as those of Madras and Bombay, one step would be gained towards equalising the present great disparity in size between the Armies of the several Presidencies, which is productive of many practical inconveniences.

106. But I look on the measure principally as rendering it possible for one General Officer to make himself master of the whole position his Army has to defend, and really to command that Army during his tenure of office, which is clearly impossible now.

107. He would find himself charged with the task of occupying and defending, with a given number of men, a given territory; able, within a year, to become personally acquainted with all the important parts of his Command, and armed with power to make any changes in which he could secure the concurrence of the Civil Government of the Province, provided

the Military charges were kept within certain given limits.

108. Such charges would be divided under two heads:—1*st*, a fixed share of the total ordinary Military charges of India proportioned to the ordinary extent and requirements of his Command; and 2*ndly*, extra expenditure chargeable to the present condition of India.

109. The latter would probably be in the form of so many Extra Corps or extra men temporarily added to the ordinary strength of each Corps of his Army, and to the possibility of reducing such extra expenditure his attention would be perpetually drawn by the necessity for proving periodically to the local, as well as to the Supreme Governments, the necessity for its continuance.

110. He would find his Army composed of—

1. European Troops.
2. Sepoy Regiments on the old footing.
3. Irregular Regiments, some as they existed before the Mutiny, others raised since, very various in character and organisation, but all armed and disciplined more or less, as far as parade movements go, according to the regular pattern.
4. Irregular Police Regiments and Levies of various kinds made over to him by the Civil Government, after retaining as Police, under Civil control, only so many as were wanted for purely Police and Civil purpose.

111. His attention would probably be first directed to his European Troops, and he would find that the two extremities of the line of his operations, he had a good sea-coast climate at Kurrachee, and good mountain stations in the Himalaya and Sub-Himalayan ranges.

112. His first object would be to secure permanent head quarters for his European troops in these comparatively healthy regions, where the families, invalids, and convalescents might live always, and the effective men, when not on active field service, might be quartered in climates more congenial to a European constitution than the generality of Indian stations.

113. To render such stations easily defensible and accessible, so that the largest possible portion of his efficient European force might be always available at the shortest possible notice, whenever wanted for distant field service, to provide good barracks, and the appliances necessary to keep his men and their families and followers in health and efficiency, would alone, when more pressing wants had been provided for, furnish ample occupation for years to a succession of the most active-minded General Officers.

114. There are few subjects of greater importance than the condition and management of the European soldier in India, but space allows me only here to state my firm belief, grounded on much and careful observation, that, in a cantonment situated as I have described, and furnished, as it would have been by Sir Charles Napier, with really good barracks, (and the best that can be built are the most economical,) with good respectable and comfortable quarters for the married men; gardens, play-grounds, and schools for their children; with amusements for the idle; workshops for the industrious; and reading-rooms for the studious, the European Soldier might last in efficiency double the number of years he does now; rear children to be useful in many ways to the State, instead of seeing them die prematurely, as fourth-fifths of them now do,

and he might add, in many ways, not only to our physical security, but to our moral strength.

115. None of these are Utopian dreams. I have seen separately, in different Stations and Regiments, all the appliances I would desire, and have witnessed their good effects; and I feel convinced that all that the most sanguine in such matters ever expected might be attained, and a great saving in our total Military expenditure be at the same time effected, if the General Officer on the spot had the power, in conjunction with the local Civil Government of the Province, to carry out all the improvements he desired within certain limits as to expense. It is the necessity for applying for sanction for every trifle to distant authorities, who know, through reports, but little, and can themselves see and hear nothing whatever of local wants,—that is the great obstacle to improvement of every kind.

116. A powerful and readily moveable European force at each extremity of his frontier line would greatly lessen the necessity for scattering the European troops over the country; still stations would remain, like Mooltan, very unfavourable to the European constitution, which must, nevertheless, on account of their great strategical importance, be garrisoned by European troops. These might be held by detachments of men selected as being ripe and seasoned soldiers, who, by frequent reliefs, might be kept in fair health and efficiency.

117. If we could keep our European force in India always recruited up to its present strength in time of European war as well as European peace, the General would have to consider merely how to preserve in

efficiency and make the most of what he has got, without attempting to do with less.

118. But the possibility of keeping up such a supply of European recruits is a point which ought to be very carefully weighed, for it is obviously impolitic to habituate ourselves to rely exclusively on a species of force, our supply of which may be diminished just at the moment when we shall need it most.

119. With regard to his Native troops, the General's first care would be to obtain a good body of European Officers; and before he can do this, it will be absolutely necessary to decide on the course to be adopted with regard to Officers in Civil employ, and to put some check on the system which at present drains the Army of many of its best Officers.

120. As regards the territories on the Indus, there seem to be peculiar facilities for disposing of a question which elsewhere is beset with some difficulty. There is no local Civil Service, and the members of the Civil Services of Bengal and Bombay who serve there, are but a small minority of the whole body of European Civil Officers.

121. Two courses suggest themselves, whereby the many anomalies and inconveniences of the present want of system may be remedied.

122. One is an enlargement of the existing Civil Service of the Western Presidency to such an extent as may enable it to provide for all Civil duties in Sind and the Punjaub as well as in Bombay, and thus to form, for the whole of India, three nearly equal bodies, one for the Civil duties of Bengal and North-Western Provinces, a second for Madras and the whole south of the Peninsula, and a third for Bombay and the Indus Territories.

123. The alternative measure is the creation of a separate fourth Civil Service for the territories on the Indus. If this measure were adopted, Members of the existing Civil Services now serving in Sind or the Punjaub, might have the option of being transferred to the new service, ranking as at present, and retaining all their existing rights and liabilities to Pension, Civil Fund, &c. in their own service, abandoning merely their claim on the appointments in their old Presidency, which are usually reserved to the Civil Service of that Presidency.

124. Whichever plan were adopted, Military Officers who had been in Civil employ for more than two years, and whose qualifications were certified by their immediate official superior, by the head of their Department, and by the Provincial Government, to be satisfactory, might have the option of being transferred, but only by order of the Home Government, to the new Civil Service. They would, in that case, become exempt from liability to be ordered to join their Regiments, and they would cease to have any further concern with the Army, save that, until regulations could be matured for a general scheme of Pensions, &c., they might retain their Army rank, and all the claim it gave them to Pension for length of service.

125. I would make an exception in the case of Officers in the Police Force. They would rarely, if ever, leave their Police Corps or duties to claim Regimental Command, but they would be eligible in turn for all Brigade and superior Commands, for which their Police duties, placing them early in Command of large bodies of men, would form an excellent training.

126. Really diplomatic service might be open to

Military Officers, as at present, without interfering with their Military rank or prospects.

127. Military Officers transferred to the new Civil Service might rank in it with Civilians, according to the length of time they had actually served in a Civil capacity.

128. Young Officers might still, as at present, be taken from the Army, and employed in Civil duties, and at the end of a definite period, say two years, the local Government might decide whether such as wished to be transferred were qualified to be recommended to the Home Government for permanent transfer.

129. Some similar process should be adopted with regard to the Civil Staff of the Army, including the Commissariat and Pay Departments, the Judge Advocate General's Department, Superintendents of Bazars, &c. There are many good reasons why such appointments should always be held by Military men, and Officers who have been selected for such duties should rise in their several Departments as long as they are efficient; but, when once so diverted from Military duty, their path in life should be quite distinct from that of the Regimental Officer, and they ought never, on any account, to be allowed to interfere with Officers doing Regimental duty, still less to supersede them.

130. Whether this can best be done by one Staff Corps or by several, one Corps for each separate Department, or by any other device, is a matter of detail. Numerous plans have been and many more might be devised, none free from some objections, but such objections are generally of very trivial moment compared with the object in view.

131. For it may be set down as a truth hardly dis-

putable and of cardinal importance, that there can be no reasonable hope of ever keeping an useful Native Army as long as we persevere in our present system of making Staff Appointments away from the Regiments an object of ambition to Regimental Officers, and a better provision for a young man in position and emolument than the Command of Native Soldiers.

132. Some Native Soldiers, whether few or many, we must have. They must ever be an essential and preponderating element in any permanent Indian Army, and if they are to be ever anything but a source of anxiety to the General, they must be commanded by men who serve with them from choice; who have a pride in their duty; whose whole hearts are in their work; and who feel they can make themselves obeyed.

133. This can be easily effected by making such service a matter of selection and a prize as it is now, with most of what are called Irregular Corps, where a man's hopes are limited to his Corps, which he has no temptation to leave till he becomes qualified for Brigade or higher Command.

134. The purely Military Staff of the Adjutant and Quartermaster General's Departments, and the Personal Staff of General Officers, would, of course, be selected, as at present, from the best qualified Officers of the Army without any restriction, and should always be objects of ambition to a Soldier who is fond of his profession. Not only are the duties purely Military, but the appointments are so few in number, that the prospect of getting one would not exercise any disturbing influence on the minds of Regimental Officers generally, or prevent their entire devotion to their Regimental duty.

135. Deducting Officers transferred to the Civil Service, to the Civil Staff of the Army, selected for service with Native Regiments, and for the Military Staff of the Army, together with the necessarily large number absorbed by the additional European Regiments, few Officers would remain unprovided with duty even of the large body whose Regiments have disappeared. But if any such remain, for whom no place could be found in so many and such various lines of employment, it will be the soundest economy to provide for them by a Pension or Half-Pay List; for nothing is more pernicious to the efficiency of a Native Corps than an European Officer serving with it unwillingly, or even listlessly, and without responsible or influential duties.

136. For the future every Cadet will join an European Regiment, and do duty there for two years after his arrival in the country; and none, it is to be hoped, will ever be transferred to a Native Regiment, except as a privilege, and with something more than their own free will.

137. Of the Sepoy Regiments which remain on the old footing, nothing need be altered beyond what is obviously and unmistakeably necessary for greater efficiency, such as giving efficient powers of Command to the nominal Commanding Officer, and getting rid of Officers who nominally belong to the Regiment, but whose liability to serve does not increase its effective strength, while they interfere with the prospects of those who do, and greatly increase the apparent cost of the Native Army.

138. The differences in organisation in different branches of the same Army which the retention of

these Corps will involve, are not greater than it is probably desirable to have in every large Army, but which in an Indian Army may be considered the inevitable consequences of a healthy system, and the necessary signs of that true vitality which alone can resist a contagion such as lately infected a whole Army.

139. The Commander in Chief, to whom Irregular Regiments and Police Corps are made over as a portion of his Army, will, for the same reason, be cautious in enforcing uniformity to any approved model. A reduction may, no doubt, be effected to a great extent of what is either superfluous in numbers, or vicious in organisation; but mere peculiarity, if not obviously objectionable, is preferable to that external uniformity which has afforded such fatal facilities for combination and has so aided the contagion of evil example.

140. Above all it must be borne in mind that the whole Army of the Indus is essentially a Frontier Army, facing, in close proximity, warlike and aggressive nations, who have twice successfully invaded India since we first gained territorial footing on the Continent, and who boast themselves prepared to repeat the attempt whenever it suits them; while they are daily becoming more subject to those Military and political influences which affect the great family of European nations. Whatever we may think of its possibility or of its chance of success, an invasion of India is a common topic of conversation in every assemblage of Chiefs between Tabriz and Peshawur, the day-dream of more than one Sovereign Prince, and a subject of more or less thought and reflection to every one who aspires to be a successful Soldier. There can be no doubt of the grave results which must follow any

advance of our Armies beyond our present frontier. But if we would avoid inviting aggression or combinations which may force us to advance in self-defence, we must be better prepared than we have been during the last ten years, and our Frontier Army must not only be in numbers sufficient to render attack hopeless, but it must always be ready for the field. If we would preserve peace, every Corps and every Station west of the Indus should be permanently on a footing prepared for immediate war.

141. The above remarks may appear vague and general, but the main point to be insisted on is, that all particulars and details must be left to local arrangement; that there must be no attempt to dictate on such points from a distance; and that no one system, however well-devised, is or can be of universal application.

142. It is, I believe, a fashionable theory that Railways, Electric Telegraphs, and similar appliances render it easier for a Central Government to control its distant subordinates, and safer to exercise that power. So far from this being the case, they seem to me to render it necessary to concede formally greater powers to Officers at a distance, and to impose heavier responsibilities, because the facility of reference holds out a temptation to refer, instead of acting, which did not exist, as a man was compelled to do before such means existed. On the other hand, the facilities of communication greatly diminish the danger of entrusting despotic powers to men at a distance, owing to the greater publicity which such facilities ensure, and the increased care with which aggrieved parties can seek redress at the hands of the Central Government.

143. I will now, as briefly as possible, recapitulate

the points on which I have dilated at, I fear, inconvenient length:—

1. The question of organising the Army is essentially a financial question; and the first question must be, not what Army we could desire, but what is the best Army we can afford?

2. Reorganisation of an Army is not a work which can be executed by a commission. The labours of any commission should be confined to inquiry, and report on defects and causes of disaster.

3. The task of reorganising the Army must be entrusted to individual Officers acting with local Governments, each independent in its sphere of territory, and within certain limits as to total expenditure, and only generally accountable to the Supreme Government.

4. A system of centralisation by persons, each despotic in his own sphere, must be substituted for our present system of centralisation by separate and independent departments.

5. The present task of reorganisation should be more immediately confined to replacing that portion of the Army which has fallen away.

6. The reorganisation of the Army must be kept quite distinct from that of the Police.

7. The Civil Government of each Presidency endued with more autocratic powers, and stricter responsibilities than at present, must undertake so to govern its own territory as to require no further aid or protection in ordinary times against internal disaffection or rebellion than can be furnished by the Police, and must itself undertake the reform of that Police where necessary.

8. The Army of India should be divided into five

distinct bodies, each under a separate Commander in Chief, viz:—

1. The Army of the Valley of the Ganges, with its base at Calcutta.
2. The Army of the Valley of the Indus, with its base at Kurrachee.
3. The Army of the West Coast, with its base at Bombay.
4. The Army of the East Coast, with its base at Madras.
5. The Army of Burmah, the Straits, and Ceylon; the whole under a Commander in Chief in India.

9. The boundaries of the Civil Governments to be readjusted, so as to correspond with the Divisions, each of which is occupied by a separate Army.

10. For the present we may restrict any attempt at entire reorganisation to the Armies occupying the Valleys of the Ganges and the Indus.

11. The Governments of Bombay and Madras will be charged with the duty of garrisoning definite portions of the Peninsula, with full power to modify the stations and constitution of their Armies under the general control of the Governor General and Commander in Chief of India, within certain limits of annual expense for regular charges, and with the obligation to seek periodical sanction for extraordinary war charges, and to keep a certain force always available for general duty beyond the limits of the Presidency.

12. These Governments should also be empowered to reform their Police on the principles first adopted by Sir Charles Napier in Sind, so as to relieve the

Army of all Civil duties, and to provide against all contingencies, save external aggression or organised rebellion.

13. The Commander in Chief in India to be absolved from all detailed Command of any one Army, and to aid the Governor General in exercising an efficient general control over the whole Military strength of India.

14. The relation of the Government and the Commander in Chief of each Presidency to the Governor General to be the same as in practice fifty years ago.

15. The total Military expenditure to be considered as a whole, and divided to each Army according to the work to be done, without any reference to the Revenue of the Presidency, to the occupation of which the Army is allotted.

16. The Police to be a local charge, and its strength to have some reference to what is paid by the persons and property protected.

17. Succession to active Command by seniority to cease on reaching the rank of Field Officer. Veterans of unimpeached character, who may be passed over on account of age or physical incapacity consequent on length of service, to succeed by seniority to higher rates of Good Service Pensions.

18. In the territories on the Indus and the Ganges, the local Commander in Chief, in conjunction with the Civil Government, having discriminated accurately between what is required for Military and what for Police duties, should take over, under his own Command, all the bodies employed on the former class of duties.

19. These he must then weed and organise. Not

by enforcing conformity to any one model, but by letting any one body of proved excellence grow and expand till it has filled up the gaps which defection may have left in our line of defence.

20. To do this the best men who have shown they can make good soldiers of Natives should be selected as Generals of Divisions, and entrusted with the task of reformation.

21. We must first get rid of what is incurably bad and dangerous; but we must not, in judging of this, trust to race as a guide.

22. Still less must the task of weeding be entrusted to distant authority. It must be left to the General seeing, hearing, and deciding for himself on the men he commands, as they come personally before him.

23. In time of peace we shall not require so large a Native Army as heretofore.

24. The proportion of Natives to European fighting men may vary, according to our means, from that of one Native to one European, up to four Natives to one European.

25. In order to make small numbers more efficient—

1*st*.—Our troops must be more massed than they are at present.

2*nd*.—All arsenals should be made defensible, and entrenched lines provided for baggage and non-combatants in every large permanent cantonment which occupies an important strategical position; but all other stations, and all stations on the frontier, should be held as Camps of a Force in the Field.

3*rd*.—The best arms procurable should be given

to all soldiers, Natives as well as Europeans. The Police will not require them.

4*th.*—The facilities for moving troops should be improved; and, with this view, the Silladar principle should be extended to all Native troops.

5*th.*—Railways, roads, and steamers should be extended as much as possible.

6*th.*—We must abandon a policy calculated to alienate Native Princes, and enable them to take care of themselves, and keep their own subjects in order, reducing Contingents, &c.

7*th.*—Permanent Head Quarters should be established for Regiments, serving at the same time as recruit and invalid depôts.

26. By these means, in the course of a few years, we ought to be able to concentrate 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior at two months' notice,—60,000 at three months' notice, and within half those periods on the frontier and sea-board. With less than this we cannot be secure in India.

27. In applying these principles to the Valley of the Indus, we should begin by giving it an Army and Civil Service as distinct from those of the rest of India as in the other Presidencies.

28. The Commander in Chief of such an Army would have—

1*st.*—To provide proper quarters for his European Regiments at Kurrachee as the sea-base of his operations, and in salubrious regions of the sub-Himalayan ranges.

2*nd.*—In order to get a really efficient body of

European Officers for the Native Force, arrangements should be made for transferring all Officers in Civil employ to a local Civil Service, and all in Civil Departments of the Military Service to a Staff Corps, leaving with the Native Corps none but Officers who serve in them from choice, and as their permanent profession.

3*rd*.—In reorganising the Native Army variety of organisation is not *per se* to be regarded as a reason for change, and no attempt should be made at assimilation for the mere sake of uniformity.

29. The whole of the Indus or Frontier Army should be kept permanently on a war establishment.

I have, &c.

H. B. E. Frere,
Commissioner in Sind.

Commissioner's Office, Kurrachee, 6th November 1858.

REORGANISATION

OF THE

ARMIES OF INDIA.

CLASSIFICATION.

The heads of inquiry in the Court's Despatch may be classed as follows:—

I.—THE RECRUITING AND THE COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

II.—THE MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

III.—ORGANISATION, PROMOTION AND REWARDS.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

ANSWERS

TO

Questions having reference to Para. 5 of the Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, from the Court of Directors.

I. What is the number of European Troops of each Arm now serving in the Bombay Presidency, and what is their Distribution?

1. The replies from the Military Authorities at Bombay will give this information more accurately than I can in detail.

The present numbers are, of course, exceptional. The ordinary establishment has of late years been—

European Infantry (H. M.'s) 4 Regiments.
„ „ (Company's) 3 Regiments.
European Cavalry (H. M.'s) 1 Regiment.
„ Artillery (Company's) 1,600 men.

They have heretofore, in time of peace, been usually distributed between

Bombay.
Belgaum.
Poona.
Kirkee (European Cavalry).
Ahmednuggur (Head Quarters, Artillery.)
Mhow (occasionally).
Deesa.
Kurrachee, Sind.
Hyderabad, Sind.
Aden.

They are now much dispersed in detachments all over the Presidency, few large stations being without a detachment of Europeans.

II. What is the number of European Troops of each Arm you deem necessary for the Bombay Presidency, and what should be their ordinary Distribution?

2. As regards numbers, this can hardly be answered without reference to Question VII. *q. v.*

It seems to me principally, if not wholly, a question of finance.

Our income is limited, and capable of little rapid extension. Large portions of it are very precarious.

We cannot long go on borrowing. It is necessary to our existence that we should bring our expenses—of which the Military charges are the heaviest portion—

within our income. Even in a Military point of view, the value of a surplus income, good credit, and a contented Native population, which needs no large force to keep it from rising, is greater to us in India than that of a powerful and well prepared Army. Give us the former and *time*, and we must, with our Naval superiority and vast mechanical resources, always be a fair match for any enemy, whether internal or external, that can assail us. But if we have a deficient income, low credit, and discontented classes among our own subjects, the largest and best appointed Army will only precipitate our downfall. *Time* will then befriend our enemies, who will have only to force us to keep our Army up to a war standard in time of peace, in order to ensure our ultimately ruining ourselves by costly victories.

This is not the place to dwell on the political and social questions affecting the feeling of our subjects towards our Government, further than to note that no Army we could possibly maintain, if our pecuniary resources were double what they are, could enable us long to hold the country, if any large classes once become convinced that there are other Governments possible which would be preferable to ours, and to introduce which, it is worth their while to make some present sacrifice.

Hence it is necessary, in answering the present question, always to bear in mind that we *must* bring our expenses within our income, and that the vital question is, not What do we want to ensure our perfect safety? but What can we afford to spend for defence? and how can we lay it out to best advantage?

The form, therefore, in which I would put this

question is, What Army can you afford to hold that part of India for which Bombay is the natural base of operations? What proportion of that Army should be Europeans? and how should they be distributed?

The most obvious divisions of India for Military purposes would be one which gave the Valley of the Ganges and its tributaries to one Army, with their base at Calcutta; the Valley of the Indus with its tributaries to another Army, with its base at Kurrachee; the western coast from the Gulf of Cutch to Mangalore, including Rajpootana, Malwa, the Deccan, Bedur, and Berar, to a third Army, with its base at Bombay; Southern India and the Coromandel Coast to a fourth Army, having its Head Quarters at Madras; Ceylon, Burmah, and the Straits' Settlements to a fifth Army, with its Head Quarters at Rangoon, or Point de Galle.

But, according to existing divisions, the Bombay Presidency Proper, including Sind with Rajpootana and Malwa, fall to the lot of the Bombay Army; and, considering the necessity which exists for a considerable disposable force on this frontier and sea-board, its duties may still be taken at about a fourth of the whole Military duties of India.

Supposing, then, that the finances of India allowed of an Army of 200,000 men, 50,000 would be assigned to Bombay, of whom 12,500 (*vide* the answer to Question VII.), would be Europeans—

Artillery	3,500
Cavalry	500
Infantry	8,500
	12,500

who might be thus distributed. (The numbers given are merely roughly proportionate approximations.)

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bombay			
Poona	1,000	500	3,000
Kirkee			
Ahmednuggur			
Belgaum	500	....	1,000
Sholapore	100	....	....
Malligaum	100	....	....
Mhow	300	....	1,000
Neemuch	100	....	....
Nusseerabad	100	....	....
Deesa	500	....	1,000
Ahmedabad			
Baroda	100	....	....
Kurrachee	500	....	2,000
Aden	200	....	500
Total..	3,500	500	8,500

The same proportions would hold good, whatever the size of the Army we could afford, whether 100,000 or 200,000.

If we had the money to pay them, I should not consider India sufficiently provided till we could assemble 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior, at two months' notice, and 60,000 within three months, and at half that notice, at any spot on the frontier or sea-board, without denuding any single station of troops. But this is, in a great measure, a question of facilities for movement, rather than of numbers, and requires the completion of a good system of rail and steam communication and telegraph.

I have classed Bombay, Poona, Kirkee, and Ahmednuggur together, because it is impossible to consider their wants separately. An adequate European garrison must always be at hand to protect Bombay; but it is a very bad place for European soldiers, and with a station like Poona within 100 miles, situated on the healthy highland of the Deccan, and connected by railway with Bombay, it is advisable to keep the Europeans as much as possible up there, sending down to Bombay only such men as are absolutely required for current garrison duties.

Kirkee is the best station for European Cavalry, who have long been quartered there, and may be considered a part of Poona. I have only proposed to have 500 European Cavalry, which is less than the ordinary Indian strength of one Regiment. My reason for proposing so small a force is, that there can be no question that for ordinary Indian service European Cavalry is less efficient in proportion to its expense than Artillery and Infantry; and if you have money to spare it is advisable rather to increase your European force in those Arms than in Cavalry; of course, when you have amply sufficient European Infantry and Artillery, there is no reason why you should not have as many more European Cavalry as you can conveniently pay for, but not till then.

Ahmednuggur, probably from its being such a good climate, and having a fort, has been made the principal Artillery station, and there must always be a considerable reserve of Artillery within easy reach of Bombay.

Accidental circumstances led to the division of the troops among these four stations—Bombay, Poona,

Kirkee and Ahmednuggur, and a great amount of capital, public and private, has been invested in providing quarters for them. It is impossible entirely to disregard such considerations, especially at a time of financial pressure like the present; but if we were now arranging for the first time, it would probably be best to have but two European stations—Bombay on the Coast, and one in the Deccan above the Ghauts.

The other stations for European Infantry have been chosen: Belgaum as the key of the Southern Muratha Country; Mhow as commanding Malwa, Khandeish, and the Trunk-road to Agra; Deesa as commanding Guzerat and Rajpootana; Aden as commanding the Red Sea; Kurrachee as the key of the Valley of the Indus and the Punjaub, as an advanced post to the west, superior even to Bombay in position, and very salubrious. It is one of the most valuable Military positions in India. But for all local and provincial duties a very small garrison would suffice.

Deesa and Ahmedabad have been coupled together, because the objects aimed at in having Europeans at the two stations are nearly identical: Deesa is more advanced, and has a better climate, while the Arsenal of the Division is at Ahmedabad. It would, of course, be better not to separate the Arsenal from the principal post in the Division, and better still to concentrate both at a spot near Aboo, where Europeans could be kept in better health than in the plains.

At the other stations there would be no more Europeans than are necessary for the Artillery, which would be stationed there.

This distribution is made on the supposition that

our Army will be more massed than it has heretofore been ; that no Regular Troops, European or Native, will be stationed at places like Shikarpoor, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Bhooj, Rajkote, Broach, Surat, Dhoolia, Sattara, Kolapoor, and Dharwar, and that all the duties at these and other minor stations will be performed by Local Corps and Police.

III. What is the number of Native Troops of each Arm now serving in the Bombay Presidency, and what is their Distribution ?

3. As in the case of Europeans, this information will be more accurately given in detail by the Military authorities at Bombay, and the present state of things is quite exceptional. Before the Mutiny the numbers were :—

29 Regiments of the Line.
1 Battalion of Veterans.
1 Marine Battalion.
2 Belooch Battalions.

—

33 Regiments of Infantry, not Locals.

—

3 Regiments of Light Cavalry.
2 Regiments of Sind Horse.
1 Regiment of Poona Horse.

—

6 Regiments of Cavalry.

About 1,000 Artillery men with about an equal number of Lascars and Drivers.

500 Sappers and Miners; and they were commonly distributed at the following stations:—

		Artillery.	Sappers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Sind Division.	Jacobabad	....	....	2 Regts. S. H.	....
	Shikarpoor	Artillery.	....	....	2 Regts.
	Hyderabad	Do.	....	....	2 do.
	Kurrachee*	Do.	....	....	2 do.
Northern Division.	Bhooj	Do.	....	....	1 do.
	Rajkote	Do.	....	1 Regt. L. C.	1 do.
	Ahmedabad	Do.	....	....	2 do.
	Deesa*	Do.	....	1 Regt. L. C.	1 do.
	Baroda	Do.	....	....	2 do.
	Broach	....	....	....	A Detachment.
	Surat	Artillery.	....	....	1 Regt.
	Tanna	....	....	....	Detachment.
	Bombay Garrison..	Artillery.	....	....	3 Regts.
Poona Division.	Poona*	Do.	Hd. Qrs. Sap. Min.	Poona Horse at Seroor.	3 do.
	Ahmednuggur	Do.	....	....	2 do.
	Malligaum	Do.	....	....	1 do.
	Sattara	Do.	....	....	1 do.
	Dapoolee	....	....	....	Veterans.
Southern Division.	Belgaum*	Artillery.	....	....	2 Regts.
	Sholapoor*	Do.	....	1 Regt. L. C.	2 do.
	Dharwar	....	....	....	1 do.
	Kolapoor	Artillery.	....	....	1 do.
	Aden	Do.	2 Cos ..	.....	2 do.
		....	....	6 Regts.	33 Regts.

Besides which, Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow were occasionally garrisoned by Bombay Troops, when the above distribution would be altered.

The Artillery at stations marked * were often exclusively Europeans.

IV. What is the number of Native Troops you deem necessary for the Bombay Presidency, and what should be their ordinary Distribution?

4. *Vide* answers to Questions II. and VII. As in the case of Europeans, I would regulate the numbers of the Army according to the finances, and I should consider that we had as large an Army as was desirable in India when, from the peace establishment, we could assemble 30,000 men in equal proportions, Natives and Europeans, at two months' notice, and 60,000 in three months' at any given point of the interior, and at half that notice at any spot on the coast or frontier.

I would assign a fourth of the whole Army to Bombay, and three-fourths of the Bombay Army should be Natives. If we could pay an Army of 200,000 men in India, 50,000 would be the proportion for Bombay, of whom 37,500 would be Natives, in the following proportions:—

Artillery.....	700	
Sappers	500	
Cavalry	7,500,	say 10 Regiments of 750 each.
Infantry.....	28,800,	say 36 Regiments of 800 each.
Total..	37,500	

These are merely proportionate approximations, who might be thus distributed in time of peace:—

	Artillery.	Sappers.	Cavalry.		Infantry.	
			Men.	Regt.	Men.	Regt.
Bombay						
Poona [Seroor, *for the Cavalry*] ..... *	200	250	750	1	6,400	8
Nuggur						
Belgaum [Kulladgee *for the Cavalry*] ..... *	....	....	750	1	1,600	2
Sholapoor ..... *	....	....	750	1	1,600	2
Malligaum ..... *	....	....	....	..	1,600	2
Asseerghur	....	....	....	..	800	1
Mhow ..... *	....	....	750	1	2,400	3
Neemuch ..... *	....	....	....	..	1,600	2
Nusseerabad	....	....	750	1	1,600	2
Deesa ..... *	100	....	1,500	2	3,200	4
Ahmedabad ..... *						
Baroda ..... *	....	....	....	..	1,600	2
Kurrachee ..... *	....	250	....	..	3,200	4
Jacobabad ..... *	300	....	2,250	3	1,600	2
Aden ..... *	100	....	....	..	1,600	2
Total....	700	500	7,500	10	28,800	36

The stations marked * are those which I should consider depôts, whence, in time of war, a force of six Regiments of Cavalry and sixteen of Infantry could be drawn.

Whatever the number of men the number and dispositions of the Battalions and Regiments should, I think, be about what is shown above. If the finances will not beat the expense of so many men, reduce each Regiment to 600 bayonets or sabres, and even still less if necessary.

V. What proportion of Native Troops now serving in the Bombay Presidency are Regulars, Irregulars, and Police Corps? Of what Races are they composed; and in what proportion do the Races occur?

5. Of the troops shown in answer to Question III. all the Artillery and Sappers and Miners were Regulars, and were generally Hindoostan men, nearly the same in composition as the corresponding Arms in the Bengal Army, with the mixture of some Murathas.

Artillery, and Sappers and Miners.

Of the thirty-three Regiments of Infantry, twenty-nine were of the Line—Regulars in the fullest sense of the word. Probably about half of the men before the Mutiny were Natives of Hindoostan, of the same races as composed the Bengal Army; but, as a general rule, much inferior in appearance, for the Bengal Army naturally got the *elite* of such classes from Hindoostan as were inclined to take service in our Army. The other half were Natives of the Deccan and Concan, perhaps in about equal proportions, genuine Murathas with some Deccan Mahomedans, and Purwarees, or other low caste men,—the finest and best men of both classes being from the Concan. The proportions varied very much in different Corps, and in some Regiments the Hindoostan men formed such a large majority, that the Corps were commonly spoken of as Hindoostanee Regiments. There were always a few Malabar and Telinga men, and in many Regiments Jews, who were usually among the best soldiers in their Corps. Of other races there

Infantry.

was a mere sprinkling, though some pains has been taken of late years to introduce Seikhs and Beloóches.

Veteran Battalion.

The Veteran Battalion was, of course, composed of the same classes as the line Regiments, but a large majority were, I believe, from the Concan, where the Battalion was stationed.

The Marine Battalion were mostly Concan Mahomedans and Purwarees, or low caste men, with a few Murathas, but all of classes more or less used to a sea-faring life.

The two Belooch Battalions were recruited in Sind and on the Frontier. The first contained a large proportion of Patans and men from the neighbourhood of Peshawur, with many men of Belooch descent. The second had a rather larger admixture of Beloochees born in Sind, and of other races from that Province. Of pure Beloochees from Beloochistan, the proportion in either Regiment is small.

The above thirty-three Regiments were all exclusively under Military control; even the Marine Battalion, when on garrison duty in Bombay, being treated like a line Regiment. The Marine Battalion and two Belooch Regiments had only three European Officers and a Surgeon each, and, in interior economy, though not in discipline, differed slightly from the line Regiments. But they were never spoken of as Irregular Regiments.

There were in fact no Irregular Infantry Regiments in the Bombay Army; all the Corps not under exclusive Military control being usually classed as Police or Local Corps, and all more or less subject to the Civil authorities. They are shown in the following table:—

Name of Corps.	Locality.	No. of European Officers.
1. Guzerat Police Corps.	Guzerat, Head Quarters Kaira.	Commandant.
2. do. Cooly Police Corps.	Guzerat, Head Quarters Ahmedabad.	Commandant.
3. 1st Khandeish Bheel Corps.	Khandeish, Head Quarters Durrumgaum.	Commandant, 2nd in Command, and Adjutant, to each Corps.
4. 2nd do. do..	Do. do. do..	
5. Ghaut Police Corps..	Concan, Head Quarters Tanna.	Commandant.
6. Sawunt Waree Local Corps.	Sawunt Waree....	Commandant, 2nd in Command, and Adjutant.
7. Kolapoor Infantry ..	Kolapoor.....	Commandant, 2nd in Command, and Adjutant.
8. Rutnagherry Rangers.	Southern Concan, Rutnagherry.	Commandant.
9. Kutch Legion [recently raised.]	Kutch	Commandant and Adjutant.

Besides these, there were Corps of drilled Infantry as Police at—

Poona,
Ahmednuggur,
Sattara,

under the Superintendent of Police.

The two former (Poona and Ahmednuggur) were exclusively employed as Police and on Civil duties, in guarding District Treasuries, &c. The Sattara Regiment used to be organised and employed as a line Regiment under a single European Officer as Commandant, but I am not aware what changes have lately been made in it.

The Sind Rural Police consisted, before the Mutiny, of nineteen Companies of drilled Infantry, under the

command of Lieutenants of Police, with an Adjutant lately appointed, at

Shikarpoor, 7 Companies,
Hydrabad, 6 Companies, and
Kurrachee, 6 Companies.

Their duties were exclusively Civil,—guarding Treasuries, &c., and as Protective Police. To these has lately been added an Extra Battalion of 800 men, now in course of formation.

As a general rule, all the local Corps mentioned above, were recruited from the localities in which they served, sometimes with a considerable admixture of the same material as our Regular Army, but usually smaller, or otherwise inferior men.

Some were intended to be recruited from particular tribes: *e. g.* No. 2 from the Coolees or Bheels of Guzerat, the Mahee Caunta, and Rajpootana; Nos. 3 and 4 from the Bheels of Khandeish; No. 5 from the Thakoors, Coolees, &c. of the Western Ghauts in the Northern Concan; and Nos. 6, 7, and 8 from the Military classes of those particular districts of the Mahratta country. The extent to which this original intention was adhered to varied much according to the individual views or prejudices of the Commanding Officer, and sometimes considerable numbers of men, foreign to the district, were introduced. I have seen some of them, especially the Bheel Corps in Khandeish, when they contained very few but Bheels, and were, in equipment and in parade discipline, equal to any Light Infantry Regiments of the line.

In the Sind Rural Police, it has always been an object to have a considerable admixture of foreigners, principally Hindoostan men and Mahrattas, and they

still preponderate. It was a part of Sir Charles Napier's policy, regarding his excellent Police, that a majority of the *protective* Police, in a newly conquered country, should not be Natives of the country.

Cavalry.

Of the Cavalry shown in answer III., the three Regiments of Light Cavalry were Regulars, composed of very much the same material as the Bengal Regular Cavalry, with the same comparative physical inferiority, and from the same cause as above stated in speaking of the Infantry. The admixture, peculiar to the Bombay Cavalry, consisted of Deccan Mahrattas and Mahomedans, but not generally in large numbers.

The Poona Irregular Horse and the two Regiments of Sind Irregular Horse were Irregulars,* *i. e.* Silladars, and exempt from the ordinary Regulations of the Army, but directly subordinate to the Military authorities. As a body, they are composed of very much the same materials as the old Irregular Cavalry of Bengal (Skinner's Horse, &c.), and of His Highness the Nizam. The admixture of Deccan Mahomedans and Mahrattas being greatest in the Poona Horse.

The same description applies, I believe, to the Southern Mahratta Horse, but, when I knew them eight years ago, there was a large proportion of Mahrattas in them.

The Civil Corps are:—

1. The Guzerat Horse, Head Quarters at Ahmeda-

* It always struck me that, at least as regarded the Sind Horse, the term "Irregular" was misapplied, as, in all the essentials of Military discipline, they were as regular and orderly as Troops could be. The term "Silladar" Regiments would much more nearly describe their real peculiarities.

bad, composed of much the same materials as the Poona Horse, with a large mixture of inhabitants of Guzerat, Cutch, Rajpootana, and Kattywar.

2. The Cutch Horse, a small local corps, principally composed of natives of Cutch, with a few Hindoostanees and Deccanees.

3. In Sind, the Mounted Police are:—

	Drilled.	Undrilled and Camel Sowars.	Total.
Shikarpoor	300	130	430
Hydrabad.....	300	50	350
Kurrachee	300	25	325
Total.....	900	205	1,105

They are generally Beloochees or Patans, natives of Sind or the Punjaub, with a few Affghans, Hindoostanees, and Deccanees.

VI. What proportion of your proposed Establishment of Native Troops should be Regulars, Irregulars, and Police?

6. The Establishment proposed in my answer to question VI. were intended to be all troops of the Regular Army; and I think it would be a great mistake to attempt to lay down or to maintain any fixed proportion between them and the Police.

It seems to me to have been one of the capital errors of our system of late years to confound the functions of the Army and the Police, and to keep up an Army

which was, in many respects, used merely as a local Police force, and to raise Corps as Police which discharged hardly any duty of real Police, and which, except in exemption from many Military Regulations, and from the control of the Commander in Chief, differed in no function that they performed from the Army.

I much fear that this fundamental error, as it appears to me, will be perpetuated and extended by the accidental circumstance that, during the late crisis, the existence of a large Military force, nominally Police, but really a separate Army, independent of the Commander in Chief of the Army, and under the exclusive orders of the Chief Civil authority, contributed greatly to the salvation of more than one province of the Empire.

There can, however, in my opinion, be little doubt that the principle of maintaining such a double Army is wrong, both in a financial and Military point of view, and that the only sound system is one which keeps up an Army for purely Military purposes under Military Chiefs, and restricts the Police to their purely Police and Civil duties, under the authority of the Civil Magistrate.

If this be done, the respective strength of each branch will depend on considerations generally independent of each other, and the Army and Police Corps will bear no permanent proportion to each other.

A sufficient Police should be maintained to perform all real Police and Civil duties. It should be divided into Detective and Protective Police, the latter being sufficiently strong to take all Civil guards and escorts, including Jail guards, Treasury guards, and the like;

whatever strength it has beyond what is necessary for such purposes is not only superfluous but positively mischievous.

The Police should, however, be sufficiently strong to keep in order all troublesome tribes and populations within our own border without having recourse to the Troops of the Regular Army. The latter should never be called on for active service except against a foreign enemy, or in case of actual organised rebellion and internal war.

There can be no doubt that, if these limitations were carefully observed, the defence of the country might be effected with a very much smaller number of men, and at less expense than at present, and, it must be borne in mind, that the strength of the Police as well as of the Army must, in the long run, be a pure question of finance. It is not what we want, but what we can pay for, that we ought to consider, and, if we gave due attention to this momentous question, we should find it much more easy to satisfy our real wants than it is at present.

But effectually to carry out such a system, it is absolutely necessary that both the Army and Police should be under one local head, with power to vary the expenditure either on the Army or the Police, and to increase or decrease salaries and establishments within a fixed limit, restricting the total expenditure per annum. It is for want of this power and responsibility that we are rapidly drifting to financial ruin, and that, whilst our expenditure is far higher than it need be, and greater than our income can afford, there is hardly a department in the State which is in a thoroughly efficient condition.

This inefficiency, easily demonstrable and often admitted, places it in the power of almost any public Officer of energy and ability to increase the State expenditure, by impressing on the Supreme authority the urgent necessity for an increase of some particular branch of his department; while there is hardly a man from the Governor General downwards who has power, without reference to England, entirely to remodel the expenditure of any single department, still less of any dozen departments, so as to bring the total expenditure within a given limit.

It is only by granting such power to the Governors of our great Provinces that we can possibly make both ends meet, and ascertain the necessary strength either of our Army or our Police, or indeed of any department in the State.

With regard to the proportions between Regular and Irregular troops, I would entirely abolish the distinction. There should be no troops in the Army, but such as were subject to the control of the Commander in Chief; and, with regard to Native troops, I would entirely discard those Regulations, the observance or non-observance of which constitutes the present difference between Regulars and Irregulars.

The essential difference between the two bodies is not the being subject to or exempt from rule generally. Both are subject to rules of their own, and the difference is in the nature of the rule which is often stricter and more imperative in the Irregular than in the Regular Corps. But the unwritten rules of common sense, applied according to the judgment of a single selected Officer to which the so called Irregular is subject, appears to me much better adapted for the

Government of Native troops, than written rules intended to ensure uniformity of system and conformity to the English Army which have lately governed the Regular Indian Army, therefore, I would advocate the general adoption of the former system.

In speaking of Irregular troops, it must be borne in mind that many of our so called Irregular Corps have been mere disorderly copies of Regular troops, the Officers Commanding them having as little real command over their men as in a Regular Corps. No argument can be drawn from the failure of such corps.

VII. What proportion should the European bear to the Native Troops in the Bombay Presidency, and state the ratios both inclusive and exclusive of Police Corps?

7. I think it a grave mistake to attempt to fix any proportion between combined European and Native troops, except on considerations of efficiency and finance.

You require an Army to hold the country, and your finances are limited. The great question is, what is the composition of the Army which will give you the nearest approach to the force you require at an expense within your financial means?

There are five propositions which seem to me so self-evident that I will not, unbidden, offer argument in proof of them :—

1*st*.—That it is impossible to hold India with a purely European or Foreign Army.

2*ndly*.—That it is equally impossible to hold it with an entirely Native Army.

3*rdly*.—That there is nothing but our own misman-

agement to prevent Natives of India being as good soldiers, and as loyal to us, their foreign Masters, as they have ever been.

4*thly*.—That Native soldiers are, man for man, far less costly than Europeans.

5*thly*.—That a mixed force of Natives and Europeans combined, is absolutely more efficient, taking all seasons and descriptions of Military service together, than any purely European force which you could maintain at the same expense.

The problem to be solved is, then, after employing as many Native soldiers as are absolutely necessary to the efficiency of an European force in hot weather, and for services which are better performed by Natives than by Europeans, what further proportion of the cheaper and more accessible Native element may you add to your Army without impairing its efficiency for general Military service?

Judging from late experience, it is difficult to provide efficiently for all the duties of a large Army in the field during a protracted campaign in India without nearly as many Native as European troops. One half may, therefore, be taken as the minimum proportion which Native troops should bear to Europeans, and which it would be desirable to have even if the difference in cost and difficulty of providing Europeans were not greater than that of providing Natives.

In some of our best campaigns, where there has been least reason to desire any alteration in the composition of the force, the proportion has been about one European to three Native fighting men, and I have heard Sir Charles Napier argue that a force mixed in such

proportions and led by European Officers, was superior in Asia to an equal number of any European troops, except French and English. He was doubtful regarding Russians, whom he had never seen in action, but he affirmed that any General, with three-fourths Natives, such as the troops he had himself commanded in Sind, and one-fourth Englishmen, ought, in a pitched battle, all other things being equal, to beat an equal number of Austrians, Prussians, or Spaniards. This was a deliberate opinion which he repeated in writing, and was not hastily formed or given.

Three to one then is about the ratio which I should consider Natives should bear to Europeans, in order to give us the most efficient Army which could be kept up for any given sum. A larger proportion of Europeans would give more than you require of the most costly element in your Army; a smaller one might reduce too low the element which is most formidable in a general action.

But the proportion would vary in the different Arms. In the Artillery, the back-bone of the Army, the advantage of having Europeans is from the paramount value and importance of the Arm, great utility of individual muscular power, and many other reasons, comparatively greater, and the drawbacks fewer than in other Arms; and, therefore, in the Artillery Europeans should so far preponderate that there should always be at least sufficient to work every gun, save in very rare exceptional cases where (as on the Sind frontier) it is altogether impossible to keep Europeans permanently stationed. In the Cavalry the advantages of employing Europeans are at a minimum, and a very small proportion of Europeans will suffice: one of the prin-

cipal reasons being that European Dragoons can never, in this country, dispense with their grass cutters, and other followers who are necessarily on foot, and thus, Europeans as Cavalry, lose much of the superior celerity and independence and other natural advantage of Cavalry as compared with Infantry, and the advantage of employing the more costly European for such service is much lessened.

I do not think the ratio should be affected by the number of men it may be found necessary to employ as Police. It seems to me essential to a sound Military system to keep the standing Army and the Police more distinct than we have done heretofore. In former days our Army did much Police work. Now our Police does, in many parts of India, much of the Military duty. I think the latter is, if any thing, the more dangerous mistake of the two, and I think it very essential to economy and efficiency in both branches of the service, that our Army should be regulated by our really Military wants, and that our Police should be restricted to what is needed for its Civil duties to repress ordinary crime, and to preserve internal peace. It is only when a Police grows beyond what is sufficient for its legitimate duties, that its numbers can have any bearing on our Military wants.

VIII. What proportion should the European bear to the Native Troops in India generally; and state the ratios as effected by the inclusion or exclusion of Native Police Corps?

8. The last answer is applicable to this question also.

IX. Is there adequate Barrack accommodation for the European Troops now serving in the Bombay Presidency, and state its amount?

9. I am not able, accurately, to state the total amount of barrack accommodation in the Bombay Presidency, but it is notorious that it is quite inadequate to the wants of even the comparatively small body of Europeans serving in the Presidency before the Mutiny.

I would draw a wide distinction between shelter suitable for the temporary accommodation of Europeans and barracks, in which European soldiers can live for long periods without getting sickly and demoralised.

The quarters for European troops generally, throughout the Presidency, are of the former description.

Of the latter description there was not, previous to Sir Charles Napier's time, a single barrack in existence. Since then excellent barracks have been built.

At Hydrabad Sind for one Regiment 700 men.

At Kurrachee for one Regiment 1,100 men, and a Troop of Horse Artillery.

And, I believe, at Poona for two Regiments (not completed).

The barracks at Sukkur (unused), at Deesa, and at Poona, are, I believe, not so inferior in convenience, or so unhealthy as others. But, with the exception of the new barracks on Sir Charles Napier's plan above specified, there are none which ought not, on economical grounds, to be condemned and rebuilt, if required as permanent quarters for Europeans.

X. Would additional Barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bombay Presidency for the

strength of European Troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

10. There would, at present, be only temporary shelter for the European troops I deem necessary. Barracks, as permanent quarters, would have to be built everywhere. Even at Kurrachee and Poona additional barracks would be required.

But the necessity for new barracks would exist even if no more than the old force of Europeans were kept in the country. There can be no doubt that even in an economical point of view the old style of barracks was most objectionable. I do not think even the latest built by any means perfect, and I think even better barracks than any we have might be built at not greater cost than those of the latest style.

XI. What proportion of the European Force should belong to Her Majesty's Regular Army, and what portion should be composed of Troops raised for Service in India?

11. As far as I am able to judge, the European troops, like every other branch of the Army in India, should be a portion of Her Majesty's Regular Army, and the European portion should be available for service in every part of the British Empire.

Every Regiment in the Army should have permanent Head Quarters either in the United Kingdom, in India, or the Colonies. The ordinary European garrison of India should all have the permanent Head Quarters of the Corps composing it in India, and should not leave India except on extraordinary emergencies, and, in like emergencies in India, Regiments of the Army whose permanent Head Quarters were

in the United Kingdom or Colonies, might temporarily reinforce the Garrison of India.

XII. Under the supposition that additional Corps of Europeans have to be raised for Service in India, how would you Officer them?

12. Many good Officers for European Regiments might, no doubt, be found among the Officers of the Native Army; but, as a general rule, Officers who have served long with our Regular Native Regiments do not make good Officers for Europeans. The system of treating the two races of soldiers, and the peculiar habits of command acquired, are very different. A man who has served long in command of Natives is, on that account, less respected as a Regimental Officer, by the lower class of European soldiers, unless they find he has unusual claims to their respect. Even then he will take longer to establish his position than if he came among them an unknown man. I should say that, if efficiency alone were looked to, it would be best to officer any new European Regiments as much as possible with Officers who have not served long enough with Regular Native Regiments to get their habits of life fixed.

XIII. Under the supposition that a considerable increase takes place in the number of Corps raised for Service in India, and that they are officered from the Officers of the mutinied Battalions of the Bengal Army, will this accession of Seniority Promotion Corps create any greater embarrassment in juxta-position with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence

of the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Marines, and the three Indian Armies, in all which Corps and Armies Seniority Promotion is the system?

13. I do not see how it could.

XIV. The feasibility of raising Corps of Foreign Mercenaries,—such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to Native and Foreign Mercenary Troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to Questions VII. and VIII.? If so, to what extent?

14. I think any plan for enlisting any large number of foreign mercenaries would render it necessary to have a larger proportion of European troops than if the mercenaries were Natives of India. Some tribes of Negroes have, I believe, a sort of dog-like fidelity. But they have peculiarities of their own, very dangerous to their employer; and, as far as I can judge of races of whom my personal knowledge is very limited, Tartars, Chinese, or Malays, with whom your only bond of union must be the mercenary one of pay, you would require an overpowering force of Europeans to ensure their fidelity.

H. B. E. Frere,
Commissioner in Sind.

Commissioner's Office,
Kurrachee, 8th November 1858.

ANSWERS

TO

Questions having reference to Para. 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

I. What is the number of European Troops of each Arm now serving in Sind? and what is their Distribution?

Answer 1.—

Station.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.
Shikarpoor	....	1 Company ..	1 Light Field Battery.
Hydrabad	....	2 Companies..	1 Light Field Battery.
Kurrachee	....	6 Companies & Head Quarters H.M.'s 51st.	1 Light Field Battery.
Total in Sind	....	9 Companies..	3 Light Field Batts.

This is exclusive of the Depôt at Kurrachee for recruits and invalids belonging to Regiments in the Punjaub, the strength of which is, of course, very variable.

In ordinary times of peace it has been usual to keep two complete Regiments of European Infantry in Sind—divided between Hydrabad and Kurrachee, a Troop of Horse Artillery at Kurrachee, and sometimes a Light Field Battery of European Artillery; but, till the present year, the Batteries at Hydrabad and Shikarpoor have been usually Native Golundauze.

II. What is the number of European Troops of each Arm you deem necessary for Sind, and what should be their ordinary Distribution?

2. For service in the Province no European troops whatever, nor any portion of the Regular Army would be required, the Police being ample for all provincial requirements.

As a part of the general defence of India the duty to be performed by the troops in Sind would consist of—

1*st.*—Garrisoning Kurrachee, which is the key of the Indus, and a seaport of remarkable salubrity, where troops can be embarked or disembarked at all times of the year, and where they are admirably placed for movement up the Indus, and in any direction by sea. It must be in a few years one of our principal Arsenals and greatest Military stations in India.

2*nd.*—Keeping open the communication up the line of the Indus with Mooltan and the Punjaub.

3*rd.*—Observing the Bolan Pass—one of the two great highways from the West into India.

It is only the first of these duties which should be assigned to Europeans as an ordinary part of our system, owing to the extreme heat in Central and Upper Sind. I think it would usually be found convenient to keep at least one-fifth of the whole force of the European Infantry and Artillery of the Bombay Army at Kurrachee, and, if our finances allowed of our keeping more than 10,000 Europeans in the Bombay Army, the excess could not be better posted than at Kurrachee.

At present the high price of forage at and near Kurrachee renders it inadvisable to post any European

Cavalry there, and none could exist and remain efficient during the hot weather in Upper Sind.

III. What is the number of Native Troops of each Arm now serving in Sind, and what is their Distribution ?

3. The ordinary distribution of Native Troops has been in time of peace —

	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.
Jacobabad ..	2 Regiments Irregular Cavalry, Sind Horse.	.....	....
Shikarpoor ..	.....	Light Field Battery	2 Regiments.
Hyderabad ..	.....	Light Field Battery	2 Regiments.
Kurrachee ..	.....	.....	2 Regiments.

At present the only Native troops are the two Regiments of Sind Horse at Jacobabad, a single Regular Regiment of Native Infantry at Kurrachee, and an Extra Police Battalion lately raised at Hyderabad.

The Civil duties everywhere are taken by the Police.

Orders have been lately issued to raise a third Regiment of Sind Horse, and two Silladar Rifle Regiments at Jacobabad, where they are now in process of formation.

IV. What is the number of Native Troops you deem necessary for Sind, and what should be their ordinary Distribution ?

4. No portion whatever of the Regular Native

Army is required for provincial purposes in Sind—the Police being ample for every local duty.

As a part of the general defence of the country the Frontier Field Force, on the scale recommended by Brigadier General Jacob, and (with the exception of the Artillery) already sanctioned by Government, should be maintained and posted where they will command the Bolan Pass:

3 Regiments Irregular Cavalry.
2 Regiments Silladar Rifles.
2 Troops Horse Artillery.

I think that when we have completed the Railway now in course of construction, and with such a Flotilla belonging to Government and private companies, from Kurrachee to the Indus, opposite Hyderabad; as will, in a few months, be on the Indus, no troops need be permanently posted at Hyderabad, nor at Shikarpoor, nor anywhere else in Sind, except at Jacobabad and Kurrachee.

V. What proportion of Native Troops, now serving in Sind, are Regulars, Irregulars, and Police Corps; of what Races are they composed, and in what proportions do the Races occur?

5. As regards the Regulars and Irregulars *vide supra* answer to Question III. The information regarding the Races of which they are composed will be found in the answer to this question relating to the Bombay Army generally.

The Sind Police was the first body of the kind organised in India on a system devised by Sir Charles Napier, under the orders of Lord Ellenborough. They are divided into—

1. "Rural Police." A body of drilled Infantry, whose

functions are purely protective. They guard prisons, jails, and treasuries, and do duty wherever permanent guards are required. They were, originally, entirely Hindoostan and Deccan men —Sir Charles Napier holding that, in a newly conquered country, a large proportion of the protective Police should be foreigners. It was also found at first difficult to get Sindees and Beloochees to submit to the uniform and drill, but of late years many of them have been enlisted.

2. "Mounted Police." A body of Police Horse, some of them armed and equipped like the Irregular Cavalry. There are many Hindoostan men in the ranks, but the majority are Natives of Sind, Beloochistan and Affghanistan. Their functions are partly protective and partly detective. A portion of the Mounted Police in each Collectorate are Beloochees of various frontier tribes, dressed in their national costume, and riding Belooch mares, and a few of them who are employed in the sandy portions of the desert ride camels.

3. "City Police." A small proportion of these men are ordinary Nujeebs and Burkundauze for protective Police purposes in towns, but most of them are trackers and detectives, and, with very few exceptions, natives of Sind.

VI. What proportion of your proposed Establishment of Native Troops should be Regulars, Irregulars, and Police?

6. *Vide* answer to Question IV. I do not think it

would be possible to fix any proportion. The strength of the Police should be regulated by purely local and provincial wants, the state of crime, to which the number of troops of the Regular Army quartered in Sind would have no reference whatever—the latter being dependent on purely general considerations connected with the defence of the whole Presidency, and totally irrespective of local wants.

VII. What proportion should the European bear to the Native Troops in Sind, and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of Police Corps?

7. *Vide* answer to the same question relating to the Bombay Presidency.

IX. Is there adequate Barrack accommodation for the European Troops now serving in Sind, and state its amount?

9. Observing the distinction between Barracks sufficient for temporary accommodation, and such as are fit for permanent quarters, I should say that, of the former class, there is ample accommodation for a Regiment at Sukkur. No European troops are ever likely to be stationed there permanently, but the Barracks are occasionally used by troops passing, and should be kept up in a serviceable state.

There are very fine Barracks with ample accommodation for one Regiment (700 men) begun by Sir Charles Napier at Hyderabad. It is not a place where I could recommend Europeans being permanently stationed, but the Barracks will always be of use for the temporary accommodation of troops when Kurrachee

is over crowded, or for Regiments going up the river; and they also should be kept in good repair.

At Kurrachee there are excellent Barracks for a Regiment of Infantry (1,100 men) and Troops of Horse Artillery, and inferior shelter for about 2,000 more Europeans. The latter is only fit for temporary use, and it would be an economical measure to pull them down, and rebuild them on a better plan.

X. Would additional Barrack accommodation have to be provided in Sind for the strength of European Troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

10. Good Barracks (for at least 3,000 men) should be provided at Kurrachee, in addition to the good Barracks now there, and in substitution for some of the old temporary buildings.

H. B. E. Frere,
Commissioner in Sind.

THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

I. What are the Races, Tribes, or Castes of which the Police Infantry of the Sind Police is composed?

1. The Regular Infantry (Rural Police) were originally almost all of the same material as the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army—chiefly Hindoostan men and Natives of the Deccan, who, from want of size or other causes, did not get enlisted in our Native Regi-

ments of the line. It was a part of Sir Charles Napier's policy that this branch of the Police should contain a considerable admixture of foreigners. Punjaubees and Putans were early admitted, and, of late years, a good many Natives of the country—Beloochees and Sindees. It now contains representatives of all the Military classes of Western and Northern India, and the countries adjoining.

The City Police (untrained Infantry), Detectives, &c. contains a few Hindoostan and Deccan Nujeebs, and Burkundauze, but is generally composed of Sindees and Beloochees or Patans, Natives of Sind.

II. What Districts are the several Races, Tribes, and Castes drawn from?

2. They are all recruited almost exclusively in Sind. The men who are not Natives of Sind are enlisted at our Military stations in the Province from among those men who may have come to seek service, or with connections serving in our Army.

III. Have any Races, Tribes, or Castes been excluded from Enlistment, either by the Regulation or the practice of the Sind administration?

3. No; there are some non-Military classes, members of which are not to be found in the Police. But when a good recruit offers, no objection is ever made to him on account of his Race, Tribe, or Caste.

IV. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of Enlistment, from whom Recruits might, with advantage, be drawn for the Sind Police?

4. No; there is no exclusion, and, I think, the best men procurable are got.

V. What Agency is employed for the Enlistment of Recruits in the Districts from whence the Sind Police is drawn?

5. None. The Commanding Officer makes his own arrangements, and has generally many more candidates than he can employ for any vacancy.

VI. On Enlistment of Recruits what precautions of Registry and other forms are observed before the local Authorities of Districts?

6. None whatever are prescribed by any authority superior to the Captain of Police. The Officers Commanding Police Corps have the matter entirely in their own hands, and generally take great care to enlist none but known men, for whose character they have some guarantee; but they make their own arrangements for this purpose.

XIX. If separate Corps are to be maintained for Military and Police purposes, should the Recruiting for both be allowed in the same District or kept to separate Districts, or should Police Corps be Recruited from a wide area without reference to Districts?

19. I do not think this is a point on which any authoritative Regulation should be attempted. Commanding Officers of the Regular Army Corps as well as of the Police should be allowed to get the best recruits they can find, when and how they can; they should never be restricted to or excluded from any particular district.

XX. Would you regard Police Corps as Nurseries from which Men might be drawn for the Army Corps?

20. Certainly not. It seems to me one of the capital errors of our late proceedings that we have made our Police, in many districts, a kind of secondary Army, with looser discipline, and inferior and harder duties.

The qualities you require in most branches of the Police are very dissimilar from those you want in a soldier, and a man is injured as a Policeman by learning to ape a soldier. This is very visibly the case in bodies like the London Police and Irish Constabulary, and precisely the same reasons hold good in India also.

Sir Charles Napier fixed the pay of his Police on the principle that the Policeman should have higher wages than the soldier, and I think he was right.

I consider that if we gave up the attempt to make our Police an inferior kind of soldiers we should have a much smaller, better paid, and more efficient body of Police, at less total cost, and be enabled to keep up a much larger, more efficient, and more disposable Army without getting into debt.

These remarks are not intended to apply to the Military organisation of some branches of Police, which I think essential to order and efficiency, nor to the habit of drawing our Police Officers generally from among young Military men, the Army being, I think, usually up to a certain age the best school for such duties. But Military order and organisation are quite distinct from Military spirit; the former are useful, if not essential, to large bodies of Protective Police; the latter are not only not useful, but are positively mis-

chievous, to the *men* of a body of Police, who should always be carefully taught that their function is to keep the peace, not to distinguish themselves by their courage and prowess in fight.

I believe these principles are quite as applicable to the task of preserving the peace among savage and warlike tribes as in a quiet commercial town. Your Policeman must always have so much of the hero in him as to be ready to risk his life, single handed, in a contest with a host of savage breakers of the peace, whether in a dark alley or on a mountain side; but this is something quite different from his looking to a fray as the summit of his hopes, and to victory in fight as more glorious than inducing the enemy to retire peaceably to their homes, without a contest, which is what you want the Policeman to effect.

XXI. What Agency should be employed for Recruiting for the Sind Police?

21. None whatever, but that of the Commanding Officer, and that which he may devise for himself.

XXIV. Should precautions be taken in connection with Recruits for Police Corps in Sind before the local Authorities of the Districts from whence the Police are drawn?

24. I do not think any are needed, and, if they interfere in any way with the authority and direct responsibility of the Commanding Officer, I should think them mischievous.

XXXIV. How should Police Corps in Sind be Armed?

34. As at present. Their arms should differ according to the work required of them. The Rural Police (drilled Infantry) should be armed with light percussion fusees and bayonets. The Mounted Police with swords and carbines, or matchlocks. The City Police, (Detective and Town Police), the Detectives, and Trackers, with swords and shields of the country. The Town Nujeebs with staves, swords, and, in some cases, fusees or matchlocks.

XXXVI. How should the Native Infantry of the Sind Police be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the Native Soldier?

36. As at present. The Rural Police in brown tunics, loose trowsers of the same colour, or dark blue, and Kilmarnock caps or puggrees. The City Police in their Native costume of uniform colour, but distinguished from the common people merely by bearing arms.

H. B. E. Frere,
Commissioner in Sind.

November 8th, 1858.

THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

I. What are the Races, Tribes, or Castes of which the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army is composed?

1. I believe about half are Natives of the Gangetic India, of the same races, tribes, and castes as the

Bengal Native Infantry, but inferior in quality—the Bengal Army having the pick of such men as offer. There are also many Hindoostan and Oude men in the Bombay Army belonging to castes, members of which were not usually admitted into the Bengal Army. The other half are chiefly Mahrattas, and Deccan Mahomedans, and Purwarries, with a few Telingas, Jews, and half-caste Christians. There were, before the late Mutiny, two Regiments (the Belooch Battalions) composed of Beloochees, Sindees, Affghans, &c., and orders have lately been issued for raising other Corps of this class of men. A few Beloochees and Sikhs have of late years been enlisted in most Infantry Corps.

II. What Districts are the several Races, Tribes, and Castes drawn from?

2. This has heretofore depended very much on the Commanding Officer who had generally an opinion of his own as to where he was likely to get the best recruits, and could generally get leave to recruit there—out of Hindoostan and Oude. The usual recruiting districts are the Deccan—about Poona, Nuggur and Sholapoor, and the Southern Concan, whence excellent soldiers have always been drawn. The district of Sawunt Warree, especially, has always furnished some of our best Infantry recruits.

III. Have any Races, Tribes, or Castes been excluded from Enlistment either by the Regulations or the practice of the Bombay Army?

3. No particular race, tribe, or caste that I know of has ever been excluded from enlistment by the Regulations of the Bombay Army.

In practice, the Commanding Officers of Corps had generally a preference for some particular race or caste, to which the recruiting of their Regiment was, so far as lay in their power, confined; but this was purely a matter of personal preference, and the practice of one Commanding Officer was often reversed under his successor. Of late years, there has been, till shortly before the Mutiny, a growing preference for the fine men of the upper classes in Hindoostan, and, with a view to correct this tendency, orders have been sometimes given from Army Head Quarters, to enlist from particular races—Beloochees and Sikhs, &c. But in general, it has been the traditionary policy of the Bombay Army to avoid having a large majority of the men in a Regiment of any one particular race or caste. Even in Regiments which, like the Belooch Battalions, were originally intended to be raised from a particular race, or which, like the 21st and 22nd Native Infantry, were generally considered Hindostanee Regiments, measures were from time to time taken by individual Commanding Officers to prevent the material of the Corps becoming too uniform.

IV. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of Enlistment, from whom Recruits might with advantage be drawn for the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army?

4. I know of none. I cannot but think it a great mistake to interfere with the discretion of Commanding Officers in this respect. They should be left quite unfettered to make their own arrangements for recruiting wherever and whatever men they think best. The

soundness, or otherwise, of the discretion they exercise is speedily seen in the state of their Corps. The interference of Head Quarters in such matters has greatly increased of late years, and much, I think, to the detriment of the Service, especially where it has been directed to ensure conformity to one particular mode of proceeding.

V. What Agency is employed for the Enlistment of Recruits in the Districts from which the Bombay Army is recruited?

5. In general, Commanding Officers make their own arrangements. Occasionally, when a large augmentation was suddenly ordered, Recruit Depôts have been established, and the men so enlisted were drafted off, as required, to different Corps. I do not know how the system answered in other respects, but it was, I believe, universally condemned by the Commanding Officers of the Regiments so furnished with recruits. They complained that they never got from the general depôt such good recruits as when they employed their own recruiting parties.

VI. On Enlistment of Recruits, what precautions of Registry and other forms are observed before the local Authorities of Districts?

6. A form of registration by the local Authorities is prescribed, but I have not got the particulars at hand to refer to. I do not know what particular object they are intended to secure, and I can imagine none which would counterbalance the undoubted evils of a multiplication of such forms of which we have already far too many.

VII. When Recruits are enlisted in Cantonments, or taken from the families of Sepoys, or the followers of Regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. I am not aware of any precautions taken in such cases, and cannot imagine any to be necessary, as the recruit would probably, and ought generally, to have been known from his childhood, to the Officer enlisting him.

VIII. What alterations should be made in existing Recruiting Regulations, and Practice, relatively to Races, Tribes or Castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the Infantry of the Native Troops in the Bombay Army?

8. I think all existing Regulations should be abolished as far as they interfere with the prefect free agency of Commanding Officers in such matters. This matter of recruiting is pre-eminently one on which the Commanding Officer, if fit for his post, must be better qualified to judge than any one else, and, in which any mistake he may make, is most quickly seen by himself and all his superiors, and most easily corrected. It is hardly possible that, if unfit to choose recruits, the Commanding Officer can be qualified for his position in other respects, and it is certain that the best conceived Regulations on such a subject, if stereotyped and imposed on Commanding Officers so as to interfere with his free agency, immediately become mischievous. Recruiting is an act of selection, and it appears to me a self-evident absurdity to prescribe rules for selecting which the party entrusted with the responsibility of the selection shall be bound to follow.

What you want is a certain quantity of bone, muscle, and other physical qualities, joined to docility, courage, and fidelity; and nothing can, I think, be more unwise than to hamper a man with any rules to fetter his proceedings in looking for such qualifications beyond what his common sense, and experience may dictate to him.

IX. What are the words of the Oath administered to the Recruit on his entering the Ranks of the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army?

9. I have not got the form at hand to refer to.

X. How long has this Form been in use in the Bombay Army?

10. I am not aware. It is, I believe, an old form.

XI. Can you suggest any improvement in the Wording, or Matter of the Oath administered to the Sepoy of the Bombay Army?

11. Some special formality to remind the recruit of the solemnity of the engagement on which he is entering must, I think, be beneficial. But the pledge should not be in the form of an oath. If such oath were taken in any form which the Hindoo or Mahomedan recruit would consider more binding than a mere verbal pledge, it must be in a form which his British Officers would generally consider idolatrous or blasphemous.

Moreover, such oaths make the recruit fancy that it is the oath which binds him to the State, and not the obligations inherent in the relation which exists between the State and a volunteer soldier, which the Natives

well understand when left to themselves, and commonly designate by their well known allusions to their "Salt." The consequence of the recruit substituting in his own mind the obligation of the oath for the natural obligation of fidelity to the State, is that, whenever he meets a Moolla or a Brahmin to adjure him, by some more potent form of oath, to do some act inconsistent with his fidelity to Government, he is the more prone to obey, under the impression that his oath to the State is overruled.

XII. Are there any Races, Tribes, or Castes in the Bombay Presidency of Seafaring habits, and could Marine Corps be formed from such Races, Tribes, or Castes?

12. There are many such races, tribes and castes, and Marine Corps, to almost any amount which could be required in India, might be raised from them.

XIII. Has the Bombay Presidency any Marine Corps, and if so, of what Strength, and whence Recruited?

13. The Bombay Marine Battalion is, I believe, 1,000 strong. It is recruited generally from the Concan and Guzerat Coasts. The men are generally Purwarries* of various castes, and Mussulmen of the

* *Note.*—Purwarrie is a generic term used in Western India to denote a class of men who are not *out-castes*, for they are divided into numerous very distinct castes, and are as particular in such matters as their high caste brethren, but who are accounted impure by the higher caste Hindoos, and generally, in a Mahratta village, live apart *outside* the village walls (whence the name "Purwarrie," "outside the village"). They comprise the Mhars (known in some parts as Dhers, and Merasees, and Soortees), who are a very important

Coast, who are a peculiar race—much given to a seafaring life. There are also a few Mahrattas.

XIV. Should each Infantry Corps be raised, each in a prescribed District, and be Recruited there, and there only?

14. I think there should be no such restriction. Each Regiment should, I think, have permanent Head Quarters, as recommended by Brigadier General John Jacob, and many of the recruits would naturally be drawn from that neighbourhood. But I would, on no account, impose any restriction on the Commanding Officer in this respect—any such restriction must sooner or later produce most mischievous results. You may select the best possible recruiting district, and yet a Commanding Officer may, in the exercise of a wise discretion, consider it highly inexpedient to take any recruits from it for his own particular Regiment; and you ought to permit him to select from a fresh field, without requiring him to give reasons sufficient to satisfy departments at a distance. If the matter is left entirely to him you may be very sure that, allowing for a few individual aberrations, you will, on the whole, get the best recruits procurable, and where the best recruits are procurable, is the best recruiting district.

part of every Mahratta village community—acting as Village watchmen and messengers, as conservators of boundaries, and taking a part in every ceremony connected with the land of which they claim to be autocthones. They were, probably, the original inhabitants subdued by Hindoo invaders, and reduced to a species of helotage. They are, perhaps, the most numerous race of Purwarries, Mangs, Chambars; and other races answering to the Domes, Passes, &c. of Hindoostan, are also accounted "Purwarries." The Purwarries found in our Army are mostly Mhars, and a few Chambars, and are physically a very fine, energetic, and intelligent race of men.

XV. Or should each Corps be Recruited over a wide area,—in fact, without reference to Districts?

15. Decidedly, in my opinion, without any reference to districts. I can imagine but one reason assigned for indicating peculiar districts whence recruits should be drawn, and that is, a fear lest any single favourite district should obtain a monopoly of the privilege of supplying our Army with recruits, and thereby give them a bond of union other than their duty to Government, and reproduce one of the causes which facilitated the late Mutiny.

But there is little danger of this being the case now, when opinions are much more divided than formerly as to what class of men is preferable as material for Native soldiers—some Officers preferring Sikhs, some Patans, and many continuing to prefer Hindoostanees of various classes and races. But, admitting the danger, it is much more likely to be enhanced than diminished by any prescription of the district whence the recruits are to be drawn, a rule which could hardly fail in time to produce an evil very similar to that which it is intended to remedy.

XVI. Should each Corps be homogeneous as to Race, Tribe, or Caste?

16. In my opinion certainly not. I think such a rule would be most dangerous. A corps of soldiers should have no common bond of union other than their duty to the State, and the rule above described would furnish them with a common bond, rarely consistent with their duty as soldiers, and often diametrically opposed to it. Our great object should be to make the men feel only as soldiers, and, as far as we can, to

sink entirely all considerations of race, tribe, or caste. Experience shows that there is no Military duty, not even service beyond sea, which is found inconsistent with the strict observance of the necessary rules of caste and religion, by men who have the true spirit of soldiers; and it has repeatedly been shown in practice that there is no reason whatever why a man's caste should, in any way, interfere with his ordinary duties as a soldier, or be known to his comrades or Commanding Officer, otherwise than every individual peculiarity must be known.

XVII. If a Corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the Companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each Company consisting of men of one Tribe or Caste, or should the Tribes and Castes be mixed up in each Company?

17. Certainly not. I think it a fundamental principle in any Native Army that no question should ever be raised as to a man's tribe, caste, or religion, except as a matter of identification, like his father's name or surname.

XVIII. If Corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the Races, Tribes, or Castes be entertained?

18. I do not think any rule should be laid down, nor should Officers or men be allowed to consider that such circumstances as race, tribe, or caste had anything to do with the selection of a soldier. No restriction whatever should be placed on the discretion of a Commanding Officer in selecting men, beyond

requiring him to get such men as he can make into good soldiers. Another strong reason against attempting to lay down any fixed rule on such a subject is, that the best proportion must be always altering. What may have been a reasonable proportion a generation or two ago, or even ten years ago, may have become unreasonable now, but your rule once laid down never alters till it has been proved actively mischievous, and has, meantime, often produced incalculable evil.

XIX. If separate Corps are to be maintained for Military and Police purposes, should the Recruiting for both be allowed in the same District, or kept to separate Districts, or should Police Corps be Recruited from a wide area without reference to Districts?

19. I do not think that either with regard to Military or Police, any rule as to the recruiting district should be prescribed to Commanding Officers.

It is most necessary to the efficiency of Police that they should not be allowed to play at soldiers; and if the essential distinction between the Police and the Army is duly observed, I do not see how they can clash in recruiting, any more than the London and Irish Constabulary interfere with the Army at Home.

For Police you require more than one class of men; some (Detectives) must almost necessarily be taken from the district in which they serve; others (Protective Police), may be advantageously men of other Provinces; but both classes should be chosen for qualities different from those required in soldiers, and are spoiled if allowed to consider themselves a Military body.

It seems to me that the non-observance of this distinction between Military and Police is one of the main causes of our present financial embarrassment, and of many of our Military difficulties. When the distinction is not observed, it gives us a Police expensive, and extensive beyond our wants, while as soldiers they are not as efficient a force as might, for the same cost, be entertained.

XX. Would you regard Police Corps as Nurseries from which men might be drawn for the Army Corps?

20. Certainly not; for the reasons above given the two services should be kept as distinct as possible. This opinion does not at all affect my conviction that a certain degree of Military organisation is essential to many branches of the Police force, and that, in general, young Military men make the best European Officers to command Police. No doubt also a Native, who is well fitted for the Police, may often be well qualified as a soldier and *vice versâ*, but the two classes of duties being entirely and essentially distinct, much harm must result from any confusion between them.

XXI. What Agency should be employed for Recruiting in the Districts of the Bombay Presidency, or of its Dependencies, or in Districts of other Presidencies?

21. I do not think any special agency should be employed. Recruiting should be left entirely to Commanding Officers, to be managed by them as they think best.

XXII. Would you employ the same kind of Agency for Recruiting for Police Corps, or a distinct Agency?

22. The same answer applies to this question also.

XXIII. What precautions should be taken before the local Authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connection with Recruits for the Army of the Bombay Presidency?

23. No precautions whatever, as far as I am aware, are needed, and I can imagine none which would not do much more harm than good.

XXIV. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with Recruits for Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency?

24. The last answer applies to this question also.

XXV. Will it be expedient to enlist Natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the Natives of the country, and, if so, should they be formed in separate Regiments, or in Companies, or otherwise?

25. I think it would be a very great, if not a fatal mistake, to look to other tropical countries out of India for recruits for the Non-European portion of our Indian Army. I do not speak of what may be advisable in a sudden emergency, but, as part of our ordinary system, I have heard of, and I can imagine no single reason for such a step, except that such tropical foreigners will be found able to stand the sun as well as Natives, and will be more trustworthy.

As regards the first point—their capacity for standing the extreme heat of an Indian sun,—I would admit, for the sake of argument, that, if men of the tribes I have heard named—Malays, Dyaks, Caffirs, Negroes, &c.—could be dropped down in the midst of a hot weather campaign, as few of them would be likely to die of mere solar heat as if they were Natives of the country. But it is not heat alone which kills men in and after such a campaign; and I know of no reason for hoping that tropical foreigners would be more exempt than Europeans from the diseases which are caused by such heat, combined with bad and insufficient food and shelter, damp and malaria, while they would be far more obnoxious to all that great and fatal class of diseases which are caused or aggravated by mental depression. Judging of such men (of whom I have, of course, little or no personal knowledge), by what I hear and read of them, and by what I do know of other semi-barbarian tropical races with which I am acquainted, I should say that, under adverse circumstances which would only rouse the spirit of the European and increase his powers of endurance, physical as well as mental, the tropical foreigner would sink into apathy and die; and there can be little doubt of their utter helplessness and hopelessness under all trying circumstances, when deprived of the leaders whom they know and to whom they are accustomed—an accident which must often happen in war.

Of all the heroic characteristics which distinguish us as a nation, and which make us what we are, there is none more marked than what is called the "not knowing when we are beaten," the endurance and steadfastness which continues a contest as a matter of duty,

even when all apparent hope of success is gone. Many Asiatic nations, the Turks for instance, and Arabs, have it in a high degree, and some of the races of India; but I never heard it attributed to the tropical foreign races whose enlistment for Indian service is usually advocated, and some of them are said to be remarkably deficient in it, giving up, in a stupid, sullen despair, and refusing all further effort when they believe themselves beaten.

I think there can be little doubt that, in circumstances like the siege of Delhi, and defence of Lucknow, such races would be found less enduring than either Europeans or Natives of India.

I doubt, therefore, whether any real advantage would be found in employing them in active operations, and whether, in the long run, they would be found more capable of bearing the climate than Europeans, or more powerful auxiliaries than Natives of India.

In time of peace they have absolutely no superiority over good Native troops, while, in many points, they are much more troublesome and expensive.

As to their superior fidelity, I think it will be more than doubtful, if they are ever employed in numbers sufficient to make them a real counterpoise to the Natives of India.

They can have to us no single tie but the mercenary one of pay, in which we may be at any time outbid. No sepoy in India can possibly be so purely and entirely mercenary as these tropical foreigners must be. In temporary discontents they may be less likely to join, owing to their general want of sympathy with the bulk of the Native population. But, in any general contest for Empire, they will assuredly be more liable

to corruption, because there is but one single motive to be influenced. The solitary example of Swiss fidelity can hardly be held to disprove the experience of all purely mercenary armies from the beginning of History. They are good for conquest, with both pay and plunder before them, but can never be depended on for defence against an invader, who appears able, as well as willing, to buy them over.

The expedient of relying on such foreigners has again and again been tried by oriental despots, and is, indeed, a stereotyped part of their policy. A body-guard of exotic mercenaries, so pampered and indulged as to leave them nothing to gain by change; so hated by the people as to make their interests one with those of their master; and so small as to put independent action out of the question, has often shown exemplary fidelity to a tyrant. But when such a body outgrows the small dimensions which are essential characteristics of such a guard, it has invariably been found dangerous, and generally fatal to its employer, and in no case has it ever afforded an example which the Government of British India could follow without certain danger and, hardly doubtful, disgrace.

XXVI. If recourse be had to Recruiting in other tropical Countries, which are the Countries and Races to be preferred?

26. This is answered above. There can be no objection to letting any Commanding Officer get men where and how he pleases; and if he has a fancy for men who are not Natives of India, and can get them, let him do so, and try them. I believe the result would be to prevent his wishing to repeat the experi-

ment; but in my opinion no special agency or extra expense should, on any account, be allowed for such a purpose. Every plan of the kind proceeds on the supposition, which I believe to be most erroneous, that Natives of India are not to be trusted; but I hold entirely with General Jacob (*vide* his letter to Sir Charles Trevelyan) that, in the military races of India, we have the best possible material for a Native Indian Army, and that nothing whatever has failed us but our own bad workmanship. Every incident of the last two years seems to me to point to the same conclusion, and I feel convinced, that had the same system been applied to any other materials drawn from any other race with which I am acquainted, the progress of failure and ruin would have been much more rapid.

XXVII. What would be the best Agency to employ for such Recruiting?

27. *Vide supra.* In a mercenary army, no agency should ever be permitted to supersede that which the Commanding Officer of the corps to be recruited may devise for himself.

XXVIII. Should a Company, or Companies of Europeans form a component part of Native Regiments?

28. I should say decidedly not. Such an arrangement must, I should think, be bad for the discipline of Europeans, and utterly destructive to the morals of the Native portion of the corps.

I have never heard any reason assigned for a scheme beset with such manifold inconveniences, except that the Europeans are required as an antidote to suspected

Native treachery, and as a kind of body-guard to the European Officers serving with the Native corps. For any such purpose they seem to me about as effectual as concealed armour against the knife of the assassin, but a poor security at best, and one which renders life hardly worth having, if it can only be preserved on condition of maintaining such safe guards.

It appears to me that, unless we can keep India principally by Native agency, in whose fidelity we can feel the same sort of reasonable confidence which we felt while we were laying the foundations of our Empire, we shall soon become weary if we do not become incapable of holding it. The process of holding the wolf by the ears can never be tolerable as an habitual mode of life, and it becomes impossible when the wolves are counted by tens of millions and the holders of them can never exceed a hundred thousand.

XXIX. If so, should such Company or Companies be enlisted for this special purpose; or be composed of men selected from European Corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European Corps, and subject to periodical relief?

29. *Vide* last answer. I believe any such plan, however modified or disguised, would be the signal, if not the occasion of our Indian Empire slipping from our hands.

XXX. Where should the Barracks of such Companies be placed relatively to the Lines of the Native Troops?

30. *Vide supra.* The idea of keeping one portion of an Army to watch another, and guard against

its proving faithless, seems to me utterly inconsistent with any possible condition of permanent security.

XXXI. Would such Detachments seriously complicate Commissariat arrangements?

31. Very seriously I should think.

XXXII. How should such Companies be Armed, with similar or different Weapons from the Native Troops with whom they would be associated?

32. There should be no difference in the mode of arming owing to difference of race. Any such difference should depend solely on the service the troops are required to perform, and their physical capabilities for bearing arms.

XXXIII. How should the Native Infantry of the Bombay Presidency be Armed?

33. With the best known Infantry weapons adapted in size to the ordinary strength of the men using them.

XXXIV. How should Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency be Armed?

34. According to the service they are required to perform. No one but the Officer Commanding them can well judge what is required, and the question should be left to him, taking care that he does not over-arm his men by trying to make soldiers of them. Staves and swords for the Foot Police, except those who are employed to guard treasuries and prisoners who should have percussion fusees and bayonets,

and swords and light percussion carbines for the Mounted Police, are the arms generally required.

XXXV. Do the advantages of making the Dress of the Native Soldier a close imitation of that of the European Soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. The only advantage I know of is, that the difference between European and Native troops may not be perceptible further off than the colour of the face can be seen. If the dress of the European soldier were what the climate requires, and calculated only for convenience and efficiency, I know no reason why the Native dress should not assimilate to it quite as closely as is necessary for the purpose above specified.

XXXVI. How should the Native Infantry of the Bombay Presidency be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the Native Soldier?

36. A very loose single-breasted frock coat, without collar, just long enough to cover the thighs, loose trowsers, buttoning at the ankle, of cloth in cold weather, and stone-coloured or "kakee" linen in the hot weather, a coloured puggree, a canvas haversack to carry what he requires on the march, waist-belt and pouch, and belts of the natural colour of the leather, without either blacking or pipe-clay. The above makes, so far as I can judge, the best dress and equipment I have seen. It is becoming and serviceable, and most comfortable to the men.

XXXVII. It has been proposed that to every European local Regiment, a Native Irregular

Regiment, officered from that European Regiment alone, should be attached: what is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an Auxiliary Native Regular or Irregular Corps of Infantry in close and permanent association?

37. I do not think, as a general rule, this plan will be found to answer. It would be generally incompatible with the selection of thoroughly-qualified Officers to command Natives, which is, I think, a fundamental principle in the organisation of a sound Native Army. The Native portion of the legion would soon come to be considered inferior to the European, and such feeling of inferiority is quite incompatible with any useful result from such association. Wherever European and Native regiments are together on active service, a strong feeling of attachment, as well as of emulation, grows up between the Europeans and any corps of the Native force which prides itself on being soldier-like; and you may tell with much certainty the spirit which animates a Native regiment, if you observe the feeling between its sepoys and the European soldiers. I could mention numerous instances of this within my own knowledge. Attachments so formed endure for years, and have always excellent effects on both races of soldiers; but I doubt if they would ever be formed by such an arrangement as is indicated in the question, unless very effectual means were taken to prevent the Native portion of the mixed legion being considered an inferior body.

XXXVIII. Do you consider that the association of European Artillerymen, with Gun Lascars and

Native Drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. I think not. The duties to be performed by the men of each race being, in the case of the Artillery, so essentially different.

XXXIX. How would you dispose the Barracks and Lines of the two associated Corps?

39. *Vide* answer to Question XXXVII.

XL. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European Troops which is an element of strength?

40. I think anything which tends to make the Native Army be considered an inferior branch of the Service must do harm to both Officers and men. Officers should be taught to consider service with a Native corps a proof of special qualification and trust. The men should be taught to emulate, as soldiers, the soldier-like qualities of their European brethren. I do not see how this is compatible with the kind of permanent association here spoken of, and, therefore, I think the plan not likely to do good; but I cannot see that such association is at all incompatible with security, or likely to impair the sense of the superior power of Europeans, a knowledge of which is, no doubt, one element of strength.

XLI. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the Service in Peace and War?

41. This could hardly be answered without trying it.

XLII. Is it desirable that the Native Troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of Auxiliary Native Battalions in permanent association with European Corps?

42. The spirit of entire confidence and self-reliance seems to me essential to the idea of a soldier of any kind, and without it he must become not merely an useless, but a most mischievous encumbrance to the State. To train the Native soldier to act in habitual dependence on European support, seems to me to be equivalent to emasculating him, and an Army of such soldiers must be far worse than none at all. It is because, I think, that the plan of Auxiliary Native Battalions in permanent association with European corps is not calculated to promote such habits of self-confidence and reliance, that I doubt its working for the good of the Native portion of the Army. No doubt, however, means might be devised for rendering such association, of Native with European corps, more habitual and permanent than at present, which would be free from such objection, but I do not see the precise object to be gained.

H. B. E. Frere,
Commissioner in Sind.

8*th November* 1858.

INFANTRY.

II.—Military Code and Rules of Discipline.

I. Can you suggest improvement in the Articles of War in use in the Native Army of the Bombay Presidency?

1. I, of course, have no practical experience of their working, but, judging from what I hear and see, the Articles of War for the Native portion of the Bombay Army have always appeared to me to be utterly unsuited to the government of such a force.

2. Their general idea is taken from the Articles of War of Her Majesty's Army, modified with the intention of making them suit Natives of India; but our Native Army differs from our English, and from most European Armies, in several characteristics, which are so important as to make what is suitable for the one quite unsuitable to the other.

3. Our English Army is a national force—our Indian Native Army is, to a much greater extent, a mercenary force. There are powerful feelings to which you can appeal in the one case, and not in the other.

4. The pay and position of an English soldier is, in many respects, inferior to those of the industrious and well conducted of the class whence he is usually taken. Hence simple dismissal, especially during the earlier years of his service, is no punishment. The reverse is the case with the Native soldier—he is better off than the generality of the class whence he is drawn, and simple dismissal is a substantial punishment, involving the loss of an eligible and lucrative employment.

5. On the other hand, the English soldier, after a few years' service, becomes unfitted for earning his livelihood by other occupations, and, if cast adrift, must often beg or starve. This is not the case with the sepoy. There are many professions in our own provinces open to him if he leaves our Army, and he can always, if he wishes, find Military service in the Armies of other States.

6. These two latter considerations point to simple dismissal, at the will of a Commanding Officer, as a punishment, much more effectual, and, at the same time, less liable to abuse from undue severity in the Native than in the British Army. To the Native dismissal is a substantial punishment during the earlier years of service, and later in life does not become absolute ruin, as in the case of the English soldier. Hence the long array of provisions in the Articles of War calculated to enforce the unwilling service of an underpaid English soldier, and to secure him from ruin, when he has long served the State, and become unfit for other employment, are quite inapplicable to the Native soldier.

7. But the main difference of all is, that the English soldier comes of races habituated to self-government, and you can only get good recruits, in large numbers, by letting them see that, however ill-paid and undesirable the service is, in some respects, the soldier has still rights of his own. The non-Miltary classes in England would not, with their eyes open, tolerate paying for an Army of their own countrymen, ruled on purely despotic principles; the Articles of War give to the engagement between the Soldier and the State some semblance of a voluntary compact, and any

breach of the Articles of War becomes a breach of a law—apparently, in some degree, self-imposed, punishment for which, commands little sympathy among Englishmen.

8. Asiatic soldiers, on the other hand, come all of races habituated to despotic government, and, in the dealings of a State with its servants and subjects, they understand and can appreciate no other. The grant of rights which they can enforce against their Sovereign and employer simply puzzles them, and a Code, like the Articles of War, and Army Regulations, by giving rise to vague notions of some ill understood rights, which some unknown authority is apparently suspected of wishing to subvert, creates a vague feeling of suspicion and discontent. Natives much prefer serving under a Master whose wishes and temper, once understood, are to them a law and rule of conduct, of which they know the exact provisions and obligations. An Englishman asks "what are my rights and duties," the Asiatic guesses what they will be by the answer to his question, which is always "who is my Master?" and of all the intricacies and divided responsibilities of our present system this is a question to which he can rarely get a clear and decided answer. In some respects his Adjutant or Commanding Officer, the Brigadier or Adjutant General, the Commander in Chief or Governor in Council, are all, more or less, his Masters; but he can never clearly understand the exact relation of each authority to the other, still less can he find the one Master whose will to him is law, for he still perceives, behind the Government itself, some power which prevents the Government from being absolutely despotic.

9. That the Natives infinitely prefer the individual

despotism is clear from the preference they always show for it, when the two forms of subordination are presented to their choice. Service in an Irregular corps is always preferred to a Regular one; and no one can deal long with Natives, without finding that they prefer serving a man they know and can trust, and that they will rely on his arbitrary will, rather than get the most binding charter of rights that ever was written on paper by a man whom they do not know.

10. In all that General Jacob has written and published on this subject, I most fully agree. Rules and laws of some kind there must be, but they should be confined to a definition of Who is to be obeyed. The authority of the immediate Commanding Officer should be made supreme over all Natives who are placed under his orders, to the extent of dismissing them from the Service; and he should be held strictly responsible to a superior Commanding Officer, up to the Commander in Chief, for the mode in which the authority so given is exercised. But the responsibility should be always retrospective in the shape of praise or blame for what always is done, and should never involve the necessity of applying for previous sanction. Whatever appears soundest and best, in the way of rules for such exercise of authority, should be embodied in Manuals and Text Books, which leave an opening for discretion and judgment; and should never assume the form of blind and unalterable law.

II. Should the Special Rules regulating punishments in the Native Army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the Rules which obtain in the British Army?

2. Regarding the kinds of punishments, there should, I think, be no distinction whatever, subjecting one class of troops to punishments from which others are exempt. The arguments for special rules for each kind of force are all founded on the difference between the two Armies already noticed: the European soldier being often the unwilling servant, who is to be retained in the service by fear of punishment—the sepoy being the voluntary member of a service, explusion from which is, in itself, severe punishment. In a service like the latter, I can imagine no reason for any peculiar Military Code at all: offences against discipline and Military orders can be severely punished by simple privation, temporary or entire, of all advantages of the Service; while, for any other offence, the general code may be so arranged as to inflict sufficient penalty. There is no so-called Military offence which does not, in its essence, constitute Civil crime, and which might be punished as such, if proper provision were made in the general code.

III. Does the System of Native Courts Martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay Army?

3. I believe their working depends very much on the superintending European Officer, to whose opinion they are very apt to show more deference than is consistent with independent judgment. I have rarely heard complaints, such as I have seen stated against the system in the Bengal Army, that Native Courts Martial are unduly lenient; perhaps the contrary is oftener the case in Bombay.

I do not think Native Courts Martial should ever be allowed, except as delegates of authority conferred on them by the Commanding Officer. He should be

the sole and supreme Judge over the men, and the occasions must be rare in which such delegation can be necessary or advisable.

IV. What means are adopted to acquaint the Native Troops of the Bombay Army with the Military Code under which they live and are governed?

4. I know of none, except the periodical reading on Parade of the Articles of War, which, I imagine, are understood by but few; and even if thoroughly understood, they would teach little without a thorough knowledge of the glosses supplied by Departmental Rules and General Orders, with which but few even of the European Officers in a Regiment have more than a superficial acquaintance.

V. What proportion of the Native Troops can read for themselves, in the Vernacular dialect, the Articles of War?

5. I cannot say.

VI. Under what Military or Civil Code are Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency?

6. Under the General Regulations, especially those noted in the margin. There are some Circular Orders of the Sudder Adawlut and of Government relating to Police Corps generally, in force, but they have never been separately collected or codified. They do not apply to Sind, where the only orders affecting the Police are

Bombay Regulations XII. of 1827, IV. of 1830, and III. of 1833.

those issued by the late Governor and the Civil Commissioners who succeeded him.

VII. How is Discipline maintained, and the Authority of Officers, European and Native, upheld in Police Corps in the Bombay Presidency?

7. Mainly, I believe, by the power of dismissal.

VIII. Do you consider the provision made for maintaining the Discipline of Police Corps, and the Authority of their European and Native Officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. I believe in the old Provinces of Bombay the pay is generally very low, and the penalty of dismissal, in consequence, not heavy; the discipline is, therefore, of necessity, more lax than it ought to be. In Sind, where the pay is better in proportion to the ordinary rate of wages, the working of the system is quite satisfactory; and it would be so everywhere if the Police were adequately paid.

(Signed) H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

II.—Military Code and Rules of Discipline. (SIND).

(No replies required to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.)

VI. Under what Military or Civil Code are Police Corps in Sind?

6. The Police in Sind are subject merely to the ordinary Civil Regulations, and to such general Rules as may, from time to time, be laid down by the Captain of Police, under the authority of the Commissioner in Sind, and the Bombay Government.

VII. How is Discipline maintained, and the Authority of Officers, European and Native, upheld in Police Corps in Sind?

7. The Captain of Police has absolute power of appointment, promotion, and dismissal, of all men and officers of the force, subject, of course, to the general authority of the Commissioner and Government. This is found ample for the maintenance of discipline and authority.

VIII. Do you consider the provision made for maintaining the Discipline of Police Corps, and the Authority of their European and Native Officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. Yes; it is by far the best organised, best disciplined, and most efficient Police I have known or heard of in India. I know of no change which it would be desirable to introduce, beyond raising the pay of some branches, and in some localities where a general rise of wages has placed the Policeman in a less favourable position than he formerly occupied as compared with the day labourer.

(Signed) H. B. E. Frere,
Commissioner in Sind.

III.—Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards. (SIND).

From Nos. 1 to 16, inclusive, no repliès required.

XVII. How should the Sind Police Corps be Officered—the question applying both to European and Native Commissioned Grades?

17. The present number of European Officers is hardly sufficient. There should be one Captain and one Lieutenant or Adjutant of Police in each of the three Divisions; and a Superintendent with an Assistant over the whole Province. The European Officers should be generally taken from the Army; but Uncovenanted Officers, if otherwise fit, should not be excluded.

The Native Officers should be, as at present, promoted at the discretion of the Captain and Superintendent from the ranks of the Police. Their pay at present is too low, and should be raised.

XVIII. If Irregular Corps and Police Corps have Native Commissioned Officers, and Regular Corps have no Native Commissioned Officers, but only Good Service Pay and Pensions as an incitement to Good Conduct and Efficiency, will the higher Pay to Privates and Non-Commissioned Officers suffice to render the Regular as popular as the Irregular and Police Corps, and to draw as good Recruits?

18. I should say decidedly not. Native Officers are, in my opinion, absolutely essential in any Military body composed of Natives.

XIX. In the Sind Police Corps is there, on first admission, any Test or Examination as to capabilities of reading or writing; or are qualifications tested on Promotion to Non-Commissioned Grades, or on Promotion to Commissioned Grades?

19. There is no test beyond what the Captain and Lieutenant of Police may chose to impose. The selection rests entirely with them, and I do not think it could be in better hands.

(No replies required to Nos. 20 and 21.)

(Signed) H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

III.—Organisation, Promotion, and Rewards.

I. In the Native Regiments of the Bombay Army what is the System of Promotion: is it based on Merit alone, or Seniority alone, or on Merit and Seniority combined?

1. On merit and seniority combined. The senior who is thoroughly qualified is generally taken; but simple seniority and merely blameless service confer no insuperable claim.

II. Are the Native Officers of the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. I should say remarkably so. They are, as a body, excellent Officers.

III. Are their acquirements usually of a higher Grade than those of the Men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. Yes: as far as I have seen, they are very generally much superior to the average of the ranks from which they rise.

IV. Is there any Test or Examination prior to Promotion to a Commissioned Grade, or in Promotion from one Commissioned Grade to another?

4. None that I know of. The man's character, as known to his European Officers, is the test.

V. Does the intervention of the Native Officers between the European Officers and their Men weaken the influence of the European Officers?

Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the Native Commissioned Officer?

5. As far as my observation goes, I should say the intervention of the Native Officers between the European Officers and their men greatly added to, if it be not essential to, the full influence of good European Officers. I cannot see how the legitimate influence of the European Officer could be communicated to the men generally without the intervention of the Native Officers.

I should think a full complement of European Officers must militate against the professional efficiency of the Native Commissioned Officers. The best managed Regiments I have known have generally been those in which the complement of European Officers was far from complete. There is not occupation with a Native

corps of the Bombay Army, in time of peace, for more than three or four Officers, and if more are present they not only take work which is better left to, because it is better done by, Native Officers, but deteriorate themselves for want of full employment. I believe it is different in the Madras Army, where the system affords more occupation to the European Officer without interfering with the Native Officers.

VI. Has it been found in the Bombay Army that, on the occurrence of Mutinies, the Native Officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European Officers to check Mutiny? Have the Native Officers sided with the Mutineers or with the European Officers?

6. In all the cases—three in number—in Sind, which came under my personal observation, the Native Officers gave information of the disaffection of their men. In each case the information was given in time to prevent a successful rising; and, in at least one case, it was given long beforehand, and in such a manner as admitted of every precaution being taken.

In none of these cases did any of the Native Officers openly side with the mutineers, but some were suspected of secretly conniving at their plot.

In the Sind Horse, under great and continued temptation, the Native Officers behaved with exemplary fidelity as well as intelligence. No mutiny took place where they were quartered, but they aided to obtain information of an intended rising of the Frontier tribes, and to arrest the ringleaders exactly as European Officers, with the same opportunities, might have done. In their own ranks, there never was a single

case of even well-grounded suspicion of want of fidelity in either Officers or men; and their simple presence kept to its duty another notoriously disaffected corps of Bengal Irregular Cavalry which were quartered at the same place.

VII. Should the Grades of Native Commissioned Officers be continued, or discontinued, in the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army?

7. I consider it essential to the very existence of a useful Native Army, that Native Officers should be continued very much as at present, but they should be differently treated. The number of European Officers with a Native corps should be diminished; they should be all selected men. The work of Officers of companies should all be done by the Native Officers; and they should not be the puppets of a formal system of drill and paper returns.

VIII. Is the substitution of an European Serjeant and Corporal to each Company of a Native Regiment, in lieu of its Native Officers, advisable?

8. I should say that unless the Serjeant and Corporal were fully equal to most European Commissioned Officers, the effects of such an arrangement would be fatal to the Native Army, and even if they were so qualified, the arrangement would be mischievous in the extreme.

I entirely concur with what has been recorded by many eminent authorities, and especially by General Jacob, as to the absolute necessity, if we would keep India, that we should allow none but educated European gentlemen, in feeling and principles, and if pos-

sible, by birth and station, to have any immediate connection, as Officers, with our Native Army; and no more of them than can be supplied with full and responsible employment.

The substitution of two European Non-Commissioned Officers for the Native Officers of each company would, if the Europeans were not superior to the generality of that class, at present, exclude all the best Native soldiers from our ranks, and add infinitely to the hostility of race, of which we have lately had so many symptoms, and which, unless corrected, must lead to irreparable evil and disaster. I can conceive few single measures better calculated, speedily and irretrievably, to ruin our Native Army.; and however individually excellent the Europeans may be, it is morally and physically impossible that they should ever supply the place which the present race of Native Officers fill in the Bombay Army—by forming a link between the European Commissioned Officer and his men.

But, while they would not form such a substitute for what we have got, even if fully equal, as Officers and gentlemen, to our present race of Commissioned Officers, they would, in other ways, be a very mischievous superfluity. There is not work enough to afford full regular occupation for even one active-minded European in a well-disciplined company of Natives, and the two Europeans must, like all half-idle men, become actively mischievous to an extent directly proportioned to their capacity for fuller employment.

IX. If the abolition of the Grade of Native Commissioned Officers be advisable, and the prospect

of distinction and emolument thus closed to the Native Soldier, would a graduated scale of Good Service Pay and Retiring Pensions, claimable after specified periods of Services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the Commissioned Grades?

9. I should think certainly not. Our best Native Officers and soldiers do not serve simply for pay, but for distinction, and would not enter at all if debarred promotion to posts of influence and honour. I do not think, from all I can learn, that Good Service Pay and Pension at all influence men till they have been some time in the service. They have a great effect in deciding the old soldier to serve on or to retire, and in influencing his conduct while such rewards are in near prospect; I should much doubt if they ever influence a recruit, as the prospect of promotion to honorable office certainly does.

X. Have Retiring Pensions proved effectual in attaching the Native Troops to the British Service?

10. They have, no doubt, had a considerable effect, but I think we impair that effect by giving the pension indiscriminately, and as a right, to good and bad soldiers indifferently, and on medical examination which gives rise to much malingering.

XI. Should not the System of Promotion generally by Seniority to the Grades of Native Commissioned Officers (if these are retained) be altered, and Promotion for Merit and Efficiency be the Rule?

11. I should say yes, assuredly.

XII. Should the System of Pensions, as now in force by Regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

12. I think no pensions should be given as matter of right.

They should be given, at the recommendation of the Commanding Officer, to men of a certain age and of approved service, when disabled by loss of health or worn out in the service. Instead of the present matter-of-course-pension, I would propose that after a certain number of years of good service the soldier should, if he wished it, and if his Commanding Officer approved, be absolved from further ordinary duty, continuing to receive a certion portion of his pay on condition that he presents himself for muster periodically at the fixed Head Quarters of the Regiment, does duty there, at a slightly enhanced rate of pay, for a number of days, in each year, sufficient to keep up his drill, and is ready to be called out for permanent garrison duty when summoned by proclamation, becoming eligible for pension and exemption from further service when fairly worn out.

The benefits I should expect from such a system would be—

1*st.*—Some reduction in the expense of the Pension List.

2*nd.*—A reduction in the number of men necessary for the Peace Establishment of a Regiment.

3*rd.*—We should have always at hand a force of old soldiers sufficient, with a few recruits, to take much garrison duty, and set free, for distant service, a large and very efficient proportion of our Army on the Active Establishment.

I have always seen reason to believe that pensions,

when fairly earned, and given with discrimination to men who have given the best part of their lives to the State, have a very beneficial effect, and that the money is well laid out; and this belief has been in no way modified by the fact, apparently well attested, that large numbers of pensioners in the North-Western Provinces behaved as badly, and some even worse, than the general run of mutinous soldiers. The classes whence they were drawn, their habits and feelings, were all identical with those of the sepoys; and it was even less matter of surprise that a pensioner should misbehave, than a man in active service. Old servants, whether of the State or private individuals, are proverbially discontented. It is notorious that the inhabitants of Chelsea and Greenwich Hospitals are, as a body, less content with their position than their brethren on active service. But we must look for the effect of the pension, not to the pensioner, but to the expectant, and on the public at large. Whatever fault a Native may find with our Government, he generally makes some exceptions, grounded on the liberality and the good faith of our Government in this matter. And I much doubt if the same effect would be produced were the amount of the Pension List added to the pay of men on active service. I think it a mistake to judge of the effect of pensions, or any similar arrangement, from what occurs during an exceptional period like that of the late mutinies. It was unmistakably a period of national delirium; and it is not the best mode of guarding against a recurrence of the paroxysm, to treat the patient as though his delirious ravings and acts were any guide to his ordinary course of conduct when in his sober senses.

XIII. What is the Charge to the State of Military Pensions to Native Officers and Men of the Bombay Army?

13. I am not aware of the exact amount.

XIV. Are Native Commissioned Officers generally fit to take part in Courts Martial?

14. I should say they were generally proportionately as well qualified for such duty as the Officers of any other Army I know. I have occasionally obtained their assistance as assessors on Civil trials, and have always had reason to be satisfied with their efficiency.

XV. Are Native Commissioned Officers on a par with European Sergeants and Corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

15. I should say, generally, that, in professional intelligence, the Native Commissioned Officers were, as a body, very much superior to the general run of European Non-Commissioned Officers; and for duty with Natives very conspicuously superior in efficiency. Sometimes, as in the Sind Horse, they seem to me even better fitted for detached duty than great numbers of English Commissioned Officers. I have no doubt whatever that, as far as regimental duties go, Native Officers are to be got, for our Indian Army, as efficient, generally as any large number of European Officers we could spare for such duty. It is as Commanding Officers that the superiority of the selected European is very decided.

XVI. If separate Corps are to be maintained for

Military and Police purposes, what will be the best organisation for the Military Corps?

1. Should they be fully Officered with Native Commissioned Grades as well as with European Officers, or—
2. Fully Officered with European, but have no Native Commissioned Grades, or—
3. Be Officered like Irregular Corps, viz. have the full complement of Native Commissioned Officers, with but a few European Officers?

16. I should say—

1*st*.—That the separation of Military from Police corps was imperative.

2*nd*.—That every Native Regiment should be officered on the third of the plans above alluded to, with a full complement of Native Commissioned Officers, and with not more than three or four European Officers—all of them selected men. There are few things connected with India regarding which I feel more strongly convinced than that this is the least costly, because it is the most efficient, mode of officering Native Regiments.

XVII. How should the Police Corps be Officered, the question applying both to European and Native Commissioned Grades?

17. Fully with Native Officers; and from one to three European Officers, according to the character of the people and the work to be done.

XVIII. If Irregular Corps and Police Corps have Native Commissioned Officers, and Regular Corps

have no Native Commissioned Officers, but only Good Service Pay and Pensions as an incitement to Good Conduct and Efficiency, will the higher Pay to Privates and Non-Commissioned Officers suffice to render the Regular as popular as the Irregular and Police Corps, and to draw as good Recruits?

18. Having expressed an opinion above adverse to any such scheme, I need only add that I do not think any possible amount of Good Service Pay and Pension would make the Regular as popular as the Irregular corps, or draw to them as good recruits.

XIX. In Police Corps, is there, on first admission, any Test or Examination as to capabilities of reading and writing; or are qualifications tested on Promotion to Non-Commissioned Grades, or on Promotion to Commissioned Grades?

19. I believe not. It is, as far as I know, left entirely to Commanding Officers of Police corps to impose or withdraw such tests—any such test, if rigorously applied, must exclude some of the best natural-born Policemen.

XX. Has the distinct organisation and the difference of System, Regulations, and component Races in the three Native Armies proved favourable to our power in India?

20. I believe it has been one of the main causes of our safety lately. I do not see how, if the three Armies had been assimilated, the late mutiny could have been otherwise than universal, and India, for the time at least, must have been lost to us.

I am convinced few things can be more dangerous to our power than compulsory uniformity.

XXI. Should a certain degree of distinctness of System, Organisation, and Composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate, or even to amalgamate, the three Armies?

21. I think that all such individual peculiarities as indicate individual character should not only be allowed, but encouraged. I cannot imagine any really healthy organisation existing without them. Whenever the local Government recommended any peculiar arrangement, on the ground of its being called for by temporary or local circumstances, the presumption should always be, that they had good grounds for so thinking, and the point should always be conceded, unless some very clear and obviously valid objection could be stated. The reverse of this has been our usual policy. The peculiarity may not be, in truth, really necessary in itself, but it is an absolutely necessary symptom of that which distinguishes the separate individual from the lifeless copy, and its removal destroys individuality.

It must be borne in mind that there is no such thing as stereotyping any branch of the administration of human affairs, least of all is such a process possible in the organisation of an Army. Thirty years of profound peace may, and often has, changed the best Army of the age into a set of lifeless automata, easily defeated by any rabble which had the individual spirit and other characteristics of a living body. It may be

fairly doubted whether any great General ever found his Army ready made to his hand. Reorganisation, more or less in accordance with his own personal views and temporary exigencies, has usually been his first task.

But though no Army can maintain its perfection for more than a few years, and constant change for the better or the worse is as much a law of nature in Armies as in all other human contrivances, much may be done to defer decay, and to keep up, in time of peace, that spirit and martial pride, that fidelity to a particular dynasty or service, and those other characteristics which will be most useful when the body comes to be remodelled to suit some future exigency. All assimilation, no matter to how perfect a model, which aims at removing individual peculiarities, has a tendency to injure such characteristics of vitality, and consequently to hasten decay.

There are, in my opinion, but very few points in which diversity of system causes any practical inconvenience, even when the diverse bodies are serving together. Diversity of organisation or composition is of comparative little consequence if each separate body be large, and commanded by its own Officers; and I can think of no points save the rates of pay for similar arms, the mode of promotion of Officers likely to command, and the general principles of formation in the field, in which diversity can be a real practical inconvenience, and regarding which assimilation is desirable.

I cannot but think that any attempt to assimilate the Indian Armies to each other, beyond those points in which diversity is of practical importance in the field, must hasten the deterioration of the whole body.

The course I would, in preference, most strongly recommend is, the direct reverse of assimilation and amalgamation. The unwieldy size of our Bengal Native Army was, no doubt, one element of its ruin, by precluding any Officer, but more especially the Commander in Chief, with his five years' tenure of office, from gaining even a general knowledge of the whole body. It seems to me that our Indian forces should be re-divided into at least four, if not more, Armies, so as to admit of a really active Commander in Chief gaining a general knowledge of the whole body under his command; and the utmost latitude in organisation should be allowed to local authorities within the limits imposed by a due regard for the finances of the Empire.

Even with regard to the three points on which I admit assimilation to be, in some respects, desirable, there are exceptions and limitations so numerous as almost to negative the rule. For instance, it is doubtless desirable that the rates of pay for similar arms should be, in some respects, similar; yet this must be subject to many local variations. Every Military man knows the inconvenience of having the same rate of pay for service in an expensive Presidency town and at a cheap Outstation. The best Military races in India, who will serve for seven Rupees in the Valley of the Ganges, or at the Nizam's, Hydrabad, will not voluntarily take service in Sind on 10 Rupees; and the Irregular Cavalry soldier, who finds 20 Rupees enough for himself and his horse in one part of India, would starve on 30 Rupees in another. It is only, therefore, when different bodies of the same arm are serving together, in the same place, that uniformity should be insisted

on. So in the promotions of Officers likely to command, A system, say that of Seniority, which might answer admirably for Engineers or Artillery, might fail to secure in Cavalry the youthful vigor and dash required for a good Captain of a troop. Again, a system which secures the flower of our aristocracy for Her Majesty's Household troops, might fail to secure good Officers for distant and inconspicuous service in a tropical climate. Even with regard to formation in the field, much allowance must be made for national character. The formation which suits the steady and enduring English soldier is not equally liked by the impetuous Frenchman. The diversities of national character in our Indian Army are, at least, as great as among the nations of Europe; and the Oude or Seikh Sepoy, the Affreedee and the Goorkha, have each their favourite mode of fighting; and some of them must act to disadvantage if all are compelled to adopt any one uniform mode of formation.

(Signed) H. B. E. Frere,
Commissioner in Sind.

IV.—European Officers.

I. Within your experience, have the powers of Commanding Officers of Native Corps been increased, or diminished, in the Bombay Army, and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the Service to which you attribute such effect?

1. During the twenty-four years for which I have known many portions of the Bombay Native Army very intimately, the powers of Commanding Officers of Native corps have been much diminished, and, I believe, on the testimony of those who knew the Army before I did, that the diminution of powers of Commanding Officers had been progressive from a much earlier date. The Commanding Officer of former days was to his men a complete impersonation of the Government in all its functions and branches,—this character has gradually been lost, till he is now, in four out of five regiments, so comparatively powerless, that a clever man, even a soldier in the ranks, may often successfully contend with, thwart him, and bring him into contempt.

From fear of such a result, Commanding Officers habitually avoid, as far as they can, the responsibility of exercising such powers as they still retain, and refer to superior authority, when there is no real necessity for so doing, so that, in practice, the loss of power is even greater than would be supposed, from the simple action of the orders which have curtailed it.

An enumeration of the orders and measures which have conduced to this result, would embrace almost every one at all affecting the powers of Commanding Officers; for the tendency has been universal and constant, and has not been confined to the Military Department alone, but has pervaded our whole administration, Military and Civil.

It is, however, by no means entirely the result of any orders or measures directly affecting the power of Commanding Officers. In former days, when communication was slow and uncertain, the Commanding Officer was always able, and was often forced to exer-

cise an amount of despotic power far beyond what was granted by Regulation. The reverse is now the case; and every facility for travelling or sending letters has not only directly diminished the authority of Commanding Officers by facilitating appeal from it, but by encouraging him to refer when he ought to act. The change is, in fact, only the result of the universal tendency of civilised administration in quiet times to centralise authority—a tendency which, in itself, is no doubt conducive to energy and vigour of administration, if the centralisation be by individuals, and not, as it is almost invariably in India, by departments.

This seems to me to have been our great and almost universal mistake. If there were a chain of men, from the private soldier to the Commander in Chief, each in his own rank subordinate to the one above him, the centralisation would be true and natural, the authority and responsibility of every man in the Army would be clearly and unmistakeably defined, and the result would be that subordination to a single will, in every portion of the Army, large or small, which is the essence of Military discipline.

But this has not been the course of our policy in India. We have multiplied independent departments, till it is next to impossible to find any man who has authority over others, and is subject himself to no more than one authority above him; and it is often most difficult to define the exact limits of the several concurrent authorities. Besides the Commander in Chief, his Adjutant, and Quartermaster General, whose authority in practice is much greater than that of the mere administrative staff of the Commander in Chief, the Regimental Commanding Officer has to do with a

Civil Government, a Pay and Audit Department, an Engineer, a Medical, a Clothing, an Ordnance and a Commissariat Department, none of them completely responsible to the Commander in Chief, and some of them so far independent of him, as frequently to be able successfully to defy his authority. Their relations to each other are often not very distinctly defined, and the result is a general hesitation to act, and a preference for referring, and asking for instructions which are utterly destructive of all vigour of administration and of sound discipline in the Army.

This is comparatively little felt in quiet times, and a certain fulness and punctuality of returns and paper-work offer a fallacious compensation for the endless delays and real loss of power. But when any necessity arises for really active operations, the machine refuses to work. It is adapted only for regular course of post, quiet offices, and a legion of clerks; and, in any time of difficulty, like that of the past year, one of three things necessarily happens: 1*st*—either a great disaster or some shameful mismanagement occurs; or, 2*ndly*, with or without such preliminary, some man assumes, and the departments submit to, a power of command greater than the regulations would grant him, and the machine goes on working under him as the supreme authority; or, 3*rdly*, which is perhaps the most common course, each department throws over-board more or less of its routine Regulation,—the strong and energetic overbear the weak and apathetic, and, after much unnecessary loss and enormous expense, a fresh system is extemporised, to endure for the period of active service, and be then superseded by a return to the old routine system.

There can be no doubt that many of our Army departments have grown far beyond the proportions which are necessary, and that the Army would be far better administered if they were made auxiliary to regimental wants, and subordinate to regimental authority. Let any one contrast the organisation and *service* efficiency of a Bombay Troop of Horse Artillery, still more those of a regiment of good Irregular Cavalry, with a corps of Regular Cavalry or Infantry, and it will be speedily apparent how little the latter gain in service efficiency, for the greater amount of their dependence on the Clothing, Ordnance, Remount, and Commissariat Departments; and for the greater amount of trouble they give to the Pay and Audit, the Engineer, and Medical Departments.

All these departments are among the greatest and least controlable sources of our heavy and increasing Military expenditure, and their reduction, within limits suited to our finances, appears to me not only possible but essential to the existence of our Empire. It seems to me that we must revert to our old system, centralise by individuals rather than by departments, and, as one step in that direction, adopt generally a regimental organisation, resembling that of the Irregular in place of the Regular portion of our Army.

That is to say, we must make the Commanding Officer not only the Commandant on parade, but the authority through whom the men are not to be housed, clothed, and fed, horsed and provided with carriage,—but made to house, clothe, feed, and horse themselves, and to provide carriage for themselves when it is required.

That this may be done, and the *service* efficiency of

each corps enormously increased, and at much less cost to the State, has been repeatedly proved, not only by argument, but in practice. The only difficulty is, that it will tolerate no really inefficient men in the chain between the Commander in Chief and the Officer Commanding the regiment. I must admit that, in practice, and, as the world goes, this is a great difficulty, but not, I think, by any means insuperable. There is no inherent difficulty in the selection of efficient Officers to command regiments, and for all ranks above that grade, and the only real difficulty seems to me to lie in the appointment of the man, able, energetic, and self-denying enough to commence the change, which must begin at Head Quarters, and which involves the sacrifice, so difficult to a zealous and active man, of the habit of minute interference, first adding greatly to his labour, while he is compelling those in command under him to think and act for themselves.

II. During the above period, have the powers of Officers of European or Native Corps been increased or diminished?

2. Very much diminished; partly by changes in Regulation which directly or indirectly curtail the powers of European Officers, but even more from causes which only incidentally affect them, *e. g.* the immense demand for Officers for staff employ. This withdrew from their corps many of the best Officers, and made others wish to leave, and often left corps without any Company Officers of ability and experience. Regiments have, I think, often of necessity become to a much greater extent than formerly what are called

" Adjutant's Regiments," in which Company Officers have little, if any, real authority.

I think that frequent foreign service, and Sir Charles Napier's administration, while in command of a very large proportion of the Bombay Army, in Sind, did much to check the degeneracy and loss of power of European Officers generally (though I think some of the remedies Sir Charles Napier proposed, *e. g.* an increase to the number of European Officers with each Native corps, were not well calculated to attain the object he had in view). But no one has done more both by his writings and example to restore the European Officer to his proper position than General John Jacob.

III. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of Commanding Officers of Corps upon the Discipline of Corps in the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army ?

3. The diminution in the powers and influence of Commanding Officers of corps has, as far as my observation goes, been most injurious in the Native Army, and from the effects I have witnessed in some extreme cases, I am only surprised that it has not been fatal to all discipline. I can only account for its not being so, by the power of what it is the fashion to call the " traditions" of the service, and the extreme docility of the raw element of which the Army is composed. Still the change for the worse has been so marked that I doubt not a very few years' perseverance in the same course would be utterly and entirely ruinous to the discipline of the Army, and a catastrophe as extensive

and fatal as has just occurred in the Bengal Army would be inevitable.

IV. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of Captains, or Officers in charge of Companies ?

4. In some regiments Captains of companies have, from accidental circumstances, and the absence of Captains on medical certificate and staff employ, been almost unknown for years, and the influence of Officers in charge of companies has, as above stated, generally decreased. The effect has been, I think, very bad, where Officers were left with the regiments in nominal charge of companies, and with little or nothing really to do. But I do not think that, under any circumstances, the company work of one or even several companies of Native Infantry is sufficient to afford adequate employment to an European Officer, and I would leave it all to Native Officers, under European control. I believe Company Officers in the Madras Army have much more to do than in Bombay—but much of it is duty not of a description to attract Officers in general, or to afford them such interesting employment as is essential, in this country, to prevent moral stagnation and corruption.

V. Upon what does the discipline of a Corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a Native Corps ? Upon the distant authority of Head Quarters, or upon the authority and influence of Officers in Command of Companies, and of the Commanding Officer of the Regiment ?

5. The discipline of a Native corps, on service, or

elsewhere, seems to me to depend mainly on the character and influence of the European Officers belonging to it.

But I cannot see how the three authorities commanding the companies, the regiment and the Army, can be separated, nor how one can be weak and uninfluential without impairing the powers of the other.

The question seems to me to imply some ambiguity in the use of the word "discipline," which it would be very desirable to remove.

I understand by discipline not merely drill, or dress, or martial appearance on parade, or even a clean defaulters' roll, but an organisation which subjects many men to the will of one, which enables that one man to move the multitude, as much as possible like one man, according to his single will, with the greatest practicable ease and celerity, and to concentrate their powers with the greatest possible amount of force on any one spot.

If this be the discipline aimed at, every Officer who contributes to it, as a channel of the supreme authority, from the corporal to the Commander in Chief, is, in his own degree, equally essential to discipline; he simply transmits according to his rank a greater or smaller amount of the supreme power, and can no more be dispensed with, or impaired in power, without injury to the whole result, than a nerve can be rendered powerless at the shoulder, without affecting the action of the hand. The Captain of a company is simply the channel for Commanding so many rank and file, the Regimental Commander so many Captains, the General so many regiments; all are equally necessary to the working of the whole machine, and neither

can be weakened, without diminishing the power to direct and move, of which he is the channel.

But our system in India has been something very different from this. With a very few and rare exceptions, for a quarter of a century past, our Commanders in Chief have been merely the heads of an office for conducting many of the details of the Military administration. It seems to me an abuse of terms to talk of their *powers*, for they exercised little, but the power of checking action in others. Living at Bombay, Poona, or Mahableshwar, rarely, if ever, visiting any other station of the Army, with very few opportunities for knowing the Officers, and still fewer for knowing the men of the Native Army, they left the administration entirely to the Military Departments, which would gradually have drawn to themselves the whole administrative functions of the Army, had not the posts been often filled by men who saw and lamented the inevitable tendencies of the system to which they belonged, and did their best to retard the evil, which they could not altogether prevent. The great and beneficial influence exercised by Sir C. Napier was shown as a General of Division, not as Commander in Chief; and Lord F. Fitzclarence came too late in life to India, and did not live to turn to account the knowledge of his Army which he spared no pains to acquire; with a few such exceptions, I know of no Officer in high Command since I came to India who can say that he endeavoured to make the Army in any way a better Army than he found it, while, during the whole period, the bonds which held men and Officers together, and which made them an Army, were gradually relaxed. Discipline, under such cir-

cumstances, can be no more than a form, and, for the maintenance of what can survive such treatment, the Drill Master is probably a more powerful agent than Officers commanding companies or regiments, or even than the Head Quarters of the Army.

VI. Should the power of Commanding Officers, and of Officers in charge of Companies, be increased or diminished?

6. The power of Commanding Officers of regiments should, I think, be made as extensive as possible. As there should, I think, be no more than three or four European Officers with each regiment there would be no European Officers of Companies.

VII. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of Discipline?

7. The improvement of discipline must, I think, begin with the highest class of Officers.

The Commander in Chief in India should be entirely exempt from all details of Commanding any Army, and his duties should be exclusively those of supervision and control. The Armies should be rearranged so as to give to each Commander in Chief under him not more than 40, or, at most, 50,000 men, and these men he should be required really to inspect and report on; manœuvring large bodies every year in time of peace in temporary camps of exercise, and furnishing reports to the Commander in Chief in India. A similar system should be carried out by all Officers Commanding Divisions and Brigades. If the superior Officers did their duty the improvement would speedily descend to the lowest ranks in the Army.

But it is absolutely necessary that all such superior Officers should be men capable of active service, and not, as is so often the case at present, men quite passed work, appointed to command, when they ought to be pensioned.

Native regiments should have not more than four European Officers—all selected men, and should be as independant of the great Army Departments as our best Irregular Cavalry.

VIII. Is the influence of the European Officers, among Native Troops, greatest in time of Peace or in time of War?

8. No doubt in time of War. The Native soldier learns his duty so easily, and gives so little trouble in garrison, that the Officers and men are much less brought together in time of peace; but it is by his habitual conduct, at all times, in peace as well as in war, that the European Officer gains the influence which is so essential in time of war.

IX. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with Native Troops in times of Peace, with regard to the Strength at which Regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. I would regulate the strength according to the exigencies of the service, and the financial condition of the country, keeping up the Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers at a fixed number, and reducing or augmenting the rank and file as required for service. I should think 600 men per regiment ample as the ordinary Peace Establishment.

Recruits should be entertained and drilled at the permanent Head Quarters of the Regiments, which would always furnish a reserve force. I would keep up, in time of peace, no more men than were really wanted for duty. In Camps of Exercise they should be trained to throw up earth-works, and entrench and hut themselves; but I think it a mistake to keep up a superfluity of soldiers with any idea of habitually employing their labour on other than Military duties. Every facility should be given to European soldiers to amuse and employ themselves off duty, for their own personal benefit; but it is less necessary for Natives, and even in the case of Europeans, I would never make a duty of any but Military labour, including such as may be useful on service. It is desirable that the sepoys should be well instructed in all such kinds of labour, and esteem them as honorable as any other form of duty. This is, I think, the case generally with our Bombay sepoys, and I have never heard of their refusing to work in trenches &c., but it should, I think, be less optional than it is at present, and be made regular matter of instruction.

X. Has the Strength of the Native Infantry of the Bombay Army ever been so great in times of Peace that it might have been in part employed, otherwise than on mere Military duties?

10. In general, ever since I have known the Bombay Army, it has been hardly worked. I can remember few instances of the ordinary duty being light enough to spare many men for work away from their lines, but a few might doubtless be spared generally in time of peace.

XI. Would it have been practicable to employ the Troops upon Public Works?

11. Not, I think, to any considerable extent, nor so continuously, nor as regularly as to make their labour of much value. The Kurrachee Mole was begun by the men of a Recruit Depôt under Major J. R. Stewart, 8th Regt. N. I., by order of General Farquharson; and I have known troops work, for a time, at other works near their own camp and lines: but I should think it difficult to make much permanent and habitual use of such labour, without an Army far in excess of what we could now afford to pay for. It would be, I think, an excellent plan so to train men, that on service a good corps of experienced Sappers could be at once selected from the line.

XII. In apportioning European Officers to Native Troops—

1. Should Native Corps have a full Complement of European Officers according to the present Scale, besides a full complement of Native Commissioned Officers; or
2. A full Complement of European Officers, and no Native Commissioned Officers; or
3. A smaller Number of European Officers than at present, and a full Complement of Native Officers?

12. I should say a full complement of Native Officers as at present, and not more than four selected European Officers, exclusive of the Surgeon, to every 600 men.

XIII. If a full Complement of European Officers, would you attach Cadets at once to Native Corps, or first to European Corps?

13. An European corps affords the best school for training Cadets into Officers in time of peace, and they may be advantageously trained there for as much as two years. No European should ever be sent to a Native corps but as a volunteer. On service an European Officer, however young, may, with advantage, at once be attached as a volunteer to a Native corps.

XIV. If a smaller Number of European Officers is assigned to Native Corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

14. I would, as a general rule, let the Officer Commanding the Native corps, subject to the approval of the Commander in Chief, select his own Subalterns from among all the young Officers in the Army who had been discharged their drill, and reported fit for duty in an European Regiment. I would hold him responsible for their general conduct and efficiency, and he should answer for any neglect to report them, if deficient, or otherwise unfit for their position. A Reviewing Officer, if the review were more of a reality than it is, could never find any difficulty in estimating the parade efficiency of every Officer with a Native corps, nor ought the General of Division to be ever at a loss in ascertaining the general character of each corps under his command, and satisfying himself that no unworthy or unfit persons were among the Officers.

I would give liberal Moonshee allowance, and every encouragement to young Officers to make themselves perfect in the Native tongues. But I would have no test of language beyond what the Selecting Officer thought necessary, on admission to a Native corps, nor subsequently beyond making the young Officer com-

mand a Parade, and conduct an Orderly Room inquiry, in presence of the Reviewing Officer, whenever called on to do so. If he can talk fluently to his men, and readily understand and be understood by them, it is all that is really required.

XV. Is the Efficency of Regiments affected by the number of Officers taken from Corps for Staff employment?

15. The present system of taking Officers from Corps for Staff employments has long seemed to me most seriously injurious to the efficiency of regiments, and I firmly believe that the present system, if continued, must very speedily cause most fatal results. It is not, however, the number taken away, which is injurious, but the system of selection, and its indirect consequences. In the first place it is professedly the elite of the whole body which is taken. If the best men are thereby taken away, the regiment of course loses its most useful members; but whether the selection be bad or good certain discontent is produced among those left behind, and the injustice is often very real.

It becomes still greater, and has a still more injurious effect on the regiment when the Officer, who has been years away on Staff employment, is sent back during some war exigency to command men he does not know, and, perhaps, to reap honours and reward gained for him by a discipline which he has indirectly, and, perhaps, unconsciously done much to ruin the real maintainers of which he has superseded.

But the worst evil of all is the general and all-pervading feeling that regimental duty is a thing to be

escaped, as speedily as possible, a badge of inefficiency or ill luck.

It is this feeling which seems to me the most striking feature of difference between the young Officers of the present day, and those I knew when I was young myself, and mixed much and intimately with them. There were then so few Civil Staff appointments that the possibility of obtaining one rarely entered into the calculations of a young Officer; the Army Staff was then more limited and accessible, as a rule, only to men of known efficiency as Regimental Officers; young Officers then looked to their regiments, of necessity, as their future homes, and made themselves as comfortable as they could, with little thought of leaving it. Their ordinary amusements were, perhaps, somewhat rougher than at present, but not worse calculated to form active men and hardy soldiers; and those who devoted themselves to Native languages or literature did it more from natural taste, and as an amusement, than as any passport to employment.

At present the grand object of almost every young Officer, from the time he joins, is to get away from his regiment. He studies, not from taste or for amusement, but to "pass," and become fit for Staff employment, just as he would to complete his education, and escape from school. Everything connected with regimental duty is irksome, as interfering with the studies which are to set him free.

Nothing can be more complete than the severance thus effected between the Native soldier and his European Officer, and I never, of late years, conversed long with any old sepoy, but he alluded to the change which had taken place in young Officers, as one which

was generally observed, and regretted by all classes of the Native Army.

I am bound to add, that the system has given to the State some of the best Civil Officers I know, but I believe they might have been obtained from the same source, without any injury to their original branch of the Service, and even this solitary advantage of the system is now nearly neutralised by the fact that, between the number of Officers withdrawn, and the checks imposed in the shape of rules, placing a limit on the number to be absent at one time, it has very much ceased to be possible to select for Staff employment. The choice is no longer from the whole Army, but is often from among two or three Officers, who have fulfilled the requirements, and belong to the two or three corps which alone happen to have a superfluity of Officers of that grade present with the regiment; and no one can now be in any way connected with the system, without seeing constant evidence of its injurious effect on all Military spirit, and proper professional feeling.

XVI. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of Mutinies, between the conduct of Regiments with few and those with many European Officers present?

16. As far as I have had an opportunity of judging the number of Officers present with a regiment made little difference—all depended on their character and the system of the regiment, and the extent to which the Officers had retained the real command over their men. The regiments which I considered to have been most severely tried from their material (Hin-

doostanee, and especially Delhi Mahomedans), the temptation held out to them, and the absolute impossibility of coercing them, if they had misbehaved, and who passed the ordeal most satisfactorily, were the regiments of Sind Horse, and they had never more than two Officers with each regiment, and for a great part of the time but one. The corps which behaved worst in this province had a larger than average proportion of European Officers present, and it was never difficult to trace the evil to causes quite independent of the number of the European Officers.

XVII. How can the demand for European Officers for Staff and Detached employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of Regiments?

17. I think General Jacob's plan of a General Gradation List is, in itself, the best I have seen, and I can see no possible objection to its prospective adoption. To meet present exigencies many other ways might be suggested for attaining the same object, with even less disturbance of existing rights and usages.

I would begin by placing permanently, on a Civil Staff list, all Officers who have been in Civil employment for more than two years, who are specifically recommended by the Heads of their Civil Department for permanent Civil employment, and who are willing to give up all claim to active Military service on the following terms:—

Their names to be removed from the Regimental list, as on permanent half-pay; their promotion to be regulated by that of the Officer who stood next below them, and remaining in the regiment, but to affect

their rank only; pension for length of service, as at present.

All other Officers to return, as a matter of course, to their regiments after two years detached service.

I would then leave with each Native Infantry regiment four selected Officers, with increased pay, as Commandant, Second in Command, Adjutant, and Quartermaster. They should form the Active List of the regiment. The remainder who were not provided with permanent or temporary Staff employment should be given their choice to remain attached to their old regiments, or to be transferred to European regiments, under such regulations as would secure to them the same rank and advantages they would have had if they had remained with their corps on the old footing.

I do not see how any reorganisation of the Bombay Army is possible which does not secure to each Officer all the advantages he would have derived under the old system.

XVIII. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the Officers of the Army as Regimental Officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of Staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

18. I would make the post of Regimental Officer with a Native corps one of selection, and feel certain there would be more efficient Regimental Officers than at present. I think that numerous schemes might be devised for ensuring a higher general standard of qualification than at present, quite free from the objections to the present system.

XIX. Would the Standard of Acquirements amongst the Officers of the Army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

19. I think not.

(Signed) H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

Printed at the BOMBAY EDUCATION SOCIETY'S PRESS, Byculla.

SUGGESTIONS

RELATIVE TO THE

RE-ORGANIZATION, DISCIPLINE,

AND

FUTURE MANAGEMENT

OF THE

BENGAL ARMY

BY

LT.-COL. WILLIAM HUNTER,

BENGAL ARMY—RETIRED LIST.

Second Edition.

LONDON:
ACTON GRIFFITH,
8, BAKER STREET, PORTMAN SQUARE.

1858.

NOTES

RELATIVE TO THE

REORGANIZATION OF THE BENGAL ARMY.

In one of the able letters of Indophilus, I find the following remarks:—"In considering the great Indian question, we ought as a practical people to direct our attention to the part which demands an immediate solution. This, clearly, is the reconstruction of the Bengal Army."

Entirely concurring in the soundness of the above advice, I venture, though with great diffidence, to offer the following suggestions on the above important subject.

Infantry of the Bengal Army.

This branch of the Bengal Army, to be denominated in future the Royal Army for service in India, and to consist, in addition to the existing European regiments in the Company's service, of 37 European regiments, and 74 Native battalions.

For the sufficient officering of the 37 regiments, the European officers of two of the old Native

regiments should be clubbed together; an arrangement which would give 52 officers to each regiment,* and would admit of a moderate number of absentees without affecting the discipline of such regiment.

From the above 52 officers, 8 should be selected for the command and staff duties of the 72 Native battalions, so as to provide each battalion with a

Commandant on a consolidated allowance of			1200	rps. per Mens.
Second in Command	„	„	800	„
Adjutant	„	„	500	„
Supernumerary Officer doing duty			400	„

Each battalion company to be under the command of its senior Native officer, who, in addition to his pay, should be authorized to draw the command allowance of a company. The former, as a stimulus to exertion, and reward for meritorious conduct might be fixed at 100 rupees per mensem. Such an arrangement would do much to satisfy the most sanguine aspirations of the Native officers, and would greatly tend to remove any feeling of jealousy and discontent caused by the existing system, which always keeps them in the back ground, and subjects them to the authority, not only of the youngest and most inexperienced European subaltern in the regiment, but, what appears a strange anomaly, also to the authority, and not unfrequently to the vulgar and unmerited rebukes of the European non-commissioned officers.

* Till all the present incumbents are absorbed, there should be a separate line of promotion for the officers of each of the old regiments.

The feelings of disgust, and sometimes of bitter contempt, which such a system is likely to engender, have, it appears to me, been altogether overlooked in accounting for the extraordinary disaffection of our Native soldiers, and their readiness to combine in favour of any change which might operate to relieve them from the domination of a government which, though not exactly oppressive, has not scrupled to wrest from them all the most honourable and lucrative appointments which the service affords.

We have all heard of the virulent animosity manifested by the poorer classes in France towards their superiors during the great French Revolution, caused in a great measure by the custom which secured to the dominant race in that country a monopoly of all posts of honour and emolument; and as in this feature, human nature is everywhere, I conceive, pretty much the same, we need not be surprised if many of the more aspiring natives of India are constantly chafing under the deprivation of similar distinctions.

Should the plan above recommended be deemed deserving of consideration, too much care could not be taken in the selection of the European officers to be attached to the Native batalions. Not only should they be men of judgment and approved ability, but likewise of active and energetic habits, kind and liberal dispositions, and, above all, well versed in the native languages. The Native officers

and soldiers, thus constantly brought into contact with men of cultivated minds, and conspicuous for their professional acquirements, would naturally become imbued with feelings of respect for, and admiration of the European character, such as can hardly be expected to exist under a system in which a majority of the European officers, however well they may be disposed towards the Natives, have usually a very imperfect knowledge of their languages, and are often, besides, sadly deficient in those qualifications which are alone calculated to make a favourable impression on the Native mind, and to re-establish that confidence which formerly existed between the European officer and the Sepoys. Moreover, as according to the old proverb, "Birds of a feather will flock together," the greater the number of European officers in a regiment, the less disposed are they to associate with the Natives.*

As, under the system suggested the European officers attached to the Native battalions would not be permanently removed from their regiments, no separate rule would be required for their promotion, and it might be deemed advisable for such officers to rejoin their regiments on attaining the rank of

* Colonel Jacob, in his tracts, justly observes, that too many of the English officers are seen idling away their time, and wasting their energies, in frivolous pursuits; and thus the example of the idle, and indifferent, tends greatly to destroy the prestige of the superior race.

Lieut.-Colonel. The adoption of this rule would ensure the presence of a certain number of experienced Indian officers at the head quarters of the European regiments—would give promotion to the second in command and other officers of the Native battalions, and would create an opening in these battalions for some aspiring and intelligent officer of the European force.

In the Native battalions, as a general rule, it would perhaps be prudent, if not essential, as regards promotion, to adhere to the rule of seniority; but not so as to shut the door to distinguished merit. To effect this, three fourths of the men might be promoted according to seniority, and the other fourth of the steps might be reserved for men remarkable for superior intelligence, or who may have distinguished themselves in action, by some brilliant and well authenticated service. 'Tis Jomini—a great authority in these matters—who, to the best of my recollection, writes:—"Quant aux récompenses il est essentiel de protéger l'ancienneté des services, tout en ouvrant une porte au mérite; les trois quarts de chaque promotion devraient être selon l'ordre du tableau, et l'autre quart réservé aux hommes qui se feraient remarquer par leur mérite, par des actions d'éclat, ou services bien constatés."

The rank of soobahdar, to which would be attached the command of a company, and, therefore, a position involving much responsibility, should be conferred only on men of an intelligence, energy,

and active habits; and all Native officers should be required, at least to read and write fluently. The first Napoleon, I am informed, however liberal he might be in the distribution of crosses to his most distinguished soldiers, made it a rule never to promote an entirely uneducated man to the rank of a commissioned officer. In the selection of our Native officers we should do well to adopt the same rule; and, moreover, to let it be known, to every soldier who enlists, that, "cœteris paribus," a competent knowledge of the English language would be considered an additional claim to promotion.

Every Native officer on attaining the age of 56 years should be placed on the retired or pension list. In the French Army it is the custom to place on the retired list, "dans le cadre de réserve," all Generals of Brigade who shall have attained the age of 62, and all Generals of Division who shall have attained the age of 65 years. The adoption of a similar rule, in regard to the European officers of the Indian Army, would do no harm; especially if, in consideration of the deleterious effects of the Indian climate on the constitution of Englishmen, the retirement of such officers should be made obligatory at a somewhat earlier period. The arguments which have so often been directed against the seniority system, in regard to the Native soldiers and officers, apply, owing to their superior authority and responsibility, I should say, in greater force to the European officers; but the obligatory retirement of

such officers, at a certain fixed age, would, in a great measure, obviate the defect complained of.

The rule of promotion by seniority, if not too rigidly adhered to, appears to me to possess one great advantage, viz., that it gives a heart to the whole army. Were we to abolish it altogether, the majority of our Sepoys, who, naturally indolent and apathetic, require some stimulus, finding that they were constantly superseded by younger men, would yearly become more disheartened and depressed—would lose all zeal for the service—and, under the "cui bono" impression, would cease to take any pride in the performance of their duty. We should, no doubt, obtain a few smarter non-commissioned officers; but, as in so doing, we should run the risk of alienating the attachment of the great body of our Native soldiers, the defects of such a plan would, I fear, overbalance the advantages.

It will be seen that I am far from advocating a too rigid adherence to promotion by seniority; but abolish it altogether, and the great mass of our Native Army, the essentially working portion of it, deprived of all hope of advancement, and with its spirit consequently in a state of atony, would, in my opinion, based on what I know of the character of the Bengal Sepoy, greatly and rapidly deteriorate in discipline, and all the more requisite qualifications of the soldier.

I am aware that, by some writers, it has been alleged, that discipline is a thing which has never been known in the Bengal Army. Colonel Jacob, in

some tracts containing many judicious remarks, but, on the other hand, full of strange delusions, and vituperative sneers, in regard to the European officers of that army, has taken great pains to imbue the public mind with this notion. The chief object, however which the gallant Colonel appears to have in view by the publication of the above tracts is to prove first, that there is only one man in India of sound discrimination, only one man capable of justly estimating the character, and properly directing the military instincts of our Native soldiers: secondly, that the Scinde Irregular Horse is immeasurably superior to every other corps of Regular or Irregular Cavalry in the Company's service; and thirdly, that of all armies in the world, the Royal Army of England has ever been the most helpless, the most ignorant, and the worst managed; the Bengal Army, of all armies in the world, the most wanting in discipline and efficiency of every description; smarting under the severe strictures, the unsparing condemnation of so harsh a critic, it is some consolation to reflect that this most helpless army in the world, in every quarter of the globe, has rarely failed to make patent its superiority over every other army with which it has come in contact; and that the Bengal Army during an entire century, with all its want of discipline, and under the command of its effeminate, and much disparaged officers, has been quite as conspicuous for valour and daring, and has contributed quite as much, if not more, towards the establishment of our marvellous

Indian Empire, as either of the armies of the sister Presidencies.

To have effected so much without the A. B. C., as the gallant Colonel expresses it, the first rudiments of discipline, is indeed an astounding accident, and only suggests to us, what a wonderfully efficient Native Army we may hope to see in Bengal, should our Sepoys ever chance to acquire a little insight into this A. B. C. of a soldier's duty; and, (discarding all historical prejudices in favor of such men as Ochterlony, Nott and Pollock, Nicholson, Gilbert, Wilson and Lawrence, &c. &c., discarding the chivalrous examples of such men as Fraser and Fitz Gerald, immortalised by their heroic deeds at Seetabuldee and Purwundurah*) should the pampered and effeminate officers of that army, ever be induced to renounce all connexion with khidmutgars, khansamans, and that long list of Oriental phantoms, which appear to be ever dancing before the eyes, and so cruelly to haunt the imagination of the gallant Colonel; it is somewhat strange, that as a fitting pendant to the above edifying picture of Asiatic follies, that distinguished officer should have overlooked its European prototype—the princely messes, the gorgeous services of plate, the claret, hock, champagne and tokay of some of the crack regiments of Her Majesty's ser-

* The chivalrous achievement of Fraser and the officers of the 2nd Cavalry at Purwundurah, is hardly to be paralleled in the glorious annals of our military history, and surpasses even if possible in daring and heroism the magnificent, though calamitous affair of Balaclava.

vice;* however, Colonel Jacob, with his particular views of discipline, would probably be equally as-

* I have remarked that Colonel Jacob's Tracts are full of delusions, and caricature, in regard to the habits of the officers of the Bengal Army. Far from fearing the sun, as they are represented, in page 28 of the Tracts, to do, I have known men, who, out tiger shooting, have been exposed to the sun during the entire month of May, from sunrise to sunset; and have returned to their cantonments with their faces, necks, and hands, almost blacker than those of their Native attendants. I have also known men, who, as a mere pastime, have been in the habit of riding their 140 miles between breakfast and dinner; enough, I should suppose, to satisfy the most fastidious Bombay officer in these matters. As to the Bengal Griffin, with his host of useless servants and his otherwise effeminate habits, the picture is very amusing, and no doubt intended to be very edifying; but, unfortunately, at least, as far as my experience goes, the picture is mere fiction and caricature; yet taking it "quantum valeat," to what, after all, do these fantastic notions amount; admitting that, here and there, there are a few Bengal Griffins to be found riding in Palkees, and surrounded by a retinue of Khansamans, Khidmutgars, Hooqquburdars, bottle holders, &c. &c., do not the most manly characters,—soldiers and civilians,—to be found in England, do exactly the same thing; have they not their butlers, footmen, pages, grooms, coachmen, &c. &c., and do they not sometimes condescend to ride in a carriage, and—"proh pudor"—sometimes even to use an umbrella; and does Colonel Jacob really imagine that these men are less English at heart, and less manly in their habits, than the youth, who, through necessity, is satisfied to put up with the services of a maid of all work, the prototype, I suppose, of the "man of all work" attached to the Bombay Griffin; then, as to the Palkee,—is there really anything so very shocking in the fact, that—"more majorum"—we Bengalees sometimes indulge in such an equipage, to avoid being half broiled, and drenched in perspiration, when about to pay a few visits to the fair sex, or buttoned up to the throat in full uniform, when about to visit some distant part of a cantonment on duty; if the Bombay Griffin, on such occasions, prefers a

tonished, compared with the British standard, at the (in some respects) apparent slackness of discipline in the French, and other Continental armies; tattoo or poney, all I can say is, there is no accounting for taste in these matters—" De gustibus non disputandum."

"That clever General Sir C. Napier, says Colonel Jacob, went "half mad at the first sight of the camels that accompanied his "little force in Scinde." The gallant colonel appears to have been affected much in the same way at the first sight of the Bengal Palkees, Hooqquburdars, bottle holders, &c. Cleverness, again remarks Colonel Jacob, is full of prejudices; genius is independent of local circumstances; under this view of the case, to which category the gallant colonel belongs can be no very difficult matter to determine; if Colonel Jacob is in the habit of indulging in classical or historical reminiscences, the contemplation of the luxurious habits of such first rate soldiers as Alexander, Cæsar, Pompey, Wallenstein, &c., must have caused him many a bitter pang—

" Omnibus in terris quæ sunt à Gadibus usque
" Aurorem et Gangem, pauci dignoscere possunt
" Vera bona, atque illis multum diversa, remotâ
" Erroris nebulâ."

There is less excuse for the aspersion which has been cast upon the Bengalees by Colonel Jacob, inasmuch as Bombay, to which Presidency he belongs, has been blessed with two splendid specimens of the Bengalee, in the persons of the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone and Sir G. Clerk, both as remarkable for manliness of character, manly habits, and ability to rough it, as they were for their liberality of disposition, and princely hospitality. Sir G. Clerk for horsemanship, pluck and stamina, had scarcely perhaps his match in India, and the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone was, I am told, equally conspicuous for the same qualities. These distinguished men were both probably sybarites, as far as a show of khansamans, khidmutgars, and bottle holders could make them so, but notwithstanding these vanities, which in Colonel Jacob's eyes, so militate with the true dignity of manhood, I believe I am correct in saying that they are the two most popular governors Bombay has seen during the present century.

—and yet the Bengal Army, which in our many and arduous struggles for supremacy, has ever so faithfully served us, was in its normal state less in want of the rod and frown of the martinet, than any of these armies, or any other army perhaps in existence.

I recollect reading in a German newspaper, the "Kölnische Zeitung," that no nation was so much talked of; so often at one time lauded to the skies, at another time consigned to the lowest depths of hell, as the English,—"so oft bald zum Himmel erhoben, bald zur Hölle verdammt als die Englander;" and so it has been for some years, to a certain extent, with the unfortunate Bengal Army. "Laudatur ab his, culpatur ab illis; the machine it is true, from causes yet to be revealed, has at last broken down, and different persons, will, of course, entertain different notions, in regard to its merits; but duly to appreciate the glorious career of that army, and to show how much it is entitled to our gratitude and admiration, we have only to open the eloquent pages of the Historian of British India, or to point to the map of that mighty Empire, with its befitting commentary, the despatches of Lake, Wellesley, Hardinge, Ellenborough, and other illustrious Indian statesmen.

To the question, what has been the cause, of the present unparalleled, and certainly unexpected convulsion in India, no one has yet been able to give a satisfactory solution; but when the mist in which this subject is shrouded shall have passed away, I do not believe, that to any want of what is strictly

called military discipline, will be traced that spirit of bitter animosity, which, at a time when there was no apprehension of any general explosion, appears to have pervaded all ranks of the Bengal Army, has urged our frantic soldiers to conspiracy, incendiarism and revolt; and which, but for the interposition of Providence, and the fidelity and energetic assistance of those chiefs and princes, whose independance we have respected, would have quenched itself in the blood, the indiscriminate slaughter probably of the entire British population of India.

To attribute any share of this virulent hatred, any share of the many clandestine, and undermining influences which must have been at work to bring about this lamentable catastrophe, this hostile and treasonable combination against the British Government, to so inadequate a cause as the imperfection of our regimental discipline, is a notion too preposterous, to be entertained by the most inveterate censors of the Bengal Army. In my humble opinion, moreover, it is quite a mistake to suppose, that our generally very quiet and well-conducted Sepoys require to be governed by the same stern system of discipline which is requisite for the maintenance of order and regularity in our European regiments. Under ordinary circumstances, I believe a thousand Sepoys, will be more easily governed, and give far less trouble, than a single company of Europeans; a too rigid discipline, I believe to be hateful to the Sepoys, and from the irritation which it causes, far from doing

good, is likely only to create the spirit which it seeks to repress, to produce those elements of disquiet and disaffection, which, from their demoralizing tendencies, we should ever be on the watch unnecessarily to avoid rousing. On the other hand, too much cannot be done to win their respect, and by kindness, that golden link in the chain, which binds together the most discordant elements of society, to secure the attachment and confidence of the Sepoys; and this, I maintain, will be best accomplished, by the selection, as above recommended, of competent officers to command the Native battalions.

To shew that I am not speaking without some little experience in these matters, I will only mention, that as Commandant of the Mewar Bheel Corps, which, as far as I am informed, has never wavered in its allegiance, I had to deal with some of the wildest, and most turbulent tribes to be found in any part of India; and yet without any very rigid system of discipline, in 1848, as will be seen by the annexed* copies of letters, I left this

* "Home Mead, Lymington Hants, 15th Feb., 1856.

"My dear Hunter,

"I have to acknowledge your letter of the 13th inst., with enclosure; tho' gratified at seeing your hand-writing again after so long a hiatus, I regret to find you have been necessitated at your age to forego the advantages of the finest Service in the World, and that from ill-health and inability to bear up against the climate of India. What a contrast to my long sojourn, who, thank God, never was compelled to quit the soil of India for a period of 52 years' actual residence there, either on sick certificate or private leave.

corps as contented, as well drilled, and in many respects, I believe, as well disciplined as any regiment in the Indian service.

"I possess a very perfect recollection of having inspected the Bheel Corps under your command at Neemutch in 1846, and the gratification and surprise I experienced at the perfect and wonderful state of discipline you had brought it to, its general and satisfactory appearance, steadiness, dress, and style of manœuvring as a Light Infantry Corps and as a Corps of the Line. We were, I remember, all struck at the intelligence, the smartness, and off-hand way in which these wild men performed the field movements, and their compactness elicited the wonder of the Officers of the Station, who had regarded them hitherto as plundering savages of the Jungles, whose hand was against every man. I had however, perhaps better opportunities of knowing the people you had in so short a time reduced to something like order and system, having been employed for six years at Pertaubgur, 30 miles S. of Neemutch, in command of the Rampoorah Local Battalion, and constantly in contact with these tribes. I can assure you a most favorable report was forwarded by me to the Military Secy. to Government, giving yourself and officers every possible credit. The Bheel Corps being a Civil Corps was not under the immediate control of the Comr. in Chief, and no documents connected with it would be found in the Adjutant-General's Office.

"With my best wishes, believe me,

"Yours very sincerely,

"C. W. HAMILTON."

"*From Lieut-Col. J. Sutherland, Agent Govr.-Genl. for the States of Rajpootana, to H. M. Elliot, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.*

"SIR, "(*D*) Camp, Ulwur, 8th May, 1848.

"It is with much regret I have the honor to lay before the Right Honble. the Govr.-Genl. in Council an application from Major Hunter (received through Lieut.-Col.

Colonel Jacob talks with great confidence, and composure, of the unassailable loyalty of the Scinde Irregular Horse; but this distinguished corps,—instead of being quartered in one of our distant frontier provinces,—had it been nearer the focus of insurrection, had it been exposed to the instigations of bigotry, and to the contagion of universal example, would not perhaps have realized these too sanguine expectations; the same turbulent soldiers, the same ferocious citizens, who, during the early days of the French Revolution, committed such enormities, and under the cover of their barricades in Paris, set all authority at defiance, would, no doubt, under the command of one of their able

Robinson's letter, No. 126, dated the 1st inst.) to resign his appointment of Commandant of the Meywar Bheel Corps from the 20th proximo, on account of health, and preparatory to retiring from the Service.

"2nd. I have been an anxious observer of Major Hunter's proceedings in the difficult and and delicate position in which he was placed in 1841, for the organization of the wild and predatory Bheels of the Meywar Hills when they came from their mountain fastnesses with their bows and arrows, until now, when he leaves them as highly disciplined a corps, I hear, as any in the Indian Army.

"5th. The success which has attended our measures for the tranquilization of the Meywar Bheel tracts is another fine example, and on the largest scale, of the possibility of disciplining uncivilized and predatory races of men, and rendering them quite competent to keep their brethren in order and to give peace to the country.

"I have, &c.,

(*Sd.*) "J. SUTHERLAND, Agent Govr.-Gen."

"*Camp, Ulwur.*"

Marshals in Algeria, have been as orderly and well-conducted members of society, as the gallant troopers of the Scinde Irregular Horse; but in Paris, the revolutionary vortex was too strong to be resisted, and the atrocities, and deeds of darkness committed in that devoted capital—not by Heathens against Christians and low caste foreign usurpers, for such we are in the eyes of the natives of India —but by Christians against their fellow-countrymen and brother Christians, have hardly been surpassed by the Nanas, and other monsters of India, destined henceforth to share with those of France, the execration of posterity.

I have nothing to say to palliate the cruel atrocities which have lately disgraced India, but those who trace them, as some do, entirely to the non-conversion of Hindoos and Mahomedans to Christianity, appear to have overlooked the circumstance, that, at one time under the impulse of religious fanaticism, at another time on the plea of political expediency, atrocities equally diabolical have been perpetrated in countries, where Christianity was the professed religion of the entire population; in proof of this assertion, I need only refer to the barbarous crusade against the Albigenses, the heart-rending annals of the Inquisition, the wholesale massacre of the Huguenots on the eve of St. Bartholomew*, and the more recent atrocities

* In some Christian countries still, as in the days of the Catholic League, and the Evangelical Union, so violent and

of the great French Revolution. As it is not, however, my intention to attempt to develope the causes of the present unhappy episode of our Indian history, I will now revert to my proper subject, the re-construction and future organization of the Bengal Army.

Strength of the Army.

The strength of each European regiment and Native battalion, would, of course, be regulated according to circumstances, and the wants of the country, and would probably fluctuate from 600 to 1000 rank and file; but it would be advisable so to regulate matters, as to have at all times under arms in India, one European for every two Native soldiers; in other words, one-third of the regular troops of the Bengal Presidency to consist of Europeans, the other two-thirds, drilled and armed in the same manner, of Natives.

In addition to the above regular force, should the aid of any irregular corps of infantry be required, I would submit for consideration whether it might

intolerant are the bigotry and sectarian prejudices of various Christian communities, that but for the restraint of the laws, and through the instrumentality of the press, the enlightened state of the public mind, persecution and torture in their worst and most hideous forms — the rack, the stake, and the wheel, would again, I fear, be the order of the day; the bigotry of caste in India is bad enough, but nothing can surpass the awful atrocities which have on various occasions emanated from Christian intolerance.—"Quantum Religio potuit suadere malorum."

not be wise to place them under the command of loyal, able, and meritorious Native officers; such a relaxation of our exclusive policy would be sure to conciliate, and rivet the attachment of men so honored; and would, I think, be attended with no danger, provided the distinction were conferred only on men conspicuous for unblemished character, eminent services, and superior professional attainments.

Indophilus, in one of his able letters, has suggested the propriety of amply rewarding those Natives, who, through the various dark phases of the present protracted insurrection, shall have continued staunch in their fidelity to the British Government; and the above boon might possibly be deemed a safe and suitable manner of evincing our appreciation of the conduct of these men. In such case, (if not immediately,) at all events at a later period, an examination before competent judges would be required, to test the professional qualifications of candidates for such commands; this alone would give a wonderful stimulus to education, hitherto a dead letter in the Native Army, and would, no doubt, in the long run produce, as Lord Macaulay tells us, it has already done in other sections of Native society, the most salutary effect on the hearts and understandings of the Native soldiers.*

* Two trustworthy Europeans of the uncovenanted service might be attached to these corps, one in the capacity of pay master, the other as quarter-master and commissariat officer.

In addition to the officers required for the purely military staff appointments, as well as the eight officers from each of the 37 European regiments, which, agreeably to the proposed plan, would be attached to the Native battalions, should the services of other officers be required for civil or diplomatic duties, they should on accepting such appointments, be struck off the strength of their respective regiments, and be placed in a separate corps, to be denominated the Civil Staff Corps; the promotion of these officers might be adjusted, so as to have effect at the period it would have occurred had they remained in their respective regiments, or it might be regulated according to a fixed period of service, say to the rank of—

Captain	after	14	years service.
Major	do.	20	do.
Lt. Col.	do.	25	do.
Colonel	do.	30	do.

Such officers not to be eligible to any military command, but they should be allowed to retire from the service with the pension of their rank, and on promotion to the rank of Colonel, should be entitled to an allowance equivalent to that drawn by Regimental Colonels under the title of off-reckonings.

It has often occurred to me that few things would conduce more to make an impression on the apathy and indolence of the Native character, gradually to enlighten and expand their minds, and to disabuse them of their many silly and inveterate

prejudices, as the sending to this country, to be relieved every five or six years, a single regiment or legion of a thousand men, to be organized by volunteers from every corps of Native cavalry and infantry in the Indian Army. To form some notion of the probable effect of such a system on the minds of our Native officers and soldiers, we have only to contemplate the conduct of Jung Bahadoor of Nepal, and other Natives, who from having resided in this country, and here associated with Europeans of superior mind and education, have duly learnt to appreciate our motives, and to acquire an insight into our character, our views, and the magnitude of our resources.

I am aware that the above proposition is liable to the charge of being too Utopian, and that my opinion on this subject is not likely to meet with much encouragement; but unless in the reconstruction of our Indian institutions we are prepared to deviate from the old worn out track of routine and hereditary traditions, and, as recommended by some of our greatest Indian statesmen, boldly to adopt measures of progress and improvement, we may, no doubt, succeed in reestablishing the supremacy of England, but we shall in vain hope to witness the regeneration of unhappy and afflicted India.

Cavalry and Artillery.

The Cavalry might be remodelled on the same plan as the Infantry; but the Artillery, Foot and Horse, should be composed entirely of Euro-

peans. With our artillery, and the other arms organized in the way I have proposed, we should have nothing to apprehend in future from the Native Army, and our Indian Empire would thus be placed upon a basis of greater security than ever. The armies of the other Presidencies might eventually be remodelled on the plan suggested for Bengal.

NUMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS.

In the *Times* newspaper it has been suggested, no doubt by the advice of competent judges, that in the Bengal Army, instead of keeping 18,000 Europeans and 150,000 Natives, we should keep 30,000 Europeans and 60,000 Natives

Now, in accordance with the above suggestion, let us have for the Infantry branch of the service 37 new European regiments, each of 600 rank and file, making a total of 22,200 men, and 74 Native battalions, each of 600 rank and file, making a total of 44,400 men—

Say, Europeans	22,200
Natives	44,400
Total of Infantry .	66,600

This would leave a wide margin for the other arms, Artillery and Cavalry, viz.

Europeans	7,800
Natives, for Cavalry only . .	15,600

Should the above force, in addition to the existing European regiments of the Bengal Army, be

considered sufficient for the duties of that Presidency, a portion of the Royal Army might gradually be withdrawn from the Bengal Presidency, and, if not required for the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, sent to England, where the presence of a few additional regiments would greatly add to the strength, security, and confidence of the nation.

Power of Commanding Officers.

I have hitherto said nothing regarding the power to be exercised by Commanding Officers, as that subject, I presume, will come under the consideration of the authorities in this country, and in India; at present, I believe, it is generally admitted that those powers, especially with regard to the Commandants of Native corps, are far too limited, and no doubt the proper remedy will be applied; in a Native corps the more the men are taught to look up to their commanding officer as the paramount authority, the greater, generally speaking, will be the efficiency of that corps.

Caste.

A great deal has been said and written of late regarding the evil influence of the Brahminical caste in our Sepoy regiments; they are undoubtedly far too numerous in proportion to the other castes; but admitting the influence of the Brahminical clique, we must also admit that, during the hundred years that England has been the dominant power in India, the fidelity, and on most occasions

exemplary conduct of the Bengal Native Army has been most conspicuous, and that army, under competent officers, has rarely failed in zeal, courage, or devotion; with good management therefore we have a right to infer that the Brahminical influence would be enlisted on the side of the English, instead of against them, and would, in that case, if restricted within proper limits, prove a valuable ingredient in the future material of the Native Army. By discarding the Brahmins altogether from our ranks, we should run the risk of losing more than we gained; the disaffection of these men would become universal, and actuated by feelings of revenge and discontent, they would probably have recourse to clandestine organization and intrigue, to undermine our influence and authority with the inferior castes.*

Patronage.

The military patronage can hardly find its way into better hands than those by which it is at present dispensed; but in whatever manner Parliament in its wisdom may deem it advisable to deal with this question, I quite agree with Indophilus,

* The Goorkhas, Bheels, and other Hill tribes make excellent soldiers, but I do not think that generally speaking the low caste men of our own provinces would make such efficient soldiers as the Rajpoots; many of the lower castes are addicted to liquor, which might at times render them turbulent, and difficult to manage, and they are moreover, I think, less imbued with a military spirit, than the high caste soldiers.

who, in regard to the appointment of cadets, observes, " the best practical arrangement would be " to nominate three or four candidates for every " vacancy, and for the best of these to be selected " by independent examiners appointed for the purpose; this would combine the advantages of nomination and competition; we should preserve " whatever benefit is supposed to be derived from a " presumed knowledge of the previous career of " the young men, and should add to it some security on behalf of the public, that the best of " the candidates would be chosen. Better candidates would also be put forward when it was " known that they would have to be measured with " others. The examination should be collective " and periodical, so that if there were 50 vacancies " there would be 200 candidates. Those who failed " the first time might be allowed one more trial. " After the cadets have been selected, they ought " all of them to have at least one year's professional " instruction at a military college."

Education.

Notwithstanding the many additional provisions which of late years have been made in India for the education of our Native subjects; in the Native Army, as before observed, education, up to the present period, has been a dead letter; few of our high caste Hindoo Sepoys are able to read or write, and the minds of these men, from excess of igno-

rance, are particularly open to the bigoted instigations of wicked and designing impostors; some persons I know object to the education of the Natives, and particularly to that of the armed masses of the people, under the impression that they would some day turn their knowledge to account and sweep us into the sea; if such be written in the book of fate we must bow to the decree, but in the mean time, as conquerors, Englishmen, and Christians, it is clearly our duty to improve, as far as we can, the moral and intellectual condition of the people committed by Providence to our rule; our present experience, however, shows, that we have far more to fear from the barbarism, than from the dawning intelligence of our Indian subjects; nothing can be more satisfactory in this respect than the very important and interesting information afforded by Indophilus.

"In the Civil Service," he says, "the only Native "officers who, during the present insurrectionary "movement, have gone against us, are the thorough "Mahomedan Deputy Collectors and joint Magis-"trates; the numerous Anglicized Hindus, hold-"ing similar situations, have to a man, remained "faithful to us: and no class has been so conspi-"cuous for its loyalty as the educated Natives of "Calcutta, and Lower Bengal." In reference to the Government system of education he further remarks, "the influence of the existing Govern-"ment system of education upon the moral cha-

" racter and religious belief of the Natives, has
" been much discussed. The first result is the
" destruction of the Hindu system in the minds of
" the pupils; it did not occur to the ancient Indian
" legislators, when they placed fetters on the human
" intellect, by binding up their false theories of
" physical science with their false religion, that
" the whole fabric might one day be brought to
" the ground by the removal of the imported
" material. There is no subject of conversion so
" hopeless as a Hindu who has been taught accord-
" ing to the perfect manner of the law of his
" fathers. There is no morality so bad as the
" sanctification of every evil propensity of our na-
" ture, and its being recommended by supposed
" divine example; all which the Hindoo religion
" involves. The youth of India are not only
" rescued from this state by the Government
" system of education, but they are advanced one
" stage further; they are taught to think, and their
" thoughts are inclined towards Christianity by a
" literature which has grown up under its influ-
" ence, which always assumes its truth, and is deeply
" imbued with its spirit. A new standard of mo-
" rality is presented to them. The law is a school-
" master to lead us to Christ, and the study of the
" writings of Bacon, Milton, Addison, Johnson, and
" Locke, establishes this 'law' in their minds; it
" does not give the effectual motive which a firmer
" belief in Christianity would impart, but it creates

" a conscience, which will continually act upon " them, until they come to a full knowledge of the " truth. Without precisely knowing on what foun- " dation the moral principles of Christianity rest, " they see the beauty of them, and profess them- " selves enthusiastic admirers of them. They are " more honest, and truthful, than the Natives who " are brought up under the old system, and are for " that reason generally preferred in making ap- " pointments to the public service.*

The testimony of Lord Macaulay on this subject is equally gratifying. His Lordship says, " I see " the morality, the philosophy, the taste of Europe " beginning to produce a salutary effect on the " hearts and understandings of our subjects; I see " bloody and degrading superstitions gradually " losing their power; I see the public mind which " we found debased, and contracted by the worst " forms of political and religious tyranny, expand- " ing itself to just, and noble views of the ends of " Government, and the social duties of man."

Now the above very interesting, and important remarks, ought, I think, to satisfy the most deter-

* In the Government seminaries religion forms no part of the regulated course of instruction, but the Bible was placed in libraries, with the understanding that it might be freely consulted, both by students and teachers, and that the teachers were at full liberty to furnish explanations out of it, of the numerous passages in English authors which cannot be understood without it.

mined opponents of secular education, that the system in its practical working, has not been without some wholesome and civilizing effects on Indian society, and that the tree is likely in the end to bear the best of fruits. Before we can hope to sow the good seed with a fair prospect of success, we must prepare the soil for its reception; secular education may be viewed in the light of the preparation,—the fertilizing matter, which is destined to accomplish the requisite improvement, and to make ready the way for that spiritual instruction, which in due time, with God's blessing, I trust will be productive of more favourable results than have hitherto crowned the labours of the many pious missionaries, whose lives have been devoted to the preaching of God's Word in India.

I could say much more on this interesting subject, but what I have said will perhaps be sufficient to show that we cannot err in imparting some kind of education to our Sepoys, as we have already done to the other classes of the Native population; it would be a sin to lose the present opportunity, of educing good out of evil, and in a judicious system of education, we have at least one most favourable opportunity of realizing so desirable an object; it is only by imparting sound and moral instruction to all classes of the people, that we can hope to raise their character, and release them from the influence of those debasing superstitions which are

at present the great obstacle to the progress of Christianity in India.*

The natural capacity of the Natives, is perhaps little inferior to that of Europeans, and their minds appear to be admirably constituted for the reception of those sciences, which "if presented to them "by every available avenue," can hardly fail to open their eyes to the egregious errors and absurdities of the Brahminical theories; at all events it is by thus attacking the keystone of the arch, that we may soonest hope to demolish the entire fabric of Indian idolatries—that we may hope eventually to sap the foundations of a religious system, which is based on all the most unhallowed passions, all the most impure, inhuman, and degrading propensities of human nature.*

* As far as my own observation goes, the Natives of India have no more objection to read the Bible, than we should have to read the Koran or the Shasters, indeed I have occasionally heard Natives to whom I have myself read portions of the Gospel, express their admiration of the exceeding beauty of the Christian morality, not unaccompanied, however, I fear by the reflection, that our actions were not always quite in accordance with the self-denying principles of our religion.

* I recollect reading in the life of Sir J. Mackintosh, an account of a Brahmin with whom Sir James became acquainted at Bombay, and whom in all branches of philosophical and metaphysical learning, he pronounced to be vastly superior to any member, civil or military, of the British community at Bombay. The Principia of Newton too, I understand have been well translated into the Persian language by a Native of Lucknow. I merely allude to these facts, to show that the adaptation of the Native mind to the acquisition and mastering of the exact sciences is no myth.

CONCLUSION.

In the plan I have recommended for the re-organization of the Bengal Army, the principal objects I have had in view are the following:—

1. To afford the Government the greatest possible elasticity of power to reduce, or add to the numbers of our forces in India, without violating the desired ratio of the Native portion, to the European portion of our troops.

2. To ensure the presence of men of talent, judgment, temper, and experience at the head of the Native battalions.

3. To ensure the presence of a certain number of active, energetic, and intelligent Native officers for the command of companies.

4. To ensure the retirement from active service of all Native officers, at an age when they generally become incompetent to the efficient performance of their professional duties.

5. To provide rewards for the most deserving of those men of the Native Army, who have proved faithful to us during the insurrection, as recommended by Indophilus; and to create hereafter, through the attraction and value of such rewards, a powerful stimulus to education in the Native Army.

6. Above all to mitigate the evils of our present very exclusive system, the objections to which have been adverted to in such strong language by the Duke of Wellington, Munro, Malcolm, Lord William

Bentinck, and other Indian statesmen, and our persevering adherence to which system has probably been one of the principal causes of an insurrection, which has shaken our Indian Empire to its foundation.

The Duke of Wellington in reference to that system, says "whenever any portion of the country "is brought under the British dominion, we throw "out of employment all who have hitherto managed "the revenues, or commanded armies."

Sir T. Munro, says, "there is no example of any "conquest, in which the Natives have been so com- "pletely excluded from all share of the government "of their country, as of British India;" again, the same high authority remarks, "our system is much "more efficacious in depressing, than all our laws "and school books can be in elevating the character "of the Natives; we are working against our own "designs, and we can expect to make no progress "while we work with a feeble instrument to improve, "and a powerful one to deteriorate; there can be no "hope of any great zeal for improvement, when the "highest acquirements lead to nothing beyond some "inferior appointment, and can confer neither wealth "or honour." Lord William Bentinck remarks, "that under the Mahomedans the sympathies of the conquerors and conquered became identified; they intermarried with the Natives, and admitted them to all privileges; our policy, on the contrary," continues his lordship, "has been the reverse of "this—cold, selfish, and unfeeling; the iron hand of

" power on one side, monopoly and exclusion on the " other. *India in order to become an attached Depen-* " *dency* of Great Britain, must be governed for her " own sake, and not for the sake of the individuals " who are sent from England to make their fortunes. " *Our Government to be secure must be made popular;* " the Government must remain arbitrary, but it may " also be, and should be paternal."

The modifications, in our existing system, which I have suggested, would, as regards the Bengal Army, to a certain extent, fulfil the above conditions, and unless we are prepared to close our understandings against the influence of the great authorities above quoted, we should not, in consequence of the late unhappy events, cease in our endeavours, by all practicable means to ameliorate the condition, and, not forgetting the " ingenuas " didicisse, &c." of our school-boy days, through the refining influences of literature, and science, to elevate the character of our Native subjects.

We have, it is true, a stern duty to perform; retribution for the atrocities which have been perpetrated must of course be exacted, and the life of the mutineers must be made to expiate the laws they have violated; but having vindicated these laws, having vindicated the principles on which repose the security, and well-being of society, let us, in that spirit, which alone becomes us, as a Christian people, again shut up the vials of our wrath; and in the progressive development of the boundless

resources of the country, as well as in the earnest and vigorous discharge of those duties, which as rulers we owe to the subject race, let it be shown that the welfare and happiness of India are still the paramount objects of the British Government, and that we are not (what Sir J. Malcolm tells us, the Natives represent us to be), "mere tyrants and "low caste usurpers, who have sought India with no "other view, but that of degrading the inhabitants, "and robbing them of their wealth."

I will finish this paper with the beautiful sentiments to which Lord Brougham, many years ago, gave utterance, but which, notwithstanding the great extension of our Indian Empire, are equally applicable to the present times.

"Should the day ever come," remarks his lordship, "when disaffection may appeal to 70,000,000 "against a few thousand strangers, who have planted "themselves on the ruins of their ancient dynasties, "you will find how much safer it is, to have won "their hearts, and universally to have cemented "their attachment by a common interest in your "system, than to rely upon 150,000 Sepoys' swords, "of excellent temper, but in doubtful hands."

W. HUNTER, Lt.-Col.

Nelson Crescent, Ramsgate,
March 16, 1858.

Bengal Army,
Retired List.

Acton Griffith, Printer, 8, Baker Street, Portman Square. W.

PROPOSED RE-ORGANIZATION

OF

The Bengal Army

IN A FINANCIAL POINT OF VIEW.

In a financial point of view I do not think any serious objection can be urged against the scheme I have suggested for the re-organization of the Bengal Army, for though I advocate the addition of 21,000 Europeans to the infantry arm of the service, it is done without the addition of a single European officer. On the other hand, the Native portion of the Regular Bengal infantry would be reduced to the extent of 29,000 men; and when India shall again be restored to order and tranquillity, after withdrawing as might I presume then safely be done, seven out of the thirteen Royal regiments usually allotted to Bengal, the Infantry of the Line in that Presidency would stand as follows:—

6 Regiments Foot Royal Army (Rank and File)	6,000
40 Regiments ditto Indian Army . . .	24,000
Europeans (Foot) . . .	30,000
74 Native Battalions (Foot)	44,000
	74,000

Before the Mutiny we had in the Bengal Presidency—

13 Regiments Foot Royal Army . . .	13,000
3 ditto ditto Company's European Regts.	3,000
Europeans (Rank and File) .	16,000
74 Regiments Native Infantry	74,000
	90,000

Thus, according to the proposed scheme in the Infantry branch of the service, the cost of 14,000 additional Europeans would have to be paid out of the Indian revenues; but against this charge there would be a deduction of 20,000 Native soldiers, and something like 300 European officers belonging to the seven regiments of the Royal Army above adverted to. Supposing the armies of the three Presidencies, (organized in the manner suggested for a peace establishment), to be put on a war-footing by the addition of 400 men to each regiment, we should in the event of danger be able to muster, including artillery and cavalry, some 80,000 British troops ready for action, and supported by such a force our Native regiments, with only four European officers added to the Native officers of each regiment, would not, I think, be wanting in pluck or confidence; at all events, officered in the manner I have suggested, our Native regiments with their superior arms, superior drill, superior discipline, and regular pay, ought at all times to be more than a match for any Native troops to which they might be opposed, and in the event of such a contingency as a Russian invasion, the powerful European force we should have in the field, would tend I repeat to inspire our Native soldiers with more courage and

confidence than the mere presence in their own ranks of a few additional European officers. I conclude, however, that in time of war, we should have as many Europeans as possible in the field, leaving our numerous stations to be garrisoned, not entirely, but chiefly by our Native regiments and Police corps. After all that has happened, if only properly managed, our Sepoys will in future probably prove more loyal and faithful than ever; and if it be only determined to govern India with the good will of the people, instead of against it, the proportion of European troops suggested would, I imagine, prove ample for the security of our Indian Empire. Under the proposed plan our artillery would be entirely European, and the numerical strength of the army would, moreover, be greatly affected, by the completion of the Indian railways, when we should have the power of concentrating our soldiers on any given point at the shortest possible notice. Though in page 5 I have recommended giving three-fourths of the promotion to seniority, this arrangement would not of course extend to the rank of Soobudar, for which post, requiring the services of *active, vigorous and capable* officers, only the best and most intelligent men would be eligible;—it would not be amiss too, perhaps, on promotion to the rank of Jumudar and Soobudar, to remove the Native officers so promoted from the regiments in which they had risen from privates. This, I believe, is usually done in the Royal Army.

1*st March*, 1859.

Note to page 3, *line* 11.

Partly through the machinations of intriguing Natives—partly through the instrumentality of the press, has happened just what Sir T. Munro predicted of the Native army years ago: "Our Sepoys," he observes, "will learn to compare their own low allowances and humble rank, with those of their European officers; to examine the grounds in which the wide difference rests, to estimate their own strength and resources, and to believe that it is their duty, to shake off a foreign yoke, and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which the country yields." Such are the prophetic words of Munro, and I fear that as long as we adhere to our present exclusive system, the discontented without a cause, as well as those misled by faction, will always have the means of fanning the spirit of discontent, by offering to the contemplation of both Hindoos and Mussulmen the superiority of their social position under the Mogul Dynasty. It is to be hoped that the late Proclamation of Her most Gracious Majesty will prove of greater practical effect, as far as the Natives are concerned, than did the Act of 1833; indeed, owing to the order of Lord Cornwallis excluding Natives from all posts of honour and emolument, the English of the present day are less identified with the people of India, than they were 50 years ago: identity of interests can only be established by admitting Natives of India to a fair share of the highest offices. As Napier says, we must give them riches, give them honours, give them a share of all good things. On this subject, *vide* also Delhi Proclamation, *sec.* 3rd. relative to Public Servants, from the *Delhi Gazette*, 29th Sept. 1858, published in Saturday's *Times*, 13th Nov. 1858.

Note to page 7, *line* 2.

Sir F. Fane when Commander-in-Chief in India, adverting to this subject in a letter to Sir C. Metcalfe, writes: "in the event of a war with the Punjab, our great difficulty would be in the want of young, active, capable commanding officers. My services, he adds, were with Generals from 35 to 45 years of age, both French and English."

Note to page 9, *line* 2.

Sir C. Napier, p. 458, vol. 3rd, says, "when I arrived in Scinde, the Bombay Troops were without discipline, just what Colonel Jacob delights to say of the Bengal Army."

Note to page 12, *line* 25.

Few men understood and appreciated the character of the Bengal Sepoy so well as the gallant General Nott. In a letter to General England, 10th August, 1842, Nott writes:—"with regard to Europeans, I would just as soon go into action with Sepoys;" again he writes, "the zealous and cheerful manner in which the Sepoys have conveyed the Battery Train during a march of 300 miles, of the most difficult country in the world, is beyond all praise, and has called forth the admiration of their European Officers, and European Artillerymen attached to the battery; their patience under fatigue and privation deserve my warmest thanks, and their active and anxious zeal to hasten the march and encounter the enemy, have confirmed me in the conviction, that they are, when they perceive that confidence is placed in them, fully equal to any troops in the world." Though the late gallant and lamented Colonel Jacob has always had so bad an opinion of the Bengal Army, Napier on the contrary speaks of that army in very complimentary terms: "Under my command," he says, "at various times for ten years, in action and out of action, the Bengal Sepoys never failed in zeal, courage or activity. At Meeanee and at Dubba the 9th Cavalry advanced bravely under a heavy fire; in the Booghtee Hills the Bengal Infantry behaved well under severe trials; in the Kohat Pass Native officers bravely led their men against the Afreedees. When have they behaved otherwise when properly led?

Note to page 15, *line* 3.

Since writing the above I have received a communication from Captain Brooke, the present able and zealous Commandant of the "Mewar Bheel Corps," informing me that the mutiny of the Bengal Army had made the Bheels of Mewar enthusiastic in our favor, and had wonderfully improved these wild tribes, by giving them confidence in themselves—the Mewar Bheel Corps volunteered for general service, and thousands of them to take service in the Bombay Army, (not excepting the Native Cavalry,) in the 2nd Regiment, of which Presidency forty strapping Bheels had been enlisted, and were pronounced by the Riding Master of that regiment, to be the best recruits he had ever received.

Note to page 16, *line* 9.

Troopers of the Irregular Bengal Cavalry received 16 rupees per mensem, but in Jacob's Horse they receive 25 or 30 rupees

a month. The troopers of the Scinde Horse with General Robert's force before Kotah were receiving, I have been informed, 40 rupees a month, and as the Delhi Badshah only offered 30, these men had little inducement to mutiny; whereas the high promises held out to our native soldiers of the Line no doubt helped to seduce them from their allegiance.

Note to page 26, *line* 12.

Sir J. Metcalfe adverting to this subject, observes—"Whatever may be the will of Almighty God with respect to the duration of British rule, it would be vain and foolish to uphold it by shackling the people with the chains of ignorance, this country has been gained and maintained by the sword, but looking to future ages, our dominion can only endure by the affections of the people."

Note to page 29, *line* 16.

Dr. Goodall in a letter to Sir C. Metcalfe writes, "the only practicable mode of converting the Natives to Christianity, is the gradual weaning them from their absurd notions, by opening to them every possible source of rational information, but above all by that most powerful of all influences, the influence of example, the pure lives of those who labour for their conversion." "Mr. Campbell in his work on India observes, "In the Bengal Presidency our attempt to christianize the Natives, has entirely failed, we have made some Infidels, but very few sincere Christians." I am disposed to think that the influx of Europeans, especially of the working classes will, owing to their frequently licentious and dissipated habits, prove an additional obstacle to the propagation of the gospel; too many of the Natives already think that the Christian religion consists in having no caste, no self-respect, eating beef and drinking freely. When we are in a position to convince the people of India that we are something better than shams in religion ourselves, we shall be more likely to succeed in our efforts to convert them. Why, instead of squandering such large sums in useless endeavours to convert the Natives, do we not devote this money to the conversion of our own people, thousands, nay millions of whom are little better, nay worse than Heathens; in acting as we do, are we not to a certain extent taking the children's bread and casting it to the dogs. Thomas

Guthrie, D.D. alluding to the profligate scenes which disgrace our great metropolis, thus expresses himself: "I should be ashamed to walk some of the districts of this City with a Native of that ancient nation, with which we are now at war, and to which God grant that we may soon be reconciled. Amid the idle groups of bloated women, and half-naked children, and wrecks of men, filling up almost every close-mouth and foot of filthy stair, with our paths crossed by some reeling drunkard, who launches himself into the common sewer, with so many shops under government license, turning health into disease, decency into tattered rags, love into estrangement or bitter hatred, young beauty into loathsomeness, woman's natural modesty into loud and coarse effrontery, mother's milk into poison, mother's hearts into stone, and the image of God into something baser than a brute; how could I look that sober, upright Pagan in the face, and ask him to become a Christian? I must be dumb, lest he should turn round on me to ask:—Are these Christians? Be these the fruits of Christianity? I would repel the charge. But what if he should follow it up with a blow less easy to parry? Pointing up to those who are rolling in wealth, or enjoying the abundant comforts of their homes, or the ordinances of their worship, he might next ask:—What are these Christians doing? What do they do to save their fellow creatures from miseries that move a Pagan to tears? What to save them from crimes unpractised by those whom you call the followers of the false prophet, by us to whose distant land you send your missionaries to turn us from our father's idols? What could I say? How could I look? With what answer could I meet the withering sarcasm:—Physician heal thyself?"

Note to page 30, *line* 2.

Mr. Holt Mackenzie, a distinguished member of the Bengal Civil Service, has stated his opinion relative to the capacity of Natives for high civil employment in the following words—"Let Government demand what qualifications it may from the Natives, if it will only use its patronage to encourage their attainment, the difficulty will be not to find candidates for office, but adequate employment for the abilities it will call into play. The Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone, one of our greatest authorities, in his evidence before a Committee of the House of Lords,

observes—"where the Natives have been considered most deficient, is in the virtue of integrity; but the best way, he adds, "of securing this virtue is good salaries, rewards by pensions, and jageers after long and distinguished services, and above all good education. "The ultimate results," he adds, "of such a system might be the making over all civil business to the Natives, retaining only the political and military in the hands of Europeans; from which," he remarks, "*would follow a much cheaper government accompanied by great improvement of the people.*" The Hon. Gentleman afterwards dwells with great emphasis on the evil effects of our present system of Government. "It tends," he says, "to level all ranks, to withdraw in a measure all encouragement to learning, and excellence of every kind; and, by the destruction of the higher classes in India, it has considerably diminished the demand of many Indian manufactures." Mr. Mills, the able Commissioner of Cuttack in 1841, told me that he had every reason to be greatly satisfied with the industry and ability of the superior Native functionaries under his controul; in many respects, I understood him to say that the Natives were decidedly superior to their English colleagues, and as an instance of the confidence they inspired in the Native population, he informed me that he rarely received an appeal from the award of the Native functionaries, whereas they rarely failed to appeal against the decision of the European civil officers.

Note to page 32, *line* 4.

Sir C. Metcalfe says, "our dominion in India can only endure by the affection of the people, by their feeling that under British rule they are more prosperous, and happy, and free, than they could be under any other government, and that their welfare and our rule are linked together."

Note to page 32, *line* 28.

The grand aim and policy of the Emperor Ukbur was to unite all classes into one people, and to this end he treated the Hindoos, and especially the Rajpoots with particular favour, and employed them in the highest offices; the Emperor Aurungzebe on the contrary, prohibited the employment of Hindoos in high public offices, and thus became the most unpopular sovereign of the Mogul dynasty.


00028020

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 02 April, 2016